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FIRST
SECTION
CASE OF SIZOV v. RUSSIA
(Application
no. 33123/08)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
15 March
2011
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Sizov v. Russia,
The
European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Nina Vajić,
President,
Anatoly Kovler,
Christos Rozakis,
Peer
Lorenzen,
Elisabeth Steiner,
Mirjana Lazarova
Trajkovska,
Julia Laffranque, judges,
and Søren
Nielsen, Section
Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 22 February 2011,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an application (no. 33123/08) against the Russian
Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by a Russian national, Mr Mikhail Mikhaylovich
Sizov (“the applicant”), on 5 February 2008.
- The
applicant was represented by Ms A. Vasilyeva and
Mr A. Gliskov,
lawyers practising in Krasnoyarsk. The Russian Government (“the
Government”) were represented by Mr G. Matyushkin,
Representative of the Russian Federation at the European Court of
Human Rights.
- The
applicant alleged, in particular, that he had been detained for a
very long time without sufficient grounds.
- On
7 October 2008 the President of the First Section decided to
give notice of the application to the Government and granted priority
treatment to it under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. It was also
decided to rule on the admissibility and merits of the application at
the same time (Article 29 § 1).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The
applicant was born in 1980 and lives in Krasnoyarsk.
A. First set of criminal proceedings against the
applicant
- On
4 July 2003 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of extortion.
However, on 6 July 2003 the Zheleznodorozhnyy District Court of
Krasnoyarsk dismissed the prosecutor's request to place the applicant
in detention and released the applicant under an undertaking not to
leave his place of residence. It held, in particular, as follows:
“... [the prosecuting authorities] did not submit
sufficient evidence justifying the [applicant's] remand in custody.
He has never been subject to criminal prosecution, he has a job and a
permanent place of residence; he played a passive role in the
offences of which he was suspected and he intends to continue his
studies.
In such circumstances, the applicant's attendance during
investigation and trial can be ensured by a less strict preventive
measure.”
- In
December 2003 the case was referred to the Tsentralnyy District Court
of Krasnoyarsk for trial.
- On
7 October 2004 unidentified persons set fire to three cars which were
considered as evidence in the criminal case against the applicant and
had been left in the charge of the victims S. and U. The victims told
the trial court that they suspected the applicant and two other
defendants of having set fire to the cars to put pressure on them.
They thought that their lives were in danger.
- On 12 October 2004 the District Court remanded the
applicant and his co-defendants Zh. and T. in custody. The court did
not set the time-limit for their pre-trial detention. In particular,
it stated as follows:
“... [the victims'] statement were joined to the
case file, whereby they stated that... on 7 October 2004 ...
three cars admitted as evidence in the criminal case and transferred
to the care of the victims had been set on fire. The victims
interpreted that circumstance as an attempt to put psychological
pressure on them by the defendants. They expressed concern for their
lives.
To date it is not known who burnt the cars.
Nevertheless, the court does not have any evidence exculpating Zh.,
T. or [the applicant].
Having regard to the above circumstances, and in
compliance with Article 255 of the [Russian Code of Criminal
Procedure] the court
HEREBY
DECIDES
...
To remand Zh. ..., T. ... and [the applicant] in
custody.”
- On
16 November 2004 the Krasnoyarsk Regional Court upheld the decision
of 12 October 2004 on appeal.
- On
15 December 2004 the police investigator suspended the investigation
in respect of vehicle arson on the grounds that the persons
responsible for burning them had not been indentified.
- On
14 February 2005 the District Court convicted the applicant along
with his co-defendants on several counts of extortion and acquitted
them on one count. The applicant was sentenced to three years'
imprisonment.
- On
24 May 2005 the Regional Court quashed the judgment of 14 February
2005 and remitted the case to the trial court for examination by a
different panel. The defendants' detention was extended until
24 August 2005. In particular, the court indicated as follows:
“The court considers that the preventive measure
imposed on Zh., [the applicant] and T., notably [pre-trial
detention], should remain unchanged. The court does not discern any
grounds for its changing or lifting.”
B. Second set of criminal proceedings
- On
15 June 2005 the District Court returned the case to the prosecutor,
at his request, to be joined to the cases against two other presumed
accomplices, V. and P. As regards the defendants' detention, the
court noted as follows:
“The court does not discern any grounds to change
or lift the restrictive measure applied earlier and Zh., [the
applicant] and T. should remain in custody.”
- On
an unspecified date the case was again referred to the District
Court.
- On
18 August 2005 the District Court extended the applicant's detention
until 24 November 2005. It held, in particular, as follows:
“... [the applicant] is charged with two counts of
particularly serious offences which might entail a lengthy custodial
sentence. [He] did not plead guilty, which fact gives rise to the
ground to believe that he might abscond and interfere with the
administration of justice, if released.”
- On
27 October 2005 the District Court further extended the detention of
three defendants, including the applicant, until 24 February 2006.
The detention of P., the fourth defendant, was extended until
28 February 2006. The court held as follows:
“Zh., T., [the applicant] and P. are charged with
particularly serious offences. Regard being had to the volume of the
criminal case file, the large number of people to be questioned and
the fact that the court will hear another criminal case between 1 and
30 November 2005, the court would be unable to examine the case
before the expiration of the term of [the defendants'] detention.
There are no grounds for changing or lifting the preventive measure.”
- On
16 February 2006 the District Court extended the applicant's and his
co-defendants' detention until 24 May 2006, referring to the same
grounds as in its decision of 27 October 2005.
- On
2 March 2006 the applicant and his co-defendants applied to the
District Court for release. The applicant submitted that the
suspicion that he had set fire to the cars was no longer valid. On
the same date the District Court examined all the applications
together and rejected them, having found that the decision to
terminate the criminal proceedings concerning the burning of the cars
had been made in the framework of different criminal proceedings,
that that decision had not been a final one and that it could not in
any way shed doubt on the reasonableness of the applicant's and his
co-defendants' detention.
- The
applicant did not appeal against the court orders of 18 August
and 27 October 2005, 16 February and 2 March 2006.
- On
15 May 2006 the District Court found the applicant and his
co-defendants guilty on several counts of extortion. The applicant
was sentenced to eight years' imprisonment.
- On
10 October 2006 the Regional Court quashed the judgment of 15 May
2006 on account of procedural breaches and remitted the case to the
trial court for fresh examination. The court further extended the
defendants' detention until 10 January 2007, noting as follows:
“Having regard to the circumstances of the case,
the gravity of the charges against Zh., T., [the applicant], P. and
V., their character and the possibility of them interfering with the
proceedings, the court considers it necessary to hold them in
custody.
C. Third set of criminal proceedings
- On
22 December 2006 the District Court extended the applicant's and his
co-defendants' detention until 10 April 2007. The court indicated as
follows:
“Having heard the prosecutor, the defence counsel,
and the defendants, the court considers that there are no grounds to
lift or change the restrictive measure. The defendants are charged
with particularly serious offences which entail a custodial sentence
of up to fifteen years; the offences were committed in concert; the
victims are known by the defendants. There is therefore reason to
believe that the defendants might abscond, interfere with the
proceedings and put pressure on victims and witnesses.”
- In
the appeal against the detention order, the applicant and his counsel
submitted that there were no grounds to keep him in detention. He had
a permanent place of residence, lived with his parents and had no
intention of interfering with the proceedings. They also pointed out
that the applicant had positive references, had
finished his university studies and had not breached the undertaking
not to leave his place of residence. Lastly, they submitted that the
District Court's reference to the gravity of the charges had no basis
in law.
- In
January 2007 the applicant was diagnosed with tuberculosis.
- On
23 January 2007 the Regional Court upheld the extension order,
finding that it was lawful and properly justified.
- On
23 March 2007 the District Court extended the applicant's and his
co-defendants' detention until 10 July 2007, on the same grounds as
in its decision of 22 December 2006. The court further noted as
follows:
“[The applicant's] reference to his poor state of
health and his illness is not a sufficient ground for release, as the
[remand prison where the applicant is detained] has a medical unit
where [the applicant] can be provided with qualified medical care.
[The applicant's] argument that the grounds underlying the decision
to remand him in custody on 12 October 2004 no longer existed is
unsubstantiated, as he failed to submit any documents confirming that
the criminal proceedings have been discontinued on exculpating
grounds.”
- In
the grounds of appeal against that detention order, the applicant's
counsel submitted that the grounds for placing him in detention had
been suppositional, the applicant's guilt had not been established,
the case had been under examination for a long time and the
applicant's health had seriously deteriorated. He had contracted
tuberculosis in detention and was not receiving appropriate medical
treatment.
- On
29 May 2007 the Regional Court upheld that extension order, noting as
follows:
“... [the applicant] was sentenced to a lengthy
term of imprisonment. However, his conviction was quashed on account
of procedural breaches, which did not change the serious character of
the charges against him... Taking into account that the examination
of the criminal case was not yet completed, the [District Court] ...
had the right to extend the [applicant's] detention and did so on a
lawful basis. [The applicant], the doctor states, is receiving
adequate medical care.”
- On
6 July 2007 the District Court extended the applicant's and his
co-defendants' detention until 10 October 2007, referring to the same
grounds as in its decision of 23 March 2007. The applicant was not
present at the hearing. Since 2 July 2007 he had been undergoing
in-patient treatment for tuberculosis. He was represented by counsel.
As regards the applicant's situation, the court indicated as follows:
“... the deterioration of the applicant's state of
health does not justify changing the preventive measure. [The
applicant] is receiving appropriate medical treatment in the [remand
prison]. The [applicant's] character was taken into account by the
court which remanded him in custody and does not justify changing the
preventive measure either. Nor does the reference ... to the lengthy
period of detention pending trial justify changing the preventive
measure. The court may, as a matter of [law], extend detention,
regard being had to the complexity of the case. The present case is a
complex one. It is voluminous; it concerns several defendants; some
difficulties arose when calling witnesses to the hearings; and the
case is being examined by a panel of judges.”
- On
7 August 2007 the Regional Court upheld the extension order, finding
that it was sufficiently motivated and lawful.
- On
2 August 2007 the District Court, at the prosecutor's request,
suspended the criminal proceedings against the applicant on the
ground that the applicant was undergoing intensive treatment for
tuberculosis and that his ill-health prevented him from participating
in the examination of the case. By the same decision the District
Court held that the applicant was to remain in detention. The
examination of the criminal charges against the applicant's
co-defendants continued and, by a final decision of 15 November
2007, they were convicted.
- On
10 October 2007 and 9 January 2008 the District Court extended
the applicant's detention until 10 January and 10 April 2008
respectively, referring to the same grounds as in its previous
decisions. On 30 October 2007 the Regional Court upheld the extension
order of 10 October 2007 on appeal, finding it lawful,
sufficiently reasoned and justified.
- On
30 January 2008 the District Court found the applicant guilty as
charged and sentenced him to five years and ten months' imprisonment.
On 13 May 2008 the Regional Court upheld the applicant's
conviction on appeal.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
- Pursuant to the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure, in
force since 1 July 2002, “preventive measures” or
“measures of restraint” (меры
пресечения)
include an undertaking not to leave a town or region of residence,
personal surety, bail and detention (Article 98). If necessary, the
suspect or accused may be asked to give “an undertaking to
appear” (обязательство
о явке) (Article 112).
- When deciding on a preventive measure, the authority
with jurisdiction is required to consider whether there are
“sufficient grounds to believe” that the accused would
abscond during the investigation or trial, reoffend, put pressure on
witnesses or other parties to the criminal proceedings, destroy
evidence or interfere with the criminal proceedings in any other way
(Article 97). It must also take into account the gravity of the
charge, information on the accused's character, his or her
profession, age, state of health, family status and other
circumstances (Article 99).
- Detention is ordered by a court if the charge carries
a sentence of at least two years' imprisonment, provided that a less
restrictive preventive measure cannot be applied (Article 108 §
1).
- From
the date when the prosecutor sends the case to the trial court the
defendant's detention is “before the court” (or “pending
trial”). The period of detention “pending trial” is
calculated up to the date on which the judgment is pronounced. It may
not normally exceed six months, but if the case concerns serious or
particularly serious criminal offences, the trial court may approve
one or more extensions of no longer than three months each (Article
255 §§ 2 and 3).
- A
preventive measure shall be lifted when it ceases to be necessary, or
else changed into a stricter or a milder one if the grounds for
application of a preventive measure change ( Article 110 § 1).
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 3 OF
THE CONVENTION
- The
applicant complained that he had been detained pending trial without
sufficient reasons and for a very long time. He referred to Article
5 § 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with
the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be
... entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending
trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.”
- The
Government contested that argument. They submitted that the applicant
had been remanded in custody pending trial only after the court had
established that he had been trying to intimidate the victims of the
crime he had been charged with. The domestic courts had taken into
account all the relevant circumstances when deciding to detain the
applicant pending trial. The fact that he had contracted tuberculosis
had no bearing on his detention. He had been placed in the prison
hospital and received adequate medical assistance. The applicant's
pre-trial detention was compatible with the “reasonable time”
requirement. The case against him had been complex. The trial court
had had to question a large number of witnesses and study voluminous
documents. Besides, the applicant's and his co-defendants' conviction
had been quashed twice on appeal. Then the proceedings against the
applicant had been stayed due to his illness. Accordingly, the
domestic authorities had displayed special diligence when dealing
with the applicant's case.
- The
applicant maintained his complaint. He noted that, when extending his
detention, the domestic judicial authorities had used a summary
formula without describing his personal situation. The courts
repeatedly alleged that the applicant might abscond, interfere with
administration of justice or continue his criminal activities,
without referring to any facts to corroborate the detention orders.
As regards the vehicle arson that the trial court had referred to
when remanding the applicant in custody, the relevant criminal
investigation had been stayed and no evidence had been presented to
the trial court to implicate the applicant in the arson, other than
the victims' complaint. The authorities' presumption that the
applicant might abscond lacked any substantiation. On the contrary,
when released on an undertaking not to leave his place of residence,
the applicant had duly complied with the court's order. He had
appeared before the investigator and the court. He had been employed
and had completed his studies at university. Even though the
applicant had drawn the judicial authorities' attention to those
circumstances, they had not taken them into account. Lastly, at no
time had the courts considered the question as to whether the
applicant's pre-trial detention had exceeded the reasonable time
requirement set out in Article 5.
A. Admissibility
- The
Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further
notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. The period to be taken into consideration
- According to the Court's well-established case-law, in
determining the length of detention under Article 5 § 3 of the
Convention, the period to be taken into consideration begins on the
day the accused is taken into custody and ends on the day when the
charge is determined, even if only by a court of first instance (see,
among many other authorities, Belevitskiy v. Russia, no.
72967/01, § 99, 1 March 2007).
- Furthermore, in view of the essential link between
Article 5 § 3 of the Convention and paragraph 1 (c) of that
Article, a person convicted at first instance cannot be regarded as
being detained “for the purpose of bringing him before the
competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed
an offence”, but is in the position provided for by Article 5 §
1 (a), which authorises deprivation of liberty “after
conviction by a competent court” (see Panchenko v. Russia,
no. 45100/98, §§ 91 and 93, 8 February 2005, with
further references).
- Accordingly,
in the present case the period to be taken into consideration
consisted of three separate terms: (1) from 12 October 2004,
when the applicant was remanded in custody, to 14 February 2005,
when he was convicted at first instance in the first set of criminal
proceedings;
(2) from 24 May 2005, when the applicant's
conviction was quashed on appeal, to 15 May 2006, when the
applicant was convicted at first instance in the second set of
criminal proceedings; and (3) from 10 October 2006, when the
applicant's conviction was again quashed on appeal, to 30 January
2008, when the applicant was convicted at first instance in the third
set of criminal proceedings.
- It
follows that the period of the applicant's detention to be taken into
consideration under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention in the
instant case amounted in total to two years and seven and a half
months.
2. Whether there were relevant and sufficient reasons
to justify the applicant's detention
- Under
the Court's case-law, the issue of whether a period of detention is
reasonable cannot be assessed in abstracto. Whether it is
reasonable for an accused to remain in detention must be assessed in
each case according to its particular features. Continued detention
can be justified in a given case only if there are specific
indications of a genuine requirement of public interest which,
notwithstanding the presumption of innocence, outweighs the rule of
respect for individual liberty (see, among other authorities, W.
v. Switzerland, 26 January 1993, § 30, Series A
no. 254-A, and Pantano v. Italy, no. 60851/00, § 66,
6 November 2003).
- It
falls in the first place to the national judicial authorities to
ensure that in a given case the pre-trial detention of an accused
person does not exceed a reasonable time. To this end they must
examine all the facts arguing for or against the existence of a
genuine requirement of public interest justifying, with due regard to
the principle of presumption of innocence, a departure from the rule
of respect for individual liberty, and set them out in their
decisions dismissing the applications for release. It is essentially
on the basis of the reasons given in these decisions and of the
matters referred to by the applicant in his appeals, that the Court
is called upon to decide whether or not there has been a violation of
Article 5 § 3 of the Convention (see Kudła v. Poland
[GC], no. 30210/96, § 110, ECHR 2000-XI, and Labita
v. Italy [GC], no. 26772/95, § 152, ECHR 2000-IV).
- The
Court accepts that the applicant's remand in custody in October 2004
may have been warranted by a suspicion of his involvement in the
alleged attempts to intimidate witnesses (see para. 9). However, as
early as December 2004, that is two months later, the relevant
criminal investigation was suspended, and no perpetrators were ever
identified. Nevertheless the applicant remained in detention.
Accordingly, in the Court's view, it was incumbent on the domestic
judicial authorities to give other reasons to justify his deprivation
of liberty.
- The
Court further observes that in 2005-2008, when extending the
applicant's detention, the domestic courts consistently relied on the
gravity of the charges against the applicant, arguing that he might
abscond, interfere with the proceedings or put pressure on the
witnesses.
- As
regards any risk of absconding, the Court reiterates that such a
danger cannot be gauged solely on the basis of the severity of the
sentence faced. It must be assessed with reference to a number of
other relevant factors, which may either confirm the existence of a
danger of absconding or make it appear so slight that it cannot
justify detention pending trial (see Panchenko v. Russia,
cited above, § 16, and Letellier v. France, 26 June
1991, § 43, Series A no. 207). In the present case,
however, the decisions of the domestic authorities gave no reasons
why, notwithstanding the arguments put forward by the applicant, they
considered the risk of his absconding to be decisive. In any event,
the Court considers that in the course of time that risk became
negligible, given the deterioration of the applicant's health and his
subsequent placement in a prison hospital in July 2007.
- Furthermore, the Court accepts that in cases involving
numerous accused, the risk that a detainee might put pressure on
witnesses or might otherwise obstruct the proceedings if released is
often particularly high. These factors may justify a relatively
longer period of detention. However, they do not give the authorities
unlimited power to extend this preventive measure (see Osuch v.
Poland, no. 31246/02, § 26, 14 November 2006, and
Celejewski v. Poland, no. 17584/04, §§
37-38, 4 May 2006). The fact that a person is charged with
acting in criminal conspiracy is not in itself sufficient to justify
long periods of detention; his personal circumstances and behaviour
must always be taken into account. There is no indication in the
present case that the domestic courts had any evidence that the
applicant had indeed attempted to intimidate witnesses or to obstruct
the course of the proceedings in any other way. In such circumstances
the Court has difficulty in accepting the argument that there was a
risk of interference with the administration of justice. Furthermore,
such a risk was bound to decrease gradually as the trial proceeded
and the witnesses were interviewed (compare Miszkurka v. Poland,
no. 39437/03, § 51, 4 May 2006) The Court is not
therefore persuaded that throughout the entire period of the
applicant's detention compelling reasons existed to fear that he
would put pressure on witnesses or otherwise hamper the investigation
of the case, and certainly not such as to outweigh the applicant's
right to trial within a reasonable time or release pending trial.
- The
Court also observes that until the applicant's illness in March 2007
the courts used the same summary formula to refuse the requests for
release and extend the pre-trial detention of the applicant and three
other persons, without describing their personal situation in any
detail. The Court has already found that the practice of issuing
collective detention orders without a case-by-case assessment of the
grounds for detention in respect of each detainee was incompatible,
in itself, with Article 5 § 3 of the Convention
(see Dolgova v. Russia, no. 11886/05, § 49, 2
March 2006; Korchuganova v. Russia, no. 75039/01, § 76,
8 June 2006; and Shcheglyuk v. Russia, no. 7649/02,
§ 45, 14 December 2006). In extending the applicant's
detention by means of collective detention orders the domestic
authorities had no proper regard to his individual circumstances.
- Lastly,
the Court emphasises that when deciding whether a person should be
released or detained the authorities have an obligation under
Article 5 § 3 to consider alternative means of
ensuring his or her appearance at trial (see Sulaoja v. Estonia,
no. 55939/00, § 64, 15 February 2005, and Jabłoński
v. Poland, no. 33492/96, § 83, 21 December 2000). In the
present case, during the entire period of the applicant's detention
the authorities did not consider the possibility of ensuring his
attendance by the use of other “preventive measures”
which are expressly provided for by Russian law to secure the proper
conduct of criminal proceedings. At no point in the proceedings did
the domestic courts explain in their decisions why alternatives to
the deprivation of liberty would not have ensured that the trial
would follow its proper course.
- The
Court has frequently found a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the
Convention in Russian cases where the domestic courts have extended
an applicant's detention relying essentially on the gravity of the
charges and using stereotyped formulae without addressing specific
facts or considering alternative preventive measures (see
Belevitskiy v. Russia, cite above, §§ 99
et seq., 1 March 2007; Khudobin v. Russia,
no. 59696/00, §§ 103 et seq., ECHR 2006-...
(extracts); Khudoyorov v. Russia, no. 6847/02, §§ 172
et seq., ECHR 2005 X (extracts); Mamedova v. Russia, no.
7064/05, §§ 72 et seq., 1 June 2006; Dolgova,
cited above, §§ 38 et seq.; Rokhlina v.
Russia, no. 54071/00, §§ 63 et seq., 7 April 2005;
Panchenko, cited above, §§ 91 et seq.; and
Smirnova v. Russia, nos. 46133/99 and
48183/99, §§ 56 et seq., ECHR 2003-IX (extracts)).
- Having
regard to the above, the Court considers that by failing to address
specific facts or consider alternative “preventive measures”
and by relying essentially on the gravity of the charges, the
authorities extended the applicant's detention on grounds which,
although “relevant”, cannot be regarded as “sufficient”
to justify its duration.
- There
has accordingly been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the
Convention.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 1 OF
THE CONVENTION
- The
applicant complained under Article 5 § 1 (c)
of the Convention that there had been no reasonable suspicion
justifying his remand in custody on 12 October 2004.
- The
Court reiterates that, according to Article 35 § 1 of the
Convention, it may only deal with the matter within a period of six
months from the date on which the final decision was taken.
- The
Court observes that the final domestic decision authorising the
applicant's remand in custody was taken by the Krasnoyarsk Regional
Court on 16 November 2004. The Court further observes that the
applicant introduced his application on 5 February 2008. It
follows that the applicant's complaint was lodged out of time and
must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 1
and 4 of the Convention for non-compliance with the six-month
time-limit.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
- Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
- The
applicant claimed 100,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary
damage.
- The
Government submitted that there had been no violation of the
applicant's rights as set out in the Convention. In any event, they
considered the applicant's claims unreasonable and excessive and
suggested that the acknowledgement of a violation would constitute
adequate just satisfaction.
- The
Court observes that the applicant spent two years and seven and a
half months in custody awaiting determination of the criminal charge
against him, his detention not being based on sufficient grounds. In
these circumstances, the Court considers that the applicant's
suffering and frustration cannot be compensated for by a mere finding
of a violation. Making its assessment on an equitable basis, it
awards the applicant EUR 5,500 in respect of non-pecuniary
damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable on that amount.
B. Costs and expenses
- The
applicant did not submit a claim for costs and expenses. Accordingly,
the Court considers that there is no call to award him any sum on
that account.
C. Default interest
- The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Declares the complaint concerning excessive
length of the applicant's pre-trial detention admissible and the
remainder of the application inadmissible;
- Holds that there has been a violation of
Article 5 § 3 of the Convention;
- Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 5,500 (five
thousand five hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in
respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be converted into Russian roubles
at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
- Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim
for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 15 March 2011, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Søren Nielsen Nina Vajić
Registrar President