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SECOND
SECTION
CASE OF
PUZINAS (no. 2) v. LITHUANIA
(Application
no. 63767/00)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
9
January 2007
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Puzinas v. Lithuania,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Mr J.-P. Costa, President,
Mr A.B.
Baka,
Mr I. Cabral Barreto,
Ms A. Mularoni,
Mrs E.
Fura-Sandström,
Ms D. Jočienė,
Mr D. Popović,
judges,
and Mr S. Naismith, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 5 December 2006,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an application (no. 63767/00) against the Republic
of Lithuania lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by a Lithuanian national, Mr Alvydas Puzinas (“the
applicant”), on 18 November 2000.
- The
Lithuanian Government (“the Government”) were represented
by their Agent, Ms E. Baltutytė.
- The
applicant alleged, in particular, a violation of Articles 8, 10 and
11 of the Convention, in respect of a disciplinary penalty imposed on
him for having by-passed the authorised channels for outgoing
prisoners’ correspondence.
- By
a decision of 13 December 2005, the Court declared the application
partly admissible.
- The
applicant and the Government each filed further written observations
(Rule 59 § 1).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The applicant was born in 1952 and lives in PanevėZys.
- The
facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as
follows.
- On
12 December 1991 the Supreme Court sentenced the applicant to 13
years’ imprisonment for aggravated murder. He served the
sentence in the Rasų Prison in Vilnius. The applicant was
released on licence on an unspecified date in 2002.
- The
applicant is the President of the organisation for prisoners’
mutual assistance and support “Freedom” (“Laisvė”).
On 9 July 1999 the applicant signed a letter, on behalf of this
organisation and certain other prisoners, complaining about the
conditions of detention at Rasų Prison and about various
allegedly unlawful acts of the prison administration. The complaint
was addressed to 10 persons, five of whom were State officials and
the five others representatives of the private media. According to
the applicant, the complaint was not sent through the prison
administration, but rather through an inmate who had been released
from the prison, in order to avoid censorship.
- On
20 July 1999 the Prison Department Director punished the applicant by
prohibiting him from receiving a parcel during a personal visit,
having found that the sending of the complaint of 9 July 1999 through
channels other than the prison administration had breached Article 50
§ 6 of the Prison Code. It was also established that the Prison
Interim Rules (fifth addendum) prohibited a prisoner from using a
personal computer, as had been the case with this letter. The
Director held that the applicant could only send the complaint to the
State authorities, not to other organisations or persons (Article 50
§ 1). The Director further stated that Article 50 §
6 of the Prison Code prohibited complaints “on behalf of other
prisoners”.
- Upon
the applicant’s appeal, on 8 December 1999 the Ombudsman
established that the provisions of the Prison Code had not properly
protected prisoners’ rights of association. The Ombudsman did
not express her opinion as to the lawfulness of the penalty.
- The
applicant applied to the administrative courts, claiming that the
penalty had been unlawful. On 6 March 2000 the Vilnius Regional
Administrative Court disallowed the claim for want of jurisdiction.
- On
30 March 2000 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the decision on
appeal. Upon the applicant’s further appeal, on 10 May 2000 the
Court of Appeal quashed the lower court decisions. It held inter
alia that the prison administration was part of the Executive,
and that the administrative courts were consequently competent to
examine the applicant’s action concerning its allegedly
unlawful acts.
- As
the applicant subsequently submitted the claim in accordance with the
requirements of the Code of Administrative Procedure, his action was
examined by the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court on 29 May 2001,
in the presence of the applicant, transported to the hearing directly
from the prison.
- The
court rejected the action as unsubstantiated, finding that the
penalty of 20 July 1999 had been lawful. It held inter alia:
“Pursuant to Article 50 § 1 of the Prison
Code, convicted persons are guaranteed the right to submit
applications, proposals and complaints to the State authorities,
public organisations and officials. When needed, the prison
administration can attach their observations [thereto]. However,
convicted persons are prevented from applying to these institutions
through channels other than the prison administration (Article 50 §
6 of the Prison Code). The applicant admitted that the application
[of 9 July 1999] was sent to 10 addressees illegally, through a
person who had completed his sentence and had been released from the
prison. The prison administration was therefore deprived of the right
to submit their comments as to the issues set out in the
application.”
- On
11 July 2001 the Supreme Administrative Court rejected the
applicant’s appeal against the judgment, holding inter alia:
“The applicant’s claims that the [relevant]
provisions of the Prison Code contradict the Constitution are
unsubstantiated. The applicant must acknowledge that he has been
convicted and sentenced to imprisonment, and that his legal situation
is different from that of persons who have not breached the law... .
As appears from the case file, the applicant was
punished [on 20 July 1999] not for corresponding with representatives
of the media, but for a breach of the requirement under Article 50 of
the Prison Code to conduct [such correspondence] through the prison
administration. The same can be said regarding the applicant’s
claims that, by way of the impugned penalty, he was punished for
making criticisms, holding opinions or imparting information.”
II. The relevant domestic law and practice
- Article
49 § 1 of the Prison Code, as then in force, stipulated that
convicted prisoners were not restricted in the amount of their
outgoing letters. The third paragraph of Article 49 required the
prison administration to send a prisoner’s letter to the
addressee within three days of receipt or its presentation by the
prisoner.
- Article
50 § 1 of the Prison Code applicable at the material time
provided that convicted prisoners could send “proposals,
applications and complaints to the State authorities, public
organisations and officials.” The provision also entitled the
prison administration to attach its own explanations in relation to
such matters.
- Until
25 June 1999, Article 50 § 2 of the Prison Code provided that
convicted prisoners’ correspondence with the prosecutor could
not be subject to censorship (cenzūra). Following a legislative
amendment effective since 25 June 1999, convicted prisoners’
correspondence with the State authorities and the European Court of
Human Rights could not be censored.
- According
to the then Article 50 §§ 5 and 6 of the Prison Code,
convicted prisoners were not allowed to send “collective
complaints and applications” or complain “on behalf of
other convicts”.
- Under
Article 50 § 6 as then in force, convicted prisoners were not
allowed to send proposals, applications and complaints addressed to
the State authorities through channels other than the prison
administration.
- Rule 7.3.2 of the Prison Interim Rules, applicable at
the material time, read as follows:
“Proposals, applications and complaints [by a
convicted person] raising questions within the competence of the
prison administration shall not be sent to the addressee, but shall
be examined on the spot. Having examined [such a] proposal,
application, or complaint, a prison official shall write a report and
... include it in the convicted person’s prison file. Should
there be disagreement, the proposal, application or complaint shall
be sent to the addressee together with the report. If there is a
repeated proposal, application or complaint with the same content,
the prison administration will note its previous reply in the report
... If the authority, organisation or official addressed by the
convicted person is not competent to decide the questions raised, the
prison administration shall advise [the prisoner] to re-address the
proposal, application or complaint. Should [the prisoner] refuse to
do so, the proposal, application or complaint shall be sent to the
addressee.”
- The
Prison Interim Rules (fifth addendum) applicable at the material time
prohibited a detainee from using a computer.
- The
new Prison Code applicable since 18 July 2001 does not allow any
screening of convicted prisoners’ correspondence with the State
authorities and the European Court of Human rights. Under Article 41
of this Code, all other correspondence may be censored (cenzūruojama)
on the basis of a decision by a competent authority (a prosecutor,
prison director or court) taken on a case-by-case basis.
- In
its ruling of 24 March 2003, the Constitutional Court held that the
domestic statutes were in breach of the Constitution insofar as they
allowed unjustified censorship of prisoners’ correspondence.
The Constitutional Court also held that specific grounds should have
been indicated for any particular instance of censorship.
- Certain
other domestic provisions concerning the censorship of convicted
prisoners’ correspondence have been summarised in the judgments
of Valašinas v. Lithuania (no. 44558/98, 24.7.2001 §§
94-97, ECHR 2001-VIII) and Puzinas (no. 1) v. Lithuania (no.
44800/98, 14.3.2002, §§ 15-17).
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION
- The
applicant alleged a violation of Article 8 of the Convention, which
provides, in so far as relevant, as follows:
“1. Everyone has the right to respect
for ... his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public
authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in
accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society ...
for the prevention of disorder or crime ...”
- The
Government submitted that the statutory requirement for convicted
prisoners to send all their communications through the prison
administration, and the resultant punishment of the applicant for
having breached this rule, had not prevented the applicant from
exercising his freedom of correspondence. In any event, the
requirements under the then Article 50 § 6 of the Prison Code
and Rule 7.3.2 of the Prison Interim Rules had been compatible with
the general interest, in order to prevent abuse by prisoners, a more
efficient handling of their complaints, and the provision of legal
assistance to prisoners by the prison administration. The Government
further stated that the domestic law applicable at the material time
had not prevented the applicant from addressing private
organisations, such as the media. All in all, the domestic law
applicable at the material time had properly protected the
applicant’s right to respect for his correspondence.
- The
applicant claimed that the penalty of 20 July 1999 confirmed that the
domestic law applicable at the material time had prevented him, as a
prisoner, from sending complaints and applications, on his own behalf
and in the name of other prisoners, to the State authorities, media
and non-public organisations. He stated that he had not been
protected by the domestic law from an arbitrary interference by the
prison administration with the exercise of his right to
correspondence. The impugned domestic provisions had allowed
indiscriminate censorship of convicted prisoners’
correspondence. As a result, he had been afraid that his complaint
about the detention conditions would have been censored if it had
been sent through the prison administration.
- The
Court observes that on 20 July 1999 the applicant was punished with a
minor disciplinary reprimand – the deprivation of the right to
receive a parcel during the next personal visit he was to receive.
The reason for that punishment, as confirmed
by the Supreme Administrative Court, was the fact that the applicant
had sent a written complaint about prison conditions, dated 9 July
1999, through an unauthorised channel and not the statutorily
required channel of the prison administration, in breach of Article
50 § 6 of the Prison Code as then in force (paragraphs 16 and 18
above). The Court finds that this punishment constituted an
interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his
correspondence, within the meaning of Article 8 § 1 of the
Convention. Whilst it did not directly affect the posting or arrival
of the impugned letter itself, it was intended to influence the
manner in which the applicant sent future correspondence of that
nature.
- Such
an interference will contravene Article 8 unless it is “in
accordance with the law”, pursues one or more of the legitimate
aims referred to in the second paragraph of that provision and is
“necessary in a democratic society” in order to achieve
them (cf., inter alia, Calogero Diana v. Italy,
judgment of 15 November 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions
1996-V, §§ 32-33; Petra v. Romania, judgment of 3
September 1998, Reports 1998-VII, §§ 37-40).
- The
Court is satisfied that the domestic law at issue in the present case
was drafted with sufficient clarity and precision, and was
furthermore accessible and appealable to courts (see, by contrast,
the Calogero Diana and Petra judgments cited above,
ibid.). The interference was thus compatible with the
“lawfulness” requirement in the second paragraph of
Article 8. It is further observed that the interference pursued the
legitimate aim of the prevention of disorder and crime.
- As
to the necessity of the interference, the Court considers that the
ordinary and reasonable requirements of imprisonment may justify a
system of internal inquiry into prisoners’ complaints about
their treatment and conditions of detention (cf. Silver and Others
v. the United Kingdom, Commission Report of 1 October 1980, §
301). With that aim in mind, some measure of control over prisoners’
correspondence, such as sporadic screening (other than letters
involving domestic or Convention judicial business), may be called
for and may not of itself be incompatible with the Convention (Silver
and Others v. the United Kingdom, Series A no. 61, judgment of 25
March 1983, § 98; a contrario, Jankauskas v. Lithuania,
no. 59304/00, judgment of 24 February 2005, §§ 21-22).
Such considerations do not imply, however, that correspondence may
either be stopped for raising complaints about prison matters or
delayed until such complaints have first been examined by the prison
administration.
- The
Court has on a number of occasions criticised the relevant Lithuanian
legislation, and particularly the rather vague definition of the word
“censorship” used therein, which has resulted in a number
of cases of abuse by the authorities in their extensive screening or
withholding of detainees’ correspondence (the aforementioned
Jankauskas judgment, §§ 19-23; the aforementioned
Puzinas (no. 1) judgment, §§ 20-22; Čiapas
v. Lithuania, no. 4902/02, judgment of 14 November 2006, §§
24-26, not final). However, the present case is distinctly not of
that breed. The Court notes, first, that the applicant’s
complaints received an adequate judicial review by the Supreme
Administrative Court (paragraphs 16 and 30 above). Secondly, the
applicant has failed to present any argument calling into question
the proportionality of the measure imposed. Thirdly, the applicant
has not shown that his possible fear of censorship was a valid excuse
for circumventing an apparently legitimate prison rule regarding the
channels of complaint. Fourthly, the penalty imposed on the applicant
was of a minor nature. In the specific circumstances of the present
case, the Court considers that the authorities did not overstep their
margin of appreciation in the present case, and that the interference
was proportionate and necessary in a democratic society.
- There
has thus been no breach of Article 8.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 10 and 11 OF THE
CONVENTION
- The
applicant also complained about the same facts under Articles 10
(freedom of expression) and 11 (freedom of association) of the
Convention. However, in the light of the considerations and
conclusion above (paragraphs 30-35) in relation to the applicant’s
complaints under Article 8 of the Convention, the Court considers
that it is not necessary to examine them separately under Article 10
or 11.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Holds that there has been no violation of Article 8 of
the Convention;
2. Holds that it is not necessary to examine the matter
separately under Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 9 January 2007, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
S. Naismith J.-P. Costa
Deputy Registrar President
