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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> European Court of Human Rights >> SARAIVA DE CARVALHO v. PORTUGAL - 15651/89 [1994] ECHR 15 (22 April 1994) URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/1994/15.html Cite as: [1994] ECHR 15, 18 EHRR 534, (1994) 18 EHRR 534

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In the case of Saraiva de Carvalho v. Portugal*,

The European Court of Human Rights, sitting, in

accordance with Article 43 (art. 43) of the Convention for the

Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("the

Convention") and the relevant provisions of the Rules of Court,

as a Chamber composed of the following judges:

Mr R. Ryssdal, President,

Mr F. Gölcüklü,

Mr A. Spielmann,

Mr S.K. Martens,

Mr I. Foighel,

Mr F. Bigi,

Mr A.B. Baka,

Mr M.A. Lopes Rocha,

Mr J. Makarczyk,

and also of Mr M.-A. Eissen, Registrar, and Mr H. Petzold, Deputy

Registrar,

Having deliberated in private on 25 November 1993 and

23 March 1994,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the

last-mentioned date:

_______________

* Note by the Registrar: The case is numbered 14/1993/409/488.

The first number is the case's position on the list of cases

referred to the Court in the relevant year (second number). The

last two numbers indicate the case's position on the list of

cases referred to the Court since its creation and on the list

of the corresponding originating applications to the Commission.

_______________

PROCEDURE

1. The case was referred to the Court by the European

Commission of Human Rights ("the Commission") on 7 April 1993,

within the three-month period laid down by Article 32 para. 1 and

Article 47 (art. 32-1, art. 47) of the Convention. It originated

in an application (no. 15651/89) against the Portuguese Republic

lodged with the Commission under Article 25 (art. 25) by a

Portuguese national, Mr Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, on

10 October 1989.

The Commission's request referred to Articles 44 and 48

(art. 44, art. 48) and to the declaration whereby Portugal

recognised the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court (Article 46)

(art. 46). The object of the request was to obtain a decision

as to whether the facts of the case disclosed a breach by the

respondent State of its obligations under Article 6 para. 1

(art. 6-1).

2. In response to the enquiry made in accordance with

Rule 33 para. 3 (d) of the Rules of Court, the applicant stated

that he wished to take part in the proceedings and designated the

lawyer who would represent him (Rule 30).

3. The Chamber to be constituted included ex officio

Mr M.A. Lopes Rocha, the elected judge of Portuguese nationality

(Article 43 of the Convention) (art. 43), and Mr R. Ryssdal, the

President of the Court (Rule 21 para. 3 (b)). On 23 April 1993,

in the presence of the Registrar, the President drew by lot the

names of the other seven members, namely Mr F. Gölcüklü,

Mr R. Macdonald, Mr A. Spielmann, Mr S.K. Martens, Mr I. Foighel,

Mr F. Bigi and Mr A.B. Baka (Article 43 in fine of the Convention

and Rule 21 para. 4) (art. 43). Subsequently Mr J. Makarczyk,

substitute judge, replaced Mr Macdonald, who was unable to take

part in the further consideration of the case (Rules 22 para. 1

and 24 para. 1).

4. As President of the Chamber (Rule 21 para. 5),

Mr Ryssdal, acting through the Registrar, consulted the Agent of

the Portuguese Government ("the Government"), the applicant's

lawyer and the Delegate of the Commission on the organisation of

the proceedings (Rules 37 para. 1 and 38). Pursuant to the order

made in consequence, the Registrar received the Government's

memorial on 26 August 1993 and the applicant's memorial

on 30 August. On 6 September the Secretary to the Commission

informed the Registrar that the Delegate would submit his

observations at the hearing.

5. On 3 November 1993 the Commission produced the documents

relating to the proceedings before it, as requested by the

Registrar on the President's instructions.

6. In accordance with the decision of the President, who had

given the applicant's lawyer leave to use the Portuguese language

(Rule 27 para. 3), the hearing took place in public in the Human

Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 23 November 1993. The Court had

held a preparatory meeting beforehand.

There appeared before the Court:

(a) for the Government

Mr A. Henriques Gaspar, Deputy Attorney-General

of the Republic, Agent,

Mr M. Pedrosa Machado, Professor of Law,

University of Lisbon and Portuguese Catholic

University,

Miss M.J. Pires, deputy to the Permanent

Representative of Portugal to the

Council of Europe, Counsel;

(b) for the Commission

Mr M.P. Pellonpää, Delegate;

(c) for the applicant

Mr R. Francês, of the Lisbon Bar, Counsel.

The Court heard addresses by Mr Henriques Gaspar,

Mr Pedrosa Machado, Mr Pellonpää and Mr Francês. The applicant

also addressed the Court.

AS TO THE FACTS

I. The circumstances of the case

7. Born in 1936, Mr Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho is a

Portuguese citizen who lives in Oeiras. At the material time he

was a lieutenant-colonel in the Portuguese army.

8. On 10 June 1984 he was arrested and held in pre-trial

detention on a charge of founding and leading a terrorist

organisation, which is an offence under Article 288 of the

Criminal Code; he was suspected of being one of the founders and

leaders of the "FP 25 de Abril" (Popular Forces 25 April), a

group that had claimed responsibility for several bomb outrages,

armed attacks and murders.

A. The judicial investigation proceedings

9. On 30 December 1984 the judge of the Lisbon Criminal

Investigation Court (tribunal de instrução criminal) to whom the

case had been assigned closed the adversarial investigation and

sent the file to the public prosecutor's office.

10. On 7 January 1985 the prosecutor delivered his charges

(acusação). He accused the applicant and several of his co-

defendants of having drawn up a comprehensive plan under which,

by means of the "FP 25 de Abril", they would seize power by force

and overthrow the State's institutions. He emphasised that

Mr Saraiva de Carvalho was one of the instigators of the scheme.

11. In accordance with section 59 of Law no. 82/77 of

6 December 1977 on the administration of justice, section 8 of

Legislative Decree no. 269/78 of 1 September 1978 and Article 365

of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 26 below), the

file was sent, together with the prosecution's submissions, to

the Lisbon Criminal Court (tribunal criminal) so that the judge

responsible for the case, Mr Antonio Salvado, could issue the

despacho de pronúncia or de não pronúncia.

12. On 22 January 1985 Mr Salvado issued a despacho de

pronúncia. After noting that there had been no irregularities

during the judicial investigation or any other impediment to a

trial of the merits, he rejected the prosecution's charges in

respect of four of the co-defendants on the ground that the

evidence gathered was not sufficient to enable a reliable

assessment to be made of the probability of guilt ("a prova

indiciária recolhida ... é insuficiente para ... permitir a

formulação de um sério juizo de probabilidade sobre a sua

culpabilidade"). On the other hand, he accepted the charges

relating to Mr Saraiva de Carvalho and seventy-two other

defendants and decided to keep all but three of them in pre-trial

detention.

The applicant did not appeal against the despacho under

Article 371 of the Code of Criminal procedure (see paragraph 26

below).

B. The judicial proceedings

1. In the Lisbon Criminal Court

13. The trial began on 7 October 1985 before the Fourth

Division of the Lisbon Criminal Court, which was composed of

three judges and was presided over by Mr Salvado. The

proceedings took up no fewer than 263 sittings of the court.

14. At the hearing on 8 October the applicant lodged an

appeal with the Lisbon Court of Appeal challenging the

compatibility of the provisions cited earlier (see paragraph 11

above) which empowered one and the same judge both to issue the

despacho de pronúncia and to try the case with

Article 32 para. 5 of the Portuguese Constitution and Article 6

para. 1 (art. 6-1) of the Convention.

He argued that in making such an order, the judge formed

a view of an accused's guilt in advance that was likely to

influence him when giving judgment on the merits.

On the same day, the Criminal Court held the appeal to be

admissible and decided to refer it to the higher court together

with any appeal against the judgment it would itself be

delivering.

15. On 20 May 1987 the Criminal Court held that the applicant

was a leading member of the "FP 25 de Abril" but not one of their

founders and sentenced him to fifteen years' military

imprisonment (presídio militar), of which one year, ten months

and fifteen days were immediately remitted under an amnesty. It

acquitted sixteen of his co-defendants and sentenced the others

and Mr Saraiva de Carvalho jointly and severally to pay the State

1,000 million escudos.

2. In the Lisbon Court of Appeal

16. On 25 November 1987 the Lisbon Court of Appeal (tribunal

de relação) dismissed appeals by the prosecution and thirty-seven

of the defendants, including Mr Saraiva de Carvalho.

Unlike the Criminal Court, it held that the applicant was

also one of the founders of the "FP 25 de Abril". It

consequently increased the sentence to eighteen years' military

imprisonment, two years and three months of which were

immediately remitted under the amnesty. The court upheld the sum

to be paid.

17. As regards the complaint based on Article 6 para. 1

(art. 6-1) of the Convention (see paragraph 14 above), the court

pointed out that the drafting history showed that the purpose of

section 59 of the aforementioned Law no. 82/77 was precisely to

ensure that investigating judges did not give rulings on the

offences into which they had to inquire; that was why the

legislature had vested in the trial judge and not the

investigating judge the power to issue the despacho de pronúncia,

which entailed assessing and classifying the offences charged.

3. In the Supreme Court

18. An appeal by Mr Saraiva de Carvalho to the Supreme Court

(Supremo Tribunal de Justiça) was dismissed on 22 June 1988.

Referring to its case-law, the court held that the provisions

complained of by the applicant were not incompatible with

Article 32 para. 5 of the Constitution; a judge issuing a

despacho de pronúncia was not bound by the view taken at that

stage of the proceedings and had complete freedom when giving

judgment on the merits, so that his impartiality was in no way

jeopardised.

On the other hand the court held that the applicant was

only a leader of the "FP 25 de Abril" and accordingly reduced the

sentence to seventeen years' imprisonment.

4. In the Constitutional Court

19. Finally, the applicant applied to the Constitutional

Court (Tribunal constitucional). Reiterating the submissions he

had made in the other courts, he argued in particular that the

despacho de pronúncia was the key decision in the prosecution.

The fact that it was taken by a judge who subsequently sat on the

trial court violated Article 32 para. 5 of the Constitution,

which established an absolute separation between judicial

investigation, prosecution and trial; it also, he submitted,

undermined the court's impartiality, as the judge in question

would be prejudiced against the defendant when he came to

consider the merits.

20. In its judgment of 15 February 1989 the Constitutional

Court emphasised the need to distinguish between the indictment,

which was the responsibility of the public prosecutor's office,

and the despacho de pronúncia. The latter was designed solely

to verify the probability of guilt in order to avoid a trial

where there was no prima facie evidence. It was thus a decision

on the viability of the indictment and did not entail any

prejudice on the part of the judge when the merits were being

considered. It consequently served as a filter and a safeguard.

Even if his legal classification of the facts was different, a

judge did not act as a prosecutor. In the instant case

Mr Salvado could not be accused of partiality merely because he

had issued the despacho de pronúncia. It would have been

different if in his decision he had gone beyond the scope of the

prosecution's charges and had made substantial alterations to

them. In that case, which was not the one before it, the

distinction between the indictment and the despacho de pronúncia

would have been lost as the judge would have encroached on the

prerogatives of the public prosecutor.

The Constitutional Court did, however, allow the appeal

on another ground, not adduced before the European Court of Human

Rights (see paragraphs 27 and 28 below), which related to a lack

of reasons in the judgment at first instance. It accordingly

remitted the case to the Supreme Court for the appropriate steps

to be taken.

21. On 23 February 1989 the prosecution sought clarification

of certain passages in the judgment and applied for rectification

of clerical errors in it. On 12 April the Constitutional Court

ordered the rectifications, allowed one item in the application

for clarification and provided the particulars sought.

5. The subsequent proceedings

22. On its rehearing of the case on 17 May 1989 the Supreme

Court quashed the Lisbon Court of Appeal's judgment of

25 November 1987 and remitted the case to that court for a fresh

assessment of the facts.

The applicant was provisionally released that same day.

23. On 13 September 1989 the Lisbon Court of Appeal delivered

a new judgment; the prosecution and several defendants, including

the applicant, appealed against it on points of law to the

Supreme Court.

On 19 December 1990 the Supreme Court allowed the appeals

in part and varied the impugned decision accordingly.

Mr Saraiva de Carvalho and seven of the co-defendants

appealed to the Constitutional Court against the Supreme Court's

judgment. The outcome of the proceedings is still awaited.

II. Relevant domestic law

A. The Constitution

24. Under Article 32 para. 5 of the Constitution,

"Criminal proceedings shall be accusatorial, the trial

and investigative measures laid down by law being

governed by the adversarial principle."

B. The Criminal Code

25. Under Article 288 of the Criminal Code,

"1. Anyone promoting or founding a terrorist group,

organisation or association shall be punishable by five

to fifteen years' imprisonment.

2. 'A terrorist group, organisation or association'

shall be understood to include any group of two or more

persons, who, acting in concert, set out to undermine

national integrity and independence or prevent, change or

impair the functioning of State institutions as

established by the Constitution; or to force the

authorities to do something, refrain from doing something

or tolerate something being done; or to intimidate

certain persons or groups or the entire population by

committing offences

...

(e) which entail the use of bombs, grenades,

firearms, explosive substances or devices, incendiary

material of any kind or parcel or letter bombs.

...

4. Where [the members of] a group, organisation or

association ... are found in possession of one of the

items mentioned in sub-paragraph (e) of paragraph 2 with

a view to achieving its criminal ends, the sentence

within the minimum and maximum limits shall be increased

by one-third."

C. The Code of Criminal Procedure

26. The relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure

in force at the time - a new code took effect on 1 January 1988 -

were the following:

Article 349

"Where the judicial investigation discloses prima facie

evidence of the commission of a punishable offence, of

the identity of the person who committed it and of his

liability, the public prosecutor's office, if it has the

standing (legitimidade) to do so, shall deliver its

charges."

Article 365

"Where the prosecution is brought by the public

prosecutor's office or, as the case may be, by the

assistente, the file shall immediately be submitted to

the judge in order that he may issue his despacho de

pronúncia or de não pronúncia within eight days."

Article 366

"The despacho de pronúncia shall contain

1. the name, occupation and address, if known, of

the defendants or the necessary information to identify

them;

2. an exact description of the offences which they

are considered to have committed and the capacity in

which they acted;

3. any special or general aggravating or extenuating

circumstances;

4. an indication of the statute creating the offence

and providing for penalties;

5. any decision relating to the accused's

provisional release which, in accordance with the law,

prolongs or alters the previously existing situation;

6. the information prescribed in Articles 354, 356

and 357, where necessary, and the order to communicate

information concerning the accused to the criminal

records office;

7. the date and the judge's signature.

..."

Article 371

"The public prosecutor's office, a private prosecutor

and the accused may appeal against a despacho de

pronúncia. The public prosecutor's office and a private

prosecutor may appeal against a despacho de não pronúncia

..."

Section 59 of Law no. 82/77 of 6 September 1977 on the

administration of justice provides:

"The Criminal Court shall be competent for the

pronúncia, the trial and the subsequent phases in respect

of criminal cases, subject to sections 63, 67 and 70."

Article 8 of Legislative Decree No. 269/78 of

1 September 1978 implementing the aforementioned Law provides:

"The judges of the Criminal Court shall be competent

for the pronúncia or its equivalent, the trial and the

subsequent phases in respect of cases to be tried under

the 'de querela' procedure or which are reserved to the

court sitting as a bench."

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

27. Mr Saraiva de Carvalho applied to the Commission on

10 October 1989 (application no. 15651/89). He complained of a

breach of his right to have his case heard by an "impartial

tribunal" within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) of

the Convention in that the same judge had both initially issued

the despacho de pronúncia and subsequently presided over the

Criminal Court. He also alleged that he had not had a fair trial

on account of inadequate reasoning in the trial court's judgment.

28. The Commission declared the second complaint inadmissible

on 17 May 1990 and the first complaint admissible on 19 May 1992.

In its report of 14 January 1993 (Article 31) (art. 31), it

expressed the opinion by nine votes to eight that there had been

no violation of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1). The full text of

the Commission's opinion and of the three dissenting opinions

contained in the report is reproduced as an annex to this

judgment*.

_______________

* Note by the Registrar: for practical reasons this annex will

appear only with the printed version of the judgment

(volume 286-B of Series A of the Publications of the Court), but

a copy of the Commission's report is available from the registry.

_______________

FINAL SUBMISSIONS TO THE COURT

29. In their memorial the Government asked the Court to hold

that there had been no breach of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) of

the Convention in the case.

AS TO THE LAW

ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 PARA. 1 (art. 6-1)

30. Mr Saraiva de Carvalho argued that his case had not been

heard by an "impartial tribunal" within the meaning of

Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1), which provides:

"In the determination of ... any criminal charge

against him, everyone is entitled to a ... hearing ... by

an ... impartial tribunal ..."

In his submission, the Fourth Division of the Lisbon

Criminal Court, which on 20 May 1987 had sentenced him to fifteen

years' military imprisonment, had not satisfied the requirements

of that provision. Its presiding judge, Mr Salvado, had earlier,

as the judge in charge of the case, issued the despacho de

pronúncia. Such a decision meant that at the outset of the

proceedings the judge had already become convinced of the

applicant's guilt, a fact that could not fail to affect the

conduct of the trial, which was the presiding judge's

responsibility.

31. According to the Government, Mr Saraiva de Carvalho's

fears could not be regarded as objectively justified. The

despacho de pronúncia could not be likened to a committal for

trial; nor was it to be confused with the indictment, since it

related only to the indictment's "viability". It afforded an

accused a double safeguard against having to undergo a public

trial when there was no prima facie evidence against him and

against being tried for offences not mentioned in the despacho.

In accordance with the procedure in force at the material time

and with the Supreme Court's case-law, a judge who issued a

despacho was not bound by it and enjoyed complete freedom to

reach his conclusion on the merits on the basis of the evidence

submitted under adversarial procedure at the trial.

32. The Commission accepted this argument in substance.

33. The Court points out that the existence of impartiality

for the purposes of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) must be

determined according to a subjective test, that is on the basis

of the personal conviction of a particular judge in a given case,

and also according to an objective test, that is ascertaining

whether the judge offered guarantees sufficient to exclude any

legitimate doubt in this respect (see, among other authorities,

the Fey v. Austria judgment of 24 February 1993, Series A

no. 255-A, p. 12, para. 28).

34. As far as the subjective test is concerned, the applicant

did not dispute Mr Salvado's personal impartiality.

35. Under the objective test, it must be determined whether,

quite apart from the judge's personal conduct, there are

ascertainable facts which may raise doubts as to his

impartiality. In this respect even appearances may be of some

importance. It follows that when it is being decided whether in

a given case there is a legitimate reason to fear that a

particular judge lacks impartiality, the standpoint of the

accused is important but not decisive. What is decisive is

whether this fear can be held to be objectively justified (ibid.,

p. 12, para. 30, and the Padovani v. Italy judgment of 26

February 1993, Series A no. 257-B, p. 20, para. 27).

In this connection, the Court has held that the mere fact

that a judge has already taken decisions before the trial cannot

in itself be regarded as justifying anxieties about his

impartiality. What matters is the scope and nature of the

measures taken by the judge before the trial (see the Hauschildt

v. Denmark judgment of 24 May 1989, Series A no. 154, p. 21,

para. 49, and the Nortier v. the Netherlands judgment of

24 August 1993, Series A no. 267, p. 15, para. 33).

36. In the despacho de pronúncia in question Mr Salvado

found, firstly, that there had been no irregularities during the

judicial investigation or any other impediment to a trial of the

merits. He went on to hold that the evidence was not sufficient

to enable a reliable assessment to be made of the probability

that four of the co-defendants were guilty, and he consequently

rejected the prosecution's charges against them. He admitted the

charges in respect of the other defendants, however, including

Mr Saraiva de Carvalho, and decided that all but three of the

accused should be kept in pre-trial detention.

37. Like the Government, the Court accepts that this

intermediate decision is not equivalent to a committal for trial.

Under the Portuguese law applicable at the time, the judge in

charge of the case, when issuing the despacho, was determining

whether the file, including the prosecution's charges, amounted

to a prima facie case such as to justify making an individual go

through the ordeal of a trial. The issues which the judge has

to settle when taking this decision are consequently not the same

as those which are decisive for his final judgment. This may be

illustrated by the fact that on 20 May 1987 the Criminal Court

division which Mr Salvado presided over acquitted sixteen of the

co-accused included in the despacho. Besides, if Mr Saraiva de

Carvalho had had any misgivings about the consequences of the

order, he could have been expected to appeal against it under

Article 371 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 26

above).

38. The instant case differs from the Piersack v. Belgium

case (judgment of 1 October 1982, Series A no. 53) and the De

Cubber v. Belgium case (judgment of 26 October 1984, Series A

no. 86) in the nature of the duties performed by the judges who

sat in those cases before the trial of the merits. In producing

the despacho, Mr Salvado was acting in his capacity as a judge

of the Fourth Division; he took no steps in the investigation or

in the prosecution. His detailed knowledge of the case did not

mean that he was prejudiced in a way that prevented him from

being impartial when the case came to trial. His function in the

initial phase of the proceedings was to satisfy himself not that

there was a "particularly confirmed suspicion" (see the

Hauschildt judgment previously cited, p. 22, para. 52) but that

there was prima facie evidence (compare the "serious indications"

mentioned in the Nortier case previously cited, p. 16, para. 35).

Nor can Mr Salvado's preliminary assessment of the

available evidence be regarded as a formal finding of guilt.

That was made only in the judgment of 20 May 1987, on the basis

of the evidence adduced and tested orally at 263 sittings and

which led the division presided over by Mr Salvado to convict the

applicant.

39. As to the decision to leave an accused in pre-trial

detention, this could only justify fears concerning a judge's

impartiality in special circumstances. Mr Salvado, however, did

not at the time make any fresh assessment capable of having a

decisive influence on his opinion of the merits; he did no more

than make a cursory examination, which disclosed no factors

telling in favour of Mr Saraiva de Carvalho's release.

40. In conclusion, Mr Salvado's participation in the adoption

of the judgment of 20 May 1987 did not undermine the impartiality

of the Criminal Court's Fourth Division, since the applicant's

fears cannot be regarded as having been objectively justified.

There has therefore been no breach of Article 6 para. 1

(art. 6-1).

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY

Holds that there has been no breach of Article 6 para. 1

(art. 6-1).

Done in English and in French, and delivered at a public

hearing in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on

22 April 1994.

Signed: Rolv RYSSDAL

President

Signed: For the Registrar

Herbert PETZOLD

Deputy Registrar