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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> European Court of Human Rights >> PHILIS v. GREECE (No. 2) - 19773/92 [1997] ECHR 34 (27 June 1997) URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/1997/34.html Cite as: 25 EHRR 417, (1998) 25 EHRR 417, [1998] 25 EHRR 417, [1997] ECHR 34

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In the case of Philis v. Greece (no. 2) (1),

The European Court of Human Rights, sitting, in accordance with

Article 43 (art. 43) of the Convention for the Protection of

Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("the Convention") and the

relevant provisions of Rules of Court A (2), as a Chamber composed of

the following judges:

Mr R. Bernhardt, President,

Mr B. Walsh,

Mr N. Valticos,

Mrs E. Palm,

Mr L. Wildhaber,

Mr P. Jambrek,

Mr K. Jungwiert,

Mr E. Levits,

Mr J. Casadevall,

and also of Mr H. Petzold, Registrar, and Mr P.J. Mahoney, Deputy

Registrar,

Having deliberated in private on 22 February and 29 May 1997,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the

last-mentioned date:

_______________

Notes by the Registrar

1. The case is numbered 65/1996/684/874. The first number is the

case's position on the list of cases referred to the Court in the

relevant year (second number). The last two numbers indicate the

case's position on the list of cases referred to the Court since its

creation and on the list of the corresponding originating applications

to the Commission.

2. Rules A apply to all cases referred to the Court before the entry

into force of Protocol No. 9 (P9) (1 October 1994) and thereafter only

to cases concerning States not bound by that Protocol (P9). They

correspond to the Rules that came into force on 1 January 1983, as

amended several times subsequently.

_______________

PROCEDURE

1. The case was referred to the Court by the Greek Government

("the Government") on 6 May 1996, within the three-month period laid

down by Article 32 para. 1 and Article 47 of the Convention (art. 32-1,

art. 47). It originated in an application (no. 19773/92) against the

Hellenic Republic lodged with the European Commission of Human Rights

("the Commission") under Article 25 (art. 25) by a Greek national,

Mr Nicolas Philis, on 15 January 1992.

The Government's application referred to Articles 44 and 48 of

the Convention (art. 44, art. 48). Its object was to obtain a decision

as to whether the facts of the case disclosed a breach by the

respondent State of its obligations under Article 6 para. 1 of the

Convention (art. 6-1).

2. In response to the enquiry made in accordance with Rule 33

para. 3 (d) of Rules of Court A, the applicant stated that he wished

to take part in the proceedings and designated the lawyers who would

represent him (Rule 30).

3. The Chamber to be constituted included ex officio Mr N. Valticos,

the elected judge of Greek nationality (Article 43 of the Convention)

(art. 43), and Mr R. Bernhardt, the Vice-President of the Court

(Rule 21 para. 4 (b)). On 10 June 1996, in the presence of the

Registrar, the President of the Court, Mr R. Ryssdal, drew by lot the

names of the other seven members, namely Mr F. Gölcüklü, Mr B. Walsh,

Mrs E. Palm, Mr L. Wildhaber, Mr K. Jungwiert, Mr E. Levits and

Mr J. Casadevall, (Article 43 in fine of the Convention and Rule 21

para. 5) (art. 43). Subsequently Mr P. Jambrek, substitute judge,

replaced Mr Gölcüklü, who was unable to take part in the further

consideration of the case (Rules 22 para. 1 and 24 para. 1).

4. As President of the Chamber (Rule 21 para. 6), Mr Bernhardt,

acting through the Registrar, consulted the Agent of the Government,

the applicant's lawyers and the Delegate of the Commission on the

organisation of the proceedings (Rules 37 para. 1 and 38). Pursuant

to the order made in consequence, the Registrar received the

Government's and the applicant's memorials on 16 December 1996.

5. On 30 January 1997 the applicant was granted legal aid (Rule 4

of the Addendum to Rules of Court A). On 13 February 1997 he lodged

an additional claim for costs and expenses in respect of his

representation at the hearing before the Court.

6. In accordance with the President's decision, the hearing took

place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on

18 February 1997. The Court had held a preparatory meeting beforehand.

There appeared before the Court:

(a) for the Government

Mr G. Kanellopoulos, Senior Adviser,

Legal Council of State, Delegate of the Agent,

Mr V. Kyriazopoulos, Legal Assistant,

Legal Council of State, Counsel;

(b) for the Commission

Mr C.L. Rozakis, Delegate;

(c) for the applicant

Mr P. Duffy, Barrister-at-Law,

Miss M. Demetriou, Barrister-at-Law, Counsel,

Mr S. Grosz, Solicitor,

Miss J. Sohrab, Advisers,

Mr N. Philis, Applicant.

The Court heard addresses by Mr Rozakis, Mr Duffy, Mr Philis and

Mr Kanellopoulos.

AS TO THE FACTS

I. Circumstances of the case

7. Mr Philis, a Greek citizen born in 1937, lives in Athens, where,

at the material time, he was working as an engineer.

In 1987 Mr Philis had already filed a different application that

led the Court to find that the applicant's right of access to a court

had been violated (judgment of 27 August 1991, Series A no. 209).

A. The criminal proceedings

8. On 14 April 1986, during proceedings he had brought against

officials of the Autonomous Organisation for Labour Housing

(Aftonomos Organismos Ergatikis Katikias - "the AOEK"), the applicant

sent the Indictment Division of the Athens Court of Appeal

(Symvoulio Efeton) a pleading in which he argued that the procedure

followed by the relevant authorities in connection with the various

legal proceedings he had brought left no doubt that there was bias in

favour of the AOEK's officials, and that the delays in the proceedings

were plainly intended to ensure that the limitation period for the

offences would run out.

9. On 25 April 1986 the public prosecutor at the

Athens Court of Appeal (Isageleas Efeton) forwarded the pleading to the

public prosecutor at the Athens Criminal Court

(Isageleas Plimmeliodikon) and recommended that the applicant should

be charged with insulting the judiciary. On 30 April 1986 the

prosecutor at the Criminal Court ordered a preliminary investigation

(see paragraph 23 below).

10. On 9 October 1986 Mr Philis appeared before the

investigating judge. He denied the charges and informed the judge that

he intended to file a pleading by 15 October 1986. In the pleading,

which he filed on 14 October 1986, he applied for several witnesses to

be heard. Four witnesses were examined between 10 November and

20 November 1986. On 20 January 1987 the investigating judge sent the

file to the prosecutor.

11. On 20 March 1987 the prosecutor asked the investigating judge to

complete the file by ordering the applicant to send him a number of

court decisions mentioned in the pleading of 14 October 1986. On

11 June 1987 Mr Philis submitted those decisions, together with another

pleading. On 12 June 1987 the investigating judge forwarded these to

the prosecutor.

12. On 5 October 1987 the prosecutor charged the applicant with

insulting the judiciary and set the case down for trial on

12 October 1988 by the Athens Criminal Court sitting with three judges

(Trimeles Plimmeliodikio). On 13 September 1988 the applicant was

summoned to appear before that court on 12 October 1988. On

22 September 1988 he made an application under Article 322 of the

Code of Criminal Procedure to be examined by an indictment division,

but this was refused by the prosecutor at the Court of Appeal on

30 September 1988.

13. On 12 October 1988 the Athens Criminal Court convicted Mr Philis

and sentenced him to five months' imprisonment, a penalty which was

converted into a fine of 400 drachmas per day. The applicant

immediately appealed, thereby causing execution of his sentence to be

stayed (see paragraph 24 below).

14. On 5 November 1990 the Athens Court of Appeal adjourned the case,

but on 25 October 1991 it allowed the appeal and quashed Mr Philis's

conviction.

15. The Court of Appeal's judgment and the record of the hearing were

finalised (katharographi) on 19 November 1991 and served on the

applicant on 28 November 1991. On 9 December 1991 the applicant

applied to the Court of Appeal to have them rectified and supplemented.

On 15 April 1992 the court ruled that the application was inadmissible

on the ground that it had not been made within twenty days of delivery

of the judgment on 25 October 1991.

16. Under Articles 473 and 506 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the

prosecutor had a right of appeal on points of law against the

Court of Appeal's judgment, to be exercised within ten days of the

finalisation of that judgment. He did not, however, avail himself of

that right, with the result that the Court of Appeal's judgment became

final on 29 November 1991.

B. The disciplinary proceedings

17. On 2 August 1982 the AOEK complained to the

Greek Chamber of Technology (Techniko Epimelitirio Ellados - "the TEE")

of the various proceedings brought by Mr Philis against the AOEK and

some of its engineers. The chairman of the TEE's disciplinary board

then initiated disciplinary proceedings against the applicant for

improper conduct. On 14 November 1983 the charges were drawn and a

rapporteur appointed. On 9 March 1984 the disciplinary board decided

to adjourn the case as the chairman of the AOEK, who had been called

to give evidence, had not appeared. On 20 November 1984 the

disciplinary board suspended the applicant from practising his

profession for ten months.

18. Mr Philis was notified of that decision on 7 June 1985. On

21 June 1985 he appealed to the TEE's Supreme Disciplinary Council

within the prescribed two weeks, thereby causing his suspension to be

stayed (see paragraph 28 below). On 14 April and 18 May 1992 he wrote

to the TEE requesting it to inform him of the outcome of his appeal.

On 22 May 1992 the TEE replied that the case was being considered by

one of the members of the Supreme Disciplinary Council acting as

rapporteur and that a hearing would be held when he had submitted his

report.

19. By a letter of 17 February 1993 the applicant was invited to

attend the Supreme Disciplinary Council hearing on 10 March 1993. On

5 March 1993 he challenged all the Council's members and asked for the

guarantees in Article 6 of the Convention (art. 6) to be respected at

the hearing.

20. On 10 March 1993 the Supreme Disciplinary Council rejected that

request. It allowed the appeal, however, and completely exonerated the

applicant.

21. On 2 April 1993 Mr Philis sought rectification of the decision

of 10 March 1993. On 26 April 1993 the Supreme Disciplinary Council

answered the points raised by the applicant in his request but did not

rectify its decision.

II. Relevant domestic law

A. The Code of Criminal Procedure

22. Under Article 36 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,

criminal proceedings may be initiated of the authorities' own motion

following a report, a complaint or any other information indicating

that an offence may have been committed.

23. The public prosecutor is then required to order a preliminary

investigation or to commit the accused for trial directly, where this

is possible. If the complaint or report in question is without

foundation, the public prosecutor takes no further action (Article 43).

24. Where an appeal is lodged in accordance with the law and within

the prescribed time-limit, execution of the judgment against which it

has been brought is stayed (Articles 471 and 497).

25. Under Article 370, criminal proceedings end when the accused has

been found guilty or innocent.

B. Provisions governing disciplinary proceedings

26. Disciplinary proceedings in the Greek Chamber of Technology are

governed by the presidential decree of 27 November and

14 December 1926, as amended by Article 1 of

Legislative Decree no. 783/1970, and by Law no. 1486/1984.

27. Article 28 of the above-mentioned presidential decree provides

that, at first instance, disciplinary offences by members of the TEE

come under the jurisdiction of disciplinary boards.

28. Under Article 32 para. 1, an appeal lies against disciplinary

board decisions. Appeals must be lodged with the

Supreme Disciplinary Council within two weeks of notification of the

decision in question. The appeal has a suspensive effect.

29. Article 34 provides that disciplinary proceedings are separate

from other proceedings and are not stayed on account of

criminal proceedings. However, in exceptional circumstances, a

disciplinary board may stay disciplinary proceedings until

criminal proceedings have ended, while remaining free to give a

decision that differs from the criminal court's judgment. Where there

is a conviction in criminal proceedings, disciplinary proceedings that

have led to an acquittal or a reprimand will be reopened.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

30. In his application to the Commission of 15 January 1992

(no. 19773/92) Mr Philis complained of five different sets of civil,

criminal or disciplinary proceedings. He submitted that these

proceedings - some of which had been brought against him, others by

him - had entailed violations of Articles 6, 8 and 14 of the Convention

(art. 6, art. 8, art. 14) and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1).

31. In decisions of 13 August 1994 and 24 May 1995 the Commission

declared admissible the complaints of a violation of Article 6

(art. 6) in that a reasonable time had been exceeded in two of the sets

of proceedings complained of, and declared the remainder of the

application inadmissible. In its report of 16 January 1996

(Article 31) (art. 31), it expressed the unanimous opinion that there

had been a violation of that provision (art. 6) in both sets of

proceedings. The full text of the Commission's opinion is reproduced

as an annex to this judgment (1).

_______________

Note by the Registrar

1. For practical reasons this annex will appear only with the printed

version of the judgment (in Reports of Judgments and

Decisions 1997-IV), but a copy of the Commission's report is obtainable

from the registry.

_______________

FINAL SUBMISSIONS TO THE COURT

32. In their memorial the Government requested the Court to "reject

the entire appeal lodged by Mr Nicolas Philis".

33. The applicant in his memorial requested the Court to

"hold:

(1) that, in the criminal proceedings instituted against the

AOEK's officials, there has been a violation of Article 6 para. 1

(art. 6-1) as regards the applicant's right to a court or to a

fair hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal;

(2) that, in the criminal proceedings instituted against the

AOEK's officials, there has been a violation of Article 6 para. 1

(art. 6-1) [for failure to comply with] the 'reasonable time'

requirement;

(3) that, in the criminal proceedings instituted against the

applicant, there has been a violation of Article 6 para. 1

(art. 6-1) [for failure to comply with] the 'reasonable time'

requirement;

(4) that, in the criminal proceedings instituted against the

applicant, there has been a violation of Article 6 para. 1

(art. 6-1) [for failure to comply with] the 'rule of law' and [on

account of a] 'denial of justice';

(5) that, in the disciplinary proceedings, there has been a

violation of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) [for failure to comply

with] the 'reasonable time' requirement;

(6) that, in the disciplinary proceedings, there has been a

violation of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) [on account of a]

'denial of justice';

(7) that there has been a violation of Article 8 and of Article 1

of Protocol No. 1 taken together and in conjunction with

Article 6 para. 1 (art. 8+P1-1+6-1);

(8) that there has been a violation of Article 13 (art. 13)".

AS TO THE LAW

I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 PARA. 1 OF THE CONVENTION

(art. 6-1)

34. The applicant complained of the excessive length of the

criminal proceedings (see paragraphs 8-16 above) and the disciplinary

proceedings (see paragraphs 17-21 above) instituted against him. He

alleged a violation of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention (art. 6-1),

which provides:

"In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of

any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a ...

hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal ..."

The Government disputed that submission, while the Commission

accepted it.

35. The Court reiterates at the outset that the reasonableness of the

length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the particular

circumstances of the case and having regard to the criteria laid

down in its case-law, in particular the complexity of the case and

the conduct of the applicant and of the relevant authorities

(see, among many other authorities, the Kemmache v. France (nos. 1

and 2) judgment of 27 November 1991, Series A no. 218, p. 27,

para. 60). It is necessary among other things to take account of the

importance of what is at stake for the applicant in the litigation

(see, for instance, the Phocas v. France judgment of 23 April 1996,

Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-II, p. 546, para. 71).

A. The reasonableness of the length of the

criminal proceedings

36. As the Court has been unable to ascertain when notice of the

investigation was first served on the applicant or when he was first

affected by it, it shares the Commission's view that the period to be

taken into consideration began on 9 October 1986, when Mr Philis first

appeared before the investigating judge (see paragraph 10 above); it

ended on 29 November 1991, when the Court of Appeal's decision quashing

his conviction became final (see paragraphs 15 and 16 above). As the

latter date marked the end of the criminal proceedings

(see paragraph 25 above), the Court cannot accept the applicant's

submission that there had not yet been a ruling on the merits of the

charge because of the Court of Appeal's allegedly unlawful refusal to

rectify its judgment of 25 October 1991.

Consequently, the period to be taken into consideration under

this head lasted more than five years.

37. The applicant argued that his right to address a court freely had

been in issue, that the case had been simple and that his conduct had

not delayed the proceedings. The judicial authorities had been wholly

responsible for the excessive length of the proceedings.

38. The Commission pointed out that there had been a period of

inactivity imputable to the State from 12 October 1988, when the

applicant appealed against his conviction at first instance

(see paragraph 13 above), until 25 October 1991, when his conviction

was quashed by the Athens Court of Appeal (see paragraph 14 above).

It considered that the Government had not provided any satisfactory

explanation for the delay, since the Athens Court of Appeal's excessive

caseload was not a convincing argument.

39. The Government submitted that there had been no long adjournments

or delays at any of the three stages in the proceedings (during the

preliminary investigation, at first instance and on appeal). The

first two stages had each lasted approximately one year. With regard

to the third stage, the Government maintained that the

Athens Court of Appeal had had a backlog of cases and that there had

been no special feature of the case which justified giving it priority

as the applicant had not been in custody. Lastly, the adjournment on

5 November 1990 (see paragraph 14 above) had been due to organisational

difficulties for which the judicial authorities had not been

responsible.

40. The Court notes that the case was not particularly complex and

that the applicant was not in any way responsible for the length of the

proceedings. It also observes that Mr Philis was convicted at first

instance (see paragraph 13 above) and agrees with the Commission that

there was a period of inactivity of approximately three years between

the date of his appeal and the date on which his conviction was

quashed. Such a period may be considered reasonable only in

exceptional circumstances which the respondent State must account for.

In this connection, the Government pleaded the excessive caseload of

the Court of Appeal and organisational difficulties it had encountered.

However, as the Court has repeatedly held, Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1)

imposes on Contracting States the duty to organise their

judicial systems in such a way that their courts can meet each of its

requirements, including the obligation to hear cases within a

reasonable time (see, as the most recent authority, the Süßmann

v. Germany judgment of 16 September 1996, Reports 1996-IV, p. 1174,

para. 55).

41. Accordingly, and taking into account what was at stake for

Mr Philis in the proceedings, the Court cannot regard the period of

time that elapsed in the instant case as reasonable.

There has therefore been a breach of Article 6 para. 1 of the

Convention (art. 6-1) in this respect.

B. The reasonableness of the length of the disciplinary

proceedings

42. The applicant also maintained that the excessive length of the

disciplinary proceedings instituted against him had contravened

Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1). He argued that the case had concerned

only one simple point of law and that he had not in any way contributed

to the delays.

43. The Commission noted that there had been a period of inactivity

of more than seven years between the lodging of the appeal against the

penalty imposed at first instance (see paragraph 18 above) and the date

on which the Supreme Disciplinary Council ruled on the appeal

(see paragraph 20 above). It considered that Mr Philis could not be

held responsible for the delay and that the Government had not provided

any convincing explanation for it.

44. The Government argued that Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) did not

apply in the instant case as the outcome of the proceedings was not

directly decisive for the applicant's civil right to practise his

profession. As the suspension from practising his profession for

ten months imposed by the disciplinary board (see paragraph 17 above)

had been stayed throughout the appeal proceedings and had then been

quashed by the Supreme Disciplinary Council (see paragraph 20 above),

Mr Philis had never been deprived of his rights.

In the alternative, the Government contended that in any event

the proceedings before 20 November 1985, when Greece's recognition of

the right of individual petition had taken effect, were outside the

Court's jurisdiction ratione temporis. Moreover, in the applicant's

interests, the Supreme Disciplinary Council had deferred its decision

until judgment had been given in the various civil and

criminal proceedings between him and the AOEK. As Mr Philis had never

tried to expedite the proceedings, he had tacitly agreed to the

deferment.

45. The Court does not accept the Government's submission.

Concerning the argument that Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) does not

apply in the present case, the Court reiterates that it is clear from

its settled case-law that disciplinary proceedings in which, as in the

instant case, the right to continue to practise a profession is at

stake give rise to "contestations (disputes) over civil rights" within

the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) (see, among other

authorities, the following judgments: König v. Germany, 28 June 1978,

Series A no. 27, pp. 29-32, paras. 87-95;

Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere v. Belgium, 23 June 1981,

Series A no. 43, pp. 19-23, paras. 41-51;

Albert and Le Compte v. Belgium, 10 February 1983, Series A no. 58,

pp. 14-16, paras. 25-29; and Diennet v. France, 26 September 1995,

Series A no. 325-A, p. 13, para. 27). It goes without saying that the

procedural guarantees of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) apply to all

litigants, not just those who have not won their case in the

national courts.

46. The Court agrees with the Commission that the period to be taken

into consideration began at the latest on 14 November 1983, when the

disciplinary charges against the applicant were drawn (see paragraph 17

above). Like the Commission, the Court acquired jurisdiction

ratione temporis when Greece's recognition of the right of individual

petition took effect on 20 November 1985. However, in order to assess

the reasonableness of the length of time which elapsed after that date,

regard must be had to the state of the case at the time (see, among

other authorities, the Foti and Others v. Italy judgment of

10 December 1982, Series A no. 56, pp. 18-19, para. 53, and the Zappia

v. Italy judgment of 26 September 1996, Reports 1996-IV, p. 1412,

para. 22). The proceedings ended on 10 March 1993, when the

Supreme Disciplinary Council completely exonerated Mr Philis

(see paragraph 20 above). While the applicant argued that the

proceedings had not yet ended as the Supreme Disciplinary Council had

refused to rectify its decision (see paragraph 21 above), he failed to

show how the outcome of such a rectification could affect his right to

practise his profession.

The Court must accordingly rule on the reasonableness of

disciplinary proceedings which lasted more than nine years, seven of

which were within the jurisdiction ratione temporis of the

Convention institutions.

47. In that connection the Court notes, as did the Commission, that

there was a long period of inactivity between the lodging of

Mr Philis's appeal with the Supreme Disciplinary Council in June 1985

and the hearing in March 1993 (see paragraphs 18 and 20 above).

48. The Court observes that the Government did not dispute the

applicant's argument, which the Commission accepted, that the case was

not complex. As to the Government's submission that consideration of

the appeal had been deferred pending the outcome of other court

proceedings, the Court notes that the Supreme Disciplinary Council

never expressly ordered that deferment. Moreover, there was no binding

statutory obligation on it to defer its decision as disciplinary bodies

are free under Article 34 of the presidential decree of 27 November and

14 December 1926 (see paragraph 29 above) to give a decision that

differs from a conviction in criminal proceedings. Nor does it appear

from the case file before the Court that Mr Philis knew of the

deferment, still less that he agreed to it.

49. The Government maintained that the applicant had never tried to

expedite the appeal proceedings. But the duty to administer justice

expeditiously is incumbent in the first place on the relevant

authorities, especially in proceedings in which they have the power of

initiative and the power to ensure that progress is made. Besides, the

Government did not specify how Mr Philis, who strictly observed the

only time-limit imposed on him (see paragraph 18 above), could have

expedited consideration of his appeal.

50. As the Government did not provide any other explanation for the

Supreme Disciplinary Council's delay, the Court finds that a period of

more than seven years to consider a case acknowledged to be simple

fails to satisfy the "reasonable time" requirement in the Convention.

There has therefore been a breach of Article 6 para. 1 of the

Convention (art. 6-1) in this respect too.

C. The other complaints raised by the applicant

51. In his memorial Mr Philis requested the Court to consider some

additional complaints based on Articles 6 para. 1, 8 and 13 of the

Convention (art. 6-1, art. 8, art. 13) and on Article 1 of

Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) (see paragraph 33 above). As those complaints

were declared inadmissible by the Commission (see paragraph 31 above),

the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain them (see, among many other

authorities, the Masson and Van Zon v. the Netherlands judgment of

28 September 1995, Series A no. 327-A, p. 13, paras. 39-40).

II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 50 OF THE CONVENTION (art. 50)

52. Under Article 50 of the Convention (art. 50),

"If the Court finds that a decision or a measure taken by a legal

authority or any other authority of a High Contracting Party is

completely or partially in conflict with the obligations arising

from the ... Convention, and if the internal law of the said

Party allows only partial reparation to be made for the

consequences of this decision or measure, the decision of the

Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the

injured party."

The applicant sought compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary

damage and reimbursement of legal costs incurred in the

domestic proceedings and before the Convention institutions.

A. Damage

53. Mr Philis claimed, firstly, one thousand million drachmas (GRD)

for his loss of earnings between 1986 and 1995. He accepted that the

proceedings in issue had not led to the suspension of his professional

activities, but maintained that while they lasted he had been deprived

of the legal protection necessary to practise his profession unimpeded.

54. The applicant further claimed GRD 4,679,553,400 for the loss

arising from the fact that actions to recover fees and for compensation

which he had instituted against the AOEK, the TEE and the Government

had remained in abeyance. The risk that further criminal and

disciplinary proceedings might be instituted against him had, he

alleged, deterred him from taking any steps to have a date set for

these actions.

55. Lastly, Mr Philis claimed GRD 20,000,000 for non-pecuniary damage

in respect of the long period during which he had lived in a state of

uncertainty.

56. The Government stated that judgments of the European Court of

Human Rights were binding in the Greek legal system and that redress

could be obtained in Greece for any injury imputable to the

public authorities. In any event, the applicant had not proved the

alleged damage or established any causal link with the alleged breach

of the Convention.

57. The Delegate of the Commission submitted that although Mr Philis

had perhaps sustained non-pecuniary damage, it was hard to establish

a link between the alleged pecuniary damage and the delays leading to

the finding of a violation.

58. The Court points out that in the present case the only issue to

be decided is whether there was a failure to comply with the

"reasonable time" requirement in two sets of proceedings, criminal and

disciplinary. Those were the only complaints declared admissible by

the Commission (see paragraph 31 above). Consequently, the applicant

cannot argue that he did not have the legal protection to which he was

entitled, and a fortiori cannot claim just satisfaction on that

account. As there is no causal link between the violations found and

the alleged damage, the Court cannot allow the claims in respect of

that damage.

It is therefore unnecessary to consider either whether the damage

alleged by Mr Philis was actually sustained or whether, as submitted

by the Government, he could obtain redress in the domestic courts.

59. As to non-pecuniary damage, the Court, making its assessment on

an equitable basis, awards the applicant GRD 1,500,000. In view of the

particular facts of the case, Mr Philis cannot now be expected to bring

new proceedings for compensation against the State.

B. Costs and expenses

60. The applicant sought reimbursement of the costs and fees incurred

in the domestic courts and before the Convention institutions, which

he assessed, in respect of his own work, at GRD 1,880,000 and

GRD 3,420,000 respectively. He also sought 14,245.50 pounds sterling

for fees and costs for the lawyers who represented him before the

Court, to which sum the applicable rate of value-added tax (VAT) was

to be added.

61. In the Government's submission, only necessary, reasonable costs

which Mr Philis could prove he had incurred could be considered. The

additional claim lodged on 13 February 1997 (see paragraph 5 above)

should be dismissed as being out of time.

62. The Court notes that it has considered the proceedings in issue

only in relation to the reasonableness of their length. Any

compensation must consequently reflect that fact.

With regard to the costs in respect of the domestic proceedings

for which the applicant is seeking reimbursement, the Court cannot see

how those were incurred to prevent the violations established by the

Court or to seek redress for them. It consequently dismisses this

claim in its entirety.

As to the amounts claimed in respect of the proceedings before

the Convention institutions, the Court finds, like the Delegate of the

Commission, that Mr Philis was assisted by lawyers only during the

hearing before the Court. Making its assessment on an equitable basis,

it awards him GRD 2,000,000 for costs and expenses, together with any

VAT that may be chargeable, less 17,750 French francs already paid by

way of legal aid.

C. Default interest

63. According to the information available to the Court, the

statutory rate of interest applicable in Greece at the date of adoption

of the present judgment is 6% per annum.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY

1. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 para. 1 of the

Convention (art. 6-1) as regards the length of the

criminal proceedings brought against the applicant;

2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 para. 1

(art. 6-1) as regards the length of the disciplinary proceedings

brought against the applicant by the Greek Chamber of Technology;

3. Holds

(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within

three months, 1,500,000 (one million five hundred thousand)

drachmas for non-pecuniary damage and

2,000,000 (two million) drachmas for costs and expenses, together

with any VAT that may be chargeable, less

17,750 (seventeen thousand seven hundred and fifty) French francs

already paid in legal aid, to be converted into drachmas at the

rate in force on the date on which the present judgment is

delivered;

(b) that simple interest at an annual rate of 6% shall be payable

on those sums from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months

until settlement;

4. Dismisses the remainder of the claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English and in French, and delivered at a public hearing

in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 27 June 1997.

Signed: Rudolf BERNHARDT

President

Signed: Herbert PETZOLD

Registrar