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FOURTH
SECTION
CASE OF SÝKORA v. SLOVAKIA
(Application
no. 26077/03)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
18 January 2011
This judgment is final but it
may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Sýkora v. Slovakia,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as
a Committee composed of:
Lech Garlicki, President,
Ján
Šikuta,
Vincent A. de Gaetano, judges,
and
Fatoş Aracı, Deputy
Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 14 December 2010,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an application
(no. 26077/03) against the
Slovak Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34
of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a
Slovak national, Mr Pavol Sýkora (“the applicant”),
on 8 August 2003.
- The
applicant was represented by Mr M. Stopka, a lawyer practising in
Čadca. The Government of the Slovak Republic (“the
Government”) were represented by Ms A. Poláčková,
their Agent, who was succeeded in that function by Ms M. Pirošíková.
- On
15 March 2006 the
President of the Fourth Section decided to give notice of the
application to the Government. In accordance with Protocol No. 14,
the application was allocated to a Committee of three Judges.
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The
applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Krásno Nad Kysucou.
1. Civil proceedings
- On
3 May 1996 the applicant, who was represented by a lawyer, brought an
action against 35 individuals before the Čadca District Court.
He sought a judicial ruling declaring that certain immovable
property belonged to the estate of his late grandfather.
-
Between June 1996 and July 1998 the District Court gathered
information concerning identification and value of the property in
question and identification of the defendants, it also appointed
official representatives of missing defendants and requested
observations from the defendants.
- Between
June 1996 and October 1997 the District Court requested the applicant
three times to submit a certificate of the quality of the disputed
land. In July 1996 the applicant responded that according to the
existing legal regulation it was not possible to submit it. At the
court's following request of July 1997 the applicant requested twice
for extension of time to submit the relevant information. After the
court's last request of October 1997 the applicant submitted a
different valuation of the property which the Court accepted.
- Between
19 October 1998 and 22 April 2005 the District Court held five
hearings, heard witnesses, sought to establish who were the actual
defendants and secured documentary evidence.
9. At the last hearing on 16 May 2005 the District
Court handed down a judgment dismissing the action. The
District Court held that the applicant had no legal standing to lodge
a claim for a judicial ruling declaring that the real estate belonged
to the estate of his late grandfather since he was not one of the
heirs. Therefore the applicant could not be considered as having a
“pressing legal interest” in obtaining the declaratory
ruling sought in respect of his late grandfather's patrimony.
- The
District Court was unable to have the judgment served on seven
defendants since some of them had died, had not taken over the
court's correspondence, had moved or their address was unknown.
- On
5 September 2005 the applicant appealed.
- On
4 October 2005 the District Court delivered a decision correcting a
mistake in one of the defendant's identification. Subsequently the
District Court repeatedly attempted to have the decision served on
the defendants. The last defendant received the judgment and the
correcting decision on 6 April 2006.
- On
3 May 2006 the District Court transmitted the case file to the court
of appeal which on 2 April 2008 upheld the first-instance judgment.
The judgment became final on 28 October 2008.
2. Constitutional complaint
- In
February 2003 the applicant lodged a complaint with the
Constitutional Court. Relying on Articles 48 §
2 and 127 of the Constitution, he complained that the length of the
proceedings in his action of 1996 had been excessive.
- In
a judgment of 2 July 2003 the Constitutional Court found that there
had been no violation of the applicant's constitutional right
to a “hearing without undue delay”. The
Constitutional Court observed that the subject-matter of the
proceedings was of a certain factual complexity in that it had been
difficult to determine who were the actual defendants to the action.
It was also noted that the circle of defendants had been changing in
the course of the proceedings. The District Court had to invite the
applicant nine times to provide updated information in this respect
and it was necessary to examine court files in other matters which
were relevant to the applicant's action. In this context the
applicant's conduct in the proceedings was found “not to be
active and cooperative”. Although the conduct of the District
Court had not always been completely continuous, no unjustified
delays were established on its part.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION
- The
applicant complained that the length of the proceedings had been
incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement, laid
down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a
reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
A. Admissibility
- The
Government referred to the Constitutional Court's reasoning and
conclusion to the effect that the applicant's right to a hearing
within a reasonable time had not been violated at the given
time. As to the further course of the proceedings following the
Constitutional Court's judgment the applicant failed to lodge a fresh
constitutional complaint had he believed that further undue delays
occurred. Finally, referring to the case of Becová v.
Slovakia (dec.), no. 23788/06, 18 September 2007, the Government
argued that the applicant had not complained before the
Constitutional Court of delays before the court of appeal.
- The
applicant disagreed. He argued that the proceedings were neither
factually nor legally complex. He pointed to the fact that the
District Court had not dealt with substantive legal issues and in May
2005 dismissed the action on the ground of lack of legal standing. It
was due to the unreasonable length of the proceedings that in their
course the defendants had died and the number of the sued individuals
had raised. He further contested the Government's contention that the
District Court's conduct had been continuous and effective.
- The
Court observes that the proceedings at the time of the Constitutional
Court's decision had lasted seven years and two months at one level
of jurisdiction.
- It
further notes that the District Court spent a significant period of
time establishing the circle of defendants since some of them were
missing or had died. Even considering the procedural complexity of
the case, lying in the necessity to determine who were the actual
defendants to the action and the conduct of the applicant, the Court
cannot accept that the circumstances of the case justified the
duration of the proceedings of more than seven years at one level of
jurisdiction.
- In
particular, the conduct of the District Court cannot be considered
effective when during a period of more than one year it requested the
applicant three times a certificate on the quality of the land in
question. Finally, it was satisfied with the value of the property
calculated differently. Given the length of the proceedings at the
relevant time as well as the finding of the Constitutional Court that
the District Court's conduct had not always been continuous the Court
considers the length of the proceedings during the assessed period to
be contrary to the requirements of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention.
- Since
the applicant was unable to obtain redress before the Constitutional
Court, the Court concludes that, as to the period of the proceedings
following the Constitutional Court's decision, he was not required,
for the purposes of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, to
have again recourse to the remedy under Article
127 of the Constitution (see the recapitulation of the relevant
principles in Becová v.
Slovakia, cited above). The
Government's objections must therefore be dismissed.
- It
follows that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the
meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes
that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore
be declared admissible.
B. Merits
- The
Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings
must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and
with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case,
the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what
was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other
authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, §
43, ECHR 2000-VII).
- The
Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present
case (see Frydlender, cited above).
- Having
examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that
the Government have not put forward any fact or argument capable of
persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present case.
The Court notes that on 16 May 2005 the District Court dismissed the
applicant's action on the ground of lack of legal standing. The
judgment was upheld by the court of appeal and became final on 28
October 2008.
- Taking
into account the reasons given by the District Court to dismiss the
action, the Court considers the duration of the proceedings of twelve
years and six months at two levels of jurisdiction as clearly
inadequate.
- There
has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
- Article
41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
- In
the application form submitted on 3 October 2003 the applicant
claimed, provisionally, an equivalent of EUR 6,639 as just
satisfaction.
- On
27 June 2006, after the application had been communicated to the
respondent Government and the parties informed that the admissibility
and merits of the case would be examined at the same time, the Court
invited the applicant to submit his claims for just satisfaction by
7 August 2006. The relevant part of the Registry's letter
reads as follows:
“... With regard to the just satisfaction claims,
I would draw your attention to Rule 60 and would remind you that
failure to submit within the time allowed quantified claims, together
with the required supporting documents, entails the consequence that
the Chamber will either make no award of just satisfaction or else
reject the claim in part. This applies even if the applicant has
indicated his wishes concerning just satisfaction at an earlier stage
of the proceedings...”
- The
applicant did not submit any such claims.
- In these circumstances, the Court makes no award under
Article 41 of the Convention (see, for example, Bzdúšek
v. Slovakia, no. 48817/99, § 32, 21 June 2005,
with further references).
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Declares the application admissible;
- Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 18 January 2011, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Fatoş Aracı Lech Garlicki
Deputy Registrar President
