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FIFTH
SECTION
CASE OF BONEVA v. BULGARIA
(Application
no. 53820/00)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
16 November 2006
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Boneva v. Bulgaria,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Mr P. Lorenzen, President,
Mrs S.
Botoucharova,
Mr K. Jungwiert,
Mr R. Maruste,
Mr J.
Borrego Borrego,
Mrs R. Jaeger,
Mr M. Villiger, judges,
and
Mrs C. Westerdiek, Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 23 October 2006,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an application (no. 53820/00) against the Republic
of Bulgaria lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by Mrs Mariana Yordanova Boneva, a Bulgarian
national who was born in 1967 and lives in Kirkovo (“the
applicant”), on 12 October 1999.
- The
applicant was represented by Ms E. Nedeva, a lawyer practising in
Plovdiv.
- The
Bulgarian Government (“the Government”) were represented
by their Agents, Ms M. Dimova and Ms M. Kotzeva, of the Ministry of
Justice.
- The
applicant alleged that after she was arrested on 30 September 1999
she was not brought promptly before a judge or other officer
authorised by law to exercise judicial power.
- By
a decision of 10 November 2005 the Court declared the application
partly admissible.
- The
parties did not submit further written observations on the merits
(Rule 59 § 1).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- At
the relevant time, the applicant was the head of the financial
department of the Kirkovo municipality.
- A
preliminary investigation was opened against her on 28 September 1999
and she was arrested. After having fainted, she was released on the
same day and was taken for treatment to a medical facility.
- On
30 September 1999 the applicant was once again arrested, charged with
misappropriation of funds and abuse of office and detained on remand
upon a decision of an investigator, approved by the Kurdzhali
Prosecutor's Office.
- On
4 October 1999 the applicant filed an appeal against her detention.
- On 8 October 1999 the applicant was brought before the
Kurdzhali Regional Court in the context of the examination of her
appeal. The domestic court, by majority, dismissed her appeal as it
found that she had been charged with a serious offence which entailed
mandatory detention.
- In response to another appeal against her detention,
on 21 October 1999 the Kurdzhali Regional Court released the
applicant on bail as it found, inter alia, that her son had
developed a serious medical condition as a result of his mother's
detention.
- On
28 February 2002 an indictment was entered against the applicant with
the Momchilgrad District Court for misappropriation of funds and
abuse of office.
- In
a judgment of 7 May 2004 of the Momchilgrad District Court acquitted
the applicant of the charges against her. The judgment entered into
force on 20 May 2004.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
- At
the relevant time and until the reform of the CCP of 1 January 2000
an arrested person was brought before an investigator who decided
whether or not he or she should be remanded in custody. The
investigator's decision was subject to approval by a prosecutor. The
role of investigators and prosecutors under Bulgarian law has been
summarised in paragraphs 25-29 of the Court's judgment in the
case of Nikolova v. Bulgaria [GC] (no. 31195/96, §§
45-53, ECHR 1999 II).
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 3 OF THE
CONVENTION
- The
applicant complained that after the arrest on 30 September 1999 she
was not brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised
by law to exercise judicial power.
Article
5 § 3 of the Convention provides, as relevant:
“Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with
the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought
promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to
exercise judicial power...”
- The
Government concurred that the legislation in force prior to 1 January
2000 did not require detainees to be brought before a judge or other
officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power. On the other
hand, they argued that the applicant had available an appeals'
procedure against her detention, which she made use of and, as a
result, was presented before a judge on 8 October 1999. The
Government considered, therefore, that the applicant had de facto
been brought promptly before judge or other officer authorised by
law to exercise judicial power, as required under Article 5 § 3
of the Convention.
- In her response, the applicant referred to the Court's
case-law, where it had found a violation as until 1 January 2000
pre-trial detention was ordered by a prosecutor or an investigator,
who cannot be regarded as “judge[s]” or “other
officer[s]” exercising judicial function (Assenov and Others
v. Bulgaria, judgment of 28 October 1998, Reports of Judgments
and Decisions 1998 VIII, Nikolova, cited above,
Shishkov v. Bulgaria, no. 38822/97, ECHR 2003 I
(extracts), Yankov v. Bulgaria, no. 39084/97, ECHR 2003 XII
(extracts), and Hamanov v. Bulgaria, no. 44062/98, 8 April
2004).
- The
Court notes that this complaint is identical to those in previous
cases against Bulgaria, where the Court found a violation as until 1
January 2000 pre-trial detention was ordered by a prosecutor or an
investigator, who cannot be regarded as “judge[s]” or
“other officer[s]” exercising judicial function (see
Assenov and Others, cited above, §§ 142 50
and Nikolova, cited above, §§ 45-53).
- In
its observations the Government argued, inter alia, that the
authorities complied with this provision, because the applicant was
brought before a judge on 8 October 1999 when the Kurdzhali Regional
Court heard her first appeal against her detention.
- The Court reiterates, however, that judicial control
under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention, must be prompt, a
matter to be assessed in each case according to its special features
(see De Jong, Baljet and Van den Brink v. the Netherlands,
judgment of 22 May 1984, Series A no. 77, pp. 24-25, §§ 51-52).
The scope for flexibility in interpreting and applying the notion of
promptness is very limited (Brogan and Others v. the United
Kingdom, judgment of 29 November 1988, Series A no. 145-B, p. 33,
§ 62, and Aquilina v. Malta [GC], no. 25642/94, §
48, ECHR 1999 III).
- In
addition to being prompt, the judicial control of the detention must
be automatic and cannot be made to depend on a previous application
by the detained person (see De Jong, Baljet and Van den Brink,
cited above, p. 24, § 51, and Aquilina, cited above,
§ 48).
- The
Court notes that in the Brogan and Others case (see the above
reference) it held that a justifiable detention in police custody
which had lasted four days and six hours, without judicial control,
breached the requirement of promptness. Applying that rationale to
the present case, a detention which had lasted eight days, without
judicial control, must also be considered to have breached the
requirement of promptness under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention.
Moreover, the applicant was presented before a judge on 8 October
1999 only as a result of the appeal she filed against her detention
and not at the undertaking of the authorities.
- In
view of the above, the Court finds that Article 5 § 3 of the
Convention has been breached on account of the authorities' failure
to bring the applicant promptly before a judge or other officer
authorised by law to exercise judicial power following her detention
on 30 September 1999.
II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
- Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
- The
applicant claimed 2,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non pecuniary
damage. She claimed that she had felt anguish as a result of her
detention and considered that if she had been brought promptly before
a judge she could have been released sooner than on 21 October 1999.
- The
Government did not submit comments on the applicant's claims in
respect of non-pecuniary damage.
- The
Court finds the applicant's argument unsubstantiated. Nevertheless,
noting its finding of a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the
Convention (see paragraph 24 above) and deciding on an equitable
basis it awards EUR 500 under this head, plus any tax that may be
chargeable on that amount.
B. Costs and expenses
- The
applicant claimed EUR 2,630 for 43 hours of legal work by her lawyer
before the domestic courts at an hourly rate of EUR 50 or EUR 80
depending on the type of work involved. She also sought EUR 1,605 for
22.5 hours of legal work by her lawyer before the Court, at the
hourly rate of EUR 50 or EUR 80 depending on the work. The applicant
also claimed EUR 129 for translation, phone, photocopying,
postal and office expenses of her lawyer. The total amount thus
sought was EUR 4,364. She submitted a legal fees agreement, a
timesheet of completed legal work, invoices for translation costs and
postal receipts. The applicant requested that the costs and expenses
incurred should be paid directly to her lawyer, Ms E. Nedeva.
- The
Government did not submit comments on the applicant's claims for
costs and expenses.
- The
Court reiterates that according to its case-law, an applicant is
entitled to reimbursement of his costs and expenses only in so far as
it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily
incurred and were reasonable as to quantum. In the instant case, it
considers that the hourly rates and the number of hours claimed, both
for the work before the domestic courts and before the Court, seem
excessive and that a reduction is necessary on that basis. Moreover,
the majority of the applicant's complaints were declared inadmissible
(see paragraph 5 above). Thus, having regard to all relevant factors
the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 750 in
respect of costs and expenses, plus any tax that may be chargeable on
that amount.
C. Default interest
- The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Holds that there has been a violation of Article
5 § 3 of the Convention on account of the authorities' failure
to bring the applicant promptly before a judge or other officer
authorised by law to exercise judicial power following her detention
on 30 September 1999;
- Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay to the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final according to
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts, to be
converted into Bulgarian levs at the rate applicable on the date of
settlement:
(i) EUR
500 (five hundred euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR
750 (seven hundred and fifty euros) in respect of costs and expenses,
payable into the bank account of the applicant's lawyer in Bulgaria,
Ms E. Nedeva;
(iii) any
tax that may be chargeable on the above amounts;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
- Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim
for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 16 November 2006,
pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Claudia
Westerdiek Peer Lorenzen
Registrar President