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European Court of Human Rights |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> European Court of Human Rights >> Philip ALDERSON v the United Kingdom - 35594/02 [2008] ECHR 375 (27 March 2008) URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2008/375.html Cite as: [2008] ECHR 375 |
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FOURTH SECTION
DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no.
35594/02
by Philip ALDERSON
against the United Kingdom
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 27 March 2008 as a Chamber composed of:
Lech
Garlicki,
President,
Nicolas
Bratza,
Giovanni
Bonello,
Ljiljana
Mijović,
Ján
Šikuta,
Päivi
Hirvelä,
Ledi
Bianku, judges,
and
Lawrence Early, Section
Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 19 September 2002,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant, Mr Philip Alderson, is a British national who was born in 1952 and lives in Newport. The United Kingdom Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr D. Walton of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London.
A. The circumstances of the case
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
On 4 February 2002, the applicant received a letter from the West Mercia Constabulary asking him to provide information about who was driving his car on 31 January 2002 when it failed to comply with the speed limit. The letter also stated that the police intended to prosecute the driver and that failing to supply information as to the driver was a criminal offence under section 172 of the Road Traffic Act 1988.
The applicant replied that he was responding under duress and that he was the driver.
On 18 September 2002, before the Magistrates’ Court, the applicant pleaded not guilty to the speeding offence and the prosecution sought to rely on his admission. The Magistrates rejected the applicant’s arguments that the use of the confession violated the Convention. He was convicted of speeding and fined GBP 125, with GBP 263 costs and three penalty points endorsed on his licence.
B. Relevant domestic law and practice
The relevant domestic law and practice is set out in O’Halloran and Francis v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 15809/02 and 25624/02, §§ 25 31, ECHR 2007 ...
COMPLAINTS
The applicant complained under Article 6 §§ 1 and 2 of the Convention that he had been subject to compulsion to give incriminating evidence in violation of the right to remain silent and the privilege against self incrimination. Article 6 of the Convention provides, so far as relevant, as follows:
“1. In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal...
2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.”
THE LAW
A. The parties’ submissions
1. The Government
The Government submitted that the present case was indistinguishable from the case of O’Halloran and Francis, cited above, and in particular the facts of O’Halloran, since the prosecution relied on the admission obtained as a result of the section 172 demand as part of its evidence at the trial.
2. The applicant
The applicant expressed his disagreement with the O’Halloran and Francis judgment. In particular, he submitted that the right to silence was absolute and that the degree of compulsion used to obtain evidence was irrelevant.
B. The Court’s assessment
The Court has previously examined cases raising issues similar to those in the present case in O’Halloran and Francis, cited above, where it found there had been no violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and that no separate issue arose to be considered under Article 6 § 2.
The Court has examined the present case and finds that there are no facts or arguments from the applicant which would lead to any different conclusion in this instance.
It follows that this application must be rejected as being manifestly ill founded pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Declares the application inadmissible.
Lawrence Early Lech Garlicki
Registrar President