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SECOND
SECTION
CASE OF NAUGZEMYS v. LITHUANIA
(Application
no. 17997/04)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
16 July 2009
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of NaugZemys v. Lithuania,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Françoise Tulkens,
President,
Ireneu Cabral Barreto,
Vladimiro
Zagrebelsky,
Danutė Jočienė,
Dragoljub
Popović,
András Sajó,
Nona
Tsotsoria, judges,
and Sally
Dollé, Section
Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 23 June 2009,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an application
(no. 17997/04) against the
Republic of Lithuania lodged with the Court
under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”)
by a Lithuanian national, Antanas
NaugZemys
(“the applicant”), on 9 May 2004.
- The
Lithuanian Government (“the Government”) were represented
by their Agent, Ms E. Baltutytė.
- On
11 May 2006 the Court
decided to give notice of the application to the Government. It was
also decided to examine the merits of the application at the same
time as its admissibility (Article 29 § 3).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The
applicant was born in 1948 and lives in Kaunas.
- On
28 November 1995 the applicant brought a civil action, requesting
annulment of a number of agreements concluded in 1987 whereby
ZD, a third person, had acquired a house and certain other items of
real property. The applicant alleged in particular that he had been
the actual buyer, and that ZD had only acted in a formal capacity.
Six other persons were defendants in the proceedings.
- ZD
lodged a counter-claim.
- Given
certain evidence that in the past the applicant had suffered from
schizophrenia, on 30 April 1997 the court ordered a psychiatric
expertise in order to establish whether the applicant was capable of
participating in the court proceedings due to his state of mental
health.
- On
15 September 1997 the State Legal Psychiatry Service informed
the court that the applicant had failed to appear before it for the
expertise to be conducted. The expertise was carried out on
14 October 1997.
- On
23 December 1997 the Pasvalys District Court dismissed the
applicant’s case as unsubstantiated.
- On
20 May 1998 the PanevėZys Regional Court quashed the decision,
returning the case for examination de novo. It was established
that the first-instance court had failed to examine certain claims of
the parties.
- On
1 February 1999 the Kėdainiai District Court again dismissed the
applicant’s case.
- The
applicant appealed. He also requested the Kėdainiai District
Court to exempt him from the obligation to pay stamp duty. On
17 February 1999 that court allowed his request.
- On
9 March 1999 the PanevėZys Regional Court quashed the
ruling by which the applicant had been exempted from paying the stamp
duty.
- On
25 May 1999 the PanevėZys Regional Court dismissed the
applicant’s appeal on the merits and upheld the decision of 1
February 1999.
- On
10 February 2000 the Supreme Court quashed the decisions of the lower
courts on account of the fact that they had failed to establish all
the relevant circumstances. The case was returned for a fresh
examination at first instance.
- On
27 November 2000 the Kėdainiai District Court allowed the
applicant’s action in full.
- On
16 January 2001 the PanevėZys Regional Court upheld the
decision.
- On
20 June 2001 the Supreme Court quashed the decisions of the lower
courts and remitted the case to the first instance court for a new
examination. It was established that the lower courts had again
failed to establish and assess all the relevant circumstances of the
case, despite having been instructed to do so in the Supreme Court’s
ruling of 10 February 2000.
- On
14 August 2002 the PanevėZys City District Court dismissed the
applicant’s claims.
- On
27 August 2002 the applicant appealed. However the PanevėZys
City District Court decided to return the appeal to the applicant
unexamined for failure to pay stamp duty. The applicant’s
objection to the latter decision was dismissed on 1 October
2002. It was established that the applicant had been and still was a
wealthy man, given that he owed numerous real estates. Consequently,
there was no ground to exempt him from stamp duty.
- On
14 February 2003 the PanevėZys Regional Court upheld the
decision of 14 August 2002.
- On
11 November 2003 the Supreme Court dismissed a cassation appeal
lodged by the applicant.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
- Article
6.246 of the Civil Code provides that civil liability arises from
non-performance of a statutory duty or from a violation of the
general duty of care. The remaining relevant domestic law as concerns
domestic remedies for the excessive length of civil proceedings is
reproduced in the judgment of Četvertakas and Others v.
Lithuania (no. 16013/02, §§
21-22, 20 January 2009).
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION
- The
applicant complained that the length of the proceedings had been
incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement of
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a
reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
Admissibility
1. The parties’ submissions
- The
Government argued that the applicant had failed to exhaust all
effective domestic remedies as he had not applied to the domestic
courts claiming redress for the length of the civil proceedings under
Articles 6.246 and 6.272 of the Civil Code. Relying on the Ruling of
the Constitutional Court of 19 August 2006, the Government also
argued that, even assuming that specific redress had not been
enshrined in any law, the applicant could have claimed redress by
relying directly on the Constitution. Moreover, having regard to the
fact that the Convention was a legal act of direct applicability and
had precedence over Lithuanian law, the applicant could have relied
on it, alleging the unlawfulness of the State authorities’
inaction and requesting redress in the domestic courts. Lastly, the
Government maintained, that the length of the civil proceedings had
been reasonable and therefore this complaint was manifestly
ill-founded.
- The
applicant contested these submissions.
2. The Court
- As
to the Government’s plea concerning exhaustion of domestic
remedies, the Court refers to its conclusion in the case of Baškienė
v. Lithuania (no. 11529/04, §§ 68-72, 24 July
2007), where it decided that a claim for damages under Article 6.272
of the Civil Code did not satisfy the test of “effectiveness”
in contexts of the present kind. The
Court finds no reason to depart from its existing case-law in this
regard. It remains unconvinced that the possibility of claiming
damages for the excessive length of proceedings under Article 6.272
of the Civil Code had – at the time of introduction of the
present application – already acquired a sufficient degree of
legal certainty requiring its exhaustion for the purposes of Article
35 § 1 of the Convention.
- Next,
whereas the Government argued that the applicant could have brought a
claim based on Article 6.246 of the Civil Code or the Constitution,
they have not adduced any evidence to demonstrate that such a remedy
had any reasonable prospect of success, especially before the ruling
of the Constitutional Court on 19 August 2006. Nor have the
Government provided the Court with practical examples showing that
the applicant could have relied effectively on the Convention at the
domestic level.
- It
follows that the Government’s objection must be dismissed.
- The
Court considers that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded
within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It
further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It
must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. The parties’ submissions
- The
Government argued that the applicant had himself contributed to the
length of proceedings by failing to act with due diligence. In
particular, on numerous occasions the applicant and his lawyer asked
the courts to adjourn hearings for different reasons. Moreover, the
applicant failed to appear promptly before the expert psychiatric
commission for an examination of his mental health and, being
unwilling to pay stamp duty, he deliberately misled the domestic
courts as to his financial situation.
- The
applicant contested the Government’s arguments.
2. The Court
- As regards the period to be taken into consideration,
the Court first observes that the civil proceedings were instituted
on 28 November 1995. They ended on 11 November 2003, when the
Supreme Court took its decision. The proceedings therefore lasted
nearly eight years at three levels of jurisdiction.
- The
Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings
must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and
with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case,
the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what
was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other
authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, §
43, ECHR 2000-VII).
- The
Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present
application (see, among many authorities, Frydlender, cited
above; Pachman and Mates v. the Czech Republic, no.
14881/02, §§ 28-24, 4 April 2006; Csősz v. Hungary,
no. 34418/04, § 29, 29 January 2008).
- Turning
to the case at hand, the Court notes that the proceedings involved
many parties and were therefore of a certain complexity. Whilst
accepting the Government’s arguments that, to a certain extent,
the applicant himself had contributed to the length of proceedings
(see paragraphs 7, 8 and 20 above), the Court cannot fail to
observe that extensive delays in the proceedings were occasioned by
mistakes or inertia on the part of the domestic authorities. In
particular, the case was returned for re-examination by the PanevėZys
Regional Court on 20 May 1998 because the lower court had failed
to examine certain claims of the parties (see paragraph 10
above). Furthermore, since the lower courts had failed to properly
establish and assess all the circumstances of the case, the Supreme
Court had to remit it twice for a fresh examination at first instance
(see paragraphs 15 and 18 above).
- Having
regard to all the material submitted to it and to its case-law on the
subject, the Court considers that in the instant case the length of
the civil proceedings was excessive and failed to meet the
“reasonable time” requirement.
There
has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention.
II. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
- The
applicant also complained under Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention that the courts were biased, and that they had
neglected the relevant circumstances of the case.
- In
this connection the Court reiterates that it is not a court of appeal
from the decisions of domestic courts and that, as a general rule, it
is for the latter to assess the evidence before them. The Court’s
task under the Convention is to ascertain whether the proceedings as
a whole were fair (see, among many authorities, García Ruiz
v. Spain [GC], no. 30544/96, §§ 28-29, ECHR
1999-I). On the basis of the materials submitted by the applicant,
the Court notes that within the framework of the civil proceedings
the applicant was able to introduce all necessary arguments in
defence of his interests, and that the judicial authorities gave them
due consideration. His claims were examined at three levels of
jurisdiction and dismissed as being unfounded. The decisions of the
domestic courts do not appear unreasonable or arbitrary. It
follows that this part of the application must be rejected as being
manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4
of the Convention.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
- Article
41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
- The
applicant claimed 100,000 Lithuanian litas (LTL, approximately 28,960
euros (EUR)) in respect of both pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage.
- The
Government contested these claims as unsubstantiated and excessive.
- The
Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found
and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim.
However, it awards the applicant EUR 1,500 in respect of
non-pecuniary damage.
B. Costs and expenses
- The
applicant did not claim any costs or expenses. Consequently, the
Court makes no award under this head.
C. Default interest
- The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Declares the applicant’s complaint
concerning the excessive length of the proceedings admissible
and the remainder of the application inadmissible;
- Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention;
- Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 1,500 (one
thousand five hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in
respect of non-pecuniary damage, this sum being converted into the
national currency of that State at the rate applicable on the date of
settlement;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
- Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s
claims for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 16 July 2009, pursuant to
Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Sally Dollé Françoise
Tulkens
Registrar President
