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FOURTH
SECTION
CASE OF
MOSKAL v. POLAND
(Application
no. 10373/05)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
15
September 2009
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Moskal v. Poland,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Nicolas
Bratza,
President,
Lech
Garlicki,
Giovanni
Bonello,
Ljiljana
Mijović,
Päivi
Hirvelä,
Ledi
Bianku,
Nebojša
Vučinić,
judges,
and
Fatoş Aracı,
Deputy
Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 25 August 2009,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an application (no. 10373/05) against the
Republic of Poland lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Polish national, Ms
Maria Moskal (“the applicant”), on 1 February 2005.
- The applicant was represented by Ms R. Strzępek, a
lawyer practising in Strzyżów. The Polish Government
(“the Government”) were represented by their Agent,
Mr J. Wołąsiewicz of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.
- The
applicant alleged, in particular, that the ex officio
re-opening of the social security proceedings concerning her right to
an early-retirement pension, which resulted in the quashing of the
final decision granting her a right to a pension, was in breach of
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. She also complained that the
same facts had given rise to a breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
to the Convention alone and in conjunction with Article 14 of the
Convention. She alleged in this connection that the revocation of her
acquired right to an early-retirement pension amounted to an
unjustified deprivation of property and to discrimination on the
grounds of her place of residence. Lastly, the applicant alleged an
interference with her right to respect for her private and family
life on account of the fact that she had been deprived of her sole
source of income.
- On
19 September 2006 a
Chamber of the Fourth Section of the Court decided to give notice to
the Government of the complaints under Articles 6 and 8 of the
Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention alone
and read in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention. It was
decided to rule on the admissibility and merits of the application at
the same time (Article 29 § 3 of the Convention).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The
applicant, Ms Maria Moskal, is a Polish national who was born in 1955
and lives in Glinik Chorzewski.
- The
applicant is married with three children. She has a medium-level
education. Prior to her early retirement she was employed for
thirty-one years and had paid her social security contributions to
the State. Her child, born in 1994, suffers from atopic bronchial
asthma (atopowa astma oskrzelowa), various allergies and
recurring sino-pulmonary infections.
A. Proceedings for early-retirement pension
- On
6 August 2001 the applicant filed an application with the Rzeszów
Social Security Board to be granted the right to an early-retirement
pension for persons raising children who, due to the seriousness of
their health condition, required constant care, the so-called “EWK”
pension.
- The
particular type of pension sought by the applicant was at the
relevant time regulated by the Cabinet's Ordinance of 15 May 1989 on
the right to early retirement of employees raising children who
require permanent care (Rozporządzenie Rady Ministrów
z dn. 15 maja 1989 w sprawie uprawnień do wcześniejszej
emerytury pracowników opiekujących się dziećmi
wymagającymi stałej opieki) (“the 1989
Ordinance”).
- Along
with her application for a pension, the applicant submitted, among
other documents, a medical certificate issued on 2 August 2001 by a
specialist in allergy and pulmonology from the Health Service
Institution in Strzyżów (Zespół Opieki
Zdrowotnej). The certificate stated that the applicant's
seven-year-old son had suffered from the age of three months from
atopic bronchial asthma, various allergies, as well as frequent
sino pulmonary infections often accompanied by fever and
bronchial constriction (spastyczne skurcze oskrzeli).
Consequently, he was in need of his mother's constant care. It was
further noted that the medical certificate had been issued in
connection with the application for an early-retirement pension
regulated by the 1989 Ordinance in view of the need to provide
permanent care to the child from 31 December 1998 onwards.
- On
29 August 2001 the Rzeszów Social Security Board (Zakład
Ubezpieczeń Społecznych) issued a decision granting the
applicant the right to an early-retirement pension in the amount of
1,683 Polish zlotys (PLN) gross (PLN 1,020 net), starting from 1
August 2001. In the same decision, however, the Social Security Board
suspended the payment of the pension due to the fact that the
applicant was still working on the date of the decision.
- On
31 August 2001 the applicant resigned from her full-time job as a
clerk at the Polish Telecommunications Company in Rzeszów,
where she had been employed for the past thirty years.
- Consequently,
on an unspecified date, the Rzeszów Social Security Board
issued a new decision authorising the payment of the previously
awarded retirement pension starting from 1 September 2001.
- Subsequently,
the applicant was issued with a pensioner's identity card marked
'valid indefinitely' and for the following ten months she continued
to receive her pension without interruption.
B. Re-opening of proceedings for early-retirement
pension
- On
25 June 2002 the Rzeszów Social Security Board issued two
decisions. By virtue of the first decision, the payment of the
applicant's pension was discontinued starting from 1 July 2002. By
virtue of the second decision, the Board revoked the initial decision
of 29 August 2001 and eventually refused to award the applicant the
right to an early-retirement pension under the scheme provided for by
the 1989 Ordinance. The latter decision stated that on 4 June 2002
the proceedings concerning the applicant's right to a pension had
been re-opened ex officio and that, as a result, “the
medical certificate attached to her application for a pension had
been found to raise doubts [as to its accuracy]”. Furthermore,
the following standard clause appeared in the decision:
“In the light of the medical documentation
obtained concerning the child, it was established that the condition
with which the child had been diagnosed was not enumerated in the
[1989] Ordinance, and the analysis of the level of severity and the
course [of the disease] did not indicate an impairment of bodily
functions to such a degree as to justify the award of the pension [on
account of] the necessity of permanent care of the child. It follows
that the medical certificate serving as the basis for the award of
the benefit is not supported by medical documentation. Consequently
the right to a retirement pension is denied.”
- The
applicant appealed against the decision of 25 June 2002 divesting her
of the right to an early-retirement pension. She submitted that she
should receive the benefit because her son required her constant
care, as confirmed by the medical certificate attached to the
original application. Moreover, the applicant alleged that the
revocation of her retirement pension was contrary to the principle of
vested rights.
- On
26 February 2003 the Rzeszów Regional Court (Sąd
Okręgowy) dismissed the applicant's appeal.
- A
medical report by an expert in pulmonology was ordered by the
Regional Court. Having examined the medical documentation concerning
the applicant's son, as well as the child in person, the expert found
that the applicant's son suffered from sporadic bronchial asthma and
recurring sino pulmonary infections. The expert concluded that
the child did not require, as of 31 December 1998 or at the time
of the proceedings, his mother's permanent care, her nursing or any
further aid, since his bronchial asthma did not significantly impair
his respiratory functions. He further observed that the applicant's
care was needed only when the child's condition occasionally became
more severe.
- Relying
on the above expert opinion, the Regional Court held that the
applicant had been rightfully divested of the right to a pension
under the scheme provided by the 1989 Ordinance as she did not
satisfy the requirement of necessary permanent care. The Regional
Court did not examine the case from the standpoint of the doctrine of
vested rights.
- On
16 October 2003 the Rzeszów Court of Appeal (Sąd
Apelacyjny) dismissed the applicant's appeal against the
aforementioned judgment. The Court of Appeal agreed with the findings
of fact contained in the expert opinion produced in the course of the
first-instance proceedings to the effect that the applicant's son did
not require at the relevant time his mother's permanent care.
- On
the issue of the re-opening of the proceedings, the Court of Appeal
observed that decisions concerning retirement and disability pensions
were only of a declaratory character. Therefore, they could be
quashed by a social security authority where new evidence had been
submitted or relevant circumstances, which pre-existed the initial
pension award but which had not been taken into consideration by the
authority beforehand, had come to light.
- Furthermore,
the Court of Appeal observed that pension decisions could be verified
even in the light of pre-existing circumstances which had not been
taken into consideration as a result of the authority's own mistake
or negligence. On the other hand, the Court of Appeal agreed with the
applicant that the proceedings could not be re-opened as a
consequence of a different assessment of the very same evidence which
had accompanied the original application for a pension.
- The
Court of Appeal found that, in the instant case, the impugned pension
proceedings had been re-opened because relevant circumstances
pre-existing the initial pension award had been discovered by the
authority in the course of a supplementary examination of the child's
entire medical record by the Social Security Board's doctor (lekarz
orzecznik).
- Finally,
the Court of Appeal stated that the doctrine of vested rights did not
apply to rights acquired unjustly, for example when a person had been
granted a right to a pension whereas in fact he or she had never met
the requirements laid down in the relevant provisions. The Court of
Appeal recalled that the purpose behind the 1989 Ordinance was to
enable the carers of children with extremely severe disorders to take
early retirement. It was aimed at providing a substitute source of
income in cases where persons had lost their wages owing to the need
to terminate their employment in order to take care of their sick
children on a permanent basis. The Court of Appeal emphasised that,
in such circumstances, it was necessary for the social security
authorities to make a careful examination of whether or not persons
applying for the right in question satisfied all the requirements.
- On
7 May 2004 (decision served on 7 August 2004) the Supreme Court (Sąd
Najwyższy) dismissed the applicant's cassation appeal, fully
endorsing the Court of Appeal's findings of fact and law. Referring
to the particular circumstances of the case, the Supreme Court held
that the social security authority had lacked evidence as to the
severity of the child's condition, since the medical certificate
attached to the application did not specify those activities which
the child could not perform due to his alleged impairment. The fact
that the aforementioned evidence had been lacking at the date of the
decision did not come to light until after the validation of the
decision. Therefore, the impugned proceedings had been re-opened due
to the discovery of new relevant circumstances and not on the basis
of a re examination of the very same evidence attached to the
applicant's application for a pension.
- The
applicant was not ordered to return her early-retirement benefits
paid by the Social Security Board from 1 September 2001 until 1 July
2002, despite the revocation of her right to the early-retirement
pension.
C. The applicant's social security status after the
revocation of the “EWK” pension
- In
the period from 1 July 2002 (the date on which the payment of the
applicant's “EWK” pension was discontinued) to 25 October
2005 the applicant was not in receipt of any social benefits. The
applicant submitted that in that period she had had no other income.
As a
result of separate social security proceedings, which had been
instituted by the applicant, the Strzyżów District Labour
Office (Powiatowy Urząd Pracy) decided on 25 October 2005
to grant the applicant a pre retirement benefit (zasiłek
przedemerytalny) in the amount of 523 Polish zlotys (PLN) net.
Because, under the applicable law, a three-year statute of
limitations applies to social security claims the decision to grant
the right had a retroactive effect, with a starting date of
25 October 2002.
As a
result, on an unspecified date, presumably on 1 August 2004, the
applicant received a pre-retirement benefit in the form of a lump-sum
payment for the period between 25 October 2002 and 31 July
2004, without interest.
The
benefit was at first paid by the Strzyżów Regional Labour
Office (Powiatowy Urząd Pracy) and since 1 August 2004 it
was paid by the Rzeszów Social Security Board. As of March
2008 the applicant's pre retirement benefit amounts to 594
Polish zlotys (PLN) net.
- In
the light of the law as it now applies, it appears that the applicant
will qualify for a regular retirement pension in 2015.
D. Additional information
- Approximately
120 applications arising from a similar fact pattern have been
brought to the Court. The applicant in the instant case and most of
the other applicants form the Association of Victims of the Social
Security Board (Stowarzyszenie Osób Poszkodowanych przez
ZUS) (“the Association”), an organisation monitoring
the practices of the Social Security Board in Poland, in particular
in the Podkarpacki region.
- The
applicant submitted, according to the Association, that only 10% of
the total number of “EWK” pension recipients had been
subjected to review and re-opening under Section 114 of the 1998 Law.
- The
Government submitted that as of the end of 2006 approximately 76,600
individuals had been in receipt of the “EWK” pension.
Although there were no statistics as to how many pensions had been
revoked either countrywide or in each region, that number was very
small.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
A. System of granting social security benefits in
Poland
- The
system of social security in Poland is regulated by the Law of
13 October 1998 on the system of social insurance (Ustawa o
systemie ubezpieczeń społecznych) and a number of other
acts applying to specific occupational groups and regulating specific
types of benefits.
Proceedings
for granting welfare benefits are two-tier. First, an application for
a benefit is made to the regional Social Security Board. The board
makes an assessment of the eligibility criteria for each type of
benefit and issues a decision. Then, in the event that an individual
concerned appeals, the decision becomes subject to judicial review by
a social security court, which is a specialised branch of a regional
civil court. The Social Security Board is a State authority which
carries out administrative functions and issues declaratory
decisions. In the judicial review phase, the Board becomes a party to
the proceedings before the social security court.
A
judicial decision taken by the regional social security court may
then be challenged by either party to the proceedings before a
special social security branch of a court of appeal. Ultimately, a
decision delivered by an appellate court may be appealed to the
Supreme Court. This remedy is available irrespective of the amount of
the claim.
B. The 1989 Ordinance
- The
1989 Ordinance ceased to be in force on 31 December 1998. However,
its provisions remained in operation with regard to persons who had
met the requirements of an early-retirement pension before that date
but had failed to apply for the benefit in due time. The conditions
to be fulfilled by a person in order to qualify for an
early-retirement pension were laid down by paragraph 1 of the 1989
Ordinance.
Paragraph
1.1 contained a reference to section 26 paragraph 1 point 2 of the
Law of 14 December 1982 on retirement pensions of employees and
their families. In the relevant part it provided that persons
entitled to an early retirement pension
were those persons (both women and men) who had been employed for at
least 20 or 25 years and who personally took care of a child.
Paragraph
1.2 provided that for children under the age of 16 it was not
necessary to submit an official Social Security Board disability
certificate. It was sufficient to present a medical certificate
issued by a specialist medical clinic stating: “due to the
health condition, caused by one of the diseases enumerated in
paragraph 1.3, the child requires permanent care”.
Paragraph
1.3 provided that early retirement was justified by the following
physical and/or mental conditions of the child:
“1. Complete dysfunction of upper or
lower limbs, pareses and palsies, which prevent the child from
independent movement and from controlling his or her physiological
functions;
2. Mild, moderate and severe mental
retardation, mental disorders, injury or disease of the central
nervous system, making impossible autonomy in decisions or in daily
activities;
3. Mild mental retardation with accompanying
significant impairment of movement, sight, hearing or other chronic
diseases significantly impairing bodily functions;
4. Other diseases impairing body
effectiveness to a very serious degree.”
C. Law of 17 December 1998 on retirement and disability
pensions paid from the Social Insurance Fund
- The
re-opening of the proceedings concerning the benefit in question is
regulated in section 114 of the 1998 Law, which at the
relevant time read as follows:
“114.1 The right to benefits or the
amount of benefits will be re-assessed upon application by the person
concerned or, ex officio, if, after the validation of the
decision concerning benefits, new evidence is submitted or
circumstances which had existed before issuing the decision and which
have an impact on the right to benefits or on their amount are
discovered.”
D. The Supreme Court's resolution of 5 June 2003
- In
its resolution of 5 June 2003 (no. III UZP 5/03), adopted by a bench
of seven judges, the Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy)
dealt with the question submitted by the Ombudsman (Rzecznik Praw
Obywatelskich) as to whether a different assessment of the
evidence attached to the application for a pension, carried out by a
social security authority after validation of the decision concerning
the pension, might constitute a ground for re opening the
proceedings leading to a review of the right to a pension in
accordance with section 114 of the Law of 17 December 1998 on
retirement and disability pensions paid from the Social Insurance
Fund. The answer was in the negative. The Supreme Court held, inter
alia:
“A different assessment of the [same] evidence as
attached to the application for a retirement or disability pension,
carried out by a social security authority after validation of the
decision awarding the right to a pension, is not one of the
circumstances justifying the ex officio re-opening of the
proceedings for a review of the right to a pension in accordance with
section 114 of the Law of 17 December 1998 on retirement and
disability pensions paid from the Social Insurance Fund.”
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No. 1 TO THE
CONVENTION
- The
applicant complained that divesting her, in the circumstances of the
case, of her acquired right to an early-retirement pension had
amounted to an unjustified deprivation of property. This complaint
falls to be examined under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the
Convention, which reads as follows:
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the
peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of
his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the
conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of
international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way
impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems
necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the
general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other
contributions or penalties.”
A. Admissibility
1. Government's preliminary objection on
incompatibility ratione materiae
(a) The Government
- The
Government submitted that the scope of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
to the Convention did not extend to erroneously acquired rights to
pensions and welfare benefits, rights which, in fact, had never
arisen under the domestic law.
(b) The applicant
- The
applicant submitted that the provision in question applied in her
case and that she had been unjustly deprived of her property.
2. The Court's assessment
(a) General principles on the
applicability of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
- The principles which apply generally in cases under
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 are equally relevant when it comes to
social and welfare benefits. In particular, Article 1 of Protocol No.
1 does not create a right to acquire property. This provision places
no restriction on the Contracting State's freedom to decide whether
or not to have in place any form of social security scheme, or to
choose the type or amount of benefits to provide under any such
scheme. If, however, a Contracting State has in force legislation
providing for the payment as of right of a welfare benefit whether
conditional or not on the prior payment of contributions that
legislation must be regarded as generating a proprietary interest
falling within the ambit of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 for persons
satisfying its requirements (see Stec and Others v. the
United Kingdom (dec.) [GC], nos. 65731/01 and 65900/01,
§ 54, ECHR 2005-...).
- In
the modern democratic State many individuals are, for all or part of
their lives, completely dependent for survival on social security and
welfare benefits. Many domestic legal systems recognise that such
individuals require a degree of certainty and security, and provide
for benefits to be paid – subject to the fulfilment of the
conditions of eligibility – as of right. Where an individual
has an assertable right under domestic law to a welfare benefit, the
importance of that interest should also be reflected by holding
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to be applicable (see, among other
authorities, Stec, cited above, § 51).
- The
mere fact that a property right is subject to revocation in certain
circumstances does not prevent it from being a “possession”
within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, at least until it
is revoked (Beyeler v. Italy [GC], no. 33202/96,
§ 105, ECHR 2000 I).
On
the other hand where a legal entitlement to the economic benefit at
issue is subject to a condition, a conditional claim which lapses as
a result of the non-fulfilment of the condition cannot be considered
to amount to “possesions” for the purposes of Article 1
of Protocol No. 1 (see Prince Hans-Adam II of Liechtenstein v.
Germany [GC], no. 42527/98, §§ 82-83, ECHR 2001-VIII,
and Rasmussen v. Poland, no.
38886/05, §71, 28 April 2009).
(b) Application of the Convention
principles to the instant case
- The
applicant in the instant case had been employed for thirty-one years
and paid her social security contributions to the State. Because her
minor child suffered from asthma, various allergies and recurring
sino pulmonary infections she wished to take early retirement
under the “EWK” pension scheme in order to provide better
care to her child (see paragraph 6 above).
- The
early-retirement pension in question, regulated by the
1989 Ordinance, was conditional on the existence of three
elements (see paragraph 28 above). The first element was the
duration of the pensioner's employment prior to his or her
application for a pension. The second element was the requirement
that the pensioner personally took care of the
child concerned. These requirements,
by their nature, were susceptible to an objective assessment. On the
other hand, the third element, which concerned the health condition
of the pensioner's child – severe enough to make it necessary
for the child to be under the permanent care of the pensioner
(the requirement of necessary permanent care) – was
variable and uncertain, and in the instant case had indeed been a
matter of contention.
- The
Court notes that the decision issued by the Rzeszów Social
Security Board on 29 August 2001 conferred on the applicant the
entitlement to receive the “EWK” pension of 1,683 Polish
zlotys (PLN) gross as of 1 September 2001. In doing so the
social security authority agreed that the applicant had satisfied all
the statutory conditions and qualified for the pension. The applicant
was issued with a pensioner's identity card marked as 'valid
indefinitely'. The 2001 decision was enforced without any
interruption for ten consecutive months, until 1 July 2002.
On 25 June 2002 the Rzeszów Social Security Board
quashed the 2001 decision and refused to award the applicant the
right to the “EWK” pension, noting that she had not
satisfied one of the conditions necessary to qualify for that type of
welfare benefit, namely that her child's health condition was not
severe enough to require, as of 31 December 1998 or at the time
of the revocation, his mother's permanent care (see paragraphs 10-14
above).
- In
the light of the parties' submissions, the Court accepts that the
applicant applied for the early-retirement pension in good faith and
in compliance with the applicable law. Because her child was not yet
sixteen years old, she was not required to have her son examined by a
board of doctors appointed by the social security authority. Instead,
she had to attach to her pension application a health certificate
concerning her child, signed by a specialist doctor. By submitting
her pension dossier to the Rzeszów Social Security Board the
applicant subjected her case to the evaluation of the State
authorities (see paragraphs 7 and 9 above). As described above, the
grant of the benefit in question depended on a number of statutory
conditions, assessment of which rested fully with the social security
authority. Consequently, the applicant could not be certain of the
outcome of her application. On the other hand, as soon as the
authorities confirmed that the applicant qualified for the benefit,
she was justified in considering that decision accurate and in acting
upon it. She resigned from her job, which was necessary to trigger
the pension payment (see paragraphs 10-11 above), and organised her
family's life accordingly. She could not have realised that her
pension right had been granted by mistake and
was justified in thinking that
unless there was a change in the condition of her child's health
the decision would not lose
its validity.
- The
Court finds that, in the instant case, a property right was generated
by the favourable evaluation of the applicant's dossier attached to
the pension application which had been lodged in good faith and by
the Social Security Board's recognition of the right. The decision of
the Rzeszów Social Security Board of 29 August 2001 provided
the applicant with an enforceable claim to receive the so-called
“EWK” early-retirement pension in a particular amount,
payable as soon as she resigned from her job. Based on this decision
the applicant was in receipt of the pension from 1 September
2001 until 1 July 2002.
In so
far as the Government submitted that the applicant did not qualify
for the “EWK” benefit, the Court will address this matter
from the point of view of justification for the withdrawal of the
benefit.
(c) Conclusion on admissibility
- It
follows that in the circumstances of the case considered as a whole,
the Court finds that the applicant may be regarded as having a
substantive interest protected by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the
Convention.
The
Court also notes that this part of the application is not manifestly
ill founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the
Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other
grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. The parties' general submissions
(a) The applicant
- The
applicant submitted that divesting her, in the circumstances of the
case, of her acquired right to an early-retirement pension had
amounted to an unjustified deprivation of property. She also argued
that even if the right had indeed been granted erroneously, an
individual who had applied for the right in good faith should not be
expected to pay the price for the mistake of public authorities
acting without due diligence.
(b) The Government
- The
Government claimed that the interference with the applicant's
property rights had been lawful and justified. In particular,
divesting the applicant of her right to the early-retirement pension
had been provided for by law and was in the general interest. There
was also a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the
interference and the interests pursued.
2. The Court's assessment
(a) General principles
- The
Court reiterates that the first and most important requirement of
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is that any interference by a public
authority with the peaceful enjoyment of possessions should be
lawful: the second sentence of the first paragraph authorises a
deprivation of possessions only “subject to the conditions
provided for by law” and the second paragraph recognises that
the States have the right to control the use of property by enforcing
“laws” (see The former King of Greece and Others
v. Greece [GC], no. 25701/94, §§ 79 and 82,
ECHR 2000-XII).
- Article
1 of Protocol No. 1 also requires that a deprivation of property for
the purposes of its second sentence be in the public interest and
pursue a legitimate aim by means reasonably proportionate to the aim
sought to be realised (see, among others authorities, Jahn and
Others v. Germany [GC], nos. 46720/99, 72203/01
and 72552/01, §§ 81-94, ECHR 2005).
- Moreover,
the principle of “good governance” requires that where an
issue in the general interest is at stake it is incumbent on the
public authorities to act in good time, in an appropriate manner and
with utmost consistency (see Beyeler, cited above,
§ 120, and Megadat.com S.r.l.
v. Moldova, no. 21151/04, § 72,
8 April 2008).
- The
requisite “fair balance” will not be struck where the
person concerned bears an individual and excessive burden (see
Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden, 23 September 1982, §§
69-74, Series A no. 52, and Brumărescu, cited
above, § 78).
(b) Application of the above principles in
the present case
(i) Whether there has been an interference
with the applicant's possessions
- The
parties agreed that the decisions of the Rzeszów Social
Security Board of 25 June 2002, which deprived the
applicant of the right to receive the “EWK” pension,
amounted to an interference with her possessions within the meaning
of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.
(ii) Lawfulness of the interference
(α) The parties' submissions
The applicant
- The
applicant submitted that the interference had not been in accordance
with the law since the decision of the Rzeszów Social Security
Board of 29 August 2001 had been quashed as a result of the
review of the same evidence as attached to her original application
for the pension. Such procedure was contrary to section 114 of the
1998 Law which, at the relevant time, allowed for the re-opening of
pension proceedings only if new evidence was introduced or
previously-existing circumstances came to light. The applicant also
relied on the 2003 Resolution of the Supreme Court (see paragraph 30
above).
The Government
- In
the Government's submission, the interference had been in accordance
with the law. They relied on the reasoning of the domestic courts
which had reviewed the decision of 25 June 2002 (see paragraphs 16 24
above). The domestic courts found that the impugned re-opening had
been triggered by the assessment of medical reports other than those
attached to the applicant's pension application. That material had
existed but had not been taken into account by the social security
authority at the time when the applicant's right to a pension was
being examined. This was considered to constitute newly-discovered
circumstances within the meaning of section 114 of the 1998 Law.
(β) The Court
- In
the instant case the measure complained of was based on section 114
of the 1998 Law, which at the relevant time provided that the right
to benefits could be re-assessed ex officio, if, after the
validation of the decision concerning benefits, new evidence was
submitted or relevant circumstances which had existed before the
decision was issued were discovered. As previously observed, such a
procedure is common to the legal systems of many member States.
The
Court, giving due deference to the findings of the domestic courts,
accepts that the proceedings in the applicant's case had been
re-opened as a consequence of the discovery of the welfare
authority's own mistake in its original assessment of the applicant's
eligibility for the early-retirement pension under the 1989
Ordinance. The procedure was thus used to correct an error on the
part of the social security board and to divest the applicant of the
right to a pension which she had acquired unjustly (see paragraphs 88
and 89 below).
- The
Court therefore concludes that the interference with the applicant's
property rights was provided for by law, as required by Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.
(iii) Legitimate aim
- The
Court must now determine whether this deprivation of property pursued
a legitimate aim, that is, whether it was “in the public
interest”, within the meaning of the second rule under Article
1 of Protocol No. 1.
(α) The parties' submissions
The applicant
- The
applicant made a general statement that the interference in question
did not pursue a legitimate aim.
The Government
- The
Government submitted that the 1989 Ordinance had been put in place as
part of the State's social policy aimed at assisting parents who, due
to their child's health condition, could not reconcile their
employment with the need to provide constant care to their child.
Given the specific nature of the “EWK” pension, it was
understandable why the requirements for eligibility for that benefit
had to be defined rigidly and precisely. The applicant had been
divested of her right to the early-retirement pension because, in
fact, she did not satisfy the statutory requirements in order to
qualify for this particular type of benefit. To continue the payment
of the “EWK” pension to the applicant and other
beneficiaries in a similar position would be accepting their unjust
enrichment.
(β) The Court
- Because
of their direct knowledge of the society and its needs, the national
authorities are in principle better placed than the international
judge to appreciate what is “in the public interest”.
Under the system of protection established by the Convention, it is
thus for the national authorities to make the initial assessment as
to the existence of a problem of public concern warranting measures
of deprivation of property. Here, as in other fields to which the
safeguards of the Convention extend, the national authorities,
accordingly, enjoy a certain margin of appreciation.
Furthermore,
the notion of “public interest” is necessarily extensive.
The Court, finding it natural that the margin of appreciation
available to the legislature in implementing social and economic
policies should be a wide one, will respect the legislature's
judgment as to what is “in the public interest” unless
that judgment is manifestly without reasonable foundation (see James
and Others v. the United Kingdom, 21 February 1986, § 46,
Series A no. 98; The former King of Greece and
Others, cited above, § 87; and Zvolský and
Zvolská v. the Czech Republic, no. 46129/99, §
67 in fine, ECHR 2002-IX).
- As
already stated above, the aim of the interference in question was to
correct a mistake of the social security authority, which resulted in
the applicant unjustly acquiring a right to the “EWK”
pension.
- The
Court considers that depriving the applicant of her early retirement
pension pursued a legitimate aim, namely to ensure that the public
purse was not called upon to subsidise without limitation in time
undeserving beneficiaries of the social welfare system.
(iv) Proportionality
- Lastly, the Court must examine whether an interference
with the peaceful enjoyment of possessions strikes a fair balance
between the demands of the general interest of the public and the
requirements of the protection of the individual's fundamental
rights, or whether it imposes a disproportionate and excessive burden
on the applicant (see, among many other authorities, Jahn and
Others [GC], cited above, § 93). Despite the margin of
appreciation given to the State, the Court must nevertheless, in the
exercise of its power of review, determine whether the requisite
balance was maintained in a manner consonant with the applicant's
right to property (see Rosinski v Poland, no. 17373/02, § 78,
17 July 2007). The concern to achieve this balance is reflected in
the structure of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention
as a whole, including therefore the second sentence, which is to be
read in the light of the general principle enunciated in the first
sentence. In particular, there must be a reasonable relationship of
proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be
realised by any measure depriving a person of his possessions (see
Pressos Compania Naviera S.A. and Others v. Belgium,
20 November 1995, § 38, Series A no. 332, and The
former King of Greece and Others, cited above, § 89).
Thus the balance to be maintained between the demands of the general
interest of the community and the requirements of fundamental rights
is upset if the person concerned has had to bear a “disproportionate
burden” (see, among many other authorities, The Holy
Monasteries v. Greece, 9 December 1994, §§
70-71, Series A no. 301-A).
(α) The parties' submissions
The applicant
- In
the applicant's view, there was no reasonable relationship between
the interference and the interests pursued. In her submission,
because the practice of reviewing applications for the “EWK”
pension was limited to 10% of the total number of the benefit's
recipients, the measure in question could not be regarded as having
been of any significant financial advantage to the social security
fund.
The
applicant also claimed that she had borne an excessive burden in that
the decision of 25 June 2002 had deprived her of her only source of
income with immediate effect.
The Government
- The
Government submitted that the decision to divest the applicant of her
right had not been disproportionate.
In
the Polish social security system only retirement pensions granted
under the general scheme, were, in principle, permanent and
irrevocable. All other benefits, based on variable conditions, were
subject to verification and possible rescission.
The
Government also argued that the impugned measure had been applied on
a small scale and equally throughout the entire country. The cases
for review had been selected at random. The social security authority
had the power to undertake the review at its own discretion within
the limits provided by law, in particular by section 114 of the
1998 Law.
(β) The Court
- The
Court observes that in the instant case the Government did not
justify the measure in question by the need to make savings in the
interests of the social security fund (unlike in Kjartan
Ásmundsson v. Iceland, no. 60669/00, § 43,
ECHR 2004 IX). The State aimed primarily at achieving
concordance between the factual situation of beneficiaries and their
compliance with the statutory requirements for this type of pension.
- In
the instant case, a property right was generated by the favourable
evaluation of the applicant's dossier attached to the application for
a pension, which was lodged in good faith, and by the Social Security
Board's recognition of the right (see also paragraph 45 above).
Before being invalidated the decision of 29 August 2001 had
undoubtedly produced effects for the applicant and her family (see in
particular paragraph 11 above).
- It
must also be stressed that the delay with which the authorities
reviewed the applicant's dossier was relatively long. The 2001
decision was left in force for ten months before the authorities
became aware of their error. On the other hand, as soon as the error
was discovered the decision to discontinue the payment of the benefit
was issued relatively quickly and with immediate effect (see
paragraph 14 above).
- In
the Court's opinion, the fact that the State did not ask the
applicant to return the pension which had been unduly paid (see
paragraph 25 above) did not mitigate sufficiently the consequences
for the applicant flowing from the interference in her case.
- Even
though the applicant had an opportunity to challenge the Social
Security Board's decision of 25 June 2002 in judicial review
proceedings, her right to the pension was determined by the courts
only two years later and during that time she was not in receipt of
any welfare benefit (see paragraphs 15-24 and 26 above).
- As
stated above, in the context of property rights, particular
importance must be attached to the principle of good governance. It
is desirable that public authorities act with the utmost
scrupulousness, in particular when dealing with matters of vital
importance to individuals, such as welfare benefits and other
property rights. In the instant case, the Court considers that having
discovered their mistake the authorities failed in their duty to act
in good time and in an appropriate and consistent manner.
- The
Court, being mindful of the importance of social justice, considers
that, as a general principle, public authorities should not be
prevented from correcting their mistakes, even those resulting from
their own negligence. Holding otherwise would be contrary to the
doctrine of unjust enrichment. It would also be unfair to other
individuals contributing to the social security fund, in particular
those denied a benefit because they failed to meet the statutory
requirements. Lastly, it would amount to sanctioning an inappropriate
allocation of scarce public resources, which in itself would be
contrary to the public interest.
Notwithstanding
these important considerations, the Court must, nonetheless, observe
that the above general principle cannot prevail in a situation where
the individual concerned is required to bear an excessive burden as a
result of a measure divesting him or her of a benefit.
If
a mistake has
been caused
by the authorities themselves, without any fault of a third party, a
different proportionality approach must be taken in determining
whether the burden borne by an applicant was excessive.
- In
this connection it should be observed that as a result of the
impugned measure, the applicant was faced, practically from one day
to the next, with the total loss of her early-retirement pension,
which constituted her sole source of income. Moreover, the Court is
aware of the potential risk that, in view of her age and the economic
reality in the country, particularly in the undeveloped Podkarpacki
region, the applicant might have considerable difficulty in securing
new employment.
- In
addition, the Court notes that, despite the fact that under the
applicable law the applicant qualified for another type of
pre-retirement benefit from the State as soon as she lost her
entitlement to the “EWK” pension, her right to the new
benefit was not recognised until the decision of 25 October 2005,
which finally brought an end to proceedings which had lasted three
years. The amount of the applicant's pre-retirement benefit is
approximately 50 % lower that her “EWK” pension (see
paragraph 26 above). Even though the decision to grant the benefit
was backdated, the benefit due for the period between 25 October 2002
and 31 July 2004 was paid without any interest (see paragraph 26
above). The mistake of the
authorities left the applicant with 50% of her expected
income, and it was only after proceedings lasting three years that
she was able to obtain the new benefit.
Lastly,
the fact that the applicant retained her full right to receive, as of
2015, an ordinary old-age pension from the pension fund is immaterial
since this would have been the case even if she had continued to
receive her “EWK” pension.
- In
view of the above considerations, the Court finds that a fair balance
has not been struck between the demands of the general interest of
the public and the requirements of the protection of the individual's
fundamental rights and that the burden placed on the applicant was
excessive.
It
follows that there has been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol
No. 1 to the Convention.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION
A. As regards the principle of legal certainty
- The
applicant also complained that the ex-officio re-opening of
the social security proceedings, which had resulted in the quashing
of the final decision granting her a right to a pension, was in
breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
Article
6 § 1 of the Convention in its relevant part reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by
[a] ... tribunal ...”
1. The parties' submissions
(a) The applicant
- The
applicant argued that the decision of 29 August 2001 of the social
security authority granting her a right to an early-retirement
pension was final. She submitted that the durability of social
security decisions was crucial for the stability of the legal effects
produced by such decisions. The principle of finality of such
decisions corresponded to the principle of legal certainty of
administrative decisions. In civil law that principle was referred to
as res judicata and it resulted in the impossibility to
institute new proceedings with the same subject matter involving the
same parties.
- The
applicant referred to the Supreme Court's resolution of 2003 in which
it had been observed that section 114 of the 1998 Law did not allow
for a new assessment of the same evidence accompanying the original
application for a pension. The right to a pension could be reviewed
only on the basis of new evidence or newly-revealed circumstances.
The
applicant maintained that her right to an early-retirement pension
had been revoked solely as a result of a new assessment of the
evidence which had been attached to the original application for a
pension in 2001.
(b) The Government
- The
Government submitted that a social security decision did not benefit
from the protection of the principle of legal certainty, construed as
the principle of res judicata. They also argued that the
notion of legal certainty was not absolute and that in the instant
case there had been relevant and sufficient reasons to depart from
that principle in order to secure respect for social justice and
fairness. In particular, the Government submitted that section 114 of
the 1998 Law enumerated the instances when a re-assessment of a right
to a benefit or the amount of the benefit was required. Any such
re-assessment implied that administrative or social security
proceedings could be re-opened and a new decision – replacing
the previous one – issued.
Moreover,
the Government relied on the principle, stated in a Supreme Court
judgment of 2001 and resolution of 2003, that a party to proceedings
was not entitled to claim a right to benefits which had been
established on the basis of an erroneous and subsequently revoked
decision of an administrative authority.
- The
Government also drew attention to the fact that in the instant case
the decision of 25 June 2002 to divest the applicant of the right to
the early-retirement pension in question had been the subject of
judicial control, with all guarantees derived from Article 6 § 1
of the Convention.
They
argued that if social security decisions were to benefit from the
protection of a strictly applied principle of res judicata,
administrative authorities would have no possibility to correct their
decisions not to grant benefits to persons who were legitimately
entitled to receive them.
Lastly,
the Government observed that even if applied in the case of a social
security decision, the principle of legal certainty, as defined in
the Court's case-law, should not prevent a domestic authority from
revoking an administrative decision by which a welfare authority had
erroneously granted a never-existing right to a pension. Such
revocation should be regarded as a legitimate departure from the
principle of legal certainty.
2. The Court's assessment
- The
Court considers that the principle of legal certainty applies to a
final legal situation, irrespective of whether it was brought about
by a judicial act or an administrative or, as in the instant case, a
social security decision which, on the face of it, is final in its
effects.
It
follows that this part of the application is not manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the
Convention or inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be
declared admissible.
- However,
having regard to the reasons which led the Court to find a violation
of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, the Court finds
that the applicant's complaint under Article 6 regarding the
principle of legal certainty of the Convention does not require a
separate examination.
B. As regards the alleged unfairness of the proceedings
- The
applicant also made a general complaint that the proceedings in her
case had been unfair. In particular, she alleged that the domestic
courts had wrongly assessed the evidence.
- This
complaint falls to be examined under Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention.
However,
pursuant to Article 35 § 3 of the Convention:
“The Court shall declare inadmissible any
individual application submitted under Article 34 which it
considers incompatible with the provisions of the Convention or the
Protocols thereto, manifestly ill-founded ...”
- The Court has no jurisdiction under Article 6 of the
Convention to substitute its own findings of fact for the findings of
domestic courts. The Court's only task is to examine whether the
proceedings, taken as a whole, were fair and complied with the
specific safeguards stipulated by the Convention.
- In
this connection, the Court notes that the applicant submitted that,
contrary to the findings of the domestic courts, the impugned
proceedings had been instituted as a result of a review of the same
evidence as attached to her original application for a pension, and
therefore not in compliance with the domestic law which stipulated
the grounds for the re-opening of pension proceedings.
- Assessing
the circumstances of the instant case as a whole, the Court finds no
indication that the impugned proceedings were conducted unfairly.
The
applicant failed to submit any evidence that the national judicial
authorities had in any way breached her rights or reached arbitrary
conclusions. The national courts held hearings on the merits of the
case, heard statements from all necessary witnesses, including the
applicant, and examined and assessed all the evidence before them,
including the medical records of the applicant's child submitted by
both parties and the reports of an independent medical expert.
Moreover, the factual and legal reasons for the national courts'
findings were set out at length in the judgments of the Regional
Court of 26 February 2003 and the Court of Appeal of 16 October 2003,
as well as in the judgment of the Supreme Court of 7 May 2004.
In their judgments the national judicial authorities gave a very
persuasive and detailed analysis of all the relevant circumstances of
the case and provided relevant and sufficient reasons for their
decisions (see paragraphs 15-24 above).
- It
follows that the applicant's complaint under Article 6 § 1,
concerning the alleged unfairness of the proceedings is manifestly
ill founded and must be rejected in accordance with
Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
III. ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION
A. As regards the loss of the “EWK” pension
- The
applicant complained of an interference with her right to respect for
her private and family life in that by divesting her of the “EWK”
pension the authorities had deprived her of her sole source of income
and financial resources indispensable for her livelihood.
This
complaint falls to be examined under Article 8 of the Convention,
which in its relevant part reads as follows:
“1. Everyone has the right to respect
for his private and family life...
2. There shall be no interference by a public
authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in
accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in
the interests of national security, public safety or the economic
well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime,
for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others.”
1. The parties' submissions
(a) The applicant
- The
applicant submitted that prior to her early retirement her salary
from the Polish Telecommunications Company had been an essential part
of her family budget. Her husband's salary was low and they had to
maintain three minor children, including the one who was chronically
ill. In the first years of her son's life the applicant received
regular help from her elderly mother. Afterwards, however, her mother
could no longer be relied on because of her old age. This was when it
became necessary for the applicant to take early retirement to stay
at home with her son. The applicant submitted that in order to
trigger the payment of the benefit granted in 2001 she had completely
terminated her employment contract. She claimed that she had little
prospect of finding a new job in the region, which had a high rate of
unemployment. She also submitted that as a result of a legal
loophole, having acquired the right to the “EWK”
retirement pension she was considered to have waived indefinitely her
right to other social security benefits.
(b) The Government
- The
Government submitted that the applicant was now in receipt of a
pre-retirement benefit paid at first by the Strzyżów
Regional Labour Office and currently, by the Rzeszów Social
Security Board. Therefore, the applicant's argument that she was
considered to have waived her right to any social benefit was untrue.
The
Government also stated that a right to work was not guaranteed by the
Convention. In any event, there was no link between the decision
divesting the applicant of her early-retirement pension and the fact
that she stood little chance of finding a new job.
2. The Court's assessment
- The
“EWK” pension is a social security benefit aimed at
enabling parents to stop working in order to look after their
seriously sick children. Moreover, in the instant case, the pension
in question constituted the basis of the applicant's family budget.
In
these circumstances, the Court accepts that divesting the applicant
of the “EWK” pension must constitute an interference with
her right to respect for her family life, given that the measure in
question entails severe consequences for the quality and enjoyment of
the applicant's family life and necessarily affects the way in which
the latter is organised (see Petrovic v. Austria, 27
March 1998, § 27, Reports of Judgments and Decisions
1998 II).
It
follows that the instant complaint falls within the scope of Article
8 of the Convention. The Court notes that this part of the
application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of
Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it is
not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared
admissible.
- However,
having regard to the reasons which led the Court to find a violation
of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, it finds that the
applicant's complaint under Article 8 of the Convention does not
require a separate consideration.
B. As regards the domestic proceedings
- The
applicant also complained that Article 8 of the Convention had been
breached because her child's health condition had been the subject of
an open dispute before the domestic courts during the pension
proceedings. Moreover, the applicant claimed that her son had been
examined in person by a court-appointed medical expert, which had
caused him considerable stress. Lastly, the applicant complained that
the report produced by the expert had been transferred to the Rzeszów
Social Security Board.
- The
Court observes that the applicant instituted judicial proceedings to
review the decision of the Rzeszów Social Security Board of
25 June 2005. As the Court has noted in the preceding
paragraphs, in order to qualify for the “EWK” pension the
applicant had to prove that her son's health was fragile enough to
make him dependent on the applicant's permanent care.
- In
these circumstances, the Court finds it natural that the domestic
courts examined all relevant evidence, which comprised various
medical documents. Ordering a report on the child's health to be
prepared by an independent doctor was both in compliance with the
domestic law and legitimate in view of the subject matter of the
proceedings. Finally, the Court does not consider that the
applicant's son could have been particularly distressed by the
medical check-up carried out by the court-appointed doctor. The child
was about eight years old at the relevant time and used to medical
personnel since he had received regular medical treatment from a very
young age.
- In
view of the above, the Court finds that the applicant's complaint
does not disclose any appearance of lack of respect for the privacy
of the applicant's child or of interference with his rights protected
by Article 8 of the Convention.
IV. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14 OF THE CONVENTION IN
CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No. 1
- Lastly, the applicant complained under Article 14 of
the Convention, in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, of
discrimination based on her place of residence. In particular, she
alleged that limiting the practice of reviewing applications for the
“EWK” pension to the Podkarpacki region had led to
unjustified discrimination of “EWK” pensioners from that
location. Without referring to any official statistics, the applicant
submitted that the majority of the recipients of the “EWK”
pension who had been subjected to a re-examination of their initial
pension claims, had come from the Podkarpacki region.
This
complaint falls to be examined under Article 14 of the Convention, in
conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.
Article
14 of the Convention reads as follows:
“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set
forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without discrimination on
any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political
or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a
national minority, property, birth or other status.”
- Noting
that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention has been found to
apply in the instant case (see paragraph 46 above) and assuming that
a place of residence applied as a criterion for the differential
treatment of citizens in the grant of State pensions is a ground
falling within the scope of Article 14 of the Convention, the Court
observes that in the instant case the applicant failed to submit
precise data to substantiate her allegation of discrimination. In any
event, the Court observes that the law on the re opening of
pension proceedings was at the relevant time implemented universally
throughout the country. The contested measure was general and aimed
at an unspecified group of persons benefiting from public funds in
accordance with the principle of equality.
Even
if there had been a difference in the treatment of “EWK”
pensioners in the Podkarpacki region, and particularly the applicant,
the Court observes that it cannot be excluded that such difference
may have resulted from the more efficient practices implemented by
the local social security authority for verifying pension
applications as compared to other regions. In particular, there is no
evidence which would indicate that persons in receipt of the “EWK”
pensions in the Podkarpacki region were deliberately targeted by the
State authorities.
- In
consequence, this complaint must be rejected as being manifestly
ill-founded pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the
Convention.
V. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
- Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
1. Pecuniary damage
- The
applicant claimed 78,209 Polish zlotys (PLN) (currently corresponding
to approximately 18,000 euros (EUR)) in respect of pecuniary damage.
This amount comprised: (1) an equivalent of the “EWK”
pension, which was not paid to her in the period from June until
September 2002, (2) the difference between the “EWK”
pension, which she did not receive and the special pre-retirement
benefit, paid to her from October 2002 until March 2007, and (3) the
difference between the “EWK” pension which she did not
receive and the special pre-retirement benefit due for the period
from April 2007 until October 2015, when the applicant qualified
for a retirement pension under the general scheme.
The
applicant also claimed 25,000 Polish zlotys (PLN) in respect of
non pecuniary damage.
- The
Government submitted that there was no causal link between the
alleged violation and the pecuniary damage claimed. In respect of the
claim for non-pecuniary damage, the Government observed that it was
exorbitant. If the Court were to find a violation in the present
case, the Government requested it to rule that that finding
constituted in itself sufficient just satisfaction.
- The
Court finds that the applicant was deprived of her income in
connection with the violation found and must take into account the
fact that she undoubtedly suffered some pecuniary and non-pecuniary
damage (see Koua Poirrez, cited above, § 70).
Making an assessment on an equitable basis, as is required by Article
41 of the Convention, the Court awards the applicant EUR 15,000 to
cover all heads of damage.
B. Costs and expenses
- The
applicant did not make a claim for any costs and expenses incurred.
C. Default interest
- The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT
1. Declares unanimously the complaint under
Article 6 of the Convention concerning the principle of legal
certainty, the complaint under Article 8 of the Convention
concerning the loss of the “EWK” pension, and the
complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention
admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;
2. Holds unanimously that it is not necessary to
examine separately the applicant's complaints under Article 6 of the
Convention concerning the principle of legal certainty and under
Article 8 of the Convention concerning the loss of the “EWK”
pension;
3. Holds by four votes to three that there has
been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the
Convention;
4. Holds by four votes to three
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 15,000
(fifteen thousand euros), in respect of pecuniary and non pecuniary
damage, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at
the rate applicable at the date of settlement, plus any tax that may
be chargeable;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
5. Dismisses unanimously the remainder of the
applicant's claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 15 September 2009,
pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Fatoş
Aracı Nicolas Bratza
Deputy Registrar President
In accordance with Article 45 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 74
§ 2 of the Rules of Court, the joint partly dissenting opinion
of Judges Bratza, Hirvelä and Bianku is annexed to this
judgment.
N.B.
F.A.
JOINT PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGES BRATZA,
HIRVELÄ AND BIANKU
- The
case is one of considerable importance, raising as it does an issue
common to a number of applications against Poland which are currently
pending before the Court. It concerns primarily the compatibility
with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 of the revocation of the grant to
the applicant of an early-retirement pension (the “EWK”
pension) on the grounds that her son's health condition was not such
as to require permanent care and that accordingly she had not been
entitled to the pension at the time it was granted. To our regret, we
are unable to join the majority of the Chamber in finding that the
revocation of the EWK pension violated the applicant's rights under
the Protocol.
- It
is not disputed by the parties, and we accept, that the decision of
the Rzeszów Social Security Board of 25 June 2002 which
deprived the applicant of the right to receive the EWK pension
amounted to an interference with her possessions within the meaning
of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. We also agree that the revocation
served a legitimate aim, namely to ensure that the public purse was
not required to continue to bear the cost of providing a benefit to
which the applicant had never been entitled. Where we part company
with the majority of the Chamber is on the question whether the
revocation was in the circumstances of the case proportionate to the
legitimate aim pursued and, more particularly, whether a fair balance
was preserved between the demands of the general interest of the
public and the requirement of the protection of the individual's
fundamental rights.
- The
factors to be weighed on the applicant's side of the scale are
undeniably powerful. In August 2001 the applicant lodged her
application for the EWK pension in good faith and attached to it, as
required, a medical certificate which was signed by a specialist on
allergies and pulmonology and which certified that her son suffered
from atopic bronchial asthma, various allergies and recurring
sino-pulmonary infections which required his mother's constant care.
After examining the application, the Social Security Board granted
the applicant the right to an EWK pension as from 1 August 2001 but
suspended payment of the pension since the applicant was still
working. Shortly thereafter, the applicant resigned from her
full-time employment and a new decision was issued by the Board
authorising payment of the pension from 1 September 2001. The
applicant was subsequently issued with a pensioner's identity card
marked “valid indefinitely” and for the following 10
months continued to receive the pension without interruption. Until
payment of the pension was discontinued and the decision to grant it
was revoked in July 2002, the applicant had no reason to believe that
she was not entitled to the pension and no reason to doubt that she
would continue to receive it as long as there was no change in her
child's medical condition. It is clear that the loss of the EWK
pension had serious financial consequences for the applicant, who
appears to have had no other source of income at the time and who is
likely to have faced considerable difficulty in finding new
employment. It is clear, too, that the blame for what had occurred
lay not with the applicant but exclusively with the Social Security
authorities who had erroneously approved the grant of the pension on
the grounds that her son's health condition qualified the applicant
to receive it.
- We
could readily accept that, in these circumstances, it would have been
disproportionate had the authorities sought to recover from the
applicant the EWK pension sums which they had erroneously paid. But
this was not the case. Where we differ from the majority is in their
view, which is confirmed by the award of just satisfaction, that a
fair balance required that the applicant should continue to be paid
the pension which she had mistakenly been awarded but to which she
had no legal entitlement until the date of her retirement in 2015, or
at least until her son attained the age of majority in 2012. In our
view, it would, on the contrary, upset any fair balance if, once
having discovered their mistake, the authorities were precluded from
ever redressing its effects and were required to perpetuate the error
by continuing to pay the pension which had been wrongly granted. This
would, as the judgment expressly recognises, not only lead to the
unjust enrichment of the recipient but would have an unfair impact on
other individuals contributing to the Social Security fund, in
particular those who were denied benefits because they failed to meet
the statutory requirements; it would also amount to sanctioning an
improper allocation of scarce public resources.
- In
this respect, the case is clearly distinguishable from that of
Stretch v. the United Kingdom (No. 25543/02, judgment of 24
June 2003) in which the Court found to be a disproportionate
interference with the applicant's property rights a local authority's
refusal to permit the applicant to exercise an option to renew a
lease on the expiry of the initial term, on the grounds that the
original grant of the option had been ultra vires the local
authority. The Court in that case observed that the lease agreement
between the applicant and the local authority was one of a private
law nature, that the local authority had received the agreed rent for
the lease and that, on exercise of the option to renew, it had the
possibility of negotiating an increase in the ground rent. In these
circumstances, there was no ground for holding that the local
authority had acted against the public interest in the way in which
it had disposed of the property under its control or that any third
party interests would have been prejudiced by giving effect to the
renewal option and there was nothing per se objectionable in
the inclusion of such a term in lease agreements. The Court further
noted that there was no unjust enrichment of the applicant, who had
the expectation of deriving a future return from his investment in
the lease, the option to renew having been an important part of the
lease for a person such as the applicant who had undertaken building
obligations.
- The
majority in the present case place emphasis on the principle of good
governance in the context of property rights and criticise the
authorities for an alleged failure to act in good time and in an
appropriate and consistent manner once having discovered their
mistake. While we accept the importance of the principle of good
governance, we cannot find that the principle was breached in the
present case; the review of the award of the EWK pension took place,
in our view, with reasonable promptness and, once having discovered
the error, the authorities acted both properly and without any undue
delay.
- It
is further argued that where, as here, a mistake has been caused by
the authorities themselves without any fault of a third party, a
“different proportionality approach” is called for when
determining whether the burden borne by an applicant was excessive.
It is unclear to us in what respect the approach to be adopted in
such a case is said to differ from that in other cases. However, even
accepting that a more stringent test may be required where the
national authorities are responsible for the error which resulted in
the original grant of the EWK pension, we do not find that the
revocation of the grant imposed on the applicant an individual and
excessive burden. We are confirmed in this view by four factors. In
the first place, although the EWK pension awarded to the applicant
was expressed to be valid indefinitely, it was not in any event a
benefit which was permanent or immutable; the payment of the pension
was subject to periodic review and was liable to be discontinued if,
inter alia, the medical condition of the applicant's child was
found no longer to require permanent care. Moreover, it was as the
domestic courts found liable to be discontinued where new evidence
had been submitted or where relevant circumstances, which pre-existed
the initial pension award but which had not been taken into
consideration by the authorities, had subsequently come to light.
Secondly, the decision of the Social Security Board to revoke the
grant of the pension was itself subjected to careful examination at
three levels of jurisdiction by the domestic courts, which examined
fresh medical evidence concerning the applicant's son before
concluding that the applicant had been rightfully divested of the
right to a pension under the scheme provided by the 1989 Ordinance as
she did not satisfy the requirement of necessary permanent care.
Thirdly, as noted above, despite the fact that the revocation was
retrospective, the applicant was never required to repay the sums
which had been mistakenly paid to her. Fourthly, when the applicant
lost her entitlement to the EWK pension, she qualified for another
form of pre-retirement benefit from the State, albeit one of
significantly less value than the EWK pension. It is true that, for
reasons which are unclear but may have been related to the fact that
the applicant was concurrently pursuing proceedings in the domestic
courts to challenge the revocation of the EWK pension, the
proceedings to obtain the alternative pre-retirement benefits were
not concluded until 25 October 2005. However, the award of these
benefits was backdated to 25 October 2002, with the consequence that
the applicant received a lump sum equivalent to 3 years' pension
payments.
- In
these circumstances, we are unable to conclude that a fair balance
was not struck between the competing public and private interests or
that the applicant's rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 were
violated.
- As
to Article 6 of the Convention, the reasons which we have relied on
above serve also to answer the applicant's complaint that the
revocation of the decision to award the EWK pension offended against
the principle of legal certainty. Thus, like the majority of the
Chamber, we do not consider that the applicant's complaint under that
Article requires a separate examination.