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FIFTH
SECTION
CASE OF SKOROKHOD v. UKRAINE
(Application
no. 47305/06)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
29
September 2011
This
judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Skorokhod v. Ukraine,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a
Committee composed of:
Mark Villiger, President,
Karel
Jungwiert,
Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre, judges,
and
Stephen Phillips,
Deputy Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 6 September 2011,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an
application (no. 47305/06) against Ukraine
lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a
Ukrainian national, Ms Natalya Ivanovna Skorokhod (“the
applicant”), on 14 November 2006.
2. The
Ukrainian Government (“the Government”) were represented
by their Agent, Mrs Valeria Lutkovska, of the Ministry of Justice.
- On
23 June 2010 the
President of the Fifth Section decided to give notice of the
application to the Government. In accordance
with Protocol No. 14, the application was allocated to a Committee of
three Judges.
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The
applicant was born in 1970 and lives in Alushta.
- On
19 July 1999 she instituted proceedings in the
Alushta Court against her former employer seeking recovery of various
job-related payments, compensation for non-pecuniary damage and the
court’s ruling obliging her former employer to amend her work
records.
- On
16 May 2003, following three remittals
of the case for fresh examination, the
above court allowed the applicant’s claim in part.
- On
22 December 2003 and 20 April 2006, respectively, the Crimea Regional
Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court upheld the above judgment. The
final decision was served on the applicant on 15 May 2006.
- According
to the Government, in the course of the proceedings the applicant
twelve times specified her claim. One hearing was adjourned at the
applicant’s request. Sixteen further hearings were adjourned at
the other party’s request, due to its representative’s
failure to appear and the absence of a judge or for unspecified
reasons. One forensic examination was ordered by the court (between
19 April 2001 and 26 April 2002).
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION
- The
applicant complained that the length of the
proceedings had been incompatible with the “reasonable time”
requirement, laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention,
which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil
rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing
within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
- The
Government contested that argument stating that
the consideration of the case had been complicated by the applicant’s
numerous specifications of the claim.
- The
period to be taken into consideration began on 19 July 1999 and ended
on 15 May 2006 when the final decision was served on the applicant
(see Gitskaylo
v. Ukraine, no. 1702 6/05, § 34,
14 February 2008). The proceedings thus lasted approximately
six years and ten months before three judicial instances.
A. Admissibility
- The
Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further
notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
- The
Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings
must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and
with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case,
the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what
was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other
authorities, Frydlender v. France
[GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII).
The Court further reiterates that special
diligence is necessary in employment disputes (Ruotolo
v. Italy, judgment of 27 February 1992,
Series A no. 230 D, p. 39, § 17).
- Turning
to the facts of the case, the Court considers that its complexity and
the conduct of the applicant, who somewhat contributed to the length
of the proceedings (see paragraph 8 above), cannot explain their
overall length. On the other hand, the Court finds that the
protraction of the proceedings was mainly caused by three remittals
of the case for fresh examination (see paragraph 6 above) and by the
repeated adjournments of the hearings (see paragraph 8 above). It
concludes, therefore, that the main responsibility for the lengthy
duration of the proceedings rests with the State.
- The Court has frequently found violations of Article 6
§ 1 of the Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one
in the present case (see Frydlender,
cited above; Pavlyulynets v. Ukraine,
no. 70767/01, § 53, 6 September 2005; and Moroz
and Others v. Ukraine, no. 36545/02,
§ 62, 21 December 2006).
- Having
examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that
the Government have not put forward any fact or argument capable of
persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present case.
Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers
that in the instant case the length of the proceedings was excessive
and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement.
There has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
II. THE REMAINING COMPLAINT
- The applicant also complained
under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about the unfavourable
outcome of the proceedings.
- Having carefully examined the
applicant’s submissions in the light of all the material in its
possession and in so far as the matters complained of are within its
competence, the Court finds that they do not disclose any appearance
of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention.
- It
follows that this part of the application must be declared
inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35
§§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
- Article
41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
- The
applicant claimed 250,000 Ukrainian hryvnias
in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
- The
Government contested the claim.
- The
Court considers that the applicant must have
sustained non-pecuniary damage and, ruling on an equitable basis,
awards her EUR 600 under this head.
B. Costs and expenses
- The
applicant made no claim for costs and expenses. Accordingly, the
Court considers that there is no call to award her
any sum under this head.
C. Default interest
- The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Declares the complaint concerning the excessive
length of the proceedings admissible and the remainder of the
application inadmissible;
- Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention;
- Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant,
within three months EUR 600 (six hundred euros), plus any tax that
may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be
converted into the national currency of the respondent State at the
rate applicable at the date of settlement;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
- Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s
claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 29 September 2011,
pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Stephen Phillips Mark Villiger Deputy
Registrar President
