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SECOND
SECTION
CASE OF
BACKOVIĆ v. SERBIA
(Application
no. 47997/06)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
7 February
2012
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Backović v. Serbia,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Françoise Tulkens,
President,
Danutė Jočienė,
Isabelle
Berro-Lefèvre,
András Sajó,
Işıl
Karakaş,
Guido Raimondi, judges,
Milenko
Kreća, ad hoc judge,
and Stanley
Naismith, Section
Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 17 January 2012, delivers the following
judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an application (no. 47997/06)
against Serbia lodged with the Court under Article 34
of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Serbian
national, Mr Čedomir Backović (“the applicant”),
on 3 November 2006.
- The
applicant was represented by Mr V. Zdravković, a lawyer
practising in Belgrade. The Serbian Government
(“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr S.
Carić.
3. Mr
Dragoljub Popović, the judge elected
in respect of Serbia, was unable to sit in the case (Rule 28). The
Government accordingly appointed Mr Milenko Kreća to sit as an
ad hoc judge
(Article 27 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 29 § 1 as in
force at the time).
4. The
applicant alleged that he had been denied access to a court in
the determination of his civil rights and obligations.
- On
12 April 2010 the President of the
Second Section decided to give notice of the application to
the Government. It was also decided to rule on the
admissibility and merits of the application at the same time (former
Article 29 § 3).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The
applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Sombor,
Serbia.
- The
facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as
follows.
- On
24 February 2005 the applicant bought a store together with a plot of
land from the P Company (plot A).
- As
the owner of the above real estate, as well as of plots B and C, the
P Company was burdened with a landed servitude (lični
realni teret) in favour of third persons, requiring their
life-long maintenance (doZivotno izdrZavanje).
- On
the basis of the above contract, however, the servitude in question,
being tied, inter alia, to plot A, was partly transferred to
the applicant as its new owner.
- On
30 March 2005 the applicant and the P Company concluded a
court-certified amendment to the contract of 24 February 2005. The P
Company thereby accepted to reimburse the applicant for any payments
made in connection with the said servitude. This entitlement was
itself constituted as a separate landed servitude (easement, stvarni
realni teret) tied to plots B and C and established in favour of
the applicant as the current owner of plot A, as well as any future
owners thereof.
- On
30 March 2005 the applicant filed a request with the Municipal
Cadastre Office (SluZba za
katastar nepokretnosti) in Sombor, seeking registration of his
easement.
- On
11 April 2005 the Municipal Cadastre Office rejected the applicant’s
request, stating that the registration sought could not be granted in
view of the relevant domestic law.
- On
18 July 2005 the applicant appealed against this decision.
- On
30 January 2006 the applicant supplemented his appeal with an expert
opinion provided by a well-known domestic legal expert, according to
whom the applicant’s entitlement of 30 March 2005 was an
easement and, as such, had had to be registered by the Municipal
Cadastre Office. The expert, retained by the applicant, further noted
that the rights of the third persons in question remained unaffected,
thus implying that their consent was not needed.
- On
29 May 2006 the legal branch of the Department of Geodesy (Republički
geodetski zavod - sector za pravne poslove) confirmed the
impugned decision of the Municipal Cadastre Office. It stated that
the applicant had not offered any proof that the third persons in
question had agreed to the arrangement reached on 24 February 2005
and 30 March 2005. It also noted that no judicial review by means of
an administrative dispute was possible.
- Both
the Municipal Cadastre Office and the Department of Geodesy are
administrative authorities and, as such, part of the respondent
State’s executive branch of government.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
A. The Cadastre Act 1992 (Zakon o drZavnom premeru i
katastru i upisima prava na nepokretnostima; published in the
Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia - OG RS - nos. 83/92,
53/93, 67/93, 48/94, 12/96, 15/96, 34/01, 25/02 and 101/05)
- Articles
1, 5 § 1, 58a and 58e provide that this Act shall regulate,
inter alia, the registration of specified real estate-related
legal entitlements, including landed servitudes (realni tereti i
sluZbenosti). Such entitlements shall be deemed constituted upon
their registration.
- Article
58v provides that registration of such entitlements may, inter
alia, be granted on the basis of a legally valid contract.
- Article
105 § 3 provides that no judicial review, by means of an
administrative dispute, of a registration-related decision issued by
the Department of Geodesy shall be possible.
B. The Property Act (Zakon o osnovama svojinskopravnih
odnosa; published in the Official Gazette of the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia nos. 6/80 and 36/90; the Official Gazette of
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia - OG FRY - no. 29/96, and OG RS
no. 115/05)
- Article
52 provides, inter alia, that a landed servitude shall be
deemed constituted upon its registration, i.e. entry in the relevant
land register (modus acquirendi).
C. The Cadastre Act 2009 (Zakon o drZavnom premeru i
katastru; published in OG RS nos. 72/09 and 18/10)
- Article
180 § 1 provides that all second instance decisions issued in
accordance with “this Act” shall be subject to judicial
review by means of an administrative dispute.
- This
Act entered into force on 11 September 2009, thereby repealing the
Cadastre Act 1992.
D. The General Administrative Proceedings Act (Zakon o
opštem upravnom postupku; published in OG FRY nos. 33/97 and
31/01, as well as in OG RS no. 30/10)
- Article
13 provides that final administrative decisions granting certain
rights or imposing certain obligations may be annulled, cancelled or
amended only in situations envisaged by this Act. The Supreme Court
clarified that this provision implies that only administrative
decisions granting certain rights or imposing certain obligations may
be considered final (Uvp II 50/2004 of 26 January 2006).
- Articles
32-38 set out the details as regards the possible recusal of civil
servants who are authorised to decide in individual administrative
matters.
E. The Civil Servants Act (Zakon o drZavnim
sluZbenicima; published in OG RS nos. 79/05, 81/05, and 83/05)
- Articles
5 provides that a civil servant (drZavni sluZbenik) shall be
obliged to act in accordance with the Constitution, the applicable
legislation and the rules of his profession, as well as to adhere to
the principles of impartiality and political neutrality. A civil
servant shall further, in the course of his work, desist from
expressing or asserting any political beliefs.
- Article
6 provides that civil servants shall be accountable for the legality,
quality and efficiency of their work, respectively. No one shall be
allowed to influence them in the performance of their duties.
- Article
18 provides, inter alia, that a civil servant shall be obliged
to execute a verbal order issued by his superior except if he
considers that the order in question is contrary to the law or the
relevant professional rules or that its execution may “cause
harm”. A civil servant shall be obliged to execute a repeated
written order of his superior issued to the same effect. He shall,
however, be obliged to refuse the execution of a verbal or a written
order whose execution would amount to a punishable offence. In a
situation of this kind the civil servant in question shall be obliged
to report the entire matter, by means of a written submission, to his
authorised supervisor.
- Articles
49-81, 86 and 126-132 provide details as regards the recruitment of
civil servants as well as the termination of their employment.
Article 62 § 1 provides that civil servants shall, in principle,
be employed on a permanent basis.
- This
Act entered into force on 1 July 2006, thus repealing earlier
legislation regulating the status of civil servants.
III. RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL FINDINGS
A. European Commission, Serbia and Montenegro, 2005
Progress Report, COM (2005) 561, p. 13
- Relevant
sections of this report read as follows:
“Pending the adoption and full implementation of
new laws, the Serbian administration remains overstaffed but at the
same time suffers from a shortage of qualified personnel and undue
political interference, which affects both institutional and policy
continuity.
In the context of the reform strategy, the Serbian
Parliament adopted the ... Law on Public Administration and the Law
on Civil Servants ...”
B. Analytical report accompanying the Commission’s
Opinion on Serbia’s application for membership of the European
Union, COM (2011) 668, p. 14
- Relevant
sections of this report read as follows:
“1.1.3. Public administration
The legal
framework providing for public administration reform (PAR) is largely
in place in Serbia and administrative capacities are generally well
developed, in particular at central level. A Strategy for PAR was
adopted by the Government in 2004 and supplemented by an Action Plan
covering the period 2009-2012 ...
The implementation
of the Strategy is making slow progress ...
The Law on Civil
Servants ..[,] adopted in 2005, regulates the position of employees
in the public administration. The Law was subsequently amended to
establish educational requirements for civil servant posts, aimed at
increasing professionalism and reducing the risk of political
influence and nepotism ... A significant number of appointments for
senior civil servant positions are still pending. Selection
procedures are not applied uniformly and, in the absence of criteria
for final recruitment decisions, managers still have excessive
discretionary powers when choosing candidates from lists prepared by
the competitions’ selection panels. Competence and
professionalism in appointments at management and lower levels in the
administration need to become the rule ...
A Human Resources
Management Service was established in 2006, in charge of ... internal
advertising and public competitions for non-management jobs ... and
overseeing the general professional training programme for civil
servants. A Strategy for the professional training of civil servants
for the period 2011- 2013 was adopted in July 2011 ... However, only
a small percentage of civil servants, and in particular a very small
percentage of managers, takes part in this training. Induction
training is not provided.”
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION
- The
applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that
he had been denied access to a court of law in the determination of
his civil rights and obligations.
- This
provision, in its relevant part, reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ... everyone is entitled to a ... hearing ... by [a] ...
tribunal established by law ...”
A. Admissibility
- The
Government maintained that the applicant had failed to make use of
the available domestic remedies at the time, as well as subsequently,
whereby his request would have been determined by a “tribunal”
within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
- The
Court considers that this objection goes to the very heart of the
question whether the applicant had been denied the right of access to
a court in the determination of his civil rights and obligations in
breach of Article 6 § 1. It would thus be more appropriately
examined at the merits stage.
- The
Court notes that the applicant’s complaint is not manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the
Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other
ground. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. The parties’ arguments
- The
Government opined that there had been no violation of Article 6 §
1 of the Convention.
- In
particular, following the adoption of the new Cadastre Act in 2009
judicial review of decisions rendered by the Department of Geodesy
became possible. The applicant should therefore have re-filed his
registration request with the Municipal Cadastre Office and, if
unsuccessful, appealed this decision to the Department of Geodesy
(see paragraph 24 above). A possible rejection of his appeal could
itself have subsequently been challenged in a judicial review
procedure, i.e. by means of an administrative dispute (see paragraph
22 above).
- In
addition or in the alternative, the Government submitted that the
applicant could have brought a separate claim with a civil court,
seeking recognition of his entitlement. A judgment in the applicant’s
favour would have meant that the Municipal Cadastre Office would have
had no option but to accept his subsequent request for the
registration of the easement in question.
- Whilst
noting in their description of the facts that both “the
Municipal Cadastre Office and the Department of Geodesy are ... [a]
... part of the Respondent State’s executive”, the
Government also argued, in respect of the present case, that the
civil servants employed with these bodies had been sufficiently
“independent” within the meaning of Article 6 § 1.
They had been recruited for an indefinite period of time, the
termination of their employment had been strictly regulated by law
and subject to judicial review, and they could not have lost their
jobs merely for refusing to follow the instructions of their
superiors. Moreover, the civil servants in question could have been
removed from dealing with the matter, had there been any legitimate
doubts as regards their impartiality (see paragraphs 26-30 above).
- Finally,
the Government contended that the decisions to refuse the applicant’s
registration request had been lawful, and noted that neither the
Municipal Cadastre Office nor the Department of Geodesy had had an
institutional interest to rule one way or another.
- The
applicant reaffirmed his complaint, adding that
the breach of his right to a court had been particularly striking in
the present case. The registration of his easement had been rejected
based on decisions adopted by two administrative bodies and the
relevant domestic law, at the time, made it patently clear that no
judicial review by means of an administrative dispute was possible.
- The
applicant further argued that the remedies referred to by the
Government could not have been effective. In particular, the
violation of his rights had occurred in 2006, whilst the new Cadastre
Act had only entered into force in 2009. There was likewise no point
in bringing a separate civil suit against the P Company since the
latter had never contested the easement constituted in favour of the
applicant, and the claim could not have been brought against the
Department of Geodesy. Ultimately, following any civil judgment
rendered in favour of the applicant, the registration of the easement
at issue would still have been up to the same administrative
authorities.
- The
applicant lastly noted that the Government’s submissions as
regards the merits of his registration request were irrelevant in the
Convention context.
2. The Court’s assessment
- In
its Golder v. the United Kingdom judgment of 21 February 1975,
the Court held that Article 6 § 1 “secures to everyone the
right to have any claim relating to his civil rights and obligations
brought before a court or tribunal” (§ 36, Series A no.
18). This “right to a court”, of which the right of
access is an aspect, may be relied on by anyone who considers on
arguable grounds that an interference with the exercise of his or her
civil rights is unlawful and complains that no possibility was
afforded to submit that claim to a court or tribunal meeting the
requirements of Article 6 § 1 (see, inter alia, Roche
v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 32555/96, § 117, ECHR
2005-X). Only an institution that has full jurisdiction and satisfies
a number of requirements, such as independence of the executive and
also of the parties, amounts to a “tribunal” within the
meaning of the said provision (see, among other authorities, the
Beaumartin v. France judgment of 24 November 1994, §
38, Series A no. 296-B). In determining whether a body can be
considered to be “independent” account must be taken of
the manner of appointment of its members, the duration of their term
of office, the existence of guarantees against outside pressures, and
the question whether the body presents an appearance of independence
(see Campbell and Fell v. the United Kingdom, 28 June 1984, §
78, Series A no. 80). The Court further recalls that decisions
of administrative authorities which do not themselves satisfy the
requirements of Article 6 § 1 should be subject to subsequent
control by a “judicial body that has full jurisdiction”
(see, Ortenberg v. Austria, 25 November 1994, § 31,
Series A no. 295 B).
- Turning
to the present case, it is firstly noted that the underlying
subject-matter of the applicant’s request was real
estate-related and pecuniary in nature and that, as such, it clearly
falls within the scope of Article 6 § 1 (see, mutatis
mutandis, Editions Périscope v. France, 26 March
1992, § 40, Series A no. 234 B).
- Secondly,
neither the Cadastre Office nor the Department of Geodesy could be
deemed, at the relevant time, as fulfilling the requirements of a
“tribunal” within the meaning of Article 6 §
1. Admittedly, new legislation was introduced in order to tackle
deficiencies in the civil service which had been documented in
international reports. However, irrespective of whether or not these
changes resulted in the bodies concerned thereafter fulfilling the
requirements of a "tribunal", the legislation in question
only entered into force on 1 July 2006, which was more than a month
after the Department of Geodesy had already rendered its decision in
respect of the applicant’s request (see paragraphs 16 and 30
above).
- Thirdly, at the material time, the applicant had been
legally barred from seeking judicial review by means of an
administrative dispute. This only changed with the adoption of the
new Cadastre Act which entered into force on 11 September 2009 (see
paragraphs 20, 22 and 23 above). In this regard the Court recalls
that the issue of whether domestic remedies have been exhausted is
normally determined by reference to the date when the application was
lodged with the Court (see Baumann v. France, no. 33592/96,
§ 47, ECHR 2001-V (extracts)), this rule being, of course,
subject to exceptions which may be justified by the specific
circumstances of each case (see Demopoulos v. Turkey and 7 other
cases (dec.) [GC], nos. 46113/99, 3843/02, 13751/02, 13466/03,
14163/04, 10200/04, 19993/04 and 21819/04), § 87, 1 March 2010,
Nogolica v. Croatia (dec.), no. 77784/01, ECHR
2002-VIII). In the present matter, however, the applicant lodged his
application with this Court on 3 November 2006.
It was not until 11 September 2009, almost three years later,
that he could arguably have re-filed his registration request with
the Municipal Cadastre Office and the Department of Geodesy and only
then, if unsuccessful, have sought judicial review by means of an
administrative dispute. Accordingly, it would be disproportionate to
require the applicant to make use of this potential avenue of redress
(see, mutatis mutandis, Pikić v. Croatia, no.
16552/02, § 31, 18 January 2005; and Parizov v. “the
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, no. 14258/03, §
46, 7 February 2008).
- Finally,
as regards the Government’s argument to the effect that the
applicant should have filed a separate civil claim (see paragraph 40
above), the Court accepts the latter’s credible response
thereto. In particular, following the adoption of any civil judgment
in favour of the applicant the registration of the easement at issue
would still have been at the discretion of the same administrative
authorities. Further, having offered no relevant domestic case-law in
support of their contention, the Government have failed to show that
in the specific circumstances of the present case a civil claim such
as the one referred to would have been anything but theoretical (see,
mutatis mutandis, Stojanović v. Serbia, no.
34425/04, §§ 59 and 60, 19 May 2009). The applicant
cannot thus be blamed for not having pursued this remedy.
- In
view of the foregoing and it being understood that it is not its task
to determine what the actual outcome of the applicant’s
registration request should have been, the Court dismisses the
Government’s preliminary objection and considers that the
applicant has been denied access to a court in the determination of
his civil rights and obligations.
- There
has, accordingly, been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention.
II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
- Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
- In
his application introduced on 3 November 2006 the applicant sought
10,000 Euros (EUR) for the non-pecuniary damage suffered.
- In
his subsequent observations the applicant made no reference to this
claim.
- Rule 60 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court
provides as follows:
“2. The applicant must submit itemised
particulars of all [just satisfaction] claims, together with any
relevant supporting documents, within the time-limit fixed for the
submission of the applicant’s observations on the merits
unless the President of the Chamber directs otherwise [emphasis
added].
3. If the applicant fails to comply with the
requirements set out in the preceding paragraphs the Chamber may
reject the claims in whole or in part.”
- In
view of the above, the applicant’s claim must be dismissed in
its entirety.
B. Costs and expenses
- The
applicant, however, claimed EUR 2,460 for the
costs and expenses incurred before the Court.
- The
Government contested this claim.
- According
to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the
reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been
shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and were
also reasonable as to their quantum. In the present case, regard
being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria,
the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 1,000 for
the proceedings before it.
C. Default interest
- The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should
be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank,
to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Decides
to join to
the merits the Government’s objection as to the
non-exhaustion of domestic remedies and dismisses it;
- Declares the application
admissible;
- Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention;
- Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant,
within three months from the date on which the judgment
becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2
of the Convention, EUR 1,000 (one thousand euros), plus
any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant,
in respect of the costs and expenses incurred before the Court, to be
converted into Serbian Dinars at the rate applicable at the date of
settlement;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
- Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s
claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 7 February 2012, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Stanley Naismith Françoise
Tulkens
Registrar President