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FOURTH
SECTION
CASE OF TROJAŃCZYK v. POLAND
(Application
no. 11219/02)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
9
January 2007
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision
In the case of Trojańczyk v. Poland,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Sir Nicolas
Bratza, President,
Mr J. Casadevall,
Mr G. Bonello,
Mr S.
Pavlovschi,
Mr L. Garlicki,
Ms L. Mijović,
Mr J.
Šikuta, judges,
and Mrs F. Elens-Passos, Deputy Section
Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 5 December 2006,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an application
(no. 11219/02) against the
Republic of Poland lodged with the Court
on 16 July 2001 under
Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”)
by Ms B. Trojańczyk, the applicant.
- The
Polish Government (“the Government”) were represented by
their Agent, Mr J. Wołąsiewicz of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.
- On
14 February 2006 the
Court decided to give notice of the application to the Government.
Applying Article 29 § 3 of the Convention, it decided to rule on
the admissibility and merits of the application at the same time.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The
applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Warszawa.
- On
23 June 1993 the applicant lodged a petition for divorce with the
Warsaw Regional Court.
- On
14 December 1993 the Warsaw Regional Court decided to secure the
payment of the applicant’s maintenance claims on the property
of the applicant’s husband pending the outcome of the divorce
proceedings. On 25 August 1995 it changed its previous
decision on the issue of security for the payment of the maintenance
claims. The defendant, the applicant’s husband, appealed. On 14
February 1996 the Warsaw Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.
Hearings
before the Regional Court were held on 4 November and 14 December
1993, 6 January, 15 February and 25 April 1994, 28 April, 2 August
and 25 August 1995, 5 March 1997, 28 January, 7 April and 16 June
1999.
On 17 January 2001 the
Warsaw Regional Court gave a judgment ruling on the divorce petition.
The applicant was served with it on 12 March 2001.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
The
relevant domestic provisions and practice concerning the State’s
liability for a tort committed by its official have been already
cited in previous cases against Poland (see, for example, Rybczyńscy
v. Poland, no. 3501/02, and Białas v. Poland,
no. 69129/01).
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION
- The
applicant complained that the length of the proceedings had been
incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement, laid
down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as
follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a
reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
- The
Government contested that argument.
-
The Court observes that the proceedings started on 23
June 1993, when the applicant lodged her petition for divorce, and
were terminated by the Warsaw Regional Court judgment of 17 January
2001. They therefore lasted 7 years and 6 months for one level of
jurisdiction.
A. Admissibility
1. Exhaustion of domestic remedies
- The
Government submitted that the applicant had not exhausted remedies
available under Polish law. They maintained that from 17 September
2004 when the 2004 Act came into force, the applicant had a
possibility of lodging with the Polish civil courts a claim for
compensation for damage suffered due to the excessive length of
proceedings under Article 417 of the Civil Code read together with
section 16 of the 2004 Act. They argued that the three-year
prescription period for the purposes of a compensation claim in tort
based on the excessive length of proceedings could run from a date
later than the date on which a final decision in these proceedings
had been given.
- The
Court notes that the arguments raised by the Government are the same
as those already examined and rejected by the Court in previous cases
against Poland (see Malasiewicz v. Poland, no. 22072/02,
§§ 32-34, 14 October 2003; Ratajczyk
v. Poland; (dec.), 11215/02, 31 May 2005; Barszcz
v Poland, no. 71152/01, 30 May 2006) and the Government have
not submitted any new circumstances which would lead the Court to
depart from its previous findings.
- The
Government further argued that the possibility of lodging a claim for
compensation for damage suffered due to the excessive length of
proceedings under Article 417 of the Civil Code had existed in Polish
law even before the entry into force of the 2004 Act, namely since
the judgment of the Constitutional Court of 4 December 2001.
- The
Court notes that it has already examined whether after 18 December
2001 and prior to the entry into force of the Law of 17 June 2004
a compensation claim in tort as provided for by Polish civil law was
an effective remedy in respect of complaints about the length of
proceedings. It held that no evidence of any judicial practice had
been provided to show that a claim for compensation based on Article
417 of the Civil Code has ever been successful before the domestic
courts (see Skawińska v. Poland (dec.), no.
42096/98, 4 March 2003 and Malasiewicz v Poland, no.
22072/02, 14 October 2003). As the Government have failed to
submit any new arguments, the Court will abide by its previous
findings.
- It
follows that the Government’s plea of inadmissibility on the
ground of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies must be dismissed.
2. Compliance with the six-month time-limit
- The
Government maintained that the application had been lodged outside
the six-month time-limit. They observed that the final judgment of
the domestic court was given on 17 January 2001 and, consequently,
the application should have been lodged until 17 July 2001 at the
latest.
In
the Government’s opinion, when examining whether the six-month
rule had been observed, the date of arrival of the correspondence at
the Court should be taken into consideration. They pointed out that
the application form reached the Court on 26 July 2001, that is nine
days after the six-month period had passed and that they found no
proof that the letter had actually been sent before the expiry of the
six-month period. In particular the Government strongly opposed the
acceptance of the date of 16 July 2001, which had been written
by the applicant next to her signature on the application form, as
the date on which the application had been lodged. They argued that
the applicant could have chosen this date arbitrarily.
- The
Court recalls that the purpose of the six-month rule is to promote
security of the law, to ensure that cases raising Convention issues
are dealt with within a reasonable time and to protect the
authorities and other persons concerned from being under uncertainty
for a prolonged period of time (see, among many other authorities,
P.M. v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 6638/03, 24 August
2004).
The
date of the introduction of an application is the date of the first
letter indicating an intention to lodge an application and giving
some indication of the nature of the application (Chalkley v. the
United Kingdom (dec.), no. 63831/00, 26 September
2002). In the present case, the Court considers that there are no
compelling reasons why the date of signature on the application form,
namely 16 July 2001, should not be accepted as the date of lodging of
the application. It is to be observed that the applicant posted her
application to the Court on that very same day, as is confirmed by
the date of the stamp on the envelope.
It
follows that the application was lodged within the prescribed
time limit.
- The
Court notes that the application is not manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further
notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
- The
Government admitted that the proceedings were not complex and the
applicant had not contributed to their length. Nevertheless, they
were of the opinion that the judicial authorities had shown adequate
diligence in ensuring the proper course of the proceedings at issue.
- The
Court recalls that the period to be taken into consideration amounted
to 7 years and 6 months for one level of jurisdiction
- The
Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings
must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and
with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case,
the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what
was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other
authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, §
43, ECHR 2000-VII). In cases relating to civil status, what is at
stake for the applicant is also a relevant consideration, and special
diligence is required in view of the possible consequences which the
excessive length of proceedings may have, notably on enjoyment of the
right to respect for family life (Laino v. Italy [GC],
no. 3158/96, § 18, ECHR 1999-I).
- The
Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present
case (see Frydlender, cited above). Having examined all the
material submitted to it, the Court considers that the Government
have not put forward any fact or argument capable of persuading it to
reach a different conclusion in the present case. It notes in
particular that the proceedings related to the applicant’s
civil status, and thus required special diligence. However, in 1997
only one hearing was held and no hearings were held in 1996 and 1998.
It has not been disputed that the case was not complex and that no
delays could be attributed to the applicant.
- Having
regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers that in
the instant case the length of the proceedings was excessive and
failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement.
There
has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
- Article
41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
- The
applicant, who did not claim costs and expenses, left the amount of
just satisfaction to be awarded to the Court’s discretion. The
Government argued that the amount should not exceed 10,000 PLN (2,500
EUR) which is the maximum compensation granted under the provisions
of the 2004 Act on complaints about a breach of the right to a trial
within reasonable time.
- The
Court considers that the applicant must have sustained some
non-pecuniary damage. Ruling on an equitable basis and having regard
to its established case-law, the Court awards her EUR 5,400 under
that head.
- The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Declares the application admissible;
- Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention;
- Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 5,400 (five
thousand four hundred euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage to be
converted into Polish zlotys at the rate applicable at the date of
settlement, plus any tax that may be chargeable;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 9 January 2007, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
F. Elens-Passos Nicolas Bratza
Deputy Registrar President
