FIRST SECTION

CASE OF SVETLANA KAZMINA v. RUSSIA

(Application no. 8609/04)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

2 December 2010

This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Svetlana Kazmina v. Russia,
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
	Christos Rozakis, President,
	Anatoly Kovler,
	Elisabeth Steiner,
	Dean Spielmann,
	Sverre Erik Jebens,
	Giorgio Malinverni,
	George Nicolaou, judges,
and André Wampach, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 9 November 2010,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1.  The case originated in an application (no. 8609/04) against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Russian national, Ms Svetlana Viktorovna Kazmina (“the applicant”), on 3 February 2004.
2.  The applicant, who had been granted legal aid, was represented by Mr Ye. Selyukov, a lawyer practising in Krasnodar. The Russian Government (“the Government”) were initially represented by Mr P. Laptev and Ms V. Milinchuk, former Representatives of the Russian Federation at the European Court of Human Rights, and subsequently by their representative Mr G. Matyushkin.
3.  The applicant complained, inter alia, about the conditions of her pre-trial detention, the conditions of her transport to and confinement at the courthouse, the excessive length of her pre-trial detention and the lack of its judicial review, and the excessive length of the proceedings.
4.  On 15 September 2006 the President of the First Section decided to communicate the applicant’s complaints under Article 5 §§ 3 and 4 and Article 6 § 1 of the Convention to the Government and (pursuant to former Article 29 § 3 of the Convention) to examine the merits of the complaints at the same time as their admissibility. Subsequently, on 2 June 2009 further observations were requested from the parties under Article 3 of the Convention.
5.  The Government objected to the joint examination of the admissibility and merits of the application. Having examined the Government’s objection, the Court dismissed it.
THE FACTS
I.  THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
6.  The applicant was born in 1971 and lives in the Krasnodar Region.
A.  Applicant’s arrest, ensuing detention and conviction
7.  On 18 May 1999 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of fraud. On 18 December 1999 she was released on bail.
8.  On 14 March 2000 the Rostov Regional Court received the case file and opened the trial against the applicant and four other persons.
9.  On 13 June 2000 the Rostov Regional Court found the applicant guilty of fraud and extortion and conditionally sentenced her to five years’ imprisonment. However, on 2 November 2000 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation quashed the judgment on appeal and remitted the case for a retrial.
10.  On 14 May 2001 the Rostov Regional Court found the applicant guilty of fraud, extortion, robbery, kidnapping, and theft and sentenced her to seven and a half years’ imprisonment. She was taken into custody from the courtroom.
11.  On 16 January 2002 the Supreme Court of Russia quashed the judgment of 14 May 2001 on appeal and remitted the case for a retrial. The applicant was remanded in custody pending the determination of the criminal charges against her.
12.  On 1 July 2002 the Rostov Regional Court extended the applicant’s detention until 1 October 2002. It found as follows:
“The defendants [the applicant and four other persons] are charged with kidnapping, illegal deprivation of liberty, burglary and other crimes.
They have been in custody: ... [the applicant] – since 18 May 1999 ...
The Prosecutor requested that the defendants’ detention be extended by 3 months.
Having examined the Prosecutor’s request, and having heard the parties to the proceedings, the court considers it necessary to extend the defendants’ detention by 3 months, that is, until 1 October 2002 inclusive, because they are charged with serious and particularly serious criminal offences.
Under Articles 255 and 256 of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure, the defendants’ detention on remand is extended by 3 (three) months, that is, from 1 July 2002 to 1 October 2002.”
13.  On 6 November 2002 the Supreme Court of Russia upheld the extension order, finding that it was sufficiently justified.
14.  On 1 October and 31 December 2002 and 31 March, 26 June, 25 September and 15 December 2003 the Rostov Regional Court extended the applicant’s detention until 1 January, 31 March, 30 June, 26 September, 25 December 2003 and 15 March 2004 respectively. The wording of the decisions was identical to that applied in the decision of 1 July 2002.
15.  The applicant appealed against each of the above-mentioned extension orders to the Supreme Court, arguing that they were not sufficiently reasoned and that the court had not taken into consideration her individual situation. On 12 February, 14 May, 16 July, 16 October and 24 December 2003 and 31 March 2004 respectively, the Supreme Court of Russia upheld the above-mentioned decisions on appeal.
16.  In the meantime, on 19 February 2004 the Rostov Regional Court extended the defendants’ pre-trial detention until 19 May 2004, citing the gravity of the charges against them. The applicant appealed against the extension to the Supreme Court.
17.  On 10 March 2005, that is, after the applicant’s conviction by the Regional Court (see paragraph 19 below), the Supreme Court of Russia terminated the examination of the applicant’s appeal because she had been convicted by the Regional Court in the meantime. Neither the applicant nor her counsel were summoned to appear at the hearing.
18.  As regards the trial proceedings in the period from 27 February 2002 to 25 February 2004, the case was adjourned on over forty-two occasions: at the request of the applicant and her co-defendants, who wished to study the case file or the records of the hearings; at the requests of the applicant and her co-defendants for the replacement of their representatives and the need for their newly appointed representatives to study the case file; due to the illness of the defendants’ representatives and their failure to appear before the court; and due to the illness of the applicant and co-defendants or following complaints made by them concerning their health. On one occasion the hearing was adjourned due to the failure of the authorities to transport the defendants to the courtroom.
19.  On 17 May 2004 the Regional Court found the applicant guilty of multiple counts of fraud, multiple counts of kidnapping, extortion, theft and robbery and sentenced her to five years’ imprisonment.
20.  The applicant lodged an appeal. She claimed, in particular, that the lay judges had sat on the bench unlawfully. The law had been changed and after 1 January 2004 lay judges were no longer permitted to take part in the administration of justice.
21.  On 10 March 2005 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation held an appeal hearing. The Supreme Court dismissed her appeal as unsubstantiated. As to her allegations about the allegedly unlawful composition of the tribunal, the court found that the trial had begun before 1 January 2004 and that the participation of two lay judges in the determination of the criminal charges against her had been in accordance with the principle of continuity of the trial.
B.  Conditions of the applicant’s detention
1.  Conditions of detention in detention facility IZ-61/1 of Rostov-on-Don
22.  From 25 May to 8 December 2001 and from 11 February 2002 to 17 May 2005 the applicant was held in detention facility IZ-61/1 of Rostov‑on-Don (Следственный Изолятор ИЗ-61/1 Главного управления Федеральной службы исполнения наказаний по Ростовской области). Throughout this period the applicant was held in the following cells:
(a)  cell no. 181 measuring 25.5 square metres and designed to accommodate 6 detainees;
(b)  cell no. 183 measuring 32.2 square metres and designed to accommodate 8 detainees;
(c)  cell no. 185 measuring 19.2 square metres and designed to accommodate 4 detainees; and
(d)  cell no. 189 measuring 27.9 square metres and designed to accommodate 6 detainees.
(a)  The Government’s account
23.  The number of inmates detained simultaneously with the applicant had not exceeded the design capacity of the cells.
24.  In each cell the applicant had an individual bed and had been provided with bedding (a mattress, a pillow, a blanket, two bed sheets and a pillowcase) and tableware (a spoon, a mug and a plate).
25.  Each cell had windows measuring at least 1.2 by 0.9 metres with glazed window panes equipped with vents easily accessible by the inmates. Access to fresh air and daylight had not been restricted. The level of natural lighting had corresponded to established sanitary norms and had allowed the inmates to read and write.
26.  The metal screens on the windows had been removed in December 2002.
27.  The cells had been illuminated with 100 watt filament lamps, which had been on from 6 a.m. to 10 p.m. At night-time the cells had been lit by 40 watt security lights with tinted glass shades. The security lights had not disturbed the inmates’ sleep.
28.  All cells had been ventilated by functioning extractor fans. Natural ventilation through windows had also been available.
29.  The cells had also been equipped with a functioning heating system. The average winter temperature had not dropped below plus 19 degrees Celsius, and the average summer temperature had not gone above plus 23 degrees Celsius.
30.  The applicant had received food of adequate quality and quantity in accordance with established legal norms.
31.  The applicant had been provided with adequate medical assistance. She had been detained separately from detainees suffering from tuberculosis, other infectious and skin diseases. She had undergone medical checkups on a regular basis and had been provided with necessary assistance following her requests. The applicant had never complained to the administration of IZ-61/1 about any alleged inadequacy in the treatment she had received.
32.  In support of their observations the Government provided several certificates issued by the director of IZ-61/1 in July 2009 and undated statements by prison wardens. They also submitted documents attesting to the destruction in 2006-2007 of registration logs (журналы покамерного размещения) in respect of the cells in IZ-61/1 following the expiry of the three-year time-limit for storing them.
(b)  The applicant’s account
33.  The cells in which the applicant had been held had always been overcrowded. Cell no. 181 had accommodated 14-17 inmates, cell no. 183 had accommodated 60-70 inmates, cell no. 185 had accommodated 10-12 inmates, and cell no. 189 had accommodated 15-26 inmates at any given time. The inmates had been obliged to take turns to sleep.
34.  The small windows in the cells had been covered with metal screens which had still been in place in 2003 and which had prevented daylight and fresh air from coming in.
35.  The arrangement of the bunks in two tiers had left the detainees very limited space and access to daylight. The artificial light in the cells had been switched on around the clock and had disturbed the applicant’s sleep.
36.  The ventilation system had not been functioning most of the time. The heating had also been inadequate. The cells had been very cold and damp. The air had been thick with the stench of tobacco, dirty laundry and the toilet.
37.  The cells had swarmed with insects. However, no remedial measures had been taken by the detention facility’s administration in this respect.
38.  The lavatory in the corner of the cell, which had no flush system and no lid, had been elevated above the floor and had been separated by a 1.1 metre long partition from the wash basin, but not from the living area. It had always been occupied and had offered no privacy.
39.  The applicant had never been provided with any personal hygiene items or toiletries.
40.  The daily food ration had been poor in quality and scarce in supply.
41.  The prison yard had been overcrowded and unequipped for physical exercise. The walls of the yard had been covered with “shuba”, a sort of abrasive concrete lining designed to prevent detainees from leaning against the walls. They had been topped with metal spikes.
42.  The applicant had been allowed to take a shower once a week. On that day, she had not been allowed to go outside for a walk.
43.  The applicant claimed that her health condition had considerably deteriorated during her stay at IZ-61/1. She submitted that for almost nine months there had been no gynaecologist among the medical staff of the facility, which had prevented her from consulting a specialist in due time. Upon her release, she had been diagnosed with a number of diseases which she had not had prior to her placement in IZ-61/1, including: chronic pyelonephritis, chronic bronchitis, neurocirculatory dystonia, thyroid gland disease, gynaecological disease, and tooth decay.
44.  In support of her statements, the applicant produced written depositions by three former cellmates, Ms S., Ms K. and Ms Ch. They stated, in particular, that in 2000-2005 cell no. 189, where they had been detained together with the applicant and which had measured approximately 20 square meters, had housed 15 to 26 inmates at any one time. They also stated that they and the other detainees had slept in shifts.
45.  The Government did not contest that the applicant’s former cellmates had been held in the same detention facility as the applicant during the relevant period of time.
2.  Conditions of transport to and confinement at the courthouse
(a)  The Government’s account
46.  Besides making reference to the general provisions of domestic law governing the transport of detainees, the Government made no specific submissions as regards the conditions of the applicant’s transport to and confinement at the holding cells area of the Rostov Regional Court.
47.  The Government submitted, however, that the applicant had been provided with food (dry rations and hot food) on the days when she had been taken to the courthouse. They relied on a certificate dated 17 July 2009 issued by the director of IZ-61/1 of Rostov-on-Don.
(b)  The applicant’s account
48.  The applicant had been transported from the detention facility to the courthouse on over one hundred and seventy-five occasions within a period of three years.
49.  On the days of court hearings, she had been taken from her cell early in the morning to the so-called “assembly cell”, together with other detainees who had a court hearing on that day. The “assembly cells” had been dark, damp, and smelly, without windows, ventilation or heating. They had not been equipped with lavatories or wash stands. The applicant had then been taken to a prison van.
50.  The applicant had been transported in an individual compartment of the van measuring 0.5 square metres. On many occasions she had to share that compartment with another person, and, owing to the lack of space, they had to take turns to sit on each other’s lap.
51.  It had been very cold in the van in the winter and stiflingly hot in the summer. It had not been possible to use the lavatory.
52.  The transport to and from the courthouse had taken several hours on each occasion. The vehicle had collected detainees from other facilities and had made stops at other courthouses on its way.
53.  At the courthouse the applicant had been detained in a small, dirty, dim windowless cell measuring 1 square metre. There had been neither ventilation nor heating in the cell. The applicant had to ask the wardens to take her to the lavatory.
54.  On the days of court hearings, the applicant had not been provided with any food, as she had been taken from her cell before breakfast and taken back after dinner. She had not been given any food rations to take with her to the courthouse. Neither had she seen other detainees receive any.
55.  The applicant’s former cellmates Ms S., Ms K. and Ms Ch. confirmed the above statements.
II.  RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
56.  For a summary of the relevant domestic law governing various aspects of detention, proceedings for the examination of its lawfulness, time-limits for a trial to take place and conditions of detention, see Gubkin v. Russia, no. 36941/02, §§ 56-80, 23 April 2009.
III.  RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS
57.  Relevant international documents concerning the general conditions in Russian penitentiary establishments and the conditions of detention of women can be found in the judgment of 1 June 2006 in the case of Mamedova v. Russia (no. 7064/05, §§ 51-53).
THE LAW
I.  ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION
58.  The applicant complained about the allegedly appalling conditions of her detention in pre-trial detention facility IZ-61/1 of Rostov-on-Don, and of the conditions of her transport to and confinement at the Rostov Regional Court. She relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”
A.  Submissions by the parties
59.  The Government asserted that the conditions of the applicant’s detention in facility IZ-61/1 of Rostov-on-Don, and the conditions of her transport to and confinement at the courthouse, had complied with both the requirements of domestic law and Article 3 of the Convention. The Government were unable to provide exact information on the number of persons detained simultaneously with the applicant in each cell due to the destruction of registration logs upon expiry of the time-limit for storing them. They submitted, however, that notwithstanding the existing overpopulation of facility IZ-61/1 in 2001-2005, the cells for female convicts had not been overcrowded given the small number of female inmates at the material time.
60.  The applicant challenged the Government’s descriptions of the conditions of her detention in IZ-61/1 as factually inaccurate. Referring to the case of Mamedova, cited above, § 53, she stressed, in particular, that the domestic authorities had persistently disregarded a number of hygiene and health issues by which the needs of female detainees fundamentally differ from the needs of male detainees. The applicant further noted that the Government’s submissions as regards the conditions of her transport to and confinement at the Rostov Regional Court lacked any specifics.
B.  The Court’s assessment
1.  Admissibility
61.  The Court observes that the applicant was held in detention facility IZ-61/1 of Rostov-on-Don during two periods: from 25 May to 8 December 2001, and from 11 February 2002 to 17 May 2005.
62.  As regards the first period, the applicant’s complaint was introduced outside the six-month time-limit and must be dismissed pursuant to Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.
63.  In so far as the second period is concerned, the Court notes that the applicant’s complaints are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention and that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.
2.  Merits
64.  The Court reiterates that to be regarded as degrading or inhuman for the purposes of Article 3 of the Convention a given form of treatment must attain a minimum level of severity (see Price v. the United Kingdom, no. 33394/96, § 24, ECHR 2001‑VII). When assessing conditions of detention, account must be taken of the cumulative effects of those conditions, as well as the specific allegations made by the applicant (see Dougoz v. Greece, no. 40907/98, § 46, ECHR 2001‑II).
(a)  Conditions of the applicant’s detention in facility IZ-61/1 of Rostov‑on‑Don
65.  The Court notes that in the present case the parties have disputed most aspects of the conditions of the applicant’s detention. However, there is no need for the Court to establish the veracity of each and every allegation, because it finds a violation of Article 3 on the basis of facts presented to it which the respondent Government have failed to refute.
66.  Having agreed in principle on the size of the cells, the parties disputed the number of detainees who shared them with the applicant. While the Government averred that the applicant had always had on average 4 square meters of personal space in each cell, the applicant argued that the cell population had considerably exceeded the design capacity of the cells and that the detainees had had to sleep taking turns.
67.  The Court observes that in certain instances the respondent Government alone have access to information capable of firmly corroborating or refuting allegations under Article 3 of the Convention, and that a failure on a Government’s part to submit such information without a satisfactory explanation may give rise to the drawing of inferences as to the well-founded nature of the applicant’s allegations (see Khudoyorov v. Russia, no. 6847/02, § 113, ECHR 2005‑X (extracts), and Ahmet Özkan and Others v. Turkey, no. 21689/93, § 426, 6 April 2004).
68.  Turning to the facts of the present case, the Court notes that the Government, in their plea concerning the number of detainees, relied on the statements made by the director of facility IZ-61/1 and by the prison wardens. The Court observes that the statements in question were not corroborated by any original prison documentation, owing to the fact that it had been destroyed prior to communication of the relevant complaint to the respondent Government in 2009 (see paragraphs 4, 33 and 59 above). Even assuming that the domestic authorities had been acting with due care in respect of handling the original prison documentation and that the failure to submit such documentation had been properly accounted for (see Shcherbakov v. Russia, no. 23939/02, § 77, 17 June 2010, and Novinskiy v. Russia, no. 11982/02, § 102, 10 February 2009), the Court cannot however accept the unsupported statements by various prison officials as sufficiently conclusive, as they appear to be based on personal recollections rather than any objective data (see Ovchinnikov v. Russia, no. 9807/02, § 70, 17 June 2010; Igor Ivanov v. Russia, no. 34000/02, § 34, 7 June 2007; and Belashev v. Russia, no. 28617/03, § 52, 4 December 2008).
69.  Having regard to the principles indicated in paragraph 64 above, together with the fact that the Government did not submit any convincing relevant information, the Court will examine the issue concerning the alleged overcrowding of the cells on the basis of the applicant’s submissions, corroborated by statements by her former cellmates which the Government has failed to refute.
70.  According to the applicant, the occupants of the cells in IZ-61/1 were afforded less than 1 square metre of personal space (see paragraph 33 above). The number of detainees in the cells of IZ-61/1 was greater than the number of available bunks. It follows that the detainees, including the applicant, had to share the sleeping facilities, taking turns to rest. The applicant spent three years and three months in such conditions.
71.  The Court reiterates that irrespective of the reasons for the overcrowding, it is incumbent on the respondent Government to organise their custodial system in such a way as to ensure respect for the dignity of detainees, regardless of financial or logistical difficulties (see Mamedova, cited above, § 63, and Benediktov v. Russia, no. 106/02, § 37, 10 May 2007).
72.  The Court has frequently found violations of Article 3 of the Convention on account of lack of personal space afforded to detainees (see Benediktov, cited above, §§ 33 et seq.; Khudoyorov, cited above, §§ 104 et seq.; Labzov v. Russia, no. 62208/00, §§ 44 et seq., 16 June 2005; Novoselov v. Russia, no. 66460/01, §§ 41 et seq., 2 June 2005; Mayzit v. Russia, no. 63378/00, §§ 39 et seq., 20 January 2005; and Kalashnikov v. Russia, no. 47095/99, §§ 97 et seq., ECHR 2002-VI).
73.  The Court has also on a number of occasions found violations of Article 3 of the Convention on account of lack of personal space afforded to detainees in detention facility IZ-61/1 of Rostov-on-Don in the period from 1998 to 2005 (see Gubkin, cited above, §§ 92-101; Bakhmutskiy v. Russia, no. 36932/02, §§ 88-97, 25 June 2009; and Bordikov v. Russia, no. 921/03, §§ 55-64, 8 October 2009).
74.  Having regard to its case-law on the subject and the material in its possession, the Court notes that the Government have not provided any evidence or made any submissions capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present case.
75.  There has therefore been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention on account of the conditions of the applicant’s detention in facility IZ-61/1 of Rostov-on-Don, which the Court considers to be inhuman and degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention.
(b)  Conditions of the applicant’s transport to and confinement at the Rostov Regional Court
76.  The Court observes at the outset that the thrust of the applicant’s complaint relates to the conditions of her transport to and confinement in the holding cells of the courthouse, as well as hunger on the days of court hearings.
77.  As to the transport to and confinement at the courthouse, the Court notes that, apart from a general submission to the effect that the conditions of the applicant’s transport to and confinement in the Rostov Regional Court had conformed to the applicable domestic law (see paragraphs 46 and 59 above), the Government failed to furnish any detailed information as to the measurements of the prison van’s compartments, their physical conditions and occupancy level, or the travel time, as well as information regarding the cells in which the applicant had been detained at the courthouse, their dimensions, the number of inmates held there together with the applicant, the availability of access to a toilet and drinking water, and so forth. Neither did they contest the applicant’s detailed description of those conditions (see paragraphs 50-53 above), or statements by the applicant’s former cellmates in support of the applicant’s account (see paragraph 55 above). In the absence of specific comments from the Government, the Court is therefore inclined to accept the applicant’s submission that on the days of court hearings she was transported and held in the holding cells of the Rostov Regional Court in cramped conditions in the absence of adequate lighting, ventilation or heating and that she only had access to the toilet as directed by the warden (compare to Denisenko and Bogdanchikov v. Russia, no. 3811/02, § 107, 12 February 2009; Starokadomskiy v. Russia, no. 42239/02, § 57, 31 July 2008; and Salmanov v. Russia, no. 3522/04, § 63, 31 July 2008).
78.  Furthermore, it appears that the applicant did not receive appropriate nutrition on the days when she was transported to the court. The Government did not contest the assertion that on the days of court hearings the applicant left the detention facility before breakfast and did not return there until after dinner (see Denisenko and Bogdanchikov, cited above, § 108, with further references). Although the Government provided a certificate issued by the head of the detention facility to the effect that the applicant received dry rations and hot food when taken to the courthouse, no evidence was provided as to the availability of necessary facilities in the holding cells area of the Regional Court for heating or eating food (compare to Salmanov, cited above, § 64, and Starokamoskiy, cited above, § 58).
79.  Thus, in the present case on numerous occasions and over a period of several years (see paragraph 48 above), the applicant was transported to and confined in unacceptable conditions in the holding cells of the Rostov Regional Court without being provided with adequate nutrition. Such treatment occurred during the applicant’s trial, at a time when she needed her powers of concentration and mental alertness the most, and was alternated with detention in the detention facility, which the Court has found to have amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment. The Court takes the view that the above considerations, taken cumulatively, are sufficient to warrant the conclusion that the inhuman and degrading treatment to which the applicant was subjected exceeded the minimum level of severity required for the finding that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.
II.  ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 3 OF THE CONVENTION
80.  The applicant complained under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention that the duration of her pre-trial detention had been in breach of the “reasonable time” requirement. Article 5 § 3 provides as follows:
“Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be ... entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial ...”
A.  Submissions by the parties
81.  The Government submitted that the applicant’s continued detention had been made necessary by the special gravity of the charges against her, her lack of permanent residence and the fact that her name had been on a wanted list at one stage during the preliminary investigation.
82.  The applicant argued that in the period from December 1999, when she had been released on bail, and May 2001, when she had been taken into custody again, she had not committed any crimes and she had always complied with her obligation to appear before the investigating authorities and the court. However, for over three years after that time, she had been held in detention merely on the basis of the gravity of the charges against her whilst awaiting conviction. At no point did the domestic authorities consider her personal situation.
B.  The Court’s assessment
1.  Admissibility
83.  The Court firstly reiterates that, in determining the length of detention pending trial under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention, the period to be taken into consideration begins on the day the accused is taken into custody and ends on the day when the charge is determined, even if only by a court of first instance (see Panchenko v. Russia, no. 45100/98, § 91, 8 February 2005; Klyakhin v. Russia, no. 46082/99, § 57, 30 November 2004; and Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772/95, §§ 145 and 147, ECHR 2000‑IV).
84.  Furthermore, the Court observes that, in view of the essential link between Article 5 § 3 of the Convention and paragraph 1 (c) of that Article, a person convicted at first instance cannot be regarded as being detained “for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence”, as specified in the latter provision. Rather, that individual is in the position provided for by Article 5 § 1 (a), which authorises deprivation of liberty “after conviction by a competent court” (see Panchenko, cited above, § 93, and Kudła v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, § 104, ECHR 2000‑XI).
85.  Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court observes that the applicant was taken into custody for the first time on 18 May 1999 and was released on bail on 18 December 1999. This period of the applicant’s detention, having been interrupted by the applicant’s release and having ended more than six months before the introduction of the applicant’s complaint on 3 February 2004, should not be taken into account. The applicant was subsequently detained on 14 May 2001 after her conviction by the Rostov Regional Court. She remained detained after the quashing of the conviction by the Supreme Court of Russia on 16 January 2002. It follows that the period from 14 May 2001 to 16 January 2002 was justified under Article 5 § 1 (a) of the Convention and should, therefore, also be excluded from the Court’s consideration. Accordingly, the period to be taken into consideration in the present case started to run from 16 January 2002 and ended on 17 May 2004 when the applicant was again convicted. It therefore amounted to two years and four months.
86.  The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention and is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
2.  Merits
87.  The Court reiterates that the persistence of reasonable suspicion that the person arrested has committed an offence is a condition sine qua non for the lawfulness of that person’s continued detention. However after a certain lapse of time it no longer suffices. In such cases, the Court must establish whether the other grounds given by the judicial authorities continued to justify the deprivation of liberty. Where such grounds were “relevant” and “sufficient”, the Court must also ascertain whether the competent national authorities displayed “special diligence” in the conduct of the proceedings (see Labita, cited above, §§ 152 and 153).
88.  The presumption is in favour of release. As the Court has consistently held, the second limb of Article 5 § 3 does not give judicial authorities a choice between either bringing an accused to trial within a reasonable time or granting him provisional release pending trial. Until his conviction, the accused must be presumed innocent, and the purpose of the provision under consideration is essentially to require his provisional release once his continued detention ceases to be reasonable (see, among other authorities, Castravet v. Moldova, no. 23393/05, § 30, 13 March 2007; McKay v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 543/03, § 41, ECHR 2006-...; Jablonski v. Poland, no. 33492/96, § 83, 21 December 2000; and Neumeister v. Austria, 27 June 1968, § 4, Series A no. 8).
89.  Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court accepts that the applicant’s detention may initially have been warranted by the reasonable suspicion of her involvement in the commission of several criminal offences. However, after a certain lapse of time the persistence of a reasonable suspicion by itself no longer sufficed. Accordingly, the domestic authorities were under an obligation to analyse the applicant’s personal situation in greater detail and to give specific reasons for holding her in custody.
90.  The Court observes that in the period from January to July 2002 the domestic court kept the applicant in detention without citing any particular reason (see paragraph 11 above). Subsequently, in the period from July 2002 to May 2004 the court extended the applicant’s detention on eight occasions. The only ground relied upon for continuing her detention was the fact that she was charged with “serious” and “particularly serious” criminal offences (see, in particular, paragraphs 12, 14 and 16 above).
91.  The Court has repeatedly held that although the severity of the sentence faced is a relevant element in the assessment of the risk of the accused absconding or reoffending, the need to continue the deprivation of liberty cannot be assessed from a purely abstract point of view, taking into consideration only the gravity of the offence. Nor can continuation of detention be used to anticipate a custodial sentence (see Belevitskiy v. Russia, no. 72967/01, § 101, 1 March 2007; Panchenko, cited above, § 102; Khudoyorov, cited above, § 180; and Ilijkov v. Bulgaria, no. 33977/96, § 81, 26 July 2001).
92.  The Court notes the Government’s argument that the applicant had had no permanent residence and that her name had been on a wanted list. The Court notes, however, that the extension orders in the relevant period contained no mention of the above circumstances. It therefore finds that the existence of the implied risks was not established.
93.  In sum, the Court finds that the domestic authorities’ decisions were not based on an analysis of all the pertinent facts. It is of particular concern to the Court that the Russian authorities persistently used a standard form summary formula to justify the extension of the applicant’s detention. The Court also notes that the domestic authorities, using the same formula, simultaneously extended the detention of the applicant and her co-defendants. In the Court’s view, this approach is incompatible, in itself, with the guarantees enshrined in Article 5 § 3 of the Convention in so far as it permits the continued detention of a group of persons without a case-by-case assessment of the grounds for detention or of compliance with the “reasonable time” requirement in respect of each individual member of the group (see Gubkin, cited above, § 144; Bakhmutskiy, cited above, § 141; Aleksey Makarov v. Russia, no. 3223/07, § 53, 12 June 2008; Shcheglyuk v. Russia, no. 7649/02, § 45, 14 December 2006; Korchuganova, cited above, § 76; and Dolgova v. Russia, no. 11886/05, § 49, 2 March 2006).
94.  The Court finds, therefore, that by failing to address concrete relevant facts and by relying solely on the gravity of the charges, the authorities extended the applicant’s detention on grounds which cannot be regarded as “sufficient”. In those circumstances it is not necessary to examine whether the proceedings were conducted with “special diligence”.
95.  There has accordingly been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention.
III.  ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 4 OF THE CONVENTION
96.  The applicant complained under Article 5 § 4 that she had been denied the right to effective judicial review of her complaint against the order to extend her detention of 19 February 2004. The applicant also complained under the same Article that the proceedings before the Supreme Court of Russia by which she sought to challenge that extension order had been unfair, in that she had not been given an opportunity to attend.
Article 5 § 4 of the Convention provides as follows:
“Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.”
A.  Submissions by the parties
97.  The Government submitted that the applicant’s appeal against the extension order of 19 February 2004 had been received by the Rostov Regional Court on 27 February 2004. However, for an unknown reason it had not been dispatched in due time to the Supreme Court. As a result, it had been dealt with only after the applicant’s conviction, on 10 March 2005, and the examination of the applicant’s appeal had therefore been terminated. The domestic authorities admitted that this chain of events “does not fully comply with the requirements of the [domestic] criminal procedural law”. Nevertheless, in their view, the decision of 10 March 2005 had not breached the applicant’s rights, because on the same day the Supreme Court had examined the applicant’s appeal against her conviction and had addressed all arguments relating to the alleged violations of the rules of criminal procedure. There had therefore been no violation of the applicant’s rights under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention.
98.  The applicant maintained her complaint.
B.  The Court’s assessment
1.  Admissibility
99.  The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention and is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
2.  Merits
100.  The Court observes that it has previously examined the complaint of the lack of effective judicial review of the extension order of 19 February 2004 in the cases of the applicant’s co-defendants and found that the termination of the examination of the applicants’ appeal against the extension order of 19 February 2004 amounted to a violation of their rights under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention (see Gubkin, cited above, §§ 148-158, and Bakhmutskiy, cited above, §§ 144-148). In the latter case cited above the Government expressly acknowledged the violation.
101.  In the circumstances of the present case the Court finds no reason to hold otherwise. It therefore concludes that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention.
102.  With regard to the complaint of procedural defects in the hearing before the Supreme Court of Russia of 10 March 2005 by which the examination of the applicant’s appeal was terminated, the Court finds that, having concluded that there has been an infringement of the applicant’s right to effective judicial review of her detention, it is not necessary to consider whether the procedural guarantees of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention were available in those proceedings (see, by analogy, Ryabykh v. Russia, no. 52854/99, § 59, ECHR 2003‑IX).
IV.  ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF THE LENGTH OF THE PROCEEDINGS
103.  The applicant complained that the length of the criminal proceedings against her had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which provides, in its relevant part, as follows:
“In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal ...”
A.  Submissions by the parties
104.  The Government submitted that some adjournments of the proceedings had been caused by circumstances beyond the parties’ control (the illness of the defendants and their representatives) and some by circumstances beyond the control of the domestic authorities (such as the replacement of representatives by the defendants and review of the case file by the defendants’ newly appointed representatives). The applicant and the other defendants had made full use of their procedural rights and should have been aware that this would result in the protraction of the proceedings. There had therefore been no fault attributable to the domestic authorities and no violation of the applicant’s right to have her case heard within a reasonable time, as provided for in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
105.  The applicant submitted that the proceedings had lasted for over six years. During this time the domestic court had passed three sentences, two of which had been found to be unlawful and subsequently quashed on appeal. The applicant’s full use of the resources afforded by law in her defence could not be held against her.
B.  The Court’s assessment
1.  Admissibility
106.  The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention and is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
2.  Merits
(a)  Period to be taken into consideration
107.  The Court reiterates that the period to be taken into consideration in determining the length of criminal proceedings begins with the day on which a person is “charged” within the autonomous meaning to be given to that term. It ends with the day on which a charge is finally determined or the proceedings are terminated (see, among many authorities, Rokhlina v. Russia, no. 54071/00, § 81, 7 April 2005). The “charge”, for the purposes of Article 6 § 1, may be defined as “the official notification given to an individual by the competent authority of an allegation that he has committed a criminal offence”, a definition that also corresponds to the test of whether “the situation of the [suspect] has been substantially affected” (see Deweer v. Belgium, 27 February 1980, § 46, Series A no. 35).
108.  The period to be taken into consideration in the present case began from the date of the applicant’s arrest on 18 May 1999 when she was first affected by the “charges” against her. The period in question ended on 10 March 2005, when the applicant’s conviction became final. It follows that the period to be taken into consideration lasted five years, nine months and twenty-four days. This period spans the investigation stage and two levels of jurisdiction, the trial court and the court of appeal having examined the case on three occasions.
(b)  Reasonableness of the length of proceedings
109.  The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of the proceedings is to be assessed in the light of the particular circumstances of the case, regard being had to the criteria laid down in the Court’s case-law – in particular, the complexity of the case, the applicant’s conduct and the conduct of the competent authorities. On the latter point, what is at stake for the applicant also has to be taken into consideration (see, among many other authorities, Korshunov v. Russia, no. 38971/06, § 70, 25 October 2007; Nakhmanovich v. Russia, no. 55669/00, § 95, 2 March 2006; and Rokhlina, cited above, § 86).
110.  The Government did not allege that the proceedings in the criminal case against the applicant had been complex. The Court sees no reason to hold that they were.
111.  Regarding the applicant’s conduct, the Court notes that the case was adjourned on several occasions at the applicant’s request (see paragraph 18 above). However, the applicant should not be held responsible for adjournments which were necessary for her to study the case file and the records of the hearings and to arrange for the replacement of representatives whose services she considered ineffective. The applicant was free to take full advantage of the resources afforded by national law in her defence (see Rokhlina, cited above, § 88, and Kalashnikov, cited above, § 129). Furthermore, the Court considers that the delays resulting from the absence of the applicant’s representative from the hearings were negligible compared to the overall length of proceedings.
112.  Turning to the conduct of the domestic authorities, the Court observes that the Government have not submitted any satisfactory explanation for the rather substantial periods of inactivity on the part of the domestic court when it came to the examination on appeal of the applicant’s convictions of 13 June 2000, 14 May 2001 and 17 May 2004. In this connection, the Court notes that the periods under consideration amounted to five, eight and ten months respectively, and that their aggregate length delayed the proceedings by almost two years.
113.  Having regard to the foregoing, and – particularly given that the applicant had been held in detention throughout the substantial period in which the proceedings were pending – what was at stake for the applicant, the Court considers that the length of the proceedings in the present case did not satisfy the “reasonable time” requirement.
114.  There has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
V.  OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
115.  Lastly, the applicant complained under Article 5 about her arrest on 18 May 1999 and her detention from 18 May to 18 December 1999, under Article 6 about the composition of the tribunal which convicted her on 17 May 2004, and of a lack of impartiality on the part of certain judges who participated in her appeal proceedings. She further complained under Article 8 that her continued detention had prevented her from taking care of her daughter and elderly parents.
116.  However, having regard to all the material in its possession, and in so far as these complaints fall within its competence, the Court finds that there is no appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
VI.  APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
117.  Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A.  Damage
118.  The applicant claimed 60,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage for the above violations of her rights.
119.  The Government considered that this claim was excessive and that the finding of a violation would constitute adequate just satisfaction.
120.  The Court notes that it has found a combination of serious violations in the present case. The applicant spent three years and three months in custody, in inhuman and degrading conditions. Her detention was not based on sufficient grounds and was excessively lengthy. She was denied the right to an effective review of her continued detention and the right to a trial within a reasonable time. In these circumstances, the Court considers that the applicant’s suffering and frustration cannot be compensated for by the mere finding of a violation. Making its assessment on an equitable basis, the Court awards the applicant EUR 22,500 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant on that amount.
B.  Costs and expenses
121.  The applicant claimed RUB 60,000 for legal fees incurred in the domestic proceedings and RUB 16,000 for photocopying, postal and translation expenses.
122.  The Government submitted that, as regards the applicant’s claim for reimbursement of expenses for legal representation, the supporting documentation did not prove that the expenses at issue were incurred in connection with the prevention of, or redress for, alleged violations of the Convention. They further noted the applicant’s failure to support her claim by providing relevant receipts for the full amount of the remaining expenses.
123.  According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the information in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the applicant in addition to the legal aid already granted the sum of EUR 1,000 covering costs under all heads, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant on that amount.
C.  Default interest
124.  The Court considers it appropriate that default interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1.  Declares admissible
(a)  the complaint under Article 3 concerning the conditions of the applicant’s detention in detention facility IZ-61/1 of Rostov-on-Don from 11 February 2002 to 17 May 2005 and the conditions of her transport to and confinement at the Rostov Regional Court;
(b)  the complaint under Article 5 § 3 concerning the length of the applicant’s pre-trial detention from 16 January 2002 to 17 May 2004;
(c)  the complaint under Article 5 § 4 concerning the alleged ineffectiveness of the judicial review of the applicant’s complaint against the detention order of 19 February 2004;
(d)  the complaint under Article 6 § 1 concerning the length of the criminal proceedings against the applicant;
and inadmissible the remainder of the application;

2.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention on account of the conditions of the applicant’s detention in detention facility IZ-61/1 of Rostov-on-Don from 11 February 2002 to 17 May 2005 and on account of her transport to and confinement at the Rostov Regional Court;

3.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention on account of the length of the applicant’s detention on remand;

4.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention on account of lack of judicial review of the applicant’s complaint against the detention order of 19 February 2004;

5.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention on account of the excessive length of the proceedings against the applicant;

6.  Holds
(a)  that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts, to be converted into Russian roubles at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:
(i)  EUR 22,500 (twenty-two thousand and five hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(ii)  EUR 1,000 (one thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;
(b)  that, from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement, simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

7.  Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 2 December 2010, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
	André Wampach	Christos Rozakis
	Deputy Registrar	President