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FIRST
SECTION
CASE OF POPOVA v. RUSSIA
(Application
no. 23697/02)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
21
December 2006
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
.
In the case of Popova v. Russia,
The
European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Mr C.L. Rozakis, President,
Mr L.
Loucaides,
Mrs F. Tulkens,
Mrs N. Vajić,
Mr A.
Kovler,
Mrs E. Steiner,
Mr K. Hajiyev,
judges,
and Mr S. Nielsen, Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 30 November 2006,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an application (no. 23697/02) against the Russian
Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by a Russian national, Ms Lyudmila Nikolayevna
Popova (“the applicant”), on 1 August 2001.
- The
applicant was represented by Mr I. Novikov, a lawyer practising in
Novosibirsk. The Russian Government (“the Government”)
were represented by Mr P. Laptev, the Representative of the Russian
Federation at the European Court of Human Rights.
- On
27 April 2005 the Court decided to give notice of the application to
the Government. Under the provisions of Article 29 § 3 of the
Convention, it decided to examine the merits of the application at
the same time as its admissibility.
THE FACTS
- The
applicant was born in 1953 and lives in the town of Barnaul in the
Altay Region.
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- After
the dismissal from a position in the Tymovsk locomotive depot, in
1993 the applicant sued her former employer for reinstatement,
payment of wage arrears and benefits. On 7 December 1993
the Tymovsk District Court of the Sakhalin Region pronounced the
judgment in her favour. The judgment was not appealed against and
became final.
- The
applicant was reinstated but on 5 January 1994 she was transferred to
another position. She refused to perform the new duties and on 10 and
31 January 1994 the employer disciplined her. On 2 February
1994 the employer decided to transfer the applicant to another
position.
- On
6 May 1994 the applicant challenged the decisions of 5, 10 and
31 January and 2 February 1994 before a court. She also claimed
wages for six work days.
- On
24 June 1994 the Tymovsk District Court annulled the decisions of 10
and 31 January 1994 and dismissed the remainder of the claims. The
judgment of 24 June 1994 was quashed on appeal and the case was
remitted for re-examination.
- The
applicant was dismissed from her position on 5 June 1995. Thus, she
amended her claims in the pending court proceedings, asking the court
also to reinstate her and grant her wage arrears and compensation for
non-pecuniary damage.
- On
16 August 1996 the Tymovsk District Court partly accepted the action.
It annulled the disciplinary decisions but dismissed the claims for
reinstatement and wage arrears. The judgment was quashed on
24 September 1996 and the case was again returned for
re-examination.
- On
12 February 1997 the Tymovsk District Court ordered the applicant's
reinstatement and payment of arrears. On 1 April 1997 the Sakhalin
Regional Court quashed the judgment and remitted the case for a fresh
examination.
- In September 1997 the applicant moved from the village
of Tymovsk to the town of Novoaltaysk in the Altay Region and
notified the District Court of the change of her place of residence.
In July 1998 the applicant moved to the village of Rebrikha in the
same region. She maintained the Novoaltaysk address for her
correspondence because her daughter continued living at that address.
According to the Government, the applicant did not inform the Tymovsk
District Court about the changes of her place of residence.
- In
November 1998 the applicant received at the Novoaltaysk address a
letter of 5 November 1998 signed by a deputy President of the
Sakhalin Regional Court. The deputy President informed the applicant
that an application for supervisory review of the judgments of 24
September 1996 and 1 April 1997 had been lodged before the Presidium
of the Sakhalin Regional Court. The Presidium had fixed a
supervisory-review hearing for 13 November 1998. The applicant's
presence was not required.
- On 13 November 1998 the Presidium of the Sakhalin
Regional Court amended the reasoning of the judgment of 24 September
1996 and ordered a fresh examination by the District Court of the
claims concerning the applicant's reinstatement, payment of wage
arrears and compensation for damage.
- According
to the Government, the Tymovsk District Court fixed hearings but
adjourned them because the applicant could not be summonsed. The
Government did not indicate any date of a hearing fixed by the
District Court between November 1998 and April 2000.
- In
2000 the applicant complained to the Prosecutor General of the
Russian Federation and a member of Parliament about the excessive
length of the proceedings in her case.
- On
19 April 2000 the Tymovsk District Court inquired the Novoaltaysk
Town and Tymovsk District police departments about the registered
place of the applicant's residence. In May 2000 the Tymovsk District
police department replied that the applicant had moved to Novoaltaysk
in 1997. The District police department indicated her address in
Novoaltaysk. The Novoaltaysk Town police department responded that
the applicant had lived in Novoaltaysk and then moved to the village
of Rebrikha. The letter of the town police department read as
follows:
“To your inquiry of 19 April 2000 [we] inform you
that Ms Popova Lyudmila Nikolayevna, born in 1953 in the Sakhalin
Region, was registered at the following address: the town of
Novoaltaysk, Ostrovskiy street, 76. Her registration was annulled on
17 July 1998 upon a request from the Rebrikha District to [the
following address] the village of Rebrikha, Pervomayskaya street,
house no. 64, flat no. 2.”
- On 8 November 2000 the District Court sent a telegram
to the applicant's address in the village of Rebrikha informing the
applicant about the hearing on 22 November 2000. An acknowledgment of
receipt shows that the telegram was not delivered to the applicant
because the street name and the house number had not been indicated.
According to the Government, the telegram was not delivered because
the applicant had once again moved to the town of Barnaul and had
failed to notify the court about that. According to the applicant,
she notified the Tymovsk District Court of her move to Barnaul,
however, she did not receive any correspondence from the District
Court at the Barnaul address.
- The
District Court fixed another hearing for 25 December 2001 and sent
summonses to the applicant. It appears that they were sent to her
address in the village of Rebrikha.
- On
25 December 2001 the Tymovsk District Court issued an interim
decision under Article 221 § 6 of the RSFSR Code on Civil
Procedure. It discontinued the proceedings because the applicant had
defaulted on 22 November 2000 and 25 December 2001, she had not
informed the court about the reasons for her absence and had appeared
to have lost interest in her case.
- According
to the applicant, in the absence of a notification of any decision in
her case she unsuccessfully complained to various domestic
authorities, including the Supreme Court and the Prosecutor General
of the Russian Federation, about the failure of the domestic courts
to determine her case within a reasonable time. No response followed,
save for the one on 8 August 2005 when the acting President of
the Sakhalin Regional Court sent a copy of the decision of 25
December 2001 to the applicant's home address in the town of Barnaul,
whereto she had moved on an unspecified date.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
- The
RSFSR Code on Civil Procedure of 11 June 1964 (in force at the
material time) provided that civil cases were to be prepared for a
hearing no later than seven days after the action had been lodged
with the court. Civil cases were to be examined no later than one
month after the preparation for the hearing had been completed
(Article 99)
- Summonses
were to be served on the parties and their representatives in such
way so that they would have enough time to appear timely at the
hearing and prepare their case. If necessary, the parties could be
summoned by a phone call or a telegram (Article 106).
- A
party was to sign the second copy of a summons which was to be
returned to a court. If a summons could not be served on a party, it
was to be served on an adult family member who lived with the party.
A family member who had received a summons was to indicate on its
second copy his/her first name, patronymic and family name and
his/her relation to a summonsed party. If a party was absent, a
person who delivered a summons was to note on the second copy of the
summons where the party had moved (Article 109).
- Article 221 § 6 provided that a court could issue
an interim decision on discontinuation of the proceedings
(определение
об оставлении
заявления без
рассмотрения),
in particular, if the plaintiff had not waived his/her right to be
present and had failed to appear for the second time, and the
respondent had not insisted on continuation of the proceedings.
- A copy of an interim decision on discontinuation of
the proceedings was to be sent to the absent party no later than
three days upon its delivery (Article 213).
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION
- The
applicant complained that the domestic courts' discontinuation of the
case without any notification to her had deprived her of the right to
obtain the determination of her claims within a “reasonable
time”, provided in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which
reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing within a
reasonable time... by [a]... tribunal...”
A. Submissions by the parties
- The
Government argued that the Court did not have competence ratione
temporis to examine the period of the proceedings before 5 May
1998. As to the remaining period, the Government pointed out that the
complexity of the case, the geographical and meteorological
characteristics of the Sakhalin Region and the applicant's behaviour
had contributed to the length of the proceedings. The applicant had
changed her place of residence four times in four years, failing each
time to inform the courts of her new place of residence. In April
2000 the authorities had attempted to establish the place of the
applicant's residence. However, she had moved again, and the
summonses for the hearings of 22 November 2000 and 25 December
2001 had not been delivered. Thus, the domestic court had no choice
but to discontinue the proceedings as the applicant apparently had
lost interest in her case. The Government did not know whether any
attempts had been made to serve the decision of 25 December 2001
on the applicant.
- The
applicant averred that the delays in the proceedings had not been
caused by complexity of the case or changes of her place of
residence. She insisted that despite her move to Novoaltaysk in 1997
and then to the village of Rebrikha in July 1998, she had maintained
correspondence with the courts. The fact that the letter of the
deputy President of the Sakhalin Regional Court of 5 November 1998
had been delivered to the address in Novoaltaysk confirmed that she
had informed the domestic courts of her move to Novoaltaysk and that
she continued to receive correspondence at the Novoaltaysk address
even after she had moved to the village of Rebrikha. The applicant
further noted that she had also informed the Tymovsk District Court
about her move to Barnaul, but no summonses had been sent there. In
August 2005 she had received a copy of the decision of 25 December
2001 at the Barnaul address.
B. The Court's assessment
1. Right of access to a court
(a) Admissibility
- The Court notes that the applicant's complaint is not
manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of
the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any
other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
(b) Merits
- The
Court considers that the applicant's complaint raises an issue as to
the right of access to a court. In this respect, the Court reiterates
that the procedural guarantees laid down in Article 6 secure to
everyone the right to have any claim relating to his civil rights and
obligations brought before a court or tribunal; in this way it
embodies the “right to a court”, of which the right of
access, that is the right to institute proceedings before courts in
civil matters, constitutes one aspect (see Golder v. the United
Kingdom, judgment of 21 February 1975, Series A no. 18, pp.
13-18, §§ 28-36).
- The
Court observes that on 6 May 1994 the applicant brought a civil
action against her employer. The parties did not dispute the fact
that on the date when the Convention entered into force in respect of
Russia the applicant's claim was pending before the Tymovsk District
Court.
- The
Court recalls that the institution of proceedings does not, in
itself, satisfy all the requirements of Article 6 § 1. The
Convention is intended to guarantee not rights that are theoretical
or illusory but rights that are practical and effective. The right of
access to a court includes not only the right to institute
proceedings but also the right to obtain a “determination”
of the dispute by a court. It would be illusory if a Contracting
State's domestic legal system allowed an individual to bring a civil
action before a court without ensuring that the case would be
determined by a final decision in the judicial proceedings. It would
be inconceivable for Article 6 § 1 to describe in detail
procedural guarantees afforded to litigants – proceedings that
are fair, public and expeditious – without guaranteeing the
parties that their civil disputes will be finally determined (see
Multiplex v. Croatia, no. 58112/00, § 45,
10 July 2003; Kutić v. Croatia, no. 48778/99,
§ 25, ECHR 2002-II).
- The
Court observes that on 25 December 2001 the Tymovsk District Court,
applying Article 221 of the RSFSR Code on Civil Procedure, issued an
interim decision discontinuing the proceedings in the applicant's
case because she had defaulted at two hearings of 22 November 2000
and 25 December 2001 and appeared to have lost interest in the
case.
- Without
losing sight of the general context of the case, the Court would
reiterate that, in proceedings originating in an individual
application, it has to confine its attention, as far as possible, to
the concrete case before it (see Ashingdane v. the United Kingdom,
judgment of 28 May 1985, Series A no. 93, § 59).
Accordingly, the Court's task in assessing the permissibility of the
limitation imposed is not to review Article 221 of the RSFSR Code on
Civil Procedure as such but the circumstances and manner in which
that provision was actually applied to the applicant's situation.
- According
to the Government, the decision of 25 December 2001 resulted from the
applicant's failure to inform the courts about the changes of her
place of residence, and it had been preceded by the District Court's
attempts to locate the applicant and its attempts to summons her to
the hearings. In particular, the Government cited the applicant's
failure to appear at the hearings of 22 November 2000 and 25 December
2001 as the reason for the discontinuation of the proceedings.
According to the Government, the summonses for those two hearings
were sent to the applicant's address in the village of Rebrikha,
whereto she had moved from Novoaltaysk (see paragraph 12 above).
- The
Court, however, is not satisfied with the accuracy and reliability of
the Government's factual submissions. Firstly, as to the
Government's argument that the District Court could not summons the
applicant to the hearings listed between November 1998 and November
2000 because it was unaware of the changes of her place of residence,
the Court observes that, as it appears from a copy of the letter of
the Presidium (see paragraph 14 above), the domestic courts knew the
applicant's address in Novoaltaysk and could effectively maintain
correspondence with her at that address, even after she had moved to
the village of Rebrikha. The Court finds it anomalous that having
been informed about the applicant's move to Novoaltaysk, the District
Court continued sending summonses to the hearings fixed before
22 November 2000 to her former place of residence in the village
of Tymovsk.
- As
to the alleged inability to summons the applicant for the last two
hearings on 22 November 2000 and 25 December 2001, the Court does not
overlook the fact that the applicant experienced certain difficulties
in communicating with the domestic courts and notifying them of the
frequent changes of her residence. It considers that she should have
displayed more diligence in the defence of her interests. However,
the Court finds it peculiar that the District Court, when trying to
summons the applicant for the hearing of 22 November 2000, sent
a telegram to the village of Rebrikha, omitting the street name and
the house number (see paragraph 18 above), although it apparently was
aware of the full address. It is even more striking that after the
District Court had been informed that the telegram had not been
delivered because of an incomplete address, it still considered that
the applicant had been properly summonsed for the hearing of 22
November 2000.
- As
to the hearing of 25 December 2001, the Government did not provide
the Court with any evidence showing whether and when the summons for
that hearing had been served on the applicant. There is also no
indication in the decision of 25 December 2001 that the District
Court examined the issue whether the applicant had been duly
summonsed for the hearing of 25 December 2001.
-
The Court considers that in the circumstances of the present case, in
particular, the obvious failure to inform the applicant about the
hearing of 22 November 2000 and the absence of indication that
she had been summonsed for the hearing of 25 December 2001, the
authorities' assumption that the applicant had lost interest in
pursuing her claim did not have a sufficient factual basis and the
decision on discontinuation of the proceedings appears to be issued
in breach of the express requirement of Article 221 § 6 of the
RSFSR Code on Civil Procedure (see paragraph 25 above).
- The
Court further observes that the Government did not know whether the
decision of 25 December 2001 had been served on the applicant.
Moreover, they did not produce any evidence showing that the decision
of 25 December 2001 had indeed been dispatched within the time-limit
established by the domestic law (see paragraph 26 above). According
to the applicant, she complained to various domestic authorities
about the courts' failure to determine her claim. The Government did
not dispute that fact. The Court notes that the nature and
persistency of the applicant's complaints could have made it
sufficiently clear to the domestic authorities that she was unaware
of the existence or contents of the decision of 25 December
2001. However, the authorities did not take any steps to provide the
applicant with information on the status of her claim.
- It,
thus, appears that for the first time the applicant received a copy
of the decision of 25 December 2001 in August 2005. In this respect
the Court reiterates that a litigant's right of access to a court
would be illusory if he or she were to be kept in the dark about the
developments in the proceedings and the court's decisions on the
claim, especially when such decisions are of the nature to bar
further examination (see Sukhorubchenko v. Russia, no.
69315/01, § 53, 10 February 2005).
- Taking
into account the circumstances of the present case, in particular,
that the decision on the discontinuation of the proceedings was
issued without appropriate notification of the assumptions on which
it had been founded and that it was not served on the applicant in a
prompt manner, the Court therefore finds that the failure of the
domestic authorities to determine the applicant's claim deprived her
of the right of access to a court. There has accordingly been a
violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
2. Length of proceedings
- The
Court notes that all the delays in the proceedings during the period
under consideration were due to the failure of the District Court to
update the applicant about the status of the proceedings she had
initiated. The Court has already taken this aspect into account in
its examination of the applicant's right of access to a court above.
Having regard to its findings on that point, it considers that the
issue of the length of the proceedings must be regarded as having
been absorbed by the issue of access to a court (see Sukhorubchenko,
cited above, § 55).
- The
Court therefore finds that it is not necessary to examine separately
the issue of the length of the proceedings.
II. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
- Lastly,
the applicant complained under Articles 6 and 14 of the Convention
that the judicial proceedings had been unfair as the courts had
misinterpreted domestic law and incorrectly assessed the facts, and
that the judgment of 7 December 1993 had not been enforced. However,
having regard to all the material in its possession, and in so far as
these complaints fall within the Court's competence, it finds that
they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and
freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. It follows that
this part of the application must be rejected as being manifestly
ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the
Convention.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
- Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
- The
applicant did not submit a claim for just satisfaction. Accordingly,
the Court considers that there is no call to award her any sum on
that account.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Declares the complaint concerning the domestic
courts' failure to examine the applicant's civil claim admissible and
the remainder of the application inadmissible;
- Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention on account of the domestic authorities'
failure to examine the applicant's civil claim;
- Holds that no separate examination of the issue
of the length of the proceedings is required;
- Holds that there is no call to award the
applicant just satisfaction
Done in English, and notified in writing on 21 December 2006,
pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Søren Nielsen Christos Rozakis
Registrar President
