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FOURTH
SECTION
DECISION
Application no.
53586/08
Celal AKBULUT
against the United Kingdom
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 10 April
2012 as a Chamber composed of:
Lech Garlicki, President,
David
Thór Björgvinsson,
Nicolas Bratza,
Päivi
Hirvelä,
George Nicolaou,
Zdravka
Kalaydjieva,
Vincent A. De Gaetano, judges,
and
Lawrence Early, Section
Registrar,
Having
regard to the above application lodged on 5 November 2008,
Having
deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
- The
applicant, Mr Celal Akbulut, is a Turkish national who was born in
1953 and lives in Turkey. He was represented before the Court by
Wilson Solicitors LLP, a firm of lawyers practising in London.
A. The circumstances of the case
- The
facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised
as follows.
- The
applicant first entered the United Kingdom, as a visitor, in 1980. He
married his wife, a British citizen born in Cyprus, later that same
year. He and his wife lived in Turkey between 1980 and 1984, before
returning to the United Kingdom, where the applicant was granted
indefinite leave to remain in 1985. The applicant and his wife have
four sons, all born in the United Kingdom in 1984, 1986, 1989 and
1993, respectively.
- On
4 February 2002, the applicant was convicted of two counts of
supplying Class A drugs, for which he was sentenced to fourteen
years’ imprisonment and made subject to a confiscation order
for GBP 17,000. The sentencing judge found that the applicant had
been near the top of the chain of an operation responsible for
supplying huge amounts of heroin. The applicant was notified on 15
August 2007 of the Secretary of State’s intention to deport
him.
- The
applicant appealed against deportation and his appeal was heard by
the then Asylum and Immigration Tribunal on 29 February 2008. The
Immigration Judge noted that the applicant had been of good character
prior to his conviction, and had been a “model prisoner”
who had been assessed as presenting a low risk of reconviction. His
relationships with his wife, four children, the youngest of whom was
still under eighteen, and his wife’s elderly and infirm parents
were taken into account. The applicant’s wife had stated that
she would not accompany the applicant to Turkey if he were deported,
as it would fracture her family, but that she would visit him and
would maintain their relationship. The applicant’s children
were all British citizens who were well settled in the United Kingdom
and in full-time education. The Immigration Judge found without
hesitation that the applicant’s deportation would be conducive
to the public good, having regard to his extremely serious crime. His
deportation would, however, impact severely on the Article 8 rights
of his family, his wife and youngest child in particular.
Nonetheless, it was observed that his family life had already been
gravely affected by his conviction and subsequent imprisonment, which
were of the applicant’s own making, and that his wife had coped
well raising their children in his absence for the past six years. It
was her choice, which the Tribunal respected, not to relocate to
Turkey with the applicant if his deportation should be ordered. Given
these facts, and the fact that the applicant could maintain links
with his family by means of visits and telephone calls, it was found
that his deportation would not be disproportionate to the legitimate
aim pursued.
- The
applicant sought reconsideration of the Tribunal’s
determination, which was refused on 8 April 2008 by a Senior
Immigration Judge, on the basis that the Tribunal had handed down a
careful and detailed determination which contained no error of law.
- The
applicant was deported to Turkey on an unknown date between 20
January 2009 and 25 June 2010.
B. Relevant domestic and international law
1. Domestic law
- Section
3(5)(a) of the Immigration Act 1971 (as amended by the Immigration
and Asylum Act 1999) provides that a person who is not a British
citizen shall be liable to deportation from the United Kingdom if the
Secretary of State deems his deportation to be conducive to the
public good.
- Section
32 of the United Kingdom Borders Act 2007 provides that the Secretary
of State must make a deportation order in respect of a “foreign
criminal,” namely a person who is not a British citizen; who is
convicted of an offence; and who is sentenced to a period of
imprisonment of 12 months or more. Section 33(2) of the same Act
provides an exception to automatic deportation in circumstances where
it would breach the foreign criminal’s rights under the
Convention or the United Kingdom’s obligations under the
Refugee Convention.
- Sections
82(1) and 84 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002
provide for a right of appeal against a decision to make a
deportation order, inter alia, on the grounds that the
decision is incompatible with the Convention.
2. Relevant instrument of the Council of Europe
- Council of Europe Recommendation Rec (2000) 15
Concerning the Security of Long-Term Migrants, 13 September 2000,
provides as follows:
“4.
As regards the protection against expulsion
a. Any decision on expulsion of a long-term immigrant
should take account, having due regard to the principle of
proportionality and in the light of the European Court of Human
Rights’ constant case-law, of the following criteria:
- the personal behaviour of the immigrant;
- the duration of residence;
- existing links of the immigrant and his or her family
to his or her country of origin.
b. In application of the principle of proportionality as
stated in paragraph 4a, member States should duly take into
consideration the length or type of residence in relation to the
seriousness of the crime committed by the long-term immigrant. More
particularly, member states may provide that a long-term immigrant
should not be expelled:
- after five years of residence, except in the case of a
conviction for a criminal offence where sentenced to in excess of two
years’ imprisonment without suspension;
- after ten years of residence, except in the case of a
conviction for a criminal offence where sentenced to in excess of
five years of imprisonment without suspension;
After twenty years of residence, a long-term immigrant
should no longer be expellable.
c. Long-term immigrants born on the territory of the
member state or admitted to the member state before the age of ten,
who have been lawfully and habitually resident, should not be
expellable once they have reached the age of eighteen.
Long-term immigrants who are minors may in principle not
be expelled.
d. In any case, each member state should have the option
to provide in its internal law that a long-term immigrant may be
expelled if he or she constitutes a serious threat to national
security or public safety.”
COMPLAINT
- The
applicant complained that his deportation to Turkey breached Article
8 of the Convention.
THE LAW
A. The applicant’s submissions
- The
applicant claimed that his family, including his adult children who
still all lived at home, was more than usually close and
interdependent and that they had strong extended family ties with his
wife’s relatives. He claimed that, in considering the
proportionality of his deportation, the domestic authorities had
given insufficient consideration to the closeness of his ties to his
family and the level of difficulty that his wife and children, none
of whom spoke Turkish, would face in relocating to Turkey. The
applicant also pointed to his good behaviour prior to and since his
conviction and the efforts which he had made to rehabilitate himself.
He claimed that the domestic authorities had not properly applied the
guidance set down by this Court in, inter alia, Boultif v.
Switzerland, no. 54273/00, ECHR 2001 IX.
B. The Court’s assessment
1. General principles
- The
Court observes that no right of an alien to enter or to reside in a
particular country is as such guaranteed by the Convention. As a
matter of well-established international law and subject to its
treaty obligations, a State has the right to control the entry of
non-nationals into its territory (see, among many other authorities,
Boultif v. Switzerland, cited above, § 39). Where
immigration is concerned, Article 8 cannot be considered to impose on
a Contracting State a general obligation to respect the choice by
married couples of the country of their matrimonial residence or to
authorise family reunion in its territory (Gül v.
Switzerland, 19 February 1996, § 38, Reports of Judgments
and Decisions 1996 I). However, the
removal of a person from a country where close members of his family
are living may amount to an infringement of the right to respect for
family life as guaranteed in Article 8 § 1 of the Convention
(see Moustaquim v. Belgium, 18 February 1991, §
36, Series A no. 193).
- The
Court has previously found that existence or non-existence of “family
life” is essentially a question of fact depending upon the real
existence in practice of close personal ties (see K.
and T. v. Finland [GC], no.
25702/94, § 150, ECHR 2001-VII). However, family life must
include the relationship arising from a lawful and genuine marriage
(see Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United
Kingdom, 28 May 1985, § 62, Series A no. 94).
Furthermore, it follows from the concept of family on which Article 8
is based that a child born of a marital union is ipso
jure part of that relationship;
hence, from the moment of the child’s birth and by the very
fact of it, there exists between him and his parents a bond amounting
to “family life” which subsequent events cannot break
save in exceptional circumstances (see, among other authorities,
Berrehab v. the Netherlands, 21 June 1988, § 21,
Series A no. 138, and Cılız
v. the Netherlands, no. 29192/95, §§
59 and 60, ECHR 2000 VIII) until
the child reaches adulthood. The Court has previously held that there
will be no family life between parents and adult children unless they
can demonstrate additional elements of dependence (Slivenko
v. Latvia [GC], no. 48321/99,
§ 97, ECHR 2003 X; Kwakye-Nti
and Dufie v. the Netherlands (dec.),
no. 31519/96, 7 November 2000).
- The
Court also recalls that, as Article 8 protects the right to establish
and develop relationships with other human beings and the outside
world and can sometimes embrace aspects of an individual’s
social identity, it must be accepted that the totality of social ties
between settled migrants such as the applicant and the community in
which they are living constitutes part of the concept of “private
life” within the meaning of Article 8. Indeed it will be a rare
case where a settled migrant will be unable to demonstrate that his
or her deportation would interfere with his or her private life as
guaranteed by Article 8 (see Miah v.
the United Kingdom (dec.), no.
53080/07, § 17, 27 April 2010). Not
all settled migrants will have equally strong family or social ties
in the Contracting State where they reside but the comparative
strength or weakness of those ties is, in the majority of cases, more
appropriately considered in assessing the proportionality of the
applicant’s deportation under Article 8 § 2.
- An interference with a person’s
private or family life will be in breach of Article 8 of the
Convention unless it can be justified under paragraph 2 of that
Article as being “in accordance with the law”, as
pursuing one or more of the legitimate aims listed therein, and as
being “necessary in a democratic society” in order to
achieve the aim or aims concerned. The Grand Chamber has
summarised the relevant criteria to be applied, in determining
whether interference, in the form of deportation, is necessary in a
democratic society, at §§ 57-58 of Üner,
cited above, as follows:
- the nature and seriousness of the offence committed by
the applicant;
- the length of the applicant’s
stay in the country from which he or she is to be expelled;
- the time elapsed since the offence
was committed and the applicant’s conduct during that period;
- the nationalities of the various persons concerned;
- the applicant’s family
situation, such as the length of the marriage, and other factors
expressing the effectiveness of a couple’s family life;
- whether the spouse knew about the offence at the time
when he or she entered into a family relationship;
- whether there are children of the marriage, and if so,
their age; and
- the seriousness of the difficulties which the spouse is
likely to encounter in the country to which the applicant is to be
expelled.
- the best interests and well-being of the children, in
particular the seriousness of the difficulties which any children of
the applicant are likely to encounter in the country to which the
applicant is to be expelled; and
- the
solidity of social, cultural and family ties with the host country
and with the country of destination.
2. Application to the facts of the case
- The first factor which must be considered is the
seriousness of the applicant’s offence. The Court notes in this
regard that the applicant was sentenced to fourteen years’
imprisonment for two counts of supplying Class A drugs, and that the
judge who sentenced him found that he had occupied a position near
the top of an organisation responsible for supplying huge amounts of
heroin. The Court accepts that Contracting States are entitled to
attach particular gravity to offences involving drugs, given the
destructive effects that such offences have on society as a whole
(see, among many other authorities, Dalia v. France, 19
February 1998, § 48, Reports of Judgments and Decisions
1998 I). The Court also notes that, while all drugs-related
offences are all properly to be viewed as serious given their
nature, the applicant’s crime was at the particularly serious
end of the spectrum, as reflected by the lengthy sentence imposed.
The applicant’s offence, therefore, should be viewed as
extremely serious.
- Turning
now to the applicant’s length of stay in the United Kingdom,
the Court notes that he spent under one year there in 1980, before
returning with his wife to live in Turkey for four years. Since 1984,
he has lived permanently in the United Kingdom, returning to Turkey
only for visits. He had therefore, at the time of his deportation,
amassed approximately twenty-five years’ continuous residence
in the United Kingdom. This is a length of time which clearly exceeds
the twenty-year period after which the Council of Europe has
recommended (see paragraph 11 above) that long-term immigrants
should no longer be expellable. However, the Court reiterates its
previous findings (see Üner v. the Netherlands [GC],
cited above, § 55) that Article 8 cannot be construed as
providing absolute protection from expulsion for any category of
person, and that, notwithstanding the terms of the recommendation,
length of residence should not alone determine whether there has been
a violation of Article 8 (see, for example, Iyisan v. the United
Kingdom (dec.), no. 7673/08, 9 February 2010).
- The
Court nonetheless considers that, in a case such as the present,
where the applicant has been lawfully resident in a Contracting State
for such a lengthy period, compelling reasons are required to render
his deportation compatible with Article 8. The Court further notes
that the applicant’s conviction in 2002 represented his first
offence; that he was, by all accounts, a model prisoner whilst
serving his term of imprisonment; and that there is nothing to
indicate that he offended again after his release. These factors are
all to the applicant’s credit.
- The
Court observes, with regard to the applicant’s family
situation, that he and his wife have been married for over thirty
years. Their relationship was therefore formed many years before the
applicant’s only offence. The couple have four sons, of whom
only the youngest was still a minor at the time of the applicant’s
deportation. The applicant’s wife is a Cypriot-born British
citizen and all of his children are British citizens who have never
lived in Turkey. All four of his sons were in full-time education at
the time of the applicant’s deportation. The applicant stressed
that he also has extended family in the United Kingdom, namely his
wife’s parents and siblings, whom his wife helps to care for,
and that his entire extended family is unusually close and
interdependent.
- The
Court notes that, at the time of the applicant’s appeal against
deportation, his wife gave evidence before the Tribunal to the effect
that, if her husband were deported, she would not accompany him to
Turkey as her life and that of her family was in the United Kingdom.
The Court further observes that, subsequent to the applicant’s
deportation, his wife remains in the United Kingdom, as do their
sons. The Court accepts that it would have been difficult for the
applicant’s wife to have accompanied him to Turkey, given her
stable job in the United Kingdom and responsibilities towards her
elderly and infirm parents and four sons, one of whom was still a
minor at the time. However, the Court does not consider that it would
have been impossible or exceptionally difficult for the applicant’s
wife to have relocated to Turkey, if not at the time of his
deportation then perhaps once their youngest child had reached the
age of majority and finished with school. The Court notes in this
regard that the applicant’s wife previously lived in Turkey for
several years with the applicant, and that she has several siblings
in the United Kingdom who also assist in caring for their parents.
The Court accepts that such an outcome would still have created a
split in the applicant’s family, as he and his wife would have
been separated from their children, but recalls that there is no
family life, in terms of Article 8, between parents and adult
children. For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that there
were no insurmountable obstacles to the applicant’s wife
relocating to Turkey and maintaining her family life with the
applicant in this manner (see Onur v. the United Kingdom, no.
27319/07, § 60, 17 February 2009).
- The
Court notes that, as the applicant’s youngest child was a minor
at the time of the applicant’s deportation (though he turned
eighteen in May 2011), his best interests must be given due weight.
The Court does not doubt that it would have been strongly preferable
for his son had the applicant not been deported to Turkey. However,
the fact is that the applicant’s youngest son’s life
continued, after his father’s deportation, much as it had for
the seven or so previous years, during which he lived with his mother
and brothers and his father was absent from the family by reason of
his imprisonment. Although the Court accepts that the applicant’s
youngest child, like his other sons, was able to visit him more
frequently in prison than he is likely to be able to do in Turkey, it
is not possible to find, given the length of the applicant’s
sentence, that his deportation would have had a major effect on the
day-to-day life of his minor son. The best interests of any children
affected by the deportation of a parent or relative, though an
important concern, must be weighed in the balance with all the other
relevant factors. In this case, for the reasons outlined above, the
Court cannot attach undue weight to the impact of the applicant’s
deportation on his one then-minor child.
- The
final criterion which the Court must consider is the relative
solidity of the applicant’s social, cultural and family ties to
the United Kingdom and to Turkey. In the light of the foregoing
information regarding his wife, children and extended family, the
Court does not doubt that the applicant has stronger family ties to
the United Kingdom, though he has relations in Turkey. It is also
accepted, given the length of his residence, that his social ties to
the United Kingdom are also considerably stronger than those he may
have retained to Turkey. However, the Court notes that the applicant
was an adult of thirty-one years old when he left Turkey; has
returned to visit his country of origin; and still speaks Turkish. He
spent all of his childhood and formative years and was wholly
educated in Turkey. As such, the Court has no doubt that the
applicant has retained sufficient cultural ties to Turkey to permit
his reintegration in that country (see Chair and J. B. v. Germany,
no. 69735/01, § 62, 6 December 2007).
- In
respect of, inter alia, the solidity of ties to Turkey, the
present applicant’s case bears strong similarities to
Iyisan, cited above, in which the applicant, a Turkish national
like the present applicant, who also had a Cypriot-British wife, was
sentenced to thirteen years’ imprisonment for the importation
of large amounts of heroin. The applicant in that case had an adult
daughter and a grandchild. The Court held that,
“In spite of the length of the applicant’s
residence in the United Kingdom, and notwithstanding the Council of
Europe’s Recommendation Rec(2000)15 Concerning the Security of
Long-Term Migrants, the Court finds that, if considered against the
criteria set down in Boultif v. Switzerland, no. 54273/00,
ECHR 2001-IX and Üner v. the Netherlands [GC], no.
46410/99, ECHR 2006-..., the interference with the applicant’s
private and family life was proportionate to the legitimate aims
pursued, namely the maintenance of an effective system of immigration
control, the prevention of disorder and crime and the protection of
health and morals. In particular, the Court has had regard to the
seriousness of the applicant’s criminal offence and the
maintenance of social, cultural and family ties to Turkey.”
- Although
the applicant’s circumstances differ from the applicant’s
in Iyisan in that he has more children, one of whom was a
minor at the time of his deportation, the Court finds that the two
cases are analogous. Having paid close regard and attached
significant weight to the applicant’s length of residence in
and strength of ties to the United Kingdom, and in particular to the
impact on his wife and children caused by his deportation, the Court
is nevertheless of the view that these factors are outweighed by the
seriousness of the one offence committed by the applicant.
- In
the light of the foregoing analysis, the Court finds that a fair
balance was struck in this case in that the applicant’s
expulsion was proportionate to the aims pursued and therefore
necessary in a democratic society. It follows that the applicant’s
complaint under Article 8 is manifestly ill-founded and must be
rejected, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the
Convention.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Declares the application inadmissible.
Lawrence Early Lech Garlicki
Registrar President