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FIFTH
SECTION
CASE OF SIMIZOV v. BULGARIA
(Application
no. 59523/00)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
18
October 2007
This judgment will
become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2
of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Simizov v. Bulgaria,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Mr P. Lorenzen, President,
Mrs S.
Botoucharova,
Mr V. Butkevych,
Mr R.
Maruste,
Mr J. Borrego Borrego,
Mrs R.
Jaeger,
Mr M. Villiger, judges,
Mr K.
Jungwiert, substitute judge,
and Mrs C. Westerdiek, Section
Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 25 September 2007,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an application
(no. 59523/00) against the
Republic of Bulgaria lodged with the Court
under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”)
by a Bulgarian national, Mr Kroum
Stefanov Simizov (“the applicant”), on 24 March 2000.
- The
applicant was represented by Mr M. Neikov and Mrs S. Stefanova,
lawyers practising in Plovdiv. The Bulgarian Government
(“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mrs
M. Karadjova, of the Ministry of Justice.
- On
30 August 2005 the
Court decided to give notice of the application to the Government.
Applying Article 29 § 3 of the Convention, it decided to rule on
the admissibility and merits of the application at the same time.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The
applicant was born in 1930 and lives in Plovdiv.
- On
23 July 1984 the applicant and his wife divorced. Thereafter,
the applicant's former wife issued proceedings against him,
requesting the partition of their common property, which included a
flat, a garage, a car, and several pieces of jewellery and numerous
other chattels.
- In
accordance with the relevant law, partition proceedings have two
stages. During the first phase the court has to establish the
co-owners, identify the items of common property which are to be
partitioned and determine the share of each co owner. During the
second phase the court effects the partition.
1. The first phase of the partition proceedings
- The
partition claim was submitted to the Plovdiv District Court in
December 1984. On 8 May 1985 its examination was stayed to
await the outcome of a separate suit between the applicant and his
former wife concerning their shares in their common property. Those
proceedings ended in 1987 by final judgment establishing that the
applicant's share was 9/16 of the joint marital property and his
former wife's - 7/16.
- The
partition proceedings resumed in March 1988. The court
held three hearings and gave judgment on 15 June 1988, allowing the
partition of the flat, the car, the jewellery and the other chattels.
The court determined the parties' shares as established in the
1985-1987 proceedings (see the preceding paragraph). On 5
December 1988 the District Court rectified its judgment noting that
the partition also concerned the garage.
- The
applicant's former wife appealed. By judgment of 6 September 1988 the
Plovdiv Regional Court quashed the lower court's judgment in so far
as it concerned several chattels. On 30 January 1989 the
applicant requested the reopening of the first phase of the partition
proceedings. On 4 May 1989 the Supreme Court partially
granted the request. It is unclear whether the Regional Court
eventually examined the remitted part of the matter, which concerned
the partition of an iron, an alarm clock, four blankets, two bed
sheets, two pillows and three cotton curtains.
2. The second phase of the partition proceedings
- Without
awaiting the outcome of the appeals that concerned the first phase of
the partition proceedings, the Plovdiv District Court commenced their
second phase. Between October 1988 and April 1991 the Plovdiv
District Court held nine hearings. Several adjournments were caused
by defective summonses.
- In
a judgment of 22 April 1991 the Plovdiv District Court allotted the
flat, part of the jewellery and of the other chattels to the
applicant and allotted the car, the garage and the rest of the
jewellery and the chattels to the applicant's former wife. Each party
was ordered to make payments to the other in respect of levelling
away differences in their shares and also for improvements and
expenses.
- On
24 May 1991 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Plovdiv Regional
Court. He challenged the evaluation of the flat and the jewellery and
the amounts he and his former wife had been ordered to pay to each
other. The court delivered its judgment on 10 December 1991. It
granted the appeal partly, reducing the amount owed by the applicant.
- Upon
the applicant's petition for review, on 31 December 1992 the Supreme
Court quashed parts of the lower courts' judgments and remitted the
case for a fresh examination.
- The
case was transmitted to the Plovdiv District Court. On 4
March 1993 the applicant sought to bring in the same proceedings
claims for damages against his former wife. On 15 May 1993 the
District Court, sitting in private, refused to accept them for
examination. The applicant's ensuing appeal was dismissed by the
Plovdiv Regional Court on 6 October 1993.
- On
4 May 1993, the Plovdiv District Court appointed an expert for the
evaluation of the flat and adjourned the hearing until 17 August
1993.
- On
3 December 1993 the applicant requested the withdrawal of the judge
by a letter containing offensive remarks and gratuitous accusations
against judges and staff of the District Court. Between 13 and 20
December 1993 all judges of the Plovdiv District Court withdrew,
apparently in reaction to the applicant's improper behaviour.
- On
an unspecified date in 1994 the applicant submitted to the Supreme
Court a request for rectification of its judgment of 31 December 1992
(see paragraph 13 above) pointing to the fact that the Supreme Court
had not specified the name of the court to which the case was to be
remitted for fresh examination.
- On
7 June 1994 the Supreme Court supplemented its judgment of
31 December 1992. It held that the case should be referred for a
fresh examination to the Plovdiv Regional Court.
- The
second phase of the partition proceedings thus resumed before the
Plovdiv Regional Court, which held a hearing in October 1994. The
court admitted written evidence and appointed an expert.
- On
10 January 1995 the applicant's former wife died. On 17 April 1995
the court, sitting in private, held that her daughter (who was also
the applicant's daughter), should become party to the proceedings.
- A
hearing took place on 8 May 1995, at which the Regional Court
appointed new experts.
- Between
1995 and 2000, the Regional Court listed numerous hearings which were
adjourned. Three adjournments causing delay of several months were
ordered as a court-appointed expert had failed to appear. Another
delay of several months was caused by the fact that judges to whom
the case had been assigned in 1997 had previously dealt with the
matter as District Court judges. The judges concerned had not noted
this problem of incompatibility prior to the date of the respective
hearing and ordered adjournments to allow the re-allocation of the
case to other judges.
- All
other adjournments during the period 1995-2000 were the result of the
authorities' failure to secure proper service of summons on the
applicant's daughter.
- Following
several such adjournments, on 23 October 1996 the Regional Court
ordered an inquiry into the reasons for the defective summoning. As
the problem persisted, on 6 March 1998 the Regional Court ordered the
mayor of Bankya, where the applicant's daughter resided, to explain
why the summons had not been served. On 13 September 1998
the mayor replied that summonses for residents of Bankya had to be
processed through the Sofia municipality. The mayor also stated that
the applicant's daughter had been notified but had not turned up to
receive the summons.
- As
the summons sent kept returning not served, the court ordered the
summons to be served on the lawyer of the applicant's daughter but in
September 1998 he informed the court that he did not represent her.
Following several additional adjournments caused by the same problem,
on 26 January 2000 the court imposed a fine on the mayor of Bankya
for having failed to ensure the serving of summonses.
- On
28 October 1999 the applicant submitted a complaint against the
delays in the proceedings under Article 217a of the Code of Civil
Procedure. It is unclear whether the request was examined.
- On
28 March 2000 the Plovdiv Regional Court received a letter by the
Sofia Municipality – Region Bankya, stating that the
applicant's daughter did not reside at the address she had given. The
court concluded that she had failed to notify it of a change of
address and considered her to be henceforth duly summoned, which
allowed the continuation of the proceedings.
28. A
hearing was held on 11 May 2000. An expert failed to show up. The
court admitted written evidence adduced by the applicant. The next
hearing was listed for 12 October 2000 in order to allow the
applicant's daughter to get acquainted with the new evidence. The
court also ordered the expert to appear at the next hearing on pain
of being fined.
- On
23 May 2000 the applicant requested the Plovdiv Regional Court to
schedule the hearing for an earlier date. On 25 May 2000 the court
refused, holding that pursuant to the provisions of the Code of Civil
Procedure the case did not call for an expedited examination. The
last hearing was held on 12 October 2000.
- The
Plovdiv Regional Court gave judgment on 5 January 2001. The court
determined that the value of the various objects to be partitioned
and ordered the applicant to pay a sum of money to his daughter.
Since the court relied on the objects' value as of 22 April 1991, the
date of their allotment to the parties, since when high inflation and
the depreciation of the Bulgarian currency had devalued pecuniary
claims, the applicant was ordered to pay 43 new Bulgarian levs
(“BGN”) (the equivalent of approximately EUR 24).
- On
1 February 2001 the applicant lodged a petition for review
(cassation) with the Supreme Court of Cassation. He challenged in
essence the value of the flat and the jewellery as determined by the
Plovdiv Regional Court.
- A
hearing scheduled for 15 October 2001 failed to take place because
the parties had not been duly summoned. The court held a
hearing on 18 February 2002.
- In
a final judgment of 1 March 2002 the Supreme Court of Cassation,
sitting as a three-member panel, reversed the Plovdiv Regional
Court's judgment in part, allowing the applicant a longer time-limit
– one year – for the payment of BGN 43 to his daughter.
The remainder of the judgment was upheld.
- On
12 July 2002 the applicant requested the reopening of the
proceedings, arguing that several persons had committed criminal
offences in relation to the examination of the case. In a
judgment of 5 June 2003 the Supreme Court of Cassation, sitting as a
five-member panel, refused to reopen the proceeding.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
- Article
217a of the Code of Civil Procedure, adopted in July 1999, provides:
“1. Each party may lodge a complaint about
delays at every stage of the case, including after oral argument,
when the examination of the case, the delivery of judgment or the
transmitting of an appeal against a judgment is unduly delayed.
2. The complaint about delays shall be lodged
directly with the higher court, no copies shall be served on the
other party, and no State fee shall be due. The lodging of a
complaint about delays shall not be limited by time.
3. The chairperson of the court with which
the complaint has been lodged shall request the case file and shall
immediately examine the complaint in private. His instructions as to
the acts to be performed by the court shall be mandatory. His order
shall not be subject to appeal and shall be sent immediately together
with the case file to the court against which the complaint has been
filed.
4. In case he determines that there has been
[undue delay], the chairperson of the higher court may make a
proposal to the disciplinary panel of the Supreme Judicial Council
for the taking of disciplinary action.”
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION
- The
applicant complained that the length of the proceedings had been
incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement, laid
down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a
reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
- The
Government contested that argument.
- The
period to be taken into consideration began only on 7 September 1992,
when the recognition by Bulgaria of the right of individual petition
took effect. However, in assessing the reasonableness of the time
that elapsed after that date, account must be taken of the fact that
at that time the proceedings had already been pending for seven years
and nine months (see paragraphs 7-13 above) (see Vatevi v.
Bulgaria, no. 55956/00, § 35, 28 September 2006).
- The
period in question ended on 1 March 2002, when the Supreme Court of
Cassation gave a final judgment. It thus lasted approximately nine
years and six months.
A. Admissibility
- The
Court notes that the application is not manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further
notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
- The
Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings
must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and
with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case,
the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what
was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other
authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, §
43, ECHR 2000-VII).
- The
Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present
case (see Frydlender, cited above, and – for a detailed
analysis of the relevant issues in a recent case concerning Bulgaria
– Vatevi v. Bulgaria, cited above).
- Having
examined all the material submitted to it and having regard to its
case-law on the subject, the Court considers that in the instant case
the length of the proceedings was excessive and failed to meet the
“reasonable time” requirement. In reaching this
conclusion, the Court does not overlook the fact that the applicant's
behaviour was at the origin of at least several adjournments (see
paragraphs 14 and 16 above). His systematic use of all possible
appeal procedures, even where what was at stake for him was of
minimal value, undoubtedly prolonged the proceedings. The Court
notes, however, that very significant delays, exceeding by far the
delays caused by the applicant, were imputable to the authorities. In
particular, for a period of approximately five years the authorities
were incapable of securing that summons be served on one of the
parties, which practically blocked the proceedings (see paragraphs
23-27 and 32 above). Also, failure on the part of judges to prepare
for the hearings in good time and non-appearance of court-appointed
experts caused additional adjournments that could have been avoided
(see paragraphs 22 and 28 above). Finally, the Court also has regard
to the global length of the proceedings, which is excessive in
itself, in view of the low level of complexity of the case.
There
has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF
ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No. 1 TO THE CONVENTION
- The
applicant further complained that the length of the proceedings
complained of had infringed his right to the peaceful enjoyment of
his possessions, as guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
- The
Government contested that argument.
- The
Court notes that this complaint is linked to the one examined above
and must therefore likewise be declared admissible.
- Having
regard to its finding under Article 6 § 1 (see paragraph 43
above), the Court considers that it is not necessary to examine
whether, in this case, there has been a violation of Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1 (see Zanghì v. Italy, judgment of 19
February 1991, Series A no. 194-C, p. 47, § 23).
III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION
- The
applicant further complained of the fact that he did not have
effective remedies in respect of the excessive length of the
proceedings. He relied on Article 13 of the Convention.
- The
Government contested that argument, stating that the applicant could
have submitted a complaint against delays under Article 217a of the
Code of Civil Procedure.
- The
Court notes that this complaint is linked to the one examined above
and must therefore likewise be declared admissible.
- The
Court reiterates that Article 13 guarantees an effective remedy
before a national authority for an alleged breach of the requirement
under Article 6 § 1 to hear a case within a reasonable time (see
Kudła v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, § 156, ECHR
2000-XI). Remedies available to a litigant at domestic
level for raising a complaint about the length of proceedings are
“effective”, within the meaning of Article 13, if they
“[prevent] the alleged violation or its continuation, or
[provide] adequate redress for any violation that [has] already
occurred” (see Kudła, cited above, § 158).
Article 13 therefore offers an alternative: a remedy will be
considered “effective” if it can be used either to
expedite a decision by the courts dealing with the case, or to
provide the litigant with adequate redress for delays that have
already occurred (see Mifsud v. France (dec.)[GC],
no. 57220/00, ECHR 2002 VIII).
- The
Court must determine whether, in the particular circumstances of the
present case, there existed in Bulgarian law any means for obtaining
redress in respect of the length of the proceedings.
- It
notes that a possibility to file a “complaint about delays”
was introduced in Bulgarian law with the adoption of Article 217a of
the Code of Civil Procedure in July 1999. This procedure allows a
litigant to apply to the chairperson of the higher court when the
examination of the case, the delivery of judgment or the transmitting
of an appeal against judgment is unduly delayed. The chairperson has
the power to issue binding instructions to the court examining the
case (see paragraph 35 above).
- However,
by the time this remedy was introduced in July 1999, very significant
delays had already accumulated during the period 1995 99. In
this connection, the Court notes that the effectiveness of a remedy
may depend on whether it has a significant effect on the length of
the proceedings as a whole (see Holzinger v. Austria (No. 1),
no. 23459/94, § 22, ECHR 2001 I, Holzinger v. Austria
(No. 2), no. 28898/95, § 21, 30 January 2001, and Rajak
v. Croatia, no. 49706/99, §§ 33 35, 28 June 2001).
- Moreover,
the Court notes that the applicant submitted a complaint against
delays in October 1999 which, apparently, was never examined and that
his request for shorter intervals between hearings was refused in May
2000 (see paragraphs 26 and 29 above). In any event, it is doubtful
whether that remedy could have had any useful effect in respect of
the authorities' inability to effect valid service of summonses –
which was the major cause of delays.
- The
Court concludes, therefore, that in the particular circumstances of
the present case a “complaint about delays” cannot be
considered an effective remedy irrespective of its possible
effectiveness in principle. The Government have not referred to other
remedies and the Court has not found it established that effective
compensatory of other remedies existed in Bulgarian law at the
relevant time.
- Accordingly,
the Court considers that in the present case there has been a
violation of Article 13 of the Convention on account of the lack of a
remedy under domestic law whereby, at the relevant time when major
delays accumulated (see paragraphs 22-30 above), the applicant could
have secured his right to have his case heard within a reasonable
time, as set forth in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
IV. OTHER COMPLAINTS
- By
letter of August 2003 the applicant also complained, relying on
various provisions of the Convention, about the alleged unfairness of
the proceedings, stating that the courts decided wrongly. He also
stated that due to judicial errors he had been ordered to pay sums he
did not owe.
- In
the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the
above matters complained of are within its competence, the Court
finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the
rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. It
follows that the remainder of the application is manifestly
ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§
3 and 4 of the Convention.
V. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
- Article
41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
- The
applicant claimed EUR 35,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
- The
Government did not express an opinion on the matter.
- The
Court considers that the applicant must have sustained non-pecuniary
damage. Ruling on an equitable basis, it awards award him EUR 1,000
under that head.
B. Costs and expenses
- The
applicant also claimed EUR 3,640 in respect of 52 hours of legal work
on the proceedings before the Court and EUR 254 in respect of
translation, postage and overhead expenses. He asked the Court to
award these amounts to be paid directly into his lawyers' bank
account.
- The
Government did not express an opinion on the matter.
- According
to the Court's case-law, an applicant is entitled to reimbursement of
his costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these
have been actually and necessarily incurred and were reasonable as to
quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the information in
its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it
reasonable to award the sum of EUR 1,000 covering costs under all
heads.
C. Default interest
- The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Declares admissible, the complaints concerning
the excessive length of the proceedings, the alleged lack of
effective remedies in this respect and the ensuing alleged
interference with the applicant's property rights and declares the
remainder of the application inadmissible;
- Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention;
- Holds that it is not necessary to examine
whether, in this case, there has been a violation of Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1 to the Convention;
- Holds that there has been a violation of Article
13 in conjunction with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;
- Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 1,000 (one
thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage and EUR 1,000 (one
thousand euros) in respect of costs and expenses, the latter amount
being payable directly into the bank account of one of the
applicant's legal representatives, plus any tax that may be
chargeable;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
- Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim
for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 18 October 2007, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Claudia Westerdiek Peer Lorenzen
Registrar President