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FOURTH
SECTION
CASE OF STANKOVÁ v. SLOVAKIA
(Application
no. 7205/02)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
9
October 2007
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Stanková v. Slovakia,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Sir Nicolas Bratza,
President,
Mr J. Casadevall,
Mr G. Bonello,
Mr K.
Traja,
Mr S. Pavlovschi,
Mr J. Šikuta,
Mrs P.
Hirvelä, judges,
and Mr T.L. Early, Section
Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 18 September 2007,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an application (no. 7205/02) against the Slovak
Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by a Slovak national, Mrs Milota Stanková
(“the applicant”), on 4 January 2002.
- The
Government of the Slovak Republic (“the Government”) were
represented by their Agent, Mrs M. Pirošíková.
- The
applicant alleged, in particular, that her right to respect for her
private life and home had been violated in that she had been ordered
to move out of a flat.
- On
29 January 2006 the President of the Fourth Section of the Court
decided to give notice of the application to the Government. Under
the provisions of Article 29 § 3 of the Convention, it was
decided to examine the merits of the application at the same time as
its admissibility.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The
applicant was born in 1951 and lives in KeZmarok.
- The
applicant and her husband held a joint tenancy of a three-room flat
owned by a cooperative in Poprad.
- Owing
to differences with her husband, the applicant left the flat together
with her two children in 1992. They started living in a two-room flat
owned by the Poprad Municipality. It was leased by the applicant's
father, who suffered from a long-term illness and died on 21 January
1994. The applicant and her two children, born in 1979 and 1982
respectively, continued to live in the flat. The applicant paid the
rent.
- In
a decision which became final on 7 November 1994 a court granted a
divorce order in respect of the applicant and her husband. Their
children were placed in the applicant's custody.
- On
6 February 1995 the applicant and her former husband reached an
agreement whereby the latter would continue using the flat in which
they had formerly lived together. On 6 March 1995 the cooperative
which owned the flat and of which the applicant was a member approved
a request for the flat to be exchanged for a one-room flat in
KeZmarok. The applicant's former husband lived in the flat in
KeZmarok until his death on 1 August 1995. His and the
applicant's son inherited membership rights in respect of the
cooperative which owned the flat in KeZmarok, including the right to
use it. The applicant later started leasing the flat with a view to
improving her financial situation.
- After
her father's death the applicant requested to be registered as
permanently residing in the flat where she had lived since 1992. In
a letter of 19 July 1995 the mayor of Poprad replied that the
position was unclear. It had to be determined, in particular, whether
the tenancy had passed to the applicant pursuant to Article 706 §
1 of the Civil Code after her father's death.
- On
4 August 1995 the Poprad Municipal Office informed the applicant that
she had formally ceased to be a tenant of the flat which she had used
with her former husband on 6 February 1995 – that is, after the
death of her father. The right to use her father's flat had not
passed to the applicant after the former's death as the requirements
of Article 706 § 1 of the Civil Code had not been met.
- On
3 September 1996 the Poprad Municipal Office included the applicant
on a list of persons seeking the tenancy of a flat. No municipal flat
could be put at the applicant's disposal at that time as other
persons were above her on the list.
- As
the applicant had refused to move out, on 30 August 1996 the Poprad
Municipal Housing Company sought a judicial order for her eviction.
- On
31 October 1996 the Poprad District Court ordered the applicant to
move out of the flat within 30 days after its judgment had become
final. On 29 October 1997 the Prešov Regional Court upheld the
first-instance judgment. The courts established that the applicant
had not become a tenant of the flat originally used by her father
since, at the time of the latter's death, she had been registered
as a user of a different flat, in which she had lived with her
former husband. The requirements of Article 706 § 1 of the Civil
Code had not been met. After her father's death the applicant had
lived in the flat in issue without any justification. In addition,
the District Court held that the applicant could live in the flat in
KeZmarok which her son had inherited from her former husband. The
plaintiff had rightly sought the protection of its ownership rights
in respect of the flat.
- The
applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, arguing that the
plaintiff company lacked the capacity to take part in the
proceedings. On 28 July 1998 the Supreme Court dismissed the
appeal on points of law, holding that the plaintiff was a legal
entity established by the Poprad Municipality. As such it had
standing to sue the applicant.
- The
Poprad Municipality requested that the order be enforced. The
applicant objected that her son had reached the age of majority and
that she could not live in his flat in KeZmarok. The Poprad District
Court dismissed the objection on 10 May 1999, holding that the issue
could not be examined in the context of the enforcement proceedings.
On 18 June 1999 an enforcement officer enforced the judgment, in
accordance with the relevant provisions of the Executions Order 1995,
with the result that the applicant was obliged to move out of the
flat in which she had lived since 1992.
- On
8 July 1999 that flat was allocated to a municipal employee who lived
in a one-room flat and who had applied, on 24 June 1999, for a bigger
one as she had to take care of an elderly and ill relative. Later the
new tenant acquired ownership of the flat for a relatively small sum
in accordance with the relevant law.
- The
applicant, with her under-age daughter, started living in the
one-room flat in KeZmarok inherited by the applicant's son. The flat
has a surface area of 33 square metres. The applicant has continued
to work in Poprad. The distance between the two towns is
approximately 15 kilometres.
- The
applicant filed a petition under Article 130 § 3 of the
Constitution, alleging, inter alia, a violation of her
constitutional right to protection of her private and family life as
well as a violation of her ownership rights in the proceedings
referred to above. She argued that the municipality had been informed
that she had moved to her father's flat in 1992 with the intention of
living there permanently. She had requested to be allocated municipal
housing and had therefore believed that her interests would be
protected. The municipality's argument that she could live in her
son's one-room flat in KeZmarok was unreasonable. In addition, her
daughter, who was under age, was disturbed by having to live in that
flat as the girl's father had committed suicide there.
- On
12 April 2000 the Constitutional Court declared admissible the
complaint alleging a violation of the applicant's right to respect
for her private and family life.
- On
10 July 2001 the Constitutional Court found that by its judgment of
29 October 1997 the Prešov Regional Court had violated the
applicant's rights under Article 19 § 2 and Article 21 § 3
of the Constitution.
- The
decision stated that the ordinary courts' conclusion that the
requirements of Article 706 § 1 of the Civil Code had not been
met in the applicant's case was correct as such. It also had to be
considered, however, whether there had been a pressing social need
for the interference and whether it had been proportionate to the
legitimate aim pursued, having regard to the particular circumstances
of the case.
- The
applicant had not acted contrary to the law when she had moved to her
father's flat in 1992. She had lived in that flat continuously,
together with her children, even after her father's death. At the
time of the examination of the request for her eviction the applicant
had had no other place to live. The flat was to be regarded,
therefore, as the applicant's home.
- The
Constitutional Court noted that Article 3 of the Civil Code permitted
the granting of relief from hardship in justified cases by ensuring
that alternative accommodation should be provided to persons who had
been ordered to move out of a flat. As to the Supreme Court's
practice and, in particular, judgment no. 1 Cdo 48/97 (see paragraph
40 below), the circumstances of the applicant's case were different
in that the applicant had legally moved into the flat in 1992 and the
flat was owned by the municipality and not by individuals. In any
event, neither Article 3 § 1 of the Civil Code nor any other
legal provision could be interpreted and applied in a manner
producing effects incompatible with Slovakia's obligations under
international treaties.
- In
view of Article 20 § 3 of the Constitution, the municipality's
ownership rights in respect of the flat could not be dissociated from
its obligation to assist citizens of Poprad in having their basic
needs satisfied. In the circumstances of the case, it should have
been examined whether ordering the applicant to leave the flat,
together with her under-age daughter and without providing them with
alternative accommodation, was contra bonos mores within the
meaning of Article 3 § 1 of the Civil Code. The protection of
family, minors and juveniles under Article 41 of the Constitution
should also have been taken into account.
- Furthermore,
the Poprad Municipality had registered the applicant as a person
seeking a flat, after having verified whether her request had been
justified, at approximately the same time as it had initiated
judicial proceedings for her eviction. It should have been verified
whether the municipality, as the owner and manager of municipal
flats, had a compelling reason for ordering the applicant to move out
of the flat immediately without being obliged to provide her with
alternative accommodation.
- The
Constitutional Court did not consider the applicant's behaviour
improper. In 1992 she had left the cooperative flat where she had
lived with a view to avoiding the negative impact of her husband's
inappropriate behaviour on her and her children. The applicant had
petitioned for divorce and her return to that flat would not have
resolved her personal situation as her husband also had the right to
use it.
- Finally,
the applicant had used the flat for a long time and the
representatives of the municipality had initially not taken a firm
standpoint as regards her title to use the flat. Reference was made,
in particular, to the mayor's letter of 19 July 1995. The owner of
the flat had therefore contributed to the applicant's belief that she
would not be obliged to leave the flat without alternative
accommodation being provided to her. In 1996, when the judicial
proceedings had started, the applicant had been in a difficult
situation as the mother of two under-age children who had lost their
father.
- When
deciding the case, the Prešov Regional Court had not duly
considered the above relevant facts. Its decision to uphold the
first-instance judgment ordering the applicant to leave the flat
without being provided with any other accommodation therefore
amounted to an interference with the applicant's right to respect for
her private and family life and for her home which was not based on
relevant and sufficient reasons. As a result, and also having regard
to the particular protection which Article 41 § 1 of the
Constitution afforded to children and juveniles, that interference
could not be regarded as being necessary in a democratic society.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
A. Constitutional provisions and practice
- Article
19 § 2 guarantees to every person the right to protection
against unjustified interference with his or her private and family
life.
- In
decision II. ÚS 23/00 of 23 March 2000 the Constitutional
Court rejected a petition filed by a judge who alleged a violation of
Article 19 §§ 2 and 3 of the Constitution in that the
Ministry of Justice had asked him to submit a financial statement.
The decision stated that the petitioner should have sought redress
before the ordinary courts by means of an action under Articles 11 et
seq. of the Civil Code for protection of his personal rights.
- Article
20 § 1 guarantees the right to own property. Paragraph 3 of
Article 20 prohibits the abuse of ownership to the detriment of the
rights of others or contrary to general interests protected by law.
- Under
Article 21 § 3, interference with the inviolability of the home
(other than the search of a home in the context of criminal
proceedings, which is governed by paragraph 2 of the same Article)
may be permitted by law only where it is necessary in a democratic
society for the protection of a person's life, health or property,
for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others or in cases
of serious threat to public order.
- Article
41 § 1 provides that marriage, parenthood and family are to be
protected by law. Particular protection is to be afforded to children
and juveniles.
- Pursuant
to Article 130 § 3 of the Constitution, as in force until
30 June 2001, the Constitutional Court could commence
proceedings upon a petition (podnet) filed by any individuals
or corporations claiming that their rights had been violated.
- According
to its case-law under Article 130 § 3, the Constitutional Court
lacked jurisdiction to draw legal consequences from a violation
of a petitioner's constitutional rights. It could neither grant
damages to the person concerned nor impose a sanction on the public
authority liable for the violation found. In the Constitutional
Court's view, it was therefore for the authority concerned to provide
redress to the person whose rights were violated.
B. The Civil Code
37. Pursuant
to Article 3 § 1, the exercise of civil rights and obligations
must not interfere with the justified rights and interests of others
unless there are relevant legal grounds and must not be contra
bonos mores.
- By
Article 11, any natural person has the right to protection of his or
her personality, and in particular of his or her life and health,
civil and human dignity, privacy, name and personal characteristics.
- Under
Article 706 § 1, where a tenant of a flat dies, unless the flat
has been jointly leased by spouses, the tenancy passes to the late
tenant's children and other close relatives, provided that they lived
in the same household as the tenant at the time of his or her death
and that they do not have their own flat.
C. The Supreme Court's practice
- In
judgment no. 1 Cdo 48/97, delivered on 20 November 1997, the Supreme
Court expressed the view that Article 3 § 1 of the Civil Code
could not be applied for the purpose of obliging the owner of a flat
(three individuals in that particular case) to provide accommodation
to a person who used the flat without any legal grounds. Imposing
such an obligation would infringe the owner's property rights.
III. APPLICATION No. 48398/99
- On
29 December 1998 the applicant lodged an application with the Court
in which she complained under Article 6 § 1 and Article 8 of the
Convention of the above-mentioned decisions of the ordinary courts
leading to her eviction from the flat in which she lived. The
application was registered as no. 48398/99.
- On
18 May 2001 a committee of three judges rejected the application as
being inadmissible. At that time the constitutional proceedings
initiated by the applicant were still pending. As the Constitutional
Court had declared admissible the complaint alleging a violation of
the applicant's right to respect for her private and family life, the
Court considered the relevant part of the application to be premature
at that time. The decision on admissibility reads as follows:
“The Court has examined the application and notes
that the applicant has been informed of the possible obstacles to its
admissibility. In the light of all the material in its possession,
and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence,
the Court finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a
violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its
Protocols. It follows that the application must be rejected, in
accordance with Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.”
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION
- The
applicant complained that she had been obliged to move out of the
flat where she had lived. She alleged a violation of Article 8 of the
Convention, which reads as follows:
“1. Everyone has the right to respect
for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public
authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in
accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in
the interests of national security, public safety or the economic
well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime,
for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others.”
A. Admissibility
- The
Government argued that the application was inadmissible on several
grounds.
- Firstly,
the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies as she had not
sought redress by means of an action for protection of her personal
rights under Articles 11 et seq. of the Civil Code after the delivery
of the Constitutional Court's judgment of 10 July 2001.
- Secondly,
the application had been lodged on 4 January 2002, more than six
months after the applicant had been obliged to move out of the flat
in question on 18 June 1999. As a petition under Article 130 § 3
of the Constitution was not an effective remedy which applicants were
required to exhaust prior to lodging an application, the
Constitutional Court's judgment of 10 July 2001 was not a “final”
decision for the purposes of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention.
- Thirdly,
the complaint under Article 8 was in any event manifestly
ill-founded.
- The
applicant disagreed with the Government's arguments.
- The
Court notes that the Constitutional Court, as the supreme authority
charged with protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms in
Slovakia, declared admissible and examined the merits of the
applicant's complaint without requiring the applicant to use the
remedy under Articles 11 et seq. of the Civil Code. The applicant was
not obliged, for the purposes of Article 35 § 1 of the
Convention, to initiate a new set of civil proceedings seeking
protection of her personal rights after the delivery of the
Constitutional Court's judgment. In particular, there is no
indication of the existence, either at the relevant time or at
present, of sufficiently consistent case-law to show that the
possibility of obtaining redress in similar cases was sufficiently
certain in practice and offered reasonable prospects of success as
required by the relevant Convention case-law (see, mutatis
mutandis, Kontrová v. Slovakia, no. 7510/04,
§§ 43-44, ECHR 2007 ... (extracts), as well as the
admissibility decision of 13 June 2006 in that case).
- As
to the argument that the application had been lodged out of time, the
Court notes that on 18 May 2001 it declared inadmissible application
no. 48398/99, in which the applicant had complained under
Article 8 of the Convention of the ordinary courts' decisions leading
to her eviction from the flat in which she had lived. At that time
the constitutional proceedings on the merits of that complaint were
still pending.
- In
general, the Court has not considered a petition under Article 130 §
3 of the Constitution to be an effective remedy which applicants were
required to use for the purpose of Article 35 § 1 of the
Convention (see, for example, Marônek v. Slovakia
(dec.), no. 32686/96, 27 April 2000, or Stančiak
v. Slovakia (dec.), no. 40345/98, 31 August 2000). It
has therefore not regarded Constitutional Court decisions dismissing
such petitions as final for the purposes of Article 35 § 1. More
recently, the Court reached the same conclusion in a case in which
the Constitutional Court, in proceedings under Article 130 § 3
of the Constitution, had found a violation of the plaintiff's
constitutional rights (see Šupa v. Slovakia (dec.), no.
72991/01, 6 February 2007).
- As
indicated above, in application no. 48398/99 the applicant
lodged her complaint about the proceedings leading to her eviction on
29 December 1998 – that is, within six months from
the Supreme Court's decision of 28 July 1998 and prior to the
enforcement of the judicial order on 18 June 1999. When
examining that application on 18 May 2001 the Court, noting that the
Constitutional Court had declared admissible the applicant's
complaint under Article 8, found the relevant part of the application
premature without examining the substance of that complaint. In this
respect the present case is different from Šupa v. Slovakia
(cited above), where the application was lodged after the delivery of
the Constitutional Court's judgment and more than six months after
the final decision given by the ordinary courts. In these
circumstances, rejecting this part of the application on the ground
that the applicant had not complied with the six-month time-limit
would be tantamount to a negation of her right of individual
application under Article 34.
- At
the relevant time the Constitutional Court lacked power to provide
redress to persons whose rights it had found violated in proceedings
pursuant to Article 130 § 3 of the Constitution (see paragraph
36 above). The applicant therefore has not lost her status as a
victim within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention as a result
of the Constitutional Court's judgment of 10 July 2001 (for
recapitulation of the relevant case-law see, for example, Amuur v.
France, judgment of 25 June 1996, Reports of Judgments and
Decisions 1996 III, p. 846, § 36 and Dalban v.
Romania [GC], no. 28114/95, § 44, ECHR 1999-VI).
- The Court further notes that this complaint is not
manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of
the Convention. It is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
- The
applicant, with reference to the Constitutional Court's judgment of
10 July 2001, maintained that the interference with her rights under
Article 8 of the Convention had been unjustified.
- The
Government admitted that the facts of the case amounted to an
interference with the applicant's right to respect for her private
life and home. The applicant had been obliged to move out of the flat
by an enforcement officer following a final judgment delivered by the
ordinary courts in accordance with the relevant provisions of the
Slovakian legal order. The interference had pursued the legitimate
aim of protecting the interests of the owner of the flat. The
applicant, who had no legal title to use the flat in Poprad, had the
possibility of living in her son's flat in KeZmarok. By ordering the
applicant to leave the flat in Poprad the domestic courts had not
overstepped the margin of appreciation reserved to Contracting States
in similar situations. In addition, the applicant was herself
responsible for the situation complained of as she had agreed to the
exchange of the cooperative flat in Poprad for a smaller one in a
different town in February 1995. At that time the applicant should
have been aware that she had no entitlement to use her father's flat
after the latter's death. The Government concluded that the
interference complained of was not disproportionate to the legitimate
aim pursued.
- The
Court notes, and it has not been disputed between the parties, that
the obligation on the applicant to leave the flat amounted to an
interference with her right to respect for her home which was based
on the relevant provisions of the Civil Code and the Executions Order
1995 (see paragraphs 16 and 39 above). That interference was
therefore “in accordance with the law”. It pursued the
legitimate aim of protecting the rights of the Poprad Municipality,
which owned the flat.
- The
only point at issue in the present case is therefore whether that
interference was “necessary in a democratic society” for
achieving the aim pursued. In this connection, the Court has to
consider whether, in the light of the case as a whole, the reasons
adduced to justify the measure were relevant and sufficient for the
purposes of paragraph 2 of Article 8 of the Convention. The notion of
necessity implies a pressing social need; in particular, the measure
employed must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. The
scope of the margin of appreciation enjoyed by the national
authorities in similar cases will depend not only on the nature of
the aim of the restriction but also on the nature of the right
involved (see Gillow v. the United Kingdom, judgment of
24 November 1986, Series A no. 109, p. 22, § 55).
- Because
of their direct knowledge of their society and its needs, the
national authorities are in principle better placed than the
international judge to strike a fair balance between the interests
involved (see Eski v. Austria, no. 21949/03, § 42,
25 January 2007). The Court's task is not to substitute itself for
the domestic authorities in the exercise of their powers, but rather
to review, in the light of the Convention, the decisions taken by
those authorities in the exercise of their margin of appreciation
(see, mutatis mutandis, Hokkanen v. Finland, judgment
of 23 September 1994, Series A no. 299-A, p. 20, § 55, and
Elsholz v. Germany, no. 25735/94, ECHR 2000-VIII, p. 363, §
48).
- In
the present case the Constitutional Court assessed the relevant facts
in the light of the same criteria as the Court applies in similar
cases. It concluded that the effect of the ordinary courts' decision
ordering the applicant to leave the flat without being provided with
any alternative accommodation produced effects which were
incompatible with her right to respect for her private and family
life and for her home, regard also being had to the special
protection of children and juveniles under Article 41 § 1 of the
Constitution.
- The
decision stated, in particular, that the interference at issue had
not been necessary in a democratic society as it had not been based
on relevant and sufficient reasons. The Constitutional Court put
emphasis on the circumstances under which the applicant had left the
flat which she had shared with her former husband and on her
situation, the gravity of which the Poprad Municipality had de
facto acknowledged by including the applicant on the list of
those seeking accommodation at approximately the same time as it had
initiated judicial proceedings with a view to obliging the applicant
to leave the flat. The Constitutional Court also took into account
the fact that the Poprad Municipality was in charge of public
housing. In that capacity, it was under an obligation to assist the
town's citizens in resolving their accommodation problems.
- Thus,
the Constitutional Court examined in depth the relevant facts of the
case and in its judgment it explained in detail the reasons why it
considered that the applicant's right to respect for her home and
private life had been violated. The Court finds the reasoning of the
Constitutional Court convincing and sees no grounds for reaching a
different conclusion.
- The
foregoing considerations are sufficient for the Court to conclude
that the interference complained of was not “necessary in a
democratic society”.
There
has accordingly been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION
- The
applicant further complained of the fact that she had no effective
remedy at her disposal in respect of the alleged violation of Article
8. She relied on Article 13 of the Convention, which provides:
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth
in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy
before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has
been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”
A. Admissibility
- The
Government contested the applicant's argument.
- The
Court notes that this complaint is linked to the one examined above
and must therefore likewise be declared admissible.
B. Merits
- Having
regard to its finding under Article 8 (see paragraph 63 above), the
Court considers that it is not necessary to examine whether, in this
case, there has been a violation of Article 13.
III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14 OF THE CONVENTION
- The
applicant complained that the flat which she had been obliged to
leave had been allocated to a different person whose situation had
been less urgent. She relied on Article 14 of the Convention, which
provides:
“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set
forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without discrimination on
any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political
or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a
national minority, property, birth or other status.”
- The
Court has examined this complaint but finds, to the extent that it
has been substantiated and falls within its competence, that it
discloses no appearance of a violation of the Convention or its
Protocols.
- It
follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be
rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the
Convention.
IV. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
- Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
- The
applicant claimed an overall sum of 1 million euros (EUR) in respect
of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage. As regards pecuniary damage,
the claim comprised the costs of removal (EUR 125), sale of furniture
(EUR 625), the daily travel expenses of both the applicant and her
daughter to and from Poprad (EUR 2,800), the rent which the applicant
had paid to the Poprad Municipality after her father's death (EUR
5,000) and compensation for lost time (EUR 27,500).
As to
the claim for non-pecuniary damage, the applicant submitted that she
and her children had suffered trauma as a result of the way in which
the domestic authorities had dealt with their case.
- The
Government proposed that the claim should be dismissed.
- The Court notes that the applicant has not supplied
any evidence capable of supporting her claim for pecuniary damage
which could be causally linked to the violation of the Convention it
has found. It is therefore not appropriate to award any compensation
under that head (see also Angelova and Iliev v. Bulgaria,
no. 55523/00, § 125, 26 July 2007, and Chassagnou
and Others v. France [GC], nos. 25088/94, 28331/95 and
28443/95, § 130, ECHR 1999 III ).
On
the other hand, the applicant undeniably sustained non-pecuniary
damage on account of the violation found. Ruling on an equitable
basis, as required by Article 41 of the Convention, the Court decides
to award the applicant EUR 3,000 under that head.
B. Costs and expenses
- The
applicant also claimed 15,200 Slovakian korunas (equivalent to
approximately EUR 450) for the costs and expenses incurred before the
domestic authorities.
- The
Government argued that the applicant had not substantiated her claim
by any relevant documents.
- According
to the Court's case-law, an applicant is entitled to reimbursement of
his costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these
have been actually and necessarily incurred and were reasonable as to
quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the information in
its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it
reasonable to award the sum claimed, namely EUR 450.
C. Default interest
- The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Declares the complaints under Articles 8 and 13
of the Convention concerning the applicant's eviction admissible and
the remainder of the application inadmissible;
- Holds that there has been a violation of Article
8 of the Convention;
- Holds that there is no need to examine the
complaint under Article 13 of the Convention;
- Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 3,000
(three thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage and EUR 450
(four hundred and fifty euros) in respect of costs and expenses, to
be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate
applicable at the date of settlement, plus any tax that may be
chargeable;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
- Dismisses
the remainder of the applicant's claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 9 October 2007, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
T.L. Early Nicolas Bratza
Registrar President
