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FIFTH
SECTION
CASE OF SCHWARZENBERGER v. GERMANY
(Application
no. 75737/01)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
10
August 2006
This judgment will
become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2
of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Schwarzenberger v. Germany,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Mr P. Lorenzen, President,
Mrs S.
Botoucharova,
Mr K. Jungwiert,
Mrs M.
Tsatsa-Nikolovska,
Mr R. Maruste,
Mr J. Borrego
Borrego,
Mrs R. Jaeger, judges,
and Mrs C. Westerdiek,
Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 3 July 2006,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an application (no. 75737/01) against the Federal
Republic of Germany lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a German national, Mr
Peter Roland Schwarzenberger (“the applicant”), on 26
July 2001.
- The
applicant, who had been granted legal aid, was represented by Mr V.
Hohbach, a lawyer practising in Heilbronn. The German Government
(“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mrs
A. Wittling-Vogel, Ministerialdirigentin, of the Federal
Ministry of Justice.
- On
27 January 2005 the Court decided to communicate the application to
the Government. Under the provisions of Article 29 § 3 of the
Convention, it decided to examine the merits of the application at
the same time as its admissibility.
- On
1 April 2006 this case was assigned to the newly constituted Fifth
Section (Rule 25 § 5 and Rule 52 § 1).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The
applicant was born in 1957 and is at present serving a prison
sentence in Bruchsal in Germany.
1. The applicant’s arrest and the criminal
proceedings against Mr D.
- On
23 April 1996 the applicant and his suspected accomplice D. were
arrested in Cadiz in Spain on suspicion of having murdered Mrs D. On
6 May 1996 the Heilbronn District Court (Amtsgericht)
issued an arrest warrant against the applicant. As the applicant
objected to being extradited to Germany, he remained in detention in
Spain.
- On
5 July 1996 D. – the victim’s adopted son – was
extradited to Germany.
- On
8 April 1997 a chamber of the Heilbronn Regional Court (Landgericht),
presided by judge V. and also comprising judges W. and B., convicted
D. of murder and of having committed robbery followed by death
constituting one single offence (Mord in Tateinheit mit Raub
mit Todesfolge), and of attempted murder. D. was found guilty of
having murdered his adoptive mother Mrs D., of having attempted to
murder his adoptive father and of having robbed his adoptive parents’
belongings. According to the findings of the Regional Court, which
were primarily based on the statements and admissions of the accused,
these offences had been committed jointly with the applicant.
- The
passages of the judgment establishing the facts of the case which
refer to the applicant read as follows:
“Schwarzenberger, who was primarily interested in
the loot, having been at first indifferent to the murder ...,
consented to drive to Germany with the accused...On the ground floor,
Schwarzenberger looked for an appropriate weapon. He removed the
loose but stable handle from a big axe and handed it to the accused.
Having in the meantime agreed to the murder, he did not want to run
any risks. The accused could see that Schwarzenberger put a hammer
weighing 200 grams into his pocket in order to be prepared for any
eventualities...As Schwarzenberger and the accused feared the failure
of their endeavour, the former approached Mrs D., kept her mouth shut
with a pillow and inflicted severe hammer blows on her head in order
to kill her. The accused was aware of this because he knew that a
human life counted for little with Schwarzenberger...The accused
credibly submitted to the court that he had informed Schwarzenberger
about his plan to murder his adoptive father, which left the latter
indifferent because he was primarily interested in the loot. The
chamber deduces from this submission that the accused knew that a
human life counted for little with Schwarzenberger...Because of the
blows inflicted by the accused, the chamber is convinced that the
accused consented to Schwarzenberger’s brutal actions, even if
it meant her death, in order to reach his real aim to kill his
adoptive father...Because of the many heavy hammer blows on the
victim’s head, the accused was aware that Schwarzenberger
wanted to kill the adoptive mother of the accused, at least in order
to gain the prospected loot...By following Schwarzenberger’s
request to keep Mrs D. at bay by dealing her a blow, the accused
expressed his consent to Schwarzenberger’s massive use of force
and was willing to accept the action...Cooperating with
Schwarzenberger, the accused wanted to slay his sleeping victim, thus
perfidiously exploiting his unsuspecting victim’s
defencelessness. Despite the accused’s intention to commit the
crime on his own, Schwarzenberger was so intensely involved in the
planning and in the choice of a weapon that his actions did not
merely constitute supportive measures, but an autonomous part of the
action, the more so as the dominant Schwarzenberger pursued his own
interest in the deed: to have access to the loot.”
- The
Regional Court further noted that this assessment of the facts
followed essentially the accused’s own submissions, who tried
to place all responsibility on the applicant. Nevertheless, the
Regional Court found him guilty himself. It further considered
whether it was necessary to hear the applicant – who remained
at the time in detention in Spain – as a witness in the
proceedings against D. Having regard to the fact that the applicant
had denied any involvement in the crime, the chamber did not expect
that the applicant’s testimony would yield any further
information.
2. The criminal proceedings against the applicant
- On
22 April 1997 the applicant was extradited to Germany.
- On
12 February 1999 the main hearing was opened before a chamber of the
Heilbronn Regional Court presided by judge W. and including judge B.;
both had already sat in the chamber which had previously tried D.
- At
the opening of the trial, the applicant objected to the participation
of judges W. and B. on the ground of possible bias (Ablehnung
wegen Besorgnis der Befangenheit). He argued that the passages in
the court’s judgment against D., seen from his viewpoint, but
also objectively, were susceptible of raising doubts about the
impartiality of these judges. On being informed that a chamber
presided by judge V. – who had presided over the trial against
D. – would decide about the objection, the applicant raised an
objection against V. on the same grounds.
- On
12 February 1999 judges W. and B. submitted their respective official
statements (dienstliche Äusserung) on the objection. They
pointed out that it would have been more satisfactory to try both D.
and the applicant in joint proceedings, as the same facts were
concerned. However, this had not been possible as D. had already been
extradited on 5 July 1996 and it could not be foreseen at the time
when the extradition proceedings relating to the applicant would be
terminated. Having regard to the necessity to expedite proceedings,
the chamber found it appropriate to consider both cases in separate
proceedings. During the main proceedings against D., the applicant
had not been available to the court. The establishment of the facts
of the case in the judgment against D. were mainly founded on D.’s
own submissions. In order to assess the extent of D.’s guilt,
it had been essential to cast light on the applicant’s
involvement. As the chamber could only base its assessment on D.’s
own submissions, they had been aware of the fact that their sources
of knowledge were limited and that an assessment of the applicant’s
possible involvement had to be left to the main proceedings against
the applicant. Both judges emphasised that they had neither reached a
final opinion nor adopted an inner attitude which could negatively
influence their impartiality towards the applicant.
- On
16 February 1999 the substitute chamber of the Heilbronn Regional
Court rejected the applicant’s objection against the presiding
judge V. It found that the simple fact that a judge had been
previously dealing with the same facts in a case against another,
subsequently convicted person did not suffice to justify an objection
against that judge because an accused person would reasonably presume
that a judge based his judgment exclusively on the outcome of the
public hearing in the specific case. According to the court, an
objection would have been justified only if the judgment of 8 April
1997 had contained unjustified and degrading value judgments on the
applicant. The court found this not to be the case, because it was
clear from the judgment of 8 April 1997 that the passages referring
to the applicant were exclusively based on D.’s submissions, as
the applicant himself, having objected to his extradition from Spain,
had at the time not been available to the court.
- On
17 February 1999 the substitute chamber dismissed the applicant’s
objection against judges W. and B. for the same reasons.
- On
10 December 1999 the Heilbronn Regional Court convicted the
applicant, who had denied any involvement in the crimes, of murder
and of having committed robbery followed by death constituting one
single offence and sentenced him to life imprisonment. According to
the Regional Court’s findings, the applicant had killed Mrs D.
in order to cover up the robbery; while D. had approved of the
applicant’s actions. The Regional Court based its judgment
mainly on the applicant’s own statements given both during
preliminary investigations and during the main hearing, on
incriminating testimony given by D., which the chamber followed only
to a certain extent, and on corroborative evidence such as the
analysis of traces found at the scene of the crime.
- The
applicant subsequently appealed on points of law, arguing that judges
B. and W. should have been excluded from the trial. On 7 March 2001
the Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) rejected the
appeal as unfounded, following a statement of the Federal Public
Prosecutor (Generalbundesanwalt) which confirmed the Regional
Court’s reasoning on the issue of the impartiality of the
judges.
- On
22 May 2001 the applicant, who was represented by counsel, lodged a
constitutional complaint in which he gave a complete account of the
proceedings before the lower courts and alleged that the impugned
decisions violated his right to a fair trial as guaranteed by the
German Basic Law and by the Convention.
- The
relevant passages of the complaint read as follows:
“Article 101 § 1 in conjunction with Articles
103 and 19 § 4 of the German Basic Law, and Article 6 § 1
of the Convention, guarantee that criminal cases shall be heard in a
fair trial, without arbitrariness and, in particular, by an unbiased
and impartial judge. According to section 24 § 2 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, a judge can be challenged for fear of bias if
there is a justifiable reason to doubt his impartiality. This is the
case if the accused, taking into account the facts known to him, has
reason to believe that a judge’s attitude towards him might
negatively influence his impartiality and neutrality. In general,
this fear cannot be based on the mere fact that a judge has
previously convicted another person who participated in the same
crime and, on that occasion, ruled on the involvement of the accused.
However, a different approach is urgently needed if a judge’s
behaviour in the previous proceedings (or, similarly, his reasoning
in a previous judgment) justifies the fear of bias. In particular,
negative value judgments about the accused’s personality, or
about his actions before or after the crime, may induce the accused
reasonably to fear that a judge might not be impartial towards him in
the new proceedings. It has been said of the person accused in the
present case, who has denied his involvement in the crime, that a
human life counted for little to him, that he acted brutally and used
massive violence, and that he, as a dominant actor, made an
autonomous contribution to the attempted murder of the adoptive
father. On the basis of such value judgments, the accused does indeed
have reason to fear that the judges, who were deciding for a second
time on the same crime, whether consciously or unconsciously, would
maintain their previous opinions ... . Comparing this case with (one)
published in volume 24 of the collection of the decisions of the
Federal Court of Justice, it is clear that the applicant has been
exposed to a high degree of value judgments on his person and his
actions. If one were to apply the ruling of the Federal Court of
Justice to the present case, there would no longer be any possibility
of removing a judge for fear of bias due to the decision in a
previous case ... . Such a result is unacceptable for the person
concerned, as has been sufficiently demonstrated. Article 6 of the
Convention (impartial, unbiased judge and fair trial) has been
violated for the same reasons.”
- On
20 June 2001 the Federal Constitutional Court, sitting as a panel of
three judges, refused to accept the applicant’s complaint for
adjudication.
- The
relevant passages of that court’s decision read as follows:
“The constitutional complaint is not accepted for
adjudication because there are no grounds therefor. The
constitutional complaint has no prospect of success, because it is
inadmissible. Its reasoning does not meet the minimum requirements
found in section 23 § 1, second sentence, and section 92 of the
Rules of Procedure of the Federal Constitutional Court. The applicant
has to describe the alleged violation of a Basic Right and the
proceedings leading to its violation in a substantiated and
conclusive way (cf. the decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court
published in the official collection BVerfGE 40, p. 141,
[at p. 156]; 49, p. 24, [at p. 47 et seq.]). The
allegation that the Regional Court rejected the objection against the
competent judges on erroneous grounds does not meet these
requirements, because not every rejection of an objection which is
erroneous with respect to ordinary laws means that there is at the
same time a violation of Article 101 § 1 of the Basic Law.
According to the consistent case-law of the Federal Constitutional
Court, a violation of the right to a decision rendered by the legally
competent judge (Recht auf den gesetzlichen Richter) is only
possible if the decision of the court on the objection is based on
arbitrary considerations (cf. BVerfGE 11, p. 1, [at p. 6]; 29,
p. 45, [at p. 48 et seq.]; 31, p. 145, [164]), or if the court has
fundamentally misjudged the meaning and implications of Article 101 §
1, second sentence (cf. BVerfGE 82, 286, [299], 87, 282,
[285]). Accordingly, a mere allegation that the objections have been
rejected in violation of the ordinary legal provision of section 24 §
2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure will not suffice to substantiate
an alleged violation of the constitution.“
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
- The
relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure read as
follows:
Section 24 § 2
“An objection can be raised on the ground of fear
of bias if there is a reason which may justify doubts on the
impartiality of a judge.”
Section 337 § 1
“An appeal on points of law can only be based on
the allegation that the judgment was based on a violation of the
law.”
Section 338
“A judgment shall always be considered to be based
on a violation of the law:
...3. if a professional judge or lay judge participated
in the drafting of a judgment after he has been challenged for bias
and if the motion for challenge was either declared to be
well-founded or erroneously rejected...”
- Article
101, § 1, second sentence, of the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz)
provides that no one shall be deprived of his right to a decision
rendered by the legally competent judge (gesetzlicher Richter).
In its case-law, the Federal Constitutional Court has consistently
dealt with the issue of whether a judge must be excluded for
suspicion of bias as a problem of the right to a decision rendered by
the legally competent judge.
- The relevant provisions of the Rules of Procedure of
the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz)
read as follows:
Section 23 § 1
“Applications for the institution of proceedings
must be submitted in writing to the Federal Constitutional Court. The
reasons must be stated; the requisite evidence must be specified.”
Section 92
“The reasons for the complaint shall specify the
allegedly violated right and the act or omission of the organ or
authority by which the complainant claims to have been harmed.”
- According
to the consistent case-law of the Federal Constitutional Court (cf.
the decision published in the official collection BVerfGE 67,
p. 90, [at p. 94]), the applicant must not only identify
the allegedly violated right, but also describe the proceedings which
led to this violation in a substantiated and conclusive way
(schlüssig und substantiiert), in order to comply with
the above-mentioned provisions.
THE LAW
- The applicant complained about the Heilbronn Regional
Court’s lack of impartiality, because two of the three judges
sitting in the chamber had previously passed a judgment against his
alleged accomplice D., in which they had made derogatory statements
on the applicant’s character and his involvement in the crime.
He relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention which, insofar as
relevant, provides as follows:
“In the determination of ... any criminal charge
against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by an
independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”
I. Admissibility
1. The parties’ submissions
- The
Government contended that the applicant did not exhaust domestic
remedies as required by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. The
applicant had failed sufficiently to substantiate his constitutional
complaint as required by section 23 sentence 2 in conjunction with
section 92 of the Rules of Procedure of the Federal Constitutional
Court. In particular, he had failed conclusively to present the
extent to which the impugned decisions were based upon arbitrary
considerations or why the Heilbronn Regional Court had fundamentally
misjudged the meaning and implications of Article 101 § 1,
second sentence of the Basic Law.
- The
applicant contested these arguments. He alleged that the Federal
Constitutional Court erroneously declared his complaint inadmissible.
The content of his submissions to that court sufficiently
demonstrated that the lower courts had rejected his objections for
arbitrary reasons and that they had misjudged the meaning and
implications of the rights in question, including Article 6 § 1
of the Convention.
2. The Court’s assessment
- The
Court reiterates that, whereas Article 35 § 1 of the
Convention must be applied with some degree of flexibility and
without excessive formalism, it normally requires that the complaints
intended to be brought subsequently before the Court should have been
made to the appropriate domestic courts, at least in substance and in
compliance with the formal requirements and time-limits laid down in
the domestic law (see, among many other authorities, Cardot v.
France, judgment of 19 March 1991, Series A no. 200,
§ 34).
- Turning
to the present case, the Court notes that the applicant, who was
represented by counsel, in his submissions to the Federal
Constitutional Court, gave a complete account of the proceedings
before the lower courts and alleged a violation of his right to a
fair trial by impartial judges as guaranteed by the German Basic Law
as well as by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. Under these
circumstances, the Court finds that the applicant has expressly and
in substance raised the complaint about the judges’
impartiality before the Federal Constitutional Court. It follows that
the applicant must be regarded as having exhausted domestic remedies.
- The
Court further notes that the complaint is not manifestly ill-founded
within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention or
inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared
admissible.
II. Merits
1. The parties’ submissions
- The
Government pointed out, firstly, that the competence of judges in
domestic criminal proceedings was established beforehand according to
abstract rules, such as the first letter of the accused’s name.
In courts with only a few chambers, this could lead to the same judge
being competent in severed criminal proceedings against
co-perpetrators.
- According
to the Government, there was no doubt about the impartiality of
judges W. or B. from either an objective or a subjective point of
view. The judges of the Heilbronn Regional Court, in their judgment
against D., did not express any unnecessary or factually unfounded
value judgments regarding the applicant. The respective statements
were those of D. himself and essential in order to establish D.’s
guilt. They served the sole purpose of proving in regard to D., on
the basis of his own statements and applying the doctrine of “in
dubio pro reo”, that he had acted with the intent to kill -
and not simply to injure - his victim. The Regional Court did not
portray the facts as having objectively occurred, but made it clear
that the depiction of the applicant’s contributory acts was
solely based on D.’s own statements during the main hearing.
These statements were neither binding nor prejudicial in the criminal
proceedings against the applicant.
- With
regard to the judges’ subjective impartiality, the contents of
the judges’ official statements, the reasons for and legal
significance of the passages regarding the applicant in the judgment
against D., and the judges’ conduct during the main hearing on
the applicant’s case disproved this assumption. With respect to
the latter, the Government pointed out that the Regional Court had
heard the applicant’s case on twenty-six days, that it had
thoroughly examined the credibility of D.’s testimony given in
this case, that it had made extensive, if eventually fruitless
efforts in order to contact the foreign witnesses named by the
applicant, and that it had based its judgment also on corroborative
evidence.
- The
applicant contested the Government’s submissions. According to
the applicant, there were strong indications that judges W. and B.
had been subjectively biased against him. The value judgments
contained in the judgment convicting D. had been totally unnecessary
in order to establish D.’s guilt. D.’s criminal liability
for murder did not depend on the character or features of the alleged
co-offender. In the eyes of any reasonable accused, the facts of the
present case justified the apprehension of bias. The applicant’s
apprehension was further enhanced by what was at stake for the
applicant – that is, either a life sentence or an acquittal.
The fact that the Regional Court more or less complied with its
procedural duties in the main proceedings against the applicant did
not rebut the apprehension of bias. The applicant further referred to
the Court’s judgment in the Rojas Morales case (Rojas
Morales v. Italy, no. 39676/98, 16 November 2000).
2. The Court’s assessment
- The
Court considers, on the outset, that it is not its task to review the
relevant law and practice in abstracto, but to determine
whether the manner in which they were applied in the applicant’s
case gave rise to a violation of Article 6 § 1 (see Hauschildt
v. Denmark, judgment of 24 May 1989, p. 21, Series A no. 154, §
45).
- The
Court reiterates that impartiality normally denotes the absence of
prejudice or bias. In its consistent case-law, the Court determines
the existence of impartiality for the purposes of Article 6 § 1
according to a subjective test, that is on the basis of the personal
conviction and behaviour of a particular judge in a given case, and
also according to an objective test, that is ascertaining whether he
or she offered sufficient guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt
in this respect (see, among many other authorities, Kyprianou v.
Cyprus [GC], no. 73797/01, § 118, ECHR 2005 ...).
- In
applying the subjective test the Court has consistently held that the
personal impartiality of a judge must be presumed until there is
proof to the contrary (see Kyprianou, cited above, § 119;
Morel v. France, no. 34130/96, § 41, ECHR 2000 VI).
Having regard to the material in its possession, the Court is not
satisfied that there is evidence establishing that judges W. and B.
acted with any personal prejudice.
- As
to the second test, when applied to a body sitting as a bench, it
means determining whether, quite apart from the personal conduct of
any of the members of that body, there are ascertainable facts which
may raise doubts as to its impartiality. In this respect even
appearances may be of some importance (see Kyprianou, cited
above, § 118; Castillo Algar v. Spain, judgment of
28 October 1998, Reports 1998-VIII, p. 3116, § 45;
and Morel, cited above, § 42). When it is being
decided whether in a given case there is a legitimate reason to fear
that a particular body lacks impartiality, the standpoint of those
claiming that it is not impartial is important but not decisive. What
is decisive is whether the fear can be held to be objectively
justified (see Kyprianou, cited above, § 118; Ferrantelli
and Santangelo v. Italy, judgment of 7 August 1996, Reports
1996-III, pp. 951-52, § 58, and Wettstein v.
Switzerland, no. 33958/96, § 44, CEDH 2000-XII).
- In
the instant case, the concerns regarding the two judges’
impartiality stemmed from the fact that they had given a judgment
against D., which contained D.’s statements on the applicant’s
character and role in the offence.
- The
Court accepts that that situation could raise doubts in the
applicant’s mind about the impartiality of the criminal court.
However, it has to decide whether these doubts were objectively
justified. In that connection, the Court notes that the answer to
that question depends on the circumstances of the specific case. The
mere fact that a trial judge has made previous decisions concerning
the same offence cannot be held as in itself justifying fears as to
his impartiality (see Hauschildt, cited above, § 50, and
Romero Martin v. Spain (dec.), no. 32045/03, 12 June 2006
concerning pre-trial decisions; Ringeisen v. Austria, judgment
of 16 July 1971, Series A no. 13, p. 40, § 97 and Diennet
v. France, judgment of 26 September 1995, Series A no. 325 A,
p. 17, § 38 concerning the situation of judges to whom a
case was remitted after a decision had been set aside or quashed by a
higher court; Thomann v. Switzerland, judgment of 10 June
1996, Reports 1996 III, pp. 815-816, §§ 35-36
concerning the retrial of an accused convicted in absentia; and Craxi
III v. Italy (dec.), no. 63226/00, 14 June 2001, Ferrantelli
and Santangelo and Rojas Morales, cited above, § 59
and 33, respectively, concerning the situation of judges having
participated in proceedings against co-offenders).
- Turning
to the present case, the Court notes that the Heilbronn Regional
Court, in its judgment of 8 April 1997, which contained the relevant
passages on the applicant, expressly stated that the established
facts were essentially based on D.’s own submissions (see
paragraphs 8 and 10 above), and thus did not constitute the Regional
Court’s assessment of the applicant’s guilt. The Regional
Court further took note of the fact that the applicant was
unavailable to the court, as he was at the time in detention in
Spain. It follows that the deciding judges had been aware of the fact
that they had not yet examined the case from the applicant’s
point of view. This is further confirmed by the judges’
official statements (see paragraph 14 above), in which they
emphasised that they had been aware of the fact that their sources of
knowledge had been limited and that an assessment of the applicant’s
possible involvement had to be left to the main proceedings against
the applicant. Indeed, the assessment of facts in the judgment given
against the applicant clearly differs from that in the judgment
against D. and does not contain any references to that judgment,
showing that the judges undertook a fresh consideration of the
applicant’s case.
- With
regard to the context of the relevant statements, the Court notes
that the Heilbronn Regional Court, when giving its judgment on D.,
essentially followed D.’s own submissions. According to these,
the lethal blows against the victim had been dealt not by D. himself,
but by the applicant. In order to establish D.’s criminal
liability for murder, the Regional Court had to assess the
applicant’s actions and intentions and had to prove that the
accused D. knew and approved of these. It follows that the impugned
statements had been relevant to D.’s conviction.
- In
these respects, the present case can be distinguished from the cases
of Ferrantelli and Santangelo and of Rojas Morales
(both cited above, §§ 59 and 33, respectively).
- Having
regard to all circumstances of this case, the Court concludes that
the applicant’s concerns with regard to judges W.’s and
B.’s impartiality were not objectively justified. There has
accordingly been no violation of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Declares the application admissible;
- Holds that there has been no violation of
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 10 August 2006, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Claudia
Westerdiek Peer Lorenzen
Registrar President
