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SECOND
SECTION
CASE OF BELÉNYESI v. HUNGARY
(Application
no. 9269/08)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
30
March 2010
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Belényesi v. Hungary,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Françoise
Tulkens,
President,
Ireneu
Cabral Barreto,
Vladimiro
Zagrebelsky,
Danutė
Jočienė,
Dragoljub
Popović,
András
Sajó,
Nona
Tsotsoria,
judges,
and Françoise Elens-Passos,
Deputy Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 9 March 2010,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an application
(no. 9269/08) against the
Republic of Hungary lodged with the Court
under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”)
by a Hungarian national, Ms Irén
Belényesi (“the applicant”), on 10 December 2002.
- The
applicant was represented by Mr I. Barbalics, a lawyer practising in
Nagyatád. The Hungarian Government (“the
Government”) were represented by Mr L. Höltzl, Agent,
Ministry of Justice and Law Enforcement.
- On
19 May 2008 the
President of the Second Section decided to give notice of the
application to the Government. It was also decided to rule on the
admissibility and merits of the application at the same time (Article
29 § 3).
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The
applicant was born in 1949 and lives in Budapest.
- On
1 March 1993 the applicant filed for divorce before the Pest Central
District Court.
- On
6 January 1995 the court dissolved the marriage and placed the
couple's minor child with the respondent. It regulated the child
maintenance and the use of the family home. On 25 August 1995 the
Budapest Regional Court upheld the first-instance decision.
- In
the ensuing proceedings concerning the matrimonial property, on
2 February 1999 the court gave the ownership of the commonly
used flat and a weekend-house to the applicant while granting the
possession of their shop to her ex-husband. It also ordered the
applicant to pay the difference in value of the different properties.
- On
appeal, on 25 March 2000 the Budapest Regional Court reversed the
first-instance decision. The applicant lodged a petition for review
with the Supreme Court. On 23 April 2002 the Supreme Court, finding
that the Regional Court's decision had been in compliance with the
law, upheld it. This decision was served on the applicant on 19 June
2002.
THE LAW
- The
applicant complained that the length of the proceedings had been
incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement of
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. The Government contested that
argument.
- The
Court observes that the period to be taken into consideration
commenced on 1 March 1993 and ended on 19 June 2002 and thus lasted
almost nine years and four months for three levels of jurisdiction.
In view of such lengthy proceedings, this complaint must be declared
admissible.
- The
Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present
application (see, among many other authorities, Frydlender v.
France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII). Having
examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that
the Government have not put forward any fact or convincing argument
capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the
present circumstances. Having regard to its case-law on the subject,
the Court considers that the length of the proceedings was excessive
and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement.
There has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
- The
applicant also complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention
and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 about the decisions given by the
courts. In so far as her complaint may be understood to concern the
assessment of the evidence and the result of the proceedings before
the domestic courts, the Court reiterates that, according to Article
19 of the Convention, its duty is to ensure the observance of the
engagements undertaken by the Contracting Parties to the Convention.
In particular, it is not its function to deal with errors of fact or
law allegedly committed by a national court unless and in so far as
they may have infringed rights and freedoms protected by the
Convention. Moreover, while Article 6 of the Convention guarantees
the right to a fair hearing, it does not lay down any rules on the
admissibility of evidence or the way it should be assessed, which are
therefore primarily matters for regulation by national law and the
national courts (García Ruiz v. Spain [GC], no.
30544/96, § 28, ECHR 1999 I).
- In
the present case – which concerned a civil-law dispute between
two individuals and was devoid of any indication of a deprivation of
property by the State – the Court considers that the
applicant's submissions do not disclose any elements of arbitrariness
and, hence, no appearance of a violation of her rights under Article
6 of the Convention or Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 has been
demonstrated. It follows that this part of the application is
manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 and
must be rejected, pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.
- Relying
on Article 41 of the Convention, the applicant claimed 21,000 euros
(EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage and EUR 10,000 in respect of
non-pecuniary damage. The Government contested these claims. The
Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found
and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim.
However, it considers that the applicant must have sustained some
non-pecuniary damage. Ruling on an equitable basis, it awards her EUR
4,800 under that head.
- The
applicant also claimed EUR 5,894 for the costs and expenses incurred
before the domestic courts and the Court. In respect of the latter
item, this sum includes legal fees billable by her lawyer, namely 16
hours, as per time-sheet, charged at an hourly rate of EUR 100. The
Government contested the claim. According to the Court's case-law, an
applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only
in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and
necessarily incurred and were reasonable as to quantum. In the
present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and
the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the
sum of EUR 1,600 covering costs under all heads.
- The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Declares the complaint concerning the excessive
length of the proceedings admissible and the remainder of the
application inadmissible;
- Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention;
- Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following
amounts, to be converted into Hungarian forints at the rate
applicable at the date of settlement:
(i) EUR
4,800 (four thousand eight hundred euros), plus any tax that may be
chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR
1,600 (one thousand six hundred euros), plus any tax that may be
chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
- Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim
for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 30 March 2010, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Françoise Elens-Passos Françoise
Tulkens
Deputy Registrar President
