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FIRST
SECTION
CASE OF PLETEŠ v. CROATIA
(Application
no. 21591/06)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
10 July 2008
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Pleteš v. Croatia,
The
European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Christos Rozakis, President,
Nina
Vajić,
Khanlar Hajiyev,
Dean
Spielmann,
Sverre Erik Jebens,
Giorgio
Malinverni,
George Nicolaou, judges,
and André
Wampach, Deputy
Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 19 June 2008,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an application
(no. 21591/06) against the
Republic of Croatia lodged with the Court
under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”)
by a Croatian national, Mr Ivica
Pleteš (“the applicant”), on 24 April 2006.
- The
Croatian Government (“the Government”) were represented
by their Agent, Mrs Š. StaZnik.
- On
14 February 2007 the
Court decided to communicate the application to the Government.
Applying Article 29 § 3 of the Convention, it decided to rule on
the admissibility and merits of the application at the same time.
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The
applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Kastav.
- On
1 July 1997 a certain N.K. brought a civil action against the
applicant in the Rijeka Municipal Court (Općinski sud u
Rijeci) seeking the division of jointly owned property. The court
held six hearings, heard evidence from two witnesses and on 2
December 1999 dismissed the plaintiff’s claim against the
applicant. A subsequent appeal by the plaintiff
was forwarded to the Rijeka County Court (Zupanijski sud u Rijeci)
on 13 March 2000.
- In
the appellate proceedings the applicant lodged a request for the case
to be transferred to another court, which was dismissed by the
Supreme Court on 4 June 2003; a request for the President of the
Rijeka County Court to stand down, which was dismissed by the Supreme
Court on 13 October 2003 and a request for the presiding judge to
stand down, which was dismissed by the President of the Rijeka County
Court on 9 January 2004. The Government submitted that all three
requests were unsubstantiated.
- On
28 January 2004 the Rijeka County Court quashed the first-instance
judgment and remitted the case for fresh examinations. In the resumed
proceedings, the Municipal Court held hearings on 27 May and 6 July
2004 and scheduled an on-site inspection which was not carried out
owing to the plaintiff’s refusal to admit the assigned expert
onto his property.
- According
to the Government, from 2004 to 2006 the applicant failed to collect
mail sent to him by the Municipal Court. This caused the adjournment
of hearings scheduled for 9 May, 6 September and 24 October 2006.
- The
Government further submitted that in the period between 2004 and 2006
criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant on charges
of numerous counts of fraud, threatening behaviour and usury. About
fifteen hearings had been adjourned since the applicant had failed to
collect the court summons.
- Meanwhile,
on 17 July 2004 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint under
section 63 of the Constitutional Court Act complaining about the
length of the proceedings. On 17 November 2005 the Constitutional
Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) dismissed his complaint
as ill-founded, finding that the proceedings were relatively complex
and that the applicant had contributed to the delays by failing to
appear at three hearings in 1998.
- The
case is at present pending before the Municipal Court.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION
- The
applicant complained that the length of the proceedings was
incompatible with the “reasonable-time” requirement, laid
down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a
reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
- The
Government contested that argument.
- The
period to be taken into consideration began on 6 November 1997, when
the Convention entered into force in respect of Croatia. However, in
assessing the reasonableness of the time that elapsed after that
date, account must be taken of the state of proceedings at that time.
The period in question has not yet ended. It has thus lasted so far
about ten years and six months for two levels of jurisdiction.
A. Admissibility
- The
Government argued that the applicant should have lodged a further
complaint with the Constitutional Court about the length of the
proceedings. They observed that although he had already lodged a
constitutional complaint to that end on 17 July 2004, which the
Constitutional Court had dismissed on 17 November 2005, a further
constitutional complaint would have had reasonable prospects of
success since it would have enabled the Constitutional Court to
examine the overall length of the proceedings, including the period
following its previous decision.
- The
applicant contested that argument.
- The Court finds that the question of exhaustion of
domestic remedies is inextricably linked to the merits of this
complaint. Therefore, to avoid prejudging the latter, both questions
should be examined together. Accordingly, it holds that the question
of exhaustion of domestic remedies in respect of this complaint
should be joined to the merits (see Kozlica v. Croatia,
no. 29182/03, § 21, 2 November 2006).
- The
Court further notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded
within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention and is
not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared
admissible.
B. Merits
- The
Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings
must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and
with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case,
the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what
was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other
authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, §
43, ECHR 2000-VII).
- The
Court observes at the outset that the applicant availed himself of an
effective domestic remedy in respect of the length of the proceedings
by lodging a constitutional complaint (see Slaviček
v. Croatia (dec.), no. 20862/02, ECHR 2002-VII), which
the Constitutional Court dismissed. In these circumstances, the Court
is required to verify whether the way in which the Constitutional
Court interpreted and applied the relevant provisions of domestic law
produced consequences that are consistent with the principles of the
Convention, as interpreted in the light of the Court’s
case-law. In doing so, the Court has to examine the period between
the date of the entry into force of the Convention in respect of
Croatia and the date of the Constitutional Court’s decision. If
a Constitutional Court’s decision is consistent with Convention
principles, the Court will, when examining the question of the
exhaustion of domestic remedies, refrain from dealing with the length
of the proceedings subsequent to that decision. Otherwise, a genuine
examination of the total length of the proceedings after ratification
is warranted (see Kozlica v. Croatia, cited above, § 23).
- The
Court notes that the period examined by the Constitutional Court
amounts to eight years (see paragraph 10 above) during which the case
was examined at two levels of jurisdiction. While there appear to
have been no substantial delays in the proceedings before the
first-instance court, the same cannot be said of the appellate
proceedings, which lasted three years, nine months and twenty-six
days. Although in that period three requests by the applicant –
two for judges to stand down and one for the case to be transferred
to a different appellate court – were also examined, the Court
does not see how deciding these procedural issues could justify such
lengthy appellate proceedings. In this connection, it notes the
Government’s submission that the applicant’s requests
were unsubstantiated, a factor which, in the Court’s view,
would, if anything, have made it easier to decide the requests.
However, the first decision, which concerned the applicant’s
request for a transfer of the case from the Rijeka County Court, was
not adopted by the Supreme Court until the appellate proceedings had
already been pending for about three years and three months.
Furthermore, the Court reiterates that it is the normal task of a
court in judicial proceedings to decide upon the circumstances which
might call for the removal of judges participating in a particular
case (see Cerin v. Croatia, no. 54727/00, § 26,
15 November 2001). Therefore, the Court cannot accept the view that
the applicant significantly contributed to the length of the
proceedings prior to the Constitutional Court’s decision.
- Having
examined all the material submitted to it, and having regard to its
case-law on the subject, the foregoing considerations are sufficient
to enable the Court to conclude that the length of the proceedings
subject to the Constitutional Court’s scrutiny was excessive
and failed to meet the “reasonable-time” requirement. In
these circumstances, it would be going beyond the requirements of
Article 35 § 1 of the Convention to compel the applicant to
lodge a further constitutional complaint (see Kozlica v. Croatia,
cited above, § 28).
- In
conclusion, the Court rejects the Government’s objection
regarding the exhaustion of domestic remedies and finds that there
has been a breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention on
account of the excessive the length of proceedings.
II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
- Article
41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
- The
applicant did not submit a claim for just satisfaction or for costs
and expenses. Accordingly, the Court considers that there is no call
to award him any sum on these accounts.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Declares the application admissible;
- Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention;
Done in English, and notified in writing on 10 July 2008, pursuant to
Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
André Wampach Christos Rozakis
Deputy Registrar President
