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FIRST
SECTION
CASE OF
SITKOV v. RUSSIA
(Application
no. 55531/00)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
18 January
2007
This judgment will
become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2
of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Sitkov v. Russia,
The
European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Mr C.L. Rozakis, President,
Mrs N.
Vajić,
Mr A. Kovler,
Mrs E. Steiner,
Mr K.
Hajiyev,
Mr D. Spielmann,
Mr S.E. Jebens, judges,
and
Mr S. Nielsen, Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 12 December 2006,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an application (no. 55531/00) against the Russian
Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by a Russian national, Mr Anatoliy Ivanovich
Sitkov (“the applicant”), on 7 February 2000.
- The
applicant, who had been granted legal aid, was represented by Mrs
Y.L. Liptser, a lawyer practising in Moscow. The Russian Government
(“the Government”) were represented by Mr P. Laptev, the
Representative of the Russian Federation in the European Court of
Human Rights.
- The
applicant complained that a final decision in his favour was quashed
by the Supreme Court by way of supervisory review, in breach of
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
He also alleged that the length of the proceedings concerning his
claim for damages against the bailiffs exceeded the reasonable time
requirement of Article 6 § 1 and that he had no effective
remedy in this respect.
- By
a decision of 9 November 2004, the Court declared the application
partly admissible.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
5. The
applicant was born in 1948 and lives in Moscow.
A. Civil dispute with a private company and the ensuing
enforcement proceedings
- In 1996
the applicant took out insurance for his summer cottage. In May 1997
the cottage burnt down. The insurer, a private company (hereinafter
referred as “the company”), paid only a part of the
amount claimed by the applicant. The applicant brought an action
against the company claiming the rest. On 5 December 1997
the Moscow Lefortovskiy District Court ordered the company to pay the
applicant 86,621 Russian roubles (RUR).
- On
18 December 1997, upon the applicant's request, the Lefortovskiy
District Court ordered the seizure of the company's account in a
private bank “Yunikbank”. As follows from the extract of
that account, provided by the “Yunikbank”, on 29 December
1997 the company had RUR 14,991 on it. There is no
indication, however, that the money on that account has ever been
seized.
- The
judgment of the Lefortovskiy District Court was upheld by the Moscow
City Court on 16 January 1998. Following that, the
Lefortovskiy District Court issued an execution order against the
company. On 26 January 1998 the execution order was sent to
the bailiff.
- On
28 January 1998 a bailiff initiated the enforcement
proceedings. On 2 February 1998 the bailiff requested from the State
Tax Office information about the accounts and assets of the company.
The Tax Office informed the bailiff that by 1 October 1997 the
company had declared RUR 350,000 in cash and RUR 12,274 on
accounts in three private banks. According to the Tax Office, in the
last fiscal report the company had also declared RUR 98,507,000
in capital assets, RUR 116,534,000 in intangible assets, and
RUR 24,804,000 in receivable accounts.
- On 11 February 1998
the bailiff visited the headquarters of the company indicated in the
company's official documents, but no property belonging to the
company was found at that address. On the same day the bailiff
discontinued the enforcement proceedings on the ground that the
defendant had no assets to seize.
- The
next day the applicant brought an action against the bailiff. He
claimed that the bailiff had failed to take appropriate steps to find
and seize the company's property. On 23 February 1998 the
Lefortovskiy District Court ruled in the applicant's favour. The
court found, in particular, that the bailiff had failed to withdraw
the debt from the defendant's account in “Yunikbank”. The
court also found that the bailiff had breached a number of procedural
rules, in particular, as it had not informed the applicant about the
initiation of the enforcement proceedings. The court ordered the
enforcement of the judgment in the applicant's favour.
- A
new bailiff was appointed to deal with the applicant's case. However,
he found no money on two of the defendant's accounts, including the
one in “Yunikbank”. On 18 March 1998 the
enforcement proceedings were discontinued.
- The
applicant challenged the discontinuation of the proceedings in court.
On 18 May 1998 the Lefortovskiy District Court quashed the
bailiff's decision and ordered the re-opening of the enforcement
proceedings. The court found, in particular, that the bailiff had
failed to establish the real whereabouts of the company and its
property. On 24 June 1998 the Moscow City Court dismissed
the Senior Bailiff's appeal against that decision.
- On
16 November 1998 the bailiff again discontinued the enforcement
proceedings in view of the absence of assets belonging to the
defendant. The applicant did not appeal against this decision.
B. Claim for damages against the Bailiff's Office
- On
16 April 1998 the applicant brought an action for damages
against the Ministry of Justice, which is responsible for the
Bailiff's Office. On 10 March 1999 the Moscow Presnenskiy
District Court recognised the liability of the Bailiff's Office for
the non-execution of the judgment of 5 December 1997 as
upheld on 16 January 1998. The court granted the applicant damages in
the amount of RUR 86,621, i.e. the sum which he had initially
claimed from the company. This judgment was not appealed against and
became final on 20 March 1999. It was transmitted to the bailiffs for
enforcement.
- On
29 July 1999 the Moscow City Prosecutor lodged with
the Moscow City Court an extraordinary appeal against the judgment of
10 March 1999. The Prosecutor also suspended the
enforcement proceedings. On 16 September 1999 the Presidium
of the Moscow City Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the judgment
of 10 March 1999.
- On
28 January 2000 the Deputy Prosecutor General lodged with
the Supreme Court of Russia a new extraordinary appeal against the
judgment of 10 March 1999. He alleged, inter alia,
that the Moscow Presnenskiy District Court should have imposed
responsibility for the alleged non-execution on the Treasury, not the
Ministry of Justice.
- On
29 February 2000 the Supreme Court of Russia granted the
prosecutor's appeal and quashed the judgment of 10 March 1999,
primarily on the ground that the first instance court had not
established a causal link between the alleged negligence of the
bailiffs and the damages allegedly incurred by the applicant. The
case was remitted to the Moscow Presnenskiy District Court for a
fresh examination.
- The
applicant indicated that following the quashing of the judgment of
10 March 1999 by the Supreme Court the hearings were repeatedly
adjourned, mainly due to the defendant's failure to appear before the
court.
- On
3 April 2001 the Presnenskiy District Court dismissed the applicant's
claim. The court found no liability of the Bailiff's Office for the
non-execution of the judgment. On 20 July 2001 the
Moscow City Court, acting as a court of appeal, quashed the judgment
of 3 April 2001, remitting the case to the Presnenskiy
District Court.
- On
18 January 2002 the Presnenskiy District Court again
refused the applicant's claim. It stated that the applicant was not
deprived of his property as a result of the actions of the Bailiff's
Office. Although the court acknowledged that the Bailiff's Office's
actions prevented the applicant from recovering his money, it
declared that the actions of the Bailiff's Office “only
hindered compensation for damage”, but “did not cause
damage”.
- The
applicant appealed against the judgment. On 5 March 2002
the Presnenskiy District Court rejected the appeal as the applicant
had not paid court fees. The applicant appealed against the decision,
claiming that he was exempted from paying the fees. On 22 May 2002
the Moscow City Court upheld the decision of 5 March 2002.
However, on 19 September 2002 the Presidium of the Moscow City
Court overruled that decision, stating that the applicant should have
been exempted from paying the fees.
- On
28 November 2002 the Moscow City Court examined the applicant's
appeal. It upheld the judgment of the Presnenskiy District Court of
18 January 2002. The City Court reiterated that as a result of
the bailiff's actions the applicant had not been deprived of his
possession and the bailiff's actions were only a hindrance to a full
compensation for damages caused by the insurance company.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
- Article
46 of the Russian Constitution provides that any acts or failure to
act by State authorities may be appealed against to a court. Pursuant
to the Law “On enforcement proceedings” of 1997, any
decision of the bailiff can be challenged in court within 10 days
from the moment when the concerned person learned about this decision
(Article 90 § 1). Articles 19 and 90 § 2 of this law
stipulate that the damage caused by the bailiffs should be
compensated under general rules of civil responsibility.
- For
relevant details concerning the supervisory review proceedings see
the Ryabykh v. Russia judgment (no. 52854/99, 24 July 2003,
§§ 31-40).
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 AND ARTICLE 1
OF PROTOCOL NO. 1 IN RESPECT OF THE SUPERVISORY REVIEW PROCEEDINGS
- The
applicant complained that the quashing on 29 February 2000 of the
final judgment of 10 March 1999 by way of supervisory review violated
his right to a fair trial guaranteed by Article 6 § 1
of the Convention and his right to the peaceful enjoyment of his
possessions guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
to the Convention.
Article
6 § 1 of the Convention, in so far as relevant, reads as
follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ...
within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
Article
1 of Protocol No. 1 provides as follows:
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the
peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of
his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the
conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of
international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way
impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems
necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the
general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other
contributions or penalties.”
- The
Government argued that there had been sufficient legal grounds for
quashing the judgment of the Presnenskiy District Court of
10 March 1999. The Presnenskiy District Court recognised
liability of the Bailiff's Office for the non-execution of the
judgment of 5 December 1997. However, that finding was
erroneous. In fact, the judgment of 5 December 1997 was not
enforced due to the bankruptcy of the company, and not because of the
bailiff's negligence, as the applicant suggested.
- The
applicant contested those arguments. His submissions, insofar as
relevant to the complaints declared admissible, may be summarised as
follows. The judgment of 5 December 1997, as upheld on 16
January 1998, remained unenforced due to the negligence of the
bailiffs. On 18 December 1997, upon the applicant's request, the
Lefortovskiy District Court ordered the seizure of the defendant
company's bank account. However, despite the court order, the account
was not seized. As a result, the company had time to withdraw money
from the bank and thus avoid payment of the judgment debt.
Furthermore, the bailiffs failed to take the necessary steps to find
and seize other assets of the company. Therefore, the responsibility
for the non-enforcement of the court judgment of 5 December 1997, as
upheld on 16 January 1998 was fully with the State and the
judgment of the Presnenskiy District Court of Moscow of 10 March
1999 was correct. The applicant concluded that the quashing of the
judgment of 10 March 1999 by the Supreme Court was unjustified
and breached the principle of legal certainty, enshrined in Article 6
of the Convention.
A. Article 6 of the Convention
- The
Court recalls that on 10 March 1999 the Moscow Presnenskiy
District Court granted the applicant's claim and awarded him a
certain amount, to be recovered from a State authority. That decision
was not appealed against by the defendant in the usual way to the
second instance court. However, four months after the judgment had
become binding and enforceable it was challenged by the Moscow City
Prosecutor by way of supervisory review. That appeal was rejected.
Six month later the Deputy Prosecutor General attempted to set aside
the judgment of 10 March 1999 again, claiming that the lower court
had erred in establishing the bailiff's liability for the
non-enforcement of judgment against the company. That time the appeal
succeeded, and the case was reopened. As a result of the ensuing
proceedings, the applicant's claims were rejected as unfounded.
- The
Court finds that this case is similar to the case of Ryabykh v.
Russia, cited above, where it was said:
“51. ... the Court reiterates that the right to a
fair hearing before a tribunal as guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 of
the Convention must be interpreted in the light of the Preamble to
the Convention, which declares, in its relevant part, the rule of law
to be part of the common heritage of the Contracting States. One of
the fundamental aspects of the rule of law is the principle of legal
certainty, which requires, among other things, that where the courts
have finally determined an issue, their ruling should not be called
into question...
54. The Court notes that the supervisory
review of the judgment ... was set in motion by the President of the
Belgorod Regional Court – who was not party to the proceedings
... As with the situation under Romanian law examined in Brumărescu,
the exercise of this power by the President was not subject to any
time-limit, so that judgments were liable to challenge indefinitely.
55. The Court reiterates that Article 6 §
1 secures to everyone the right to have any claim relating to his
civil rights and obligations brought before a court or tribunal. In
this way it embodies the “right to a court”, of which the
right of access, that is the right to institute proceedings before
courts in civil matters, constitutes one aspect. However, that right
would be illusory if a Contracting State's domestic legal system
allowed a final, binding judicial decision to remain inoperative to
the detriment of one party. It would be inconceivable that Article 6
§ 1 should describe in detail procedural guarantees afforded to
litigants – proceedings that are fair, public and expeditious –
without protecting the implementation of judicial decisions; to
construe Article 6 as being concerned exclusively with access to a
court and the conduct of proceedings would be likely to lead to
situations incompatible with the principle of the rule of law which
the Contracting States undertook to respect when they ratified the
Convention (see Hornsby v. Greece, judgment of 19 March 1997,
Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997 II, p. 510, §
40).
56. The Court considers that the right of a
litigant to a court would be equally illusory if a Contracting
State's legal system allowed a judicial decision which had become
final and binding to be quashed by a higher court on an application
made by a State official.”
- Furthermore, the Court has found in the judgment
Sovtransavto Holding v. Ukraine (no. 48553/99, § 77,
ECHR 2002 VII) that:
“...judicial systems characterised by the
objection (protest) procedure and, therefore, by the risk of final
judgments being set aside repeatedly, as occurred in the instant
case, are, as such, incompatible with the principle of legal
certainty that is one of the fundamental aspects of the rule of law
for the purposes of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, read in the
light of Brumărescu ...”
- Turning
to the facts of the present case, the Court notes that the lower
court's judgment in the applicant's favour was quashed by way of
supervisory review. The primary reason for the re-opening of the case
was the need to re-assess the facts of the case, namely to examine
anew whether or not there had been a causal link between the
bailiff's omission and the non-enforcement of the judgment against
the private company. The appeal was lodged by an official, who
was not a party to the proceedings and whose power to introduce such
appeal was not limited in time.
- Having
regard to the circumstances, the Court does not find any reason for
departing from its aforementioned judgments and considers that there
has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 in respect of the quashing
of the final and binding judgment given in the applicant's case.
B. Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention
- The Court further reiterates that a judgment debt may
be regarded as a “possession” for the purposes of Article
1 of Protocol No. 1 (see, among other authorities, Burdov v.
Russia, no. 59498/00, § 40, ECHR 2002-III). Quashing such a
judgment after it has become final and unappealable will constitute
an interference with the judgment beneficiary's right to the peaceful
enjoyment of that possession (see Brumărescu, cited
above, § 74). In the case Tregubenko v. Ukraine
(no. 61333/00, § 46 et seq., 2 November 2004) the Court found a
violation of Article 1 of Protocol no. 1 to the Convention in that
the quashing of a final judgment of pecuniary nature in the
applicant's favour constituted a disproportionate interference with
his right to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. The Court
dismissed the Government's argument that the quashing was justified
by the need to correct a judicial error committed by a lower court
(§§ 54-55).
- Turning to the circumstances of the present case the
Court observes that, by allowing the application lodged by the Deputy
Prosecutor General, the Supreme Court of Russia set at naught an
entire judicial process which had ended in a final and binding
judicial decision and thus res judicata. The reason for
reopening of the proceedings, put forward by the authorities, namely
the need to correct a judicial error, was the same as in the
Tregubenko case quoted above (see § 54). The
Court therefore finds no reason to depart from its reasoning in the
aforementioned Ryabykh, Tregubenko and follow-up cases. It
concludes that the setting aside of the judgment of 10 March 1999 in
supervisory review proceedings for the sake of correcting an alleged
judicial error constituted an unjustified interference with the
applicant's possessions, protected by virtue of Article 1 of Protocol
no. 1 to the Convention. Consequently, there has been a violation of
this Convention provision.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 IN RESPECT OF
THE EXCESSIVE LENGTH OF THE PROCEEDINGS
- The
applicant further complained that the length of the proceedings
concerning his claim for damages against the bailiffs had exceeded
reasonable time requirement. He referred to Article 6 § 1, cited
above.
- The
Government submitted that, in view of the number of instances
involved, the overall length of civil proceedings had not been
unreasonable. The applicant contested the Government's
view. He maintained that the dispute at issue had not been
particularly complex. Had the judgment of 5 December 1997, as
upheld on 16 January 1998, been properly executed, the subsequent
proceedings would not have taken so much time. The delays in the
proceedings after the date of the quashing were also imputable to the
State.
- The
Court notes that the court proceedings started on 16 April 1998
when the applicant brought his complaint against the Bailiff Service.
The court proceedings initially ended with the judgment in the
applicant's favour of 10 March 1999, which entered into force on 20
March 1999. Following the adoption of the judgment in the
applicant's favour, the enforcement proceedings were started;
however, the enforcement was suspended in July 1999, when the Moscow
City Prosecutor's office made the first attempt to challenge the
judgment by way of supervisory review. In January 2000 the General
Prosecutor's office challenged the judgment of 10 March 1999 anew,
and, as a result, on 29 February 2000 the proceedings were
reopened and lasted until 28 November 2002, when the Moscow City
Court adopted the final decision in the case. Assessing the overall
length of the proceedings the Court considers
that whereas it was to a decisive extent attributable to
the supervisory review proceedings, this issue by
itself gave rise to a finding of a violation under Article 6 § 1
(see above). Accordingly, since that problem has already been
addressed by the Court, there is no need to examine these facts again
through the prism of the “reasonable length” requirement
of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 IN RESPECT OF THE
ALLEGED LACK OF EFFECTIVE REMEDIES
- The
applicant claimed that he had no effective remedy in respect of the
length of the civil proceedings. He relied on Article 13 of the
Convention, which reads as follows:
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth
in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy
before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has
been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”
- The
Government did not present separate comments on Article 13, but
insisted that “the applicant's claims regarding interference
with his rights connected with the “reasonable time”
requirement were ill-founded”. The applicant maintained his
complaint that he did not have effective remedies to expedite the
proceedings.
- The
Court reiterates that in the circumstances the main factor which
contributed to the overall length of the proceedings against the
Bailiff Service was the decision of the supervisory review instance,
which was not susceptible to any ordinary appeal (see above; see also
in this respect Sardin v. Russia, (dec.), no. 69582/01, 12
February 2004). However, since the issue of the length of the
proceedings in the present case has been absorbed by the finding of a
violation of Article 6 of the Convention under the supervisory review
aspect, the Court finds that the complaint under Article 13 of the
Convention should be treated accordingly. In view of its finding that
the supervisory review deprived the applicant of his “right to
a court” (see §§ 29 – 33 above), the Court
considers that it is not necessary to examine separately the
complaint about the absence of effective remedies with respect of the
proceedings engendered by that supervisory review.
IV. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
- Article
41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
1. The parties' submissions
- The
applicant claimed that because of the negligence of the bailiffs he
had not received 76,621 RUR due to him under the judgment of
5 December 1997. He also claimed that that amount should
have been increased in line with the cost of living index for the
relevant period. He produced a letter by the Moscow State Committee
on Statistics containing statistical information on the cost of
living in Moscow. In his words, by 2005 the “principle debt”
should have amounted to 598,221 RUR.
- The
applicant also claimed penalties for the delayed payment of the
compensation for his summer cottage in the amount stipulated in the
insurance policy. In his words, the amount of penalties should also
have been increased in line with the cost of living index. According
to his calculations, by 2005 the penalties amounted to 13,397,198
RUR.
- In
sum, the applicant claimed 375,372 EUR under the head of pecuniary
damages.
- The
applicant also claimed one million euros for the mental harm
allegedly caused to him by the domestic authorities' failure to
recover the compensation from the insurance company. He repeated his
arguments concerning the merits of the present case.
- The
Government argued that that claim was unsubstantiated. First, the
State's liability cannot be derived from the provisions of the
insurance policy, as the applicant suggested. Secondly, the
applicant's claims where based on the alleged non-enforcement of the
judgment of 5 December 1997. However, this complaint was
declared inadmissible by the Court. Thirdly, the applicant has never
applied to the Russian courts in order to increase the amounts due to
him in line with the inflation rate. The Government admitted that the
applicant “could claim for certain non-pecuniary compensation
... due to ... [the bailiffs'] negligence, as it was indicated in the
Presnenskiy District Court judgment of 18 January 2002, but not for
compensation of damage initially inflicted by the insurance company”.
They also claimed that a finding of a violation would be a sufficient
just satisfaction.
2. The Court's assessment
- First,
the Court notes that the applicant's calculations are mainly based on
the provisions of the insurance policy. However, the present case
does not concern the refusal of the insurance company to compensate
for the fire damage. Nor is this case about the alleged failure of
the authorities to enforce the judgment of 5 December 1997. That
complaint was declared inadmissible on 9 November 2004. The
complaint that gave rise to a finding of a violation concerned the
quashing by way of supervisory review of the judgment of 10 March
1999. Therefore, only that aspect of the case may entitle the
applicant to any compensation under Article 41.
- Thus,
the Court cannot accept calculations based on the provisions of the
insurance policy. However, the Court accepts that the quashing of the
judgment of 10 March 1999 deprived the applicant of the fruits of his
litigation with the bailiffs, which is evidently at the heart of his
grievances. Therefore, the applicant may be understood as claiming
the amount due to him by virtue of the judgment of 10 March 1999.
- The
Court recalls that pursuant to that judgment the applicant was
entitled to RUR 86,621. However, on 29 February 2000 that
judgment was quashed; in other words, the applicant was deprived of
his “possessions” in the amount of RUR 86,621 (see
above, paragraph 35). In the Court's view, this amount constitutes
his pecuniary loss and should be returned to him under Article 41 of
the Convention.
-
The applicant also claimed that the core amount of the judgment debt
should be increased in line with the increase in the cost of living.
The Government argued that the applicant did not apply to the
domestic courts for such an increase. However, the Court notes that
in domestic terms the judgment of 10 March 1999 was inexistent. In
such circumstances any appeal to a domestic court with a view to
increase the amount of the judgment debt would necessarily fail. In
these circumstances the Court considers it possible to establish the
real value of the judgment debt in view of the increase in the cost
of living.
- The
accuracy of the statistical information provided by the applicant is
not contested by the Government. The Court notes that the judgment in
the applicant's favour was quashed in February 2000. The applicant
provided information as to the cost of living index up to the
November 2004. Based on the figures contained in the letter of the
Department of Statistics, referred to by the applicant, the amount of
RUR 86,621 in February 2000 would be equal to RUR 176,208 in
October 2004. Therefore, this amount should be paid to the applicant
on account of his pecuniary losses caused by the quashing of the
judgment of 10 March 1999, plus any tax that may be chargeable on
that amount.
- Second,
as regards non-pecuniary damage, the Court accepts that the quashing
of a final judgment in the applicant's favour caused him a feeling of
anxiety and disappointment. However, the amount claimed by the
applicant is excessive: the civil proceedings at issue did not
concern his livelihood or his other vital interests. On the equitable
basis the Court awards applicant 1,500 EUR under the head of
non-pecuniary damages, plus any tax that may be chargeable on that
amount.
B. Costs and expenses
- The
applicant alleged that his expenses related to the proceedings before
the European Court amounted to 38,000 RUR. He admitted that he had
not kept all relevant receipts in support of that claim, except for a
fee note from the translator. The fee note indicated that 5,900 RUR
was paid for a “translation for the European Court”.
- The
Government maintained that that the translation fees had no relation
to the proceedings in the present case.
- The
Court has to establish, first, whether the costs and expenses
indicated by the applicant were actually incurred and, second,
whether they were necessary (see McCann and Others v. the
United Kingdom, judgment of 27 September 1995, Series A
no. 324, § 220). The Court notes that the applicant
has been granted legal aid, which the Court considers as capable of
covering his core expenses including those related to the
translation. The applicant does not explain why additional
translation was needed. Therefore, the Court concludes that these
expenses were not necessary and should be dismissed. In absence of
other supporting documents, the Court does not considers it
appropriate to award the applicant's costs and expenses other that
what had been already received by the applicant as legal aid.
C. Default interest
- The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Holds that there has been a violation of
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention on account of the quashing
of the judgment of 10 March 1999;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1 to the Convention in respect of the same fact;
3. Holds that there is no need to examine the complaint about
the length of the civil proceedings;
4. Holds that there is no need to examine the complaint about
the alleged lack of domestic remedies in respect of the length
complaint;
- Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, RUR 176,208
(one hundred seventy six thousand two hundred eight Russian roubles)
in respect of pecuniary damage and EUR 1,500 (one thousand five
hundred euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage, the latter amount
to be converted into the Russian roubles at the rate applicable at
the date of settlement, plus any tax that may be chargeable on the
above amounts;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
- Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim
for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 18 January 2007,
pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Søren Nielsen Christos Rozakis
Registrar President
