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FIFTH
SECTION
CASE OF SILIN v. UKRAINE
(Application
no. 23926/02)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
13
July 2006
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Silin v. Ukraine,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Mr P. Lorenzen, President,
Mr K.
Jungwiert,
Mr V. Butkevych,
Mrs M. Tsatsa-Nikolovska,
Mr R.
Maruste,
Mr J. Borrego Borrego,
Mrs R. Jaeger, judges,
and
Mrs C. Westerdiek, Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 19 June 2006,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an application
(no. 23926/02) against Ukraine
lodged with the Court under Article
34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by Ukrainian
nationals, Messrs Sergey Mikhailovich and Konstantin Mikhailovich
Siliny (“the applicants”), on 14 June 2002.
- The
applicants were represented by their mother, Mrs T. Silina.
The Ukrainian Government (“the Government”) were
represented by their Agent, Mrs V. Lutkovska.
- On
23 June 2005 the Court
decided to communicate the complaint about the length of the
proceedings to the respondent Government. Applying Article 29 §
3 of the Convention, it decided to rule on the admissibility and
merits of the application at the same time.
- On
1 April 2006 this case was assigned to the newly constituted Fifth
Section (Rule 25 § 5 and Rule 52 § 1).
THE FACTS
- The
applicants, Mr Sergey Mikhailovich Silin and Mr Konstantin
Mikhailovich Silin, are brothers. They were born in 1982 and 1985,
respectively, and currently reside in the town of Zaporizhzhya,
Ukraine.
- In
September 1997 the title to reside in the State-owned flat,
where the applicants’ father had resided before his death on
29 December 1996, was transferred to Mr S.
I. CIVIL COURT PROCEEDINGS
- On
2 December 1997 the applicants instituted civil proceedings in
the Leninskyy District Court of Zaporizhzhya (“the Leninskyy
Court”) against the Zaporizhstal Joint Stock Company, the
Zaporizhzhya Town State Administration, and Mr S. The applicants
claimed their right to reside in the impugned flat. They maintained
that they had been residing in that flat before 1997 and that in
October 1997 their possessions had been unlawfully taken out of
the flat. On 27 December 1997 the Zaporizhstal Company
submitted its objections concerning the applicants’ claims.
- According
to the Government, the court scheduled the first hearing for
6 May 1998, following the completion of its preparatory
work on the case, which included meetings with the parties and
obtaining the documents relevant to the case.
- Out
of twenty hearings held between December 1997 and October 2000
fourteen were adjourned due to the absence or at the request of Mr S.
or the representative of the Zaporizhstal Company. The hearing of
11 December 1998 was adjourned until 29 January 1999
at the applicants’ request.
- There
were no hearings held during the periods of 2 December 1997 –
6 May 1998, 24 July – 27 October 1998,
29 March – 18 June 2000, and 18 July –
5 October 2000. According to the Government, there is no
information about the progress of the case between 3 June and
26 October 1999, as the minutes of the court hearings were
destroyed due to an external damage caused to the court building.
According to the applicants, no hearings took place in that period of
time.
- On
29 March 2000 the court, following the motion of the
Zaporizhstal Company, allowed the participation of the Housing
Department of the Zaporizhzhya Town State Administration as a
co-defendant in the proceedings on the ground that the latter was the
owner of the flat.
- On
5 October 2000 the court found for the applicants.
- On
21 November 2000 the Zaporizhzhya Regional Court, upon the
appeal in cassation of the Zaporizhstal Company, quashed the decision
of the first instance court and remitted the case for a fresh
consideration.
- On
28 March 2001 the applicants requested the Leninskyy Court
to order the Zaporizhzhya Town Prosecutor’s Office to provide
the court with the copies of the documents concerning their criminal
law complaints examined by the prosecutors in September 2000
(see paragraph 18 below). On the same day the court allowed the
request and adjourned the proceedings pending the prosecutors’
reply.
- On
an unspecified date the prosecutors submitted the documents requested
to the court.
- On
6 February 2002 the court, sitting as a panel of three
judges, found against the applicants. It held that the applicants had
neither resided in the flat nor acquired a right to reside there. The
court further held that there had been no personal possessions found
in that flat which could have belonged to the applicants. The court
also noted that the applicants enjoyed the right to reside in
another, originally State-owned flat. The applicants’ mother
acquired the latter flat by privatisation.
- On
18 April 2002 and 21 February 2003, respectively, the
Zaporizhzhya Regional Court of Appeal and the panel of three judges
of the Supreme Court of Ukraine rejected the applicants’
appeals and upheld the judgment of 6 February 2002.
II. APPLICANTS’ CRIMINAL COMPLAINTS
- On
unspecified dates the applicants lodged with the local police and
prosecutors several criminal law complaints concerning their eviction
from the flat. In September 2000 the applicants’
complaints were examined and rejected as unsubstantiated. The police
and prosecutors refused to commence criminal investigation into the
matter. The applicants did not challenge these decisions before the
national courts.
THE LAW
I. COMPLAINT ABOUT THE LENGTH OF THE PROCEEDINGS
- The
applicants complained that the length of the proceedings had been
incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement,
provided in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as
follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a
reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
A. Admissibility
- The
Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further
notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
- The
Court observes that the impugned proceedings began in December 1997
and were completed in February 2003. Their overall duration was
around five years and three months.
- The
Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings
must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and
with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case,
the conduct of the applicants and the relevant authorities and what
was at stake for the applicants in the dispute (see, among many other
authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, §
43, ECHR 2000-VII).
1. Complexity of the case
- The
Government contended that the case was complicated due to the fact
that on 27 December 1997 the Zaporizhstal Company had
lodged with the domestic courts a counter-claim.
- The
applicants disputed the Government’s contention. They
maintained that there had been no counter-claim lodged in the course
of the proceedings.
- The
Court notes that the dispute primarily concerned a title to reside in
a State-owned flat. The domestic courts had to establish whether the
applicants had acquired a right to reside in that flat, whether they
had actually resided there and whether there had been their
possessions in the flat. The courts based their decisions on the
written evidence submitted by the parties and the statements of four
witnesses heard by the courts. As it appears from the material in its
possession, the Court observes that, contrary to the Government’s
submissions, there was no counter-claim lodged in the proceedings.
Therefore, the Court concludes that the subject matter of the
litigation at issue could not be considered particularly complex.
2. Conduct of the applicants
- The
Government maintained that the applicants were responsible for a
delay of more than twelve months, as the proceedings had been
adjourned on 11 December 1998 and 28 March 2001
upon their motions (see paragraphs 9 and 14 above). According to the
Government, a delay of eleven months was caused due to the fact that
applicants had challenged the decisions of 6 February and
18 April 2002.
- The
applicants disagreed.
- The
Court observes that the applicants contributed to the length of the
proceedings by requesting their adjournment on 11 December 1998
(until 29 January 1999). The Court further observes that
the applicants’ motion of 28 March 2001 was aimed at
obtaining the documents concerning their criminal complaints (see
paragraph 18 above). However, this motion cannot explain the whole
period of the court’s inactivity until February 2002. The Court
considers that the submission of these documents by another public
authority should not have taken long.
- The
Court notes that the applicants challenged the decisions of
6 February and 18 April 2002 before the higher courts.
However, they cannot be blamed for using the avenues available to
them under domestic law in order to protect their interests and they
did not contribute considerably to the overall length of the
proceedings.
- Given
the above considerations, the Court concludes that, while there are
some periods of delay which could be attributed to the applicants,
there is no evidence before the Court to suggest that the applicants
contributed significantly to the overall length of the proceedings.
3. What was at stake for the applicants
- The
Court observes that the proceedings were of some importance for the
applicants. Nonetheless, the Court does not find any ground for the
domestic courts to deal with this case with some urgency vis-à-vis
other cases pending before them.
4. Conduct of the national authorities
- The
Government stated that there were no significant periods of
inactivity attributable to the State. In particular, the Government
mentioned that between December 1997 and October 2000 the
defendants had either been repeatedly absent from the hearings or
requested their adjournment.
- The
applicants objected to this view.
- The
Court recalls that it is the role of the domestic courts to manage
their proceedings so that they are expeditious and effective (see, as
a recent authority, Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) [GC],
no. 36813/97, § 183, ECHR 2006 ...). In
particular, the domestic courts were in a position to judge whether
there were valid grounds for the adjournment of the proceedings at
the request of any of the parties and, if so, to establish the period
of such adjournment. Moreover, the courts enjoyed full competence
under Ukrainian law to apply administrative and criminal law
sanctions against the parties whose behaviour caused unjustified
delays in the proceedings.
- Therefore,
the Court considers that the State authorities were responsible for
the protraction of the proceedings before the first instance court
for a total of around fifteen months, which took place between
December 1997 and October 2000 (see paragraphs 8 and 10
above) and for which the Government have not put forward any
plausible justification.
- The
Court notes that the proceedings before the courts of appeal and
cassation were completed within one year. Nonetheless, having regard
to the delays before the first instance court and to the
circumstances of the instant case as a whole, the Court considers
that in the instant case the length of the proceedings was excessive
and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement.
- There
has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention.
II. OTHER COMPLAITNS
- The
applicants further complained under Articles 6 § 1
and 13 of the Convention about the outcome and unfairness of the
proceedings.
- The
Court finds that there is nothing to show observes that the
proceedings were arbitrary or that the court decisions reached were
manifestly unreasonable. The applicants enjoyed the right to
adversarial proceedings with the participation of interested parties
and were able to introduce all necessary arguments in defence of
their interests, and the judicial authorities gave them due
consideration. Accordingly, this part of the application must be
rejected as manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§
3 and 4 of the Convention.
- The
applicants finally complained that their eviction from the flat and
the failure of the police to prevent third parties from entering the
flat amounted to a violation of their right to respect for their
home. They invoked Article 8 § 1 of the
Convention.
- The
Court observes that the applicants raised these complaints before the
domestic courts. The latter established that the applicants had
neither resided in the impugned flat nor acquired a right to reside
there. Accordingly, they were not evicted from the flat. In view of
its findings under Articles 6 § 1 and 13 of the
Convention (at paragraph 39), the Court does not find any ground to
depart from the conclusions of the domestic courts.
- The
Court considers that the facts of the present case do not disclose
any appearance of a violation of Article 8 of the Convention and that
this part of the application must be rejected as being manifestly
ill-founded pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the
Convention.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
- Article
41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
- The
applicants claimed UAH 8,210
in respect of pecuniary damage. They also claimed EUR 5,000 each
in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
- The
Government maintained that the applicant’s claims were
unsubstantiated and submitted that the finding of a violation would
constitute sufficient just satisfaction.
- The
Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found
and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim.
However, the Court considers that the applicant must have sustained
non-pecuniary damage as regards the excessive length of the
proceedings in their case. The Court, making its assessment on an
equitable basis, as required by Article 41 of the Convention,
considers that the finding of a violation constitutes in itself
sufficient just satisfaction for the non-pecuniary damage.
B. Costs and expenses
- The
applicants did not submit any claim under this head. The Court
therefore makes no award.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT
- Declares unanimously the complaint under
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention concerning the
excessive length of the proceedings admissible and the remainder of
the application inadmissible;
- Holds by four votes to three that there has been
a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;
- Holds unanimously that the finding of a
violation constitutes in itself sufficient just satisfaction for the
non-pecuniary damage sustained by the applicants;
- Dismisses unanimously the applicants’
claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 13 July 2006, pursuant to
Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Claudia Westerdiek Peer Lorenzen
Registrar President
In accordance with Article 45 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 74
§ 2 of the Rules of Court, the joint dissenting opinion of Mr
Lorenzen, Mr Maruste and Mrs Jaeger is annexed to this judgment.
P.L.
C.W.
JOINT DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGES LORENZEN, MARUSTE AND
JAEGER
The
majority has found that there has been a breach of Article 6 § 1
of the Convention because the length of the proceedings was excessive
in the present case. We are not able to agree with this finding for
the following reasons.
The
proceedings involved court instances at three levels and lasted in
total a little less than 5 years and 3 months. Furthermore the case
had to be heard twice in the first instance due to the quashing of
the judgment of 5 October 2000 by the Regional Court. It is true as
stated by the majority that there was a period of around fifteen
months in total before the first instance court for which the
Government have not put forward any plausible explanation. However,
the proceedings before the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court were
terminated within a year and the global period for determining the
case cannot be considered unreasonable. Thus in cases where several
instances are involved it is in our opinion important not to consider
the length of the proceedings separately because an exhaustive
examination of the factual and legal issues by a first instance court
may often reduce the time needed by higher courts. Furthermore it
must be taken into account – as rightly stated by the majority
– that the applicant to some extent contributed to the length
of the proceedings and that it was a civil case of a non urgent
nature.
Having
regard to the circumstances of the case the period in question cannot
be regarded as unacceptable if viewed in the context of the total
duration of the proceedings, as it must be, cf. for example G.L. v.
Italy judgment of 3 October 2002, no. 54283/00, and Hadjikostova v.
Bulgaria, judgment of 4 December 2003, no. 36843/97 with further
references. Accordingly there has in our opinion been no violation of
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.