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FOURTH
SECTION
CASE OF RUCIŃSKI v. POLAND
(Application
no. 33198/04)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
20
February 2007
This judgment will
become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2
of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Ruciński v. Poland,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Sir Nicolas Bratza, President,
Mr G.
Bonello,
Mr K. Traja,
Mr L. Garlicki,
Ms L.
Mijović,
Mr J. Šikuta,
Mrs P. Hirvelä,
judges,
and Mr T.L. Early, Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 30 January 2007,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an application (no. 33198/04) against the Republic
of Poland lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by a Polish national, Mr W. Ruciński, on
6 August 2004.
- The
Polish Government (“the Government”) were represented by
their Agent, Mr J. Wołąsiewicz of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.
- On
11 October 2005 the Court declared the application partly
inadmissible and decided to communicate the complaint concerning the
length of the applicant’s pre-trial detention to the
Government. Under the provisions of Article 29 § 3 of the
Convention, it decided to examine the merits of the application at
the same time as its admissibility.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The
applicant was born in 1943 and lives in Kielce.
- In
April 2002 the Kielce Regional Prosecutor ordered the applicant’s
house, car and premises used for commercial activities to be searched
in view of the strong suspicion that he had been a member of a
criminal group and had committed offences concerning property and
documents.
- On
28 May 2002 the applicant was arrested and on 29 May 2002 he was
remanded in custody by the Kielce District Court on suspicion of
forging documents, financial fraud and membership of a criminal gang.
The court considered that there was a reasonable risk that the
applicant would tamper with evidence, given the fact that he had had
close personal and business connections with several other persons
charged with the same offences. On 17 June 2002 the Kielce Regional
Court upheld the decision to detain him.
- In
decisions of 21 August and 22 November 2002 the Katowice District
Court prolonged the applicant’s detention, holding that there
was a contradiction between the applicant’s statements and the
evidence collected in the course of the proceedings. In addition,
some documents had been forged and the prosecuting authorities could
not yet identify all the perpetrators of the offences. The court made
reference to the activities already carried out and gave a precise
indication of the evidence that still had to be taken. Consequently,
it decided that it was indispensable to separate the applicant from
the other suspects and from the evidence which had not yet been
secured. The court also relied on the serious nature of the charges
against the applicant and the severity of the penalty he faced.
-
On 20 January 2003 the Kielce Regional Prosecutor extended the
charges against the applicant.
- The
applicant’s detention was prolonged on 24 February 2003 by the
Kielce District Court and subsequently by the Cracow Court of Appeal
on 22 April 2003. The courts relied on the same grounds as previously
invoked by the District Court. They pointed to the complexity of the
case and the existence of a fear of collusion, given the applicant’s
role in the criminal gang and the considerable number of witnesses
acquainted with the applicant who had yet to give evidence.
-
On 21 July 2003 a bill of indictment concerning 20 persons was filed
with the Kielce District Court. The applicant was indicted on charges
of multiple fraud, insurance fraud, misuse of property and membership
of a criminal gang. The prosecution asked the court to hear evidence
from 254 witnesses and to obtain over 300 other pieces of
evidence.
- On
30 July 2003 the Kielce District Court prolonged the applicant’s
detention until 30 October 2003, holding that there was a reasonable
risk that the applicant and other defendants with whom he maintained
close personal or business relations would tamper with evidence by
inducing others to give false statements. On 28 August 2003 the
Kielce Regional Court dismissed an appeal by the applicant against
that decision.
- On
17 September and 17 November 2003 the Kielce District Court held
hearings. Owing to the fact that many of the accused had entered into
a plea bargain, the prosecutor filed a new bill of indictment and the
hearings scheduled for 17, 18 and 19 November 2003 were adjourned
until 17 December 2003 in order to give the accused the
opportunity to familiarise themselves with the new bill.
- Hearings
were held on 17 December 2003, 19, 20, 21, 28 and 29 January,
16, 17, 18, 23 and 25 February, 15, 17, 22 and 24 March, 21 April,
19 May, 16 and 30 June, 14, 15, 21 (adjourned on an application by
the accused) and 29 July (a hearing scheduled for 22 July was
adjourned because the lawyer of one of the accused was absent), and
1, 6, 7, 8, 13 and 15 September 2004.
- Meanwhile,
the applicant’s detention was prolonged on 29 October 2003
and 28 January (an appeal by the applicant was dismissed on
11 February 2004), 24 March and 15 April 2004. The court relied
on the fear of collusion stemming from the fact that many of the
witnesses had not yet given evidence and that the members of the
criminal group had maintained close relations. In particular, the
court stressed that during the preparatory proceedings the defendants
had illegally tried to contact each other. In its last decision the
court also stated that the applicant and another defendant had twice
lodged applications to adjourn the hearings at which it was to take
evidence from the former co-accused, who possessed the greatest
knowledge about the defendants’ activities.
- On
16 September 2004 the District Court made an application to the
Cracow Court of Appeal under Article 263 § 4 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, requesting the prolongation of the applicant’s
detention beyond the statutory time-limit of 2 years. On
13 October 2004 the Court of Appeal prolonged his detention until 21
December 2004, partly allowing the application. The court stressed
that the proceedings had almost been completed and that there was
therefore no need to prolong the applicant’s detention for the
whole period requested. Its decision was upheld on 23 November
2004.
- A
hearing scheduled for 18 October 2004 was adjourned until 19 October
owing to the illness of one of the defendants. The hearing set down
for 20 October 2004 had to be adjourned owing to the absence of a
witness. It was held on 21 October 2004.
- Further
hearings were held on 10, 17 and 24 November 2004. The hearing
scheduled for 29 November was adjourned at the request of one of the
accused.
- On
30 November 2004 the Kielce Regional Prosecutor filed another bill of
indictment against the applicant and some of his co-defendants.
- In
the course of the proceedings, the applicant lodged several
unsuccessful applications for release from detention, which were
dismissed on 23 July, 25 September and 31 October 2002, 17 December
2003, and 16 June and 1 September 2004.
- On
8 December 2004 the Cracow Court of Appeal dismissed a second
application by the District Court for the prolongation of the
applicant’s detention. The appellate court held that the
District Court had failed to conclude the proceedings within the
expected time-frame and that the applicant should not have to suffer
the negative consequences of that fact. It further argued that the
proceedings could be terminated in the course of the forthcoming
hearings, given that there remained only one witness to be examined
and that in the event of his absence his statements could be read
out. On 15 October 2004 an appeal by the prosecutor against that
decision was dismissed.
- Hearings
were held on 1, 15 and 20 December 2004.
- At
the hearing on 20 December 2004 the court decided to place the
applicant under police supervision and to prohibit him from leaving
the country.
- On
28 July 2005 the Kielce District Court gave judgment, convicting the
applicant and sentencing him to four years and six months’
imprisonment for a total of 24 offences, most of them committed when
acting within an organised criminal group.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
- The
relevant domestic law and practice concerning the imposition of
detention on remand (aresztowanie tymczasowe), the grounds for
its prolongation, release from detention and rules governing other,
so-called “preventive measures” (środki
zapobiegawcze) are set out in the Court’s judgments in the
cases of Gołek v. Poland (no. 31330/02, §§
27-33, 25 April 2006) and Celejewski v. Poland (no.
17584/04, §§ 22-23, 4 August 2006).
THE LAW
ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 3 OF THE CONVENTION
- The
applicant complained that the length of his pre-trial detention was
in breach of Article 5 § 3 which provides, in so far as
relevant:
“Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with
the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be
... entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending
trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.”
A. Admissibility
- The
Government in the first place submitted that the applicant had not
exhausted the remedies provided for in Polish law as regards his
complaint under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention, in that he had
failed to appeal against the decisions of 21 August and 22 November
2002, 24 February, 22 April and 29 October 2003 to prolong his
detention.
-
The Court observes that it is well established in its case-law that
applicants must make normal use of those domestic remedies which are
likely to be effective and sufficient. When a remedy has been
attempted, use of another remedy which has essentially the same
objective is not required (see, mutatis mutandis, Crémieux
v France, no. 11471/85, Commission decision of 19
January 1989, and Yaşa v. Turkey, Reports
of Judgments and Decisions 1998-VI, p. 2431, § 71).
- In
the present case the applicant lodged appeals against most of the
decisions to prolong his detention, including the decisions in the
final stage of the proceedings, when the length of the detention
reached its most critical point. He also applied to be released from
detention. The Court considers that the purpose of the remedies
attempted by the applicant was to obtain a review of his detention on
remand. In the circumstances of the case these remedies constitute
adequate and effective remedies within the meaning of Article 35 of
the Convention as their aim was to obtain his release. They
accordingly have the same purpose as the remedies advocated by the
Government.
- The
Court notes that the arguments raised by the Government are similar
to those already examined and rejected in a previous case against
Poland (see Grzeszczuk v. Poland, no. 23029/93, Commission
decision of 10 September 1997) and that the Government have not
mentioned any new circumstances which could lead the Court to depart
from that case-law.
- It
follows that this complaint cannot be dismissed for non-exhaustion of
domestic remedies. The Court further notes that it is not
inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared
admissible.
Merits
1. Period to be taken into consideration
- The
Court observes that the applicant was arrested on 28 May 2002 and
remanded in custody on 29 May 2002. He was released on 20 December
2004. Accordingly, the total period of his detention amounts to about
two years and six months.
2. Reasonableness
of the length of the applicant’s detention
(a) The parties’ arguments
- The
Government were of the opinion that there had been valid reasons for
holding the applicant in detention for the entire period in question.
They firstly referred to the serious suspicion that he had committed
the offences with which he had been charged. The Government
emphasised that there had existed other “relevant and
sufficient” grounds justifying the applicant’s continued
detention. In this connection, they submitted that his detention had
been necessary in order to secure the proper conduct of the
proceedings, having regard to the severity of the penalty he faced.
- The
Government further referred to the serious risk of the applicant’s
absconding or tampering with evidence. In that connection, they
submitted that evidence had had to be heard from the members of the
gang who had maintained close personal and business relations with
the applicant. In addition, some of the accused had entered into a
plea bargain and had later become witnesses in the proceedings. On
the date on which this preventive measure had been applied, the
investigation had still been in progress and it had been expected
that it would be necessary to extend the scope of the investigation.
Having said that, the Government concluded that only the isolation of
the members of the group, at least until all of them had been
detained and had given evidence, could have prevented them from
colluding and coordinating their statements, and from exerting
improper pressure on witnesses.
- The
Government also argued that during the entire period of the
applicant’s detention there had been no circumstances that had
justified lifting that measure or replacing it with a more lenient
one.
- As
regards the review of the applicant’s detention, the Government
pointed out that on each occasion the decisions extending it or
dismissing his applications for release had been sufficiently
reasoned and detailed. The courts had considered not only the
conditions for the applicant’s further detention but also
developments in his situation. They had not relied solely on the
reasons given in the first decision to detain the applicant but had
also taken into account new elements which had emerged in the course
of the proceedings; accordingly, they had not ordered his detention
automatically but had based their decisions on a careful
consideration of each individual case and had decided to release him
as soon as they found that the reasons justifying his detention had
ceased to persist.
36. The Government stressed that the case had been very complex. They
pointed out that both the prosecutor and the trial court had
conducted extensive evidentiary proceedings, which was typical for
proceedings conducted in cases concerning organised crime. The
proceedings had concerned 20 accused and numerous criminal acts.
Almost 250 witnesses had been examined and the applicant had given
evidence nine times.
- According to the Government, hearings had been held
regularly and at short intervals. In the Government’s opinion,
the proceedings had been concluded with reasonable speed and without
any undue delays.
- The
applicant contested the Government’s arguments and emphasised
that the courts had not given relevant and sufficient reasons for his
continued detention. He submitted that the courts had not pointed to
any factor indicating that there had been a risk of his absconding,
going into hiding or otherwise evading justice. He argued that the
courts had not provided any arguments in support of their findings
concerning his membership of a criminal gang or his illegal business
activities.
(b) The Court’s assessment
(i) Principles established under the
Court’s case-law
- Under
the Court’s case law, the issue of whether a period of
detention is reasonable cannot be assessed in abstracto.
Whether it is reasonable for an accused to remain in detention must
be assessed in each case according to its special features. Continued
detention can be justified in a given case only if there are specific
indications of a genuine requirement of public interest which,
notwithstanding the presumption of innocence, outweighs the rule of
respect for individual liberty (see, among other authorities, the W.
v. Switzerland judgment of 26 January 1993, Series A
no. 254-A, p. 15, § 30, Kudła v. Poland
[GC], no. 30210/96, §§ 110-111 with further
references, ECHR 2000-XI).
- It
falls in the first place to the national judicial authorities to
ensure that, in a given case, the pre-trial detention of an accused
person does not exceed a reasonable time. To this end they must
examine all the facts arguing for or against the existence of a
genuine requirement of public interest justifying, with due regard to
the principle of the presumption of innocence, a departure from the
rule of respect for individual liberty and set them out in their
decisions dismissing the applications for release. It is essentially
on the basis of the reasons given in these decisions and of the
established facts stated by the applicant in his appeals that the
Court is called upon to decide whether or not there has been a
violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention (see the
Contrada v. Italy judgment of 24 August 1998, Reports
1998-V, p. 2185, § 54, McKay v. the United Kingdom,
[GC], no. 543/03, judgment of 6 October 2006, § 43).
- It
falls in the first place to the national judicial authorities to
ensure that, in a given case, the pre-trial detention of an accused
person does not exceed a reasonable time. To this end they must,
paying due regard to the principle of the presumption of innocence,
examine all the facts arguing for or against the existence of the
above-mentioned requirement of public interest justifying a departure
from the rule in Article 5 and must set them out in their decisions
on the applications for release. It is essentially on the basis of
the reasons given in these decisions and of the well-documented facts
stated by the applicant in his appeals that the Court is called upon
to decide whether or not there has been a violation of Article 5 §
3 (see, for example, Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772/95, §
152, ECHR 2000-IV, and Kudła, cited above, § 110).
- The
persistence of reasonable suspicion that the person arrested has
committed an offence is a condition sine qua non for the
lawfulness of the continued detention, but after a certain lapse of
time it no longer suffices. The Court must then establish whether the
other grounds given by the judicial authorities continued to justify
the deprivation of liberty. Where such grounds were “relevant”
and “sufficient”, the Court must also be satisfied that
the national authorities displayed “special diligence” in
the conduct of the proceedings (see Labita v. Italy [GC], no.
26772/95, cited above, § 153). The complexity and special
characteristics of the investigation are factors to be considered in
this respect (see, for example, Scott v. Spain, judgment of 18
December 1996, Reports 1996-VI, pp. 2399-2400, § 74,
and I.A. v. France, judgment of 23 September 1998,
Reports 1998-VII, p. 2978, § 102).
(ii) Application of the principles to the
circumstances of the present case
- The
Court observes that the judicial authorities relied, in addition to
the reasonable suspicion against the applicant, on the need to ensure
the proper conduct of the proceedings. In this connection, they
referred to the risk that he might obstruct the proceedings and exert
unlawful pressure on witnesses, in particular since the case
concerned, inter alia, financial offences and fraud
committed in co-operation with other persons.
-
The Court accepts that the reasonable suspicion against the applicant
of having committed the offences with which he had been charged may
have warranted his detention at the early stage of the proceedings
against him. However, with the passage of time that ground inevitably
became less and less relevant. In particular, the Court considers
that that ground cannot suffice to justify the entire period in
issue. It must therefore establish whether the other grounds advanced
by the judicial authorities were “relevant” and
“sufficient” to continue to justify the deprivation of
his liberty.
- As
regards the risk of the applicant’s tampering with evidence or
going into hiding, the Court observes that the judicial authorities
based their findings in this regard on the existence of close
business and personal relations between the defendants and other
members of the criminal group. Moreover, the courts had regard to the
contradiction between the applicant’s statements and the
evidence collected in the course of the proceedings, which, together
with the fact that some of the evidence had been forged, resulted in
the need to separate the applicant from other suspects and from the
evidence which had not yet been secured.
- The
applicant’s detention was subsequently supervised by the courts
at regular intervals. In their decisions prolonging his detention the
domestic authorities further relied on the reasonable suspicion that
the applicant had committed the offences concerned and on the
severity of the likely penalty. However, they also took into account
new elements that emerged in the course of the proceedings and the
conduct of the trial court. In particular, the courts pointed to the
persistent risk of collusion and unlawful obstruction of the
proceedings, increased by the fact that some of the accused had
entered into a plea bargain and were later witnesses in the
proceedings. This risk justified the court’s findings that no
other preventive measure would be sufficient to ensure the proper
conduct of the proceedings. The courts further argued that the
attitude of the applicant during the hearings was an additional
ground for keeping him in custody. The applicant was finally
sentenced for 24 crimes and found guilty of acting within a criminal
gang.
- The
Court accepts that, in the special circumstances of the case, the
risk flowing from the nature of the applicant’s criminal
activities actually existed and justified holding him in custody for
the relevant period.
- The
foregoing considerations permit the Court to conclude that the
grounds given for the applicant’s pre-trial detention satisfied
the requirement of being “relevant” and “sufficient”.
- The Court lastly observes that the proceedings were of
considerable complexity, regard being had to the number of
defendants, their relations and the extensive evidentiary proceedings
the trial court had conducted. The proceedings had concerned 20
accused and numerous criminal acts.
- In
assessing the conduct of the authorities in the present case, the
Court will take into account the special circumstances deriving from
the fact that it concerned a member of a criminal gang (see
Celejewski v. Poland, no. 17584/04, 4 May 2006, Buta v.
Poland, no. 18368/02, 28 November 2006, Bąk v. Poland,
no. 7870/04, 16 January 2007).
- The
Court’s attention has been drawn in particular to the
significant number of 250 witnesses questioned in the course of the
investigation and by the first-instance court. Nevertheless, the
hearings in the applicant’s case were held regularly and at
short intervals. Between February 2003, when the bill of indictment
was lodged, and July 2005, when the first-instance judgment was
given, over 40 hearings were held. There were no significant periods
of inactivity on the part of the prosecution authorities and the
trial court.
- In
conclusion, the Court takes note of the seriousness and the nature of
the charges against the applicant, as well as the number of other
persons charged, the relations between them and the amount of
evidence examined. The complexity of the case undoubtedly prolonged
its examination and contributed to the length of the applicant’s
detention on remand.
- The
applicant was released on 20 December 2004 at an advanced stage of
the proceedings.
- The
Court consequently considers that in the particular circumstances of
the case the domestic authorities cannot be criticised for a failure
to observe “special diligence” in the handling of the
applicant’s case.
- Assessing
the above elements as a whole, the Court does not consider that the
facts of the case disclose a violation of the applicant’s right
to a trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial,
within the meaning of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention.
Accordingly,
there has been no violation of this provision.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Declares the remainder of the application
admissible;
- Holds that there has been no violation of
Article 5 § 3 of the Convention.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 20 February 2007,
pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
T.L. Early Nicolas Bratza
Registrar President
