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FOURTH
SECTION
CASE OF RAITA v. FINLAND
(Application
no. 16207/05)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
16 February 2010
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Raita v. Finland,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Nicolas Bratza, President,
Lech
Garlicki,
Ljiljana Mijović,
David Thór
Björgvinsson,
Ján Šikuta,
Päivi
Hirvelä,
Mihai Poalelungi, judges,
and
Lawrence Early,
Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 26 January 2010,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an application
(no. 16207/05) against the
Republic of Finland lodged with the Court
under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”)
by a Finnish national, Mr Juha Ilkka
Tapio Raita (“the applicant”), on 3 May 2005.
- The
applicant was represented by Mr Pekka Somerkoski, a lawyer practising
in Helsinki. The Finnish Government (“the
Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr Arto Kosonen
of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
- On
9 June and 18 December 2008
the President of the Fourth Section decided to communicate to the
Government the complaints concerning the length of the proceedings
and the non-communication of certain documents to the applicant. It
was also decided to rule on the admissibility and merits of the
application at the same time (Article 29 § 3).
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The
applicant was born in 1960 and lives in Wittenborn.
- The
applicant and his siblings inherited real property from their father.
The property is situated in Piispankylä, Vantaa. At the time, a
master plan (yleiskaava, generalplan) had been drawn up for
the area but it had not reached the town planning stage.
- On
17 June 1996 they sold the property for 210,000 Finnish marks (FIM)
(some 35,420 euros) (EUR). The buyer was a company which was to be
set up later and it was represented by the applicant.
- On
26 August 1996 the city decided to use its first call on the
property, since it had already negotiated the purchase of the
surrounding properties and the purchase price was considered
advantageous.
- On
24 September 1996 the applicant challenged the city's decision.
- On
2 May 1997 the Uusimaa County Administrative Court (lääninoikeus,
länsrätten) rejected his appeal, finding
that pursuant to the Pre-emption Act (etuostolaki, förköpslagen;
Act no. 608/1977) the city had a first call on the property since the
sellers and the buyer were not close relatives (sections 1 and 5). It
did not uphold the applicant's argument that the pre-emption was
manifestly unfair (section 6).
- On
26 June 1997 the applicant appealed. On both parties' request, the
consideration of the case was postponed pending negotiations with a
view to reaching a friendly settlement.
- On
10 March 1999 the Supreme Administrative Court (korkein
hallinto-oikeus, högsta förvaltningsdomstolen) rejected
the appeal.
- On
10 September 1999 the applicant lodged an extraordinary appeal,
arguing that the parties had been taken by surprise by the decision
of March 1999 since they had been given to understand that the
proceedings would be stayed until a settlement was reached.
- On
18 June 2001 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the applicant's
appeal and annulled its earlier decision. Having examined the
applicant's procedural complaint, and since the case file contained
clarifications which had not been available to the County
Administrative Court when it took its decision on 2 May 1997, the
case was referred back to the lower court.
- The
Helsinki Administrative Court (hallinto-oikeus,
förvaltningsdomstolen, which had replaced the County
Administrative Court), received the parties' submissions, including,
inter alia, a certificate according to which the property had
a taxation value of FIM 611,776 in 1994 and an appraisal
document according to which the property's market value was
FIM 2.5 million. Both documents were lodged by the
applicant. The city contested the appraisal document's relevance,
arguing that it started from the wrong assumptions as to, inter
alia, the size of the property and the planning situation. The
city maintained that the purchase price, FIM 210,000, reflected
the real value at the time of the purchase. The applicant also relied
on a draft preliminary agreement (drawn up in 1998) between his
father's estate and the city of Vantaa, which stated an aggregate
purchase price of FIM 3.36 million concerning the property in issue
and another property. However, that price had been fixed on the
understanding that the area would be the subject of town planning
before the conclusion of the contract.
- On
13 February 2002 the Administrative Court revoked the city's
decision. Although there was no evidence before it showing the market
value of the property, it could however be concluded on the basis of
an overall assessment of the case that the purchase price was below
the market value. Having regard to the purchase price and the
relationship between those who had signed the deed of sale, the court
held that the pre-emption was manifestly unfair. It however rejected
the applicant's complaint that the city had failed to duly inform him
of its decision to pre-empt (sections 9 and 10 of the Pre-emption
Act). Having noted that the buyer was not the applicant but a company
to be set up later, it also rejected his complaint that the city
could not pre-empt the property as the sellers and the buyer were
close relatives (sections 1, 5 and 21a). The fact that the deed of
sale had subsequently been altered to the effect that the applicant
stated that he had taken the place of the company did not detract
from this position. The alteration had been made only on 24 June
1997, that is, after the lower court had rejected the applicant's
appeal.
- The
city appealed, arguing that the taxation value of 1994 had no
relevance to the case as the taxation value did not follow the
fluctuations in the economic situation of the country or the demand
for real property at a given time. It was to be noted that during the
period from 1993 to 1997 real property prices had dipped to one third
of what they had been in 1990 and 1991 and that the taxation value
was confirmed periodically and did not therefore reflect the
situation in 1997. The city also argued that no relevance could be
given to the relationship between those who had signed the deed of
sale.
- The
applicant replied to the appeal, arguing that the market value was
considerably higher than the taxation value. Furthermore, there had
been no intention on the part of his family to sell the property to
an outsider. He also argued that, following the entry into force of
the Real Property Code (maakaari, jordabalken; Act no.
540/1995), on 1 January 1997, he was to be considered the owner under
Chapter 2, section 4 since no company had been established.
- Pursuant
to the practice in the Supreme Administrative Court, it invited the
city's submissions in reply. The city argued (submission dated 12
August 2003) that the property's taxation value had dropped as
follows: in 1996 to FIM 428,000; in 1997-2001 to FIM 250,000-270,000
and in 2003 to FIM 323,400. Furthermore, the fluctuations in the
market value were reflected in the taxation value with a delay of
several years. The drop in the relevant property's value followed the
general price development. The city maintained that in considering
whether the conditions for pre-emption were met at the time of the
purchase in 1996, no relevance could be given to facts occurring
thereafter. It also noted that no town plan had yet been drawn up.
- On
4 November 2004 the Supreme Administrative Court overturned the lower
court's decision. Referring to the Government Bill on the enactment
of the Pre-emption Act and on subsequent amendments thereto, the
court noted that the aim of the said Act was, inter alia, to
slow the increase in value of real property and to reduce the number
of cases in which the parties to the purchase, in order to evade tax,
did not state the full price in the deed of sale. It also noted that
a considerably lower price than the market value could be relevant to
the assessment of whether the conditions for pre-emption were
fulfilled. The purchase price had, however, to be assessed in the
light of the situation on the real estate market and the planning of
the area at the time of the pre-emption. The court considered that
the taxation value as such did not attest the property's market value
and that the afore-mentioned appraisal document and draft preliminary
agreement were in part based on wrong assumptions. It noted that no
town plan had been drawn up and that the property consisted of vacant
land, whose price was affected by the advantageous location as to
traffic communication and the expectations as regards future
lucrative use of the property. The assessment of the value, however,
could not have been based on the price of the permitted building
volume expected to be allocated by a town plan.
- The
Supreme Administrative Court considered that in assessing whether the
pre-emption was manifestly unfair, the purchase price had to be
considered in relation to the prevailing planning and real property
market situation at the time of the pre-emption. The court found that
no credible and undisputed evidence as to the relationship between
the purchase price and the market value had been presented. It could
not be concluded that the purchase price had been considerably lower
than the market value simply on the basis of the location of the
property and the existence of a master plan which lacked legal
effect. Furthermore, manifest unfairness within the meaning of
section 6 of the Pre-emption Act could not arise solely from an
advantageous purchase price. Nor was a court required to make precise
comparisons of purchase prices. The Supreme Administrative Court
concluded that the use of the city's first call on the property was
not manifestly unfair, having regard in addition to the content of
section 6 and the aim of the Pre-emption Act, as explained in the
travaux préparatoires, to improve the land situation of
the municipality by guaranteeing the availability of vacant land to
be used for building purposes and for forwarding, to check real
property speculation and to reduce the number of cases in which, in
order to evade tax, the full price was not stated in the deed of
sale. The court also noted that there was no evidence to the effect
that the parties to the purchase had a special bond with the property
in question. As to the other complaints raised by the applicant, it
confirmed the lower court's view. The decision ran to 21 pages, of
which 9 pages contained reasons.
- On
3 May 2005 the applicant lodged an extraordinary appeal with the
Supreme Administrative Court claiming, inter alia, that the
court had not invited his submissions in reply to the city's second
set of representations of 12 August 2003.
- In
its decision of 14 December 2006 the Supreme Administrative Court
noted that the city's above-mentioned second set of representations
had not been sent to the applicant for comment. Nor had he received
them for information, which was the practice in the Supreme
Administrative Court. The applicant had received the second set of
representations after the decision of 4 November 2004 and he had been
given an opportunity to comment on them during the extraordinary
proceedings. Bearing in mind that the applicant had already been able
to express his views in two sets of proceedings before the
Administrative Court and the Supreme Administrative Court, and that
the representations had not affected its decision of 4 November
2004 in such a way that the case should be reopened, the court
rejected the applicant's extraordinary appeal.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION IN RESPECT OF THE LENGTH OF THE PROCEEDINGS
- The
applicant complained that the length of the proceedings had been
incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement, laid
down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing within a
reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
- The
Government contested that argument.
A. Admissibility
- The
Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further
notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
- The
period to be taken into consideration began on 26 August 1996 and
ended on 4 November 2004. It thus lasted over eight years and two
months at two levels of jurisdiction, of which the lower level twice
and the higher level three times.
- The
Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings
must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and
with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case,
the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what
was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other
authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, §
43, ECHR 2000-VII).
- The
Government pointed out that during the first set of proceedings, both
parties had made several requests for postponing the consideration of
the case or the time-limits for submitting observations due to the
ongoing friendly-settlement negotiations. The case had been postponed
for approximately one year and four months. The Supreme
Administrative Court had finally decided the case in spite of the
parties' requests for postponement. The case had been somewhat
complex as the parties had disagreed on the basic facts and had
submitted a lot of material. The case had been referred back to the
Administrative Court, inter alia, due to the new material
submitted, at least partly, by the applicant. Each court had
considered the case as expeditiously as possible.
- The
applicant did not comment on the length issue.
- The
Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present
case (see Frydlender, cited above).
- Having
examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that
the Government have not put forward any fact or argument capable of
persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present case.
Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers
that in the instant case the length of the proceedings was excessive
and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement.
- There
has accordingly been a violation of Article 6 § 1.
II. REMAINDER OF THE APPLICATION
A. Non-communication of certain
documents
- The
applicant further complained that the Supreme Administrative Court's
final decision had been flawed by the fact that the court had not
invited his submissions in reply to the city's second set of
representations of 12 August 2003, which had included statistics on,
inter alia, purchase prices. What is more, they had not even
been communicated to him for information. The applicant maintained
that the above-mentioned second set of representations had contained
incorrect and misleading information which had influenced the Supreme
Administrative Court's decision of 4 November 2004. The court
should have heard the applicant as such a hearing could not be
regarded as manifestly unnecessary.
- The
Government pointed out that the applicant had complained about this
same issue in his extraordinary appeal to the Supreme Administrative
Court. The applicant had received the second set of representations
and he had been given an opportunity to comment on them during the
extraordinary proceedings in the Supreme Administrative Court. On 14
December 2006 the court had found that the non-communication had
amounted to a procedural error under national law but it had not
affected the decision in question in such a manner that the judgment
should be annulled. It thus followed that the applicant had not been
placed in a disadvantageous position vis-à-vis the
other party to the proceedings.
- The
Court notes that the Supreme Administrative Court had acknowledged in
its decision of 14 December 2006 that the city's above-mentioned
second set of representations had not been sent to the applicant for
comment, nor had he received them for information. However, the
applicant had received the second set of representations after the
decision of 4 November 2004 and he had been given an opportunity to
comment on them during the extraordinary proceedings in the Supreme
Administrative Court. Moreover, the Supreme Administrative Court had
noted in its decision that the applicant had already been able to
express his views in two sets of proceedings before the
Administrative Court and the Supreme Administrative Court, and that
the representations had not affected its decision of 4 November
2004 in such a way as to justify reopening the case.
- Having
regard to the foregoing and bearing in mind the practice of the
Supreme Administrative Court of sending second sets of
representations to the opposing party for information only, the Court
finds that the failure of the Supreme Administrative Court to
communicate certain documents was remedied by the same court during
the extraordinary proceedings.
- Accordingly,
this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be
rejected pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the
Convention.
B. Complaints under Article 6 and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to
the Convention
- The
applicant also complained, under Article 6 and Article 1 of Protocol
No. 1 to the Convention, that the Supreme Administrative Court had
failed in its duty to find out the market value of the property or
alternatively, that it should have drawn the parties' attention to
the need to submit further evidence on the issue. He complained about
the allegedly incorrect application of law by the Supreme
Administrative Court, in particular sections 6, 9, 10 and 21a of the
Pre-emption Act and Chapter 2, section 4, of the Real Estate Code.
Furthermore, the applicant complained that his negotiations with a
view to reaching a friendly settlement with the city of Vantaa had
broken down due to the Supreme Administrative Court's move to decide
the case on 10 March 1999 without informing the parties in advance.
Lastly, he complained that the facts of the case disclosed a
violation of his property rights.
- As
to the first complaint, the Court notes that while it is true that
national law places the administrative courts under a general duty to
examine and clarify the cases brought before them, the principle that
the initiative also lies with the parties is also relevant. Having
regard to the subject matter, the fact that the Supreme
Administrative Court did not obtain evidence as to the market value
of its own motion or invite the parties to submit further evidence
does not disclose any appearance of a violation. As to the allegedly
incorrect application of law by the Supreme Administrative Court, the
Court recalls that it is not its function to deal with errors of fact
or law allegedly committed by a national court unless and in so far
as they may have infringed rights and freedoms protected by the
Convention (see García Ruiz v. Spain [GC], no.
30544/96, § 28, ECHR 1999 I.). In the present case there is
no indication of any violation in this respect. Neither does the
complaint that the friendly settlement negotiations broke down due to
the Supreme Administrative Court's decision to decide the case
without warning the parties disclose any appearance of a Convention
violation as the Supreme Administrative Court later annulled that
decision.
- As
concerns the alleged violation of the applicant's property rights,
the Court considers that, even assuming that there was an
interference with the rights of the applicant, who had sold the
property to a company to be set up later (see paragraph 6 above), it
was prescribed by law and served the legitimate aim of, inter
alia, guaranteeing the availability of appropriate land to be
used for town development purposes. As to the proportionality, the
applicant had the possibility to obtain the city's pre-approval. In
case of a refusal, the parties to the purchase could either have
raised the purchase price to make the deal less attractive for the
city or, at least, to get a satisfactory sale price in case of
pre-emption. Finally, the applicant could have bought the property in
his own name had he considered it important that it stay in the
family. The Court thus finds that this complaint does not disclose
any appearance of a violation of the applicant's rights under the
Convention.
- Accordingly,
this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be
rejected pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the
Convention.
C. Rest of the applicant's complaints
- Moreover,
the applicant lodged several new complaints under Article 6 of the
Convention in his letters dated 9 July, 17 August and 23 October
2009.
- As
regards these complaints, the Court notes that they were not lodged
with the Court within the six months' time-limit. It follows that
these complaints must be rejected as being out of time within the
meaning of Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
- Article
41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
- The
applicant claimed compensation in respect of pecuniary damage
without specifying any amount.
- The
Government contested the claim. No specific claim for pecuniary
damage had been submitted by the applicant within the meaning of Rule
60 of the Rules of Court. In any event, there was no causal link
between the alleged violations of Article 6 of the Convention and any
pecuniary damage suffered. Consequently, the claim should be
rejected.
- The
Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found
and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim.
B. Costs and expenses
- The
applicant also claimed compensation for the costs and expenses
incurred before the domestic courts without specifying the amount and
EUR 4,500 for those incurred before the Court.
- The
Government contested these claims. The applicant's claim for costs
and expenses had not been specified within the meaning of Rule 60 of
the Rules of Court. In any event, the Government suggested that the
Court should not exceed an award of EUR 1,000 (inclusive of
value-added tax) to the applicant under this heading.
- According
to the Court's case-law, an applicant is entitled to the
reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been
shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and were
reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to
the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court
rejects the claim for costs and expenses in the domestic proceedings
and considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 2,500 (inclusive
of value-added tax) for the proceedings before the Court.
C. Default interest
- The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Declares the complaint concerning the excessive
length of the proceedings admissible and the remainder of the
application inadmissible;
- Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention;
- Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 2,500 (two
thousand five hundred euros), in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
- Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim
for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 16 February 2010,
pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Lawrence Early Nicolas Bratza
Registrar President
