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THIRD
SECTION
CASE OF
I.G. v. MOLDOVA
(Application
no. 53519/07)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
15 May
2012
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of I.G. v. Moldova,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Josep Casadevall,
President,
Corneliu Bîrsan,
Egbert
Myjer,
Ineta Ziemele,
Nona Tsotsoria,
Mihai
Poalelungi,
Kristina Pardalos, judges,
and
Santiago Quesada, Section
Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 17 April 2012,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an application (no. 53519/07) against the Republic
of Moldova lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by a Moldovan national, Ms I.G. (“the
applicant”), on 6 October 2007. The President of the
Section acceded to the applicant’s request not to have her name
disclosed (Rule 47 § 3 of the Rules of Court).
- The
applicant was represented by Mr A. Postica and Ms D. Straisteanu,
lawyers practising in Chişinău. The Moldovan Government
(“the Government”) were represented by their Agent,
Mr V. Grosu.
- The
applicant alleged, in particular, that she had been a victim of a
breach of Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention on account of the
State’s failure to conduct a proper investigation into her
allegation of rape committed against her when she was fourteen years
old. The applicant also complained that there had not been any
effective remedies available to her as required by Article 13 of the
Convention in respect of the above breaches and that she had been
subjected to discriminatory treatment contrary to Article 14 of the
Convention taken together with Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention.
- On
13 July 2009 the application was communicated to the Government. It
was also decided to rule on the admissibility and merits of the
application at the same time (Article 29 § 1).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The
applicant was born on 10 December 1989 and lives in Bilicenii Vechi.
At the time of the events complained of, she was fourteen years and
eight months old.
- On
the evening of 21 August 2004 V.R. invited the applicant and one of
her friends to accompany him out for the evening. V.R. was
twenty-three years old at the time and lived in the same
neighbourhood as the applicant’s grandmother, whom the
applicant visited often. The applicant and V.R. had known each other
for many years and had met before on different occasions.
- Towards
the end of the evening the applicant and V.R. went by car to a
bar/nightclub in a neighbouring village. At the bar, the applicant
and V.R. were joined by V.V., V.D. and another girl, A.S. The
applicant sat together with V.R. and his friends. V.R. bought a
bottle of vodka and encouraged the applicant to drink with them.
Initially, the applicant refused to drink but then she yielded to
peer pressure and consumed approximately 100 ml of vodka. According
to the applicant, V.R. had threatened her with violence and with not
driving her back home if she did not drink. When later questioned,
V.R. disputed that he had made such threats. After they had finished
the drinks, they all left the bar and V.R. drove everyone home. When
they approached V.D.’s house, V.D. and A.S. asked V.R. to wait
for them, promising to be back in half an hour.
- V.R. and the applicant were left alone in the car. V.R.
parked the car near V.D.’s house and asked the applicant to
move to the backseat with him. The applicant later explained in a
statement she gave to a prosecutor that when she had stood up she had
felt dizzy and had had to support herself by leaning against the car.
V.R. disputed that and submitted that the applicant had not appeared
to be intoxicated. The applicant further submitted that while sitting
on the backseat, V.R. had attempted to kiss her on the lips, but she
had moved away, telling him that she was not willing to have sex and
that she was afraid of what her parents would think. V.R. had assured
the applicant that no one would find out, while getting closer and
pressing his body against her, thereby pinning her down. He had used
one of his hands to hold the applicant’s arms while removing
her clothes with the other hand. In her statement to the prosecutor
the applicant indicated:
“... I did not want to have
sexual intercourse with V.R. but because I had drunk vodka I felt
weak, I could not move or physically resist him. V.R. took off my
jeans, pants, t-shirt and bra, [and] penetrated me... I felt pain...
I had not had sexual intercourse before and until that moment with
V.R. I was a virgin... because it was dark in the car I did not see
that I was covered in blood...”
- V.R.
disputed the above description of the events when questioned by the
prosecutor and submitted that the applicant had immediately accepted
his proposal that she have sex with him and had removed her clothes
by herself. He also submitted that she had confessed to him to having
previously had sex with his brother and that he had not been aware of
her age.
- The
applicant stated that after the rape took place, V.R. had threatened
to kill her should she tell anyone that he had had sex with her. The
applicant recalled that the act had lasted for approximately 10
minutes. The applicant had then put on her clothes and shortly
afterwards V.D. and A.S. had returned to the car. V.R. had driven the
applicant home and had repeated his threat. V.R. disputed the
allegation that he had made threats.
- Later that day (22 August 2004) the applicant told her
mother that she had been raped by V.R. On the same day the
applicant’s mother went to V.R.’s house. He admitted
having had sex with the applicant and promised to marry her after she
graduated from school. However, two days later the applicant’s
mother learned that V.R. was responsible for making another girl
pregnant and that he was about to marry her. The applicant’s
mother therefore made a complaint on the applicant’s behalf at
the Singerei District Police Station on 25 August 2004, alleging
rape. On 26 August 2004, the Singerei District Prosecutor’s
Office opened a criminal investigation into the crime of rape of a
minor. The criminal offence is set out in Article 171 paragraph 2
subparagraph (b) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Moldova.
- The case was assigned to V.C., a prosecutor at the
Singerei District Prosecutor’s Office. He ordered a medical
forensic examination of the applicant. The examination was conducted
on the same day and concluded that there had been a “rupture of
the hymen, which could have been caused in the circumstances
described by a straight, blunt object, possibly an erect penis”.
No traces of blood or semen were found due to the applicant’s
delayed examination.
- On
26 August 2004 the prosecutor questioned the applicant and her mother
and on 1 September 2004 V.R. was questioned.
- On
1 September 2004, as a result of the applicant’s complaint and
the findings of the forensic medical expert, V.R. was charged with
the crime of rape of a minor. On 14 September 2004 the prosecutor
ordered an additional forensic medical examination of the applicant.
The additional forensic report issued on 17 September 2004 reached
similar conclusions to those of the previous forensic examination,
but, in addition, it found no bruises or injuries present on the
applicant’s body.
- In the meantime, on 1 September 2004, V.V. was
questioned as a witness. He stated that on the evening of 21 August
2004 he had gone together with V.R., the applicant, V.D. and a girl
named A.S. to a bar/nightclub in a nearby village. V.V. confirmed
that the applicant had drunk alcohol and danced. After they had
finished the first bottle of vodka, another one had been ordered. He
did not know whether the applicant had also drunk from that bottle
and had not seen whether she had been unsteady on her feet upon
leaving the bar. After leaving the bar, V.R. had driven him home and
had then left together with the applicant, V.D. and A.S. V.V. had not
known where they were headed.
- On
26 October 2004 a confrontation between the applicant and V.R. was
carried out. The parties maintained their positions. In particular,
the applicant insisted that the sexual intercourse had been
non-consensual, while V.R. insisted on the contrary. They also
disputed whether V.R. had threatened the applicant and whether V.R.
had been aware of the applicant’s age.
- On
26 November 2004 the prosecutor in charge of the case requested a
prolongation of the time allowed for the investigation of the case
from his superior. He enumerated the actions carried out so far and
indicated that it was necessary to prolong the time allowed for the
investigation until 31 January 2005 in order to question several more
witnesses. It appears that the request was approved on the same date
by A.B., a senior prosecutor within the same prosecutor’s
office.
- On
1 December 2004 another prosecutor within the same prosecutor’s
office, C.C., cleared V.R. of the charge of rape of a minor. The
Prosecutor stated in his decision that:
“... taking into account the findings of the
forensic medical expert and the statements of the suspect, as well as
the statements of the witnesses and of the victim, I conclude that
V.R.’s actions did not constitute the elements of the crime set
out by Article 171 paragraph 2 subparagraph (b) of the Criminal Code
of the Republic of Moldova. Therefore I clear V.R. of all charges
against him”.
- In
the same decision, C.C. ordered the continuation of the criminal
investigation without giving any further details.
- Between
3 and 6 December 2004 the investigation of the case continued and the
same prosecutor questioned several more witnesses, including the
applicant’s cousins, her classmates and neighbours.
- On
19 January 2005 A.B. annulled the decision of 1 December 2004 as
illegal. In his decision he stated that “the decision of
1 December 2004 was not based on a thorough examination of all
the circumstances of the case, specifically of the fact that at the
time of the sexual intercourse the victim, who was a minor, was
intoxicated and could not control her actions”. Moreover, the
prosecutor stated that after the adoption of the decision new facts
had been discovered which confirmed V.R.’s guilt. The case was
assigned to prosecutor V.C.
- On
25 January 2005 V.R. was again charged with the crime of rape of a
minor. The criminal investigation ended on 31 January 2005 and
the file was sent to the Singerei District Court.
- Having
heard the witnesses and looked through the evidence before it, the
court delivered its judgment on 10 February 2006. The court rejected
V.R’s claim that he had not known the applicant’s age on
the basis of the evidence given regarding his knowledge of her age.
However, the court also rejected the applicant’s claim that she
had been so intoxicated as to have been unable to control her
actions, reasoning that according to one of the witnesses she had not
consumed more than 50 ml of vodka and that she had described the
incident in detail. The court concluded that the sexual intercourse
had been mutually consensual on the basis of the fact that there had
been no signs of physical violence on the applicant’s body, as
confirmed by the forensic expert reports. The court therefore amended
the criminal charges against V.R. on its own motion, finding him
criminally liable for sexual intercourse with a person under the age
of sixteen committed under the influence of alcohol, in contravention
of Article 174 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Moldova. The
charge of rape against V.R. was dismissed by the court. V.R. was
given a suspended sentence of three years’ imprisonment.
- Both
the applicant (through her mother as legal guardian) and the
prosecutor separately appealed against the judgment of the Singerei
District Court. V.R. did not appeal.
- The
applicant argued that the first-instance court had failed to take
into account her vulnerability, due to intoxication with alcohol and
her young age, and had only looked into the issue of consent from the
perspective of corroborative evidence of resistance.
- The prosecutor lodged his appeal on 1 March 2006,
making similar arguments to those in the applicant’s appeal.
- On
11 April 2007 the Bălţi Court of Appeal rejected the
applicant’s appeal, arguing that the applicant’s right to
appeal was limited by Articles 276 and 401 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Moldova (“the CCP”).
The court explained that according to those articles the victim of a
crime could lodge an appeal only if criminal proceedings had been
initiated upon his/her prior complaint (la
plâgerea prealabilă). As the offence of rape
was not one of the offences which could only be prosecuted upon the
victim’s complaint, the applicant was not included in the
category of people having the right to appeal a court’s
judgment.
The
Court of Appeal also dismissed the prosecutor’s appeal,
annulled the judgment of the Singerei District Court and ordered the
termination of the criminal prosecution against V.R. The court
considered in the first place that the annulment of the decision of 1
December 2004 on 19 January 2005 had been unlawful because “only
a hierarchically superior prosecutor, i.e. the Prosecutor General and
his inferiors” had the right to do that. Moreover, in the
opinion of the Court of Appeal, there had been no legal grounds to
annul the decision of 1 December 2004 because: (a) there had been no
elements of rape in V.R.’s actions; and (b) according to
Article 63 (2)(3) of the CCP a person can only be considered a
suspect for the purpose of that article for three months. The court
finally ruled that because the decision of 1 December 2004 had
been declared valid, any further prosecution of V.R. would be in
breach of the principle of ne bis in idem and thus contrary to
Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention.
- Since the applicant had been refused the right of
appeal against the first-instance court’s decision in her case,
her lawyer wrote to the General Prosecutor’s Office requesting
that an appeal on points of law be lodged before the Supreme Court of
Justice. The General Prosecutor’s Office failed to lodge such
an appeal. In their letter of 16 August 2007 replying to the
applicant’s lawyer, the General Prosecutor’s Office
admitted that the prosecutor had missed the two-month deadline set by
Article 422 of the CCP to appeal against the decision of the Bălţi
Court of Appeal. As a result, all proceedings in respect of V.R. were
terminated and the final decision in the case concerning the
applicant’s allegation of rape became prosecutor C.C.’s
decision of 1 December 2004.
- The applicant sought psychological help after the
conclusion of the proceedings before the Bălţi Court of
Appeal. During July – August 2007 she was seen by a
psychiatrist from Memoria, a local non-governmental organisation
working in this field. An excerpt from the applicant’s medical
file issued on 18 August 2007 describes her as suffering from
post-traumatic stress disorder caused by the sexual assault, the
failure of the courts to render an effective conviction and the
humiliation to which she had been publicly subjected due to the
domestic proceedings in her case.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
- The
relevant parts of the Criminal Code read at the material time as
follows:
Article 171. Rape
“Rape, or sexual intercourse committed by use of
physical or psychological compulsion on [a] person or by taking
advantage of the victim’s impossibility to defend herself or to
freely consent, is punishable with imprisonment from 3 to 5 years.
Rape:
committed repeatedly
committed knowingly on a minor
... - ... (g),
is punishable with imprisonment from 5 to 15 years.
...”
Article 174. Sexual intercourse with a
person under the age of 16
“Sexual intercourse, homosexual acts, or lesbian
acts, with a person who is certainly known to be under the age of 16,
are punishable with imprisonment for up to 5 years.”
The
relevant parts of the Code of Criminal Procedure read as follows:
Article 52. The competence of the
prosecutor within the criminal investigation
“(1) In criminal investigations, the prosecutor:
...
(8) may annul decisions issued by the investigating body
that are illegal and unreasoned;
...”
Article 401. Individuals that may lodge an
appeal
“(1) An appeal may be lodged by:
(a) the public prosecutor, with respect to the criminal
and civil aspects of a case;
(b) the defendant, with respect to the criminal and
civil aspects of the case...;
(c) the victim, with respect to the criminal aspect of
the case if the criminal proceedings were initiated upon her/his
prior complaint in accordance with the law;
...”
On 20
May 2008 the last paragraph of the above provision was declared
unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court and from then on victims
of any kind of offence could lodge appeals.
Article 452. Extraordinary appeals
(1) The Prosecutor General, as well as [the parties],
may lodge an extraordinary appeal before the Supreme Court of Justice
[against] any final judgment after the exhaustion of ordinary
remedies.
(2) The Prosecutor General may make an extraordinary
appeal in favour of the defendant against a final judgment, even if
ordinary remedies were not used.
Article 453. Grounds for an extraordinary
appeal
(1) Final judgments of conviction [or] acquittal [...]
may be challenged by an extraordinary appeal in order to correct
errors of law [...], in the following cases:
...
(e) when the Constitutional Court has acknowledged as
unconstitutional the provisions of a law applied to the case;
...”
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 3, 8, 13 AND 14 OF THE
CONVENTION
- The
applicant complained that the Moldovan authorities had not
investigated her allegations of rape effectively. In her view, that
had amounted to a violation of the State’s positive obligations
to protect the individual’s physical integrity and private life
and to provide effective remedies in this respect. She also argued
that the requirement of corroborative evidence of resistance had
violated her right to non-discrimination on the basis of her sex.
Articles 3, 8, 13 and 14 of the Convention, on which the applicant
relied, read as follows:
Article 3
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”
Article 8 § 1
“Everyone has the right to respect for his private
... life ...”
Article 13
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth
in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy
before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has
been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”
Article 14
“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set
forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without discrimination on
any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political
or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a
national minority, property, birth or other status.”
A. Admissibility
- The
Government submitted that on 20 May 2008, before the date of the
introduction of the completed application form in the present case,
the Constitutional Court of Moldova had declared unconstitutional the
provisions of Article 401 of the CCP, which had limited the ability
of victims of crimes to lodge appeals in criminal proceedings.
According to the Government, after this decision of the
Constitutional Court, the applicant could have challenged the
decision of the Bălţi Court of Appeal of 11 April 2007 by
lodging an extraordinary appeal, as provided for by Articles 452 and
453 of the CCP. As the applicant had not availed herself of that
opportunity, her application had to be declared inadmissible for
failure to exhaust domestic remedies.
- The
applicant disagreed with the Government and submitted, in the first
place, that her application had been introduced with the Court on
6 October 2007. The completed application form had been
submitted within the time-limit set by the Court, namely on 15 May
2008 – which had been five days before the adoption of the
Constitutional Court’s decision on 20 May 2008 and three
weeks before its publication in the Official Gazette on 6 June 2008.
The applicant therefore argued that no remedies in domestic law had
been available to her at the time of lodging her application with the
Court.
- The
Court reiterates that the assessment of whether domestic remedies
have been exhausted is normally carried out with reference to the
date on which the application was lodged with the Court. However,
this rule is subject to exceptions, which may be justified by the
particular circumstances of each case (Brusco v. Italy
(dec.), no. 69789/01, ECHR 2001 IX).
- Moreover,
under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention normal recourse should be
had by an applicant to remedies which are available and sufficient to
afford redress in respect of the breaches alleged. The existence of
the remedies in question must be sufficiently certain not only in
theory but also in practice, failing which they will lack the
requisite accessibility and effectiveness (see, among other
authorities, the Akdivar and Others v. Turkey,
16 September 1996, § 66, Reports of Judgments and
Decisions 1996-IV).
- Even
assuming that this is an exceptional case in which the applicant was
required to exhaust a remedy which became available after the
introduction of her application with the Court, it is noted that
according to Article 452 of the CCP it was not open to the applicant
to lodge an extraordinary appeal with the Supreme Court because
ordinary remedies had not been exhausted. The Court therefore
concludes that the application cannot be declared inadmissible for
non-exhaustion of domestic remedies and, accordingly, the
Government’s objection is dismissed.
- The
Court further notes that the application is not manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the
Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other
grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
- The
applicant submitted that she had felt mistreated by the manner in
which her case had been examined. As there had been no physical
evidence of assault, the criminal justice system had been more
inclined to believe the perpetrator, showing no concern for the need
to protect her as a minor. The domestic authorities had failed to
effectively assess the issue of consent by a minor and had therefore
fallen short of the positive obligation to enact criminal law
provisions effectively punishing sexual assault against minors. At
the age of fourteen she had been victimised twice: first by the
sexual assault inflicted on her; and then by the domestic
proceedings, which had only intensified her feelings of humiliation,
anguish and frustration without rendering an effective conviction.
The applicant also submitted that she had been subjected to
discriminatory treatment on the ground of her sex.
- The Government disagreed with the applicant and argued
that the case had been investigated properly and, unlike in M.C.
v. Bulgaria (no. 39272/98, ECHR 2003 XII), the
applicant had been able to put questions to the witnesses and had
participated in a confrontation with V.R. Moreover, unlike in the
Bulgarian case, V.R. had even been convicted by the first-instance
court for the offence of having sexual intercourse with a minor. The
Government finally disputed the allegation that the applicant had
been subjected to discriminatory treatment.
- The
Court reiterates that the obligation of the High Contracting Parties
under Article 1 of the Convention to secure to everyone within their
jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention, taken
together with Article 3, requires States to take measures designed to
ensure that individuals within their jurisdiction are not subjected
to ill-treatment, including ill-treatment administered by private
individuals (see A. v. the United Kingdom, 23 September 1998,
§ 22, Reports 1998-VI; Z and Others v. the United
Kingdom [GC], no. 29392/95, §§ 73-75, ECHR 2001-V; and
E. and Others v. the United Kingdom, no. 33218/96, 26 November
2002).
- In
a number of cases, Article 3 of the Convention was found to give rise
to a positive obligation to conduct an official investigation (see
Assenov and Others v. Bulgaria, 28 October 1998, § 102,
Reports 1998-VIII). Such a positive obligation cannot be
considered, in principle, to be limited solely to cases of
ill-treatment by State agents (see, mutatis mutandis, Calvelli
and Ciglio v. Italy [GC], no. 32967/96, ECHR 2002-I).
- On
that basis, the Court considers that States have positive obligations
inherent in Article 3 of the Convention to enact criminal law
provisions effectively punishing rape and to apply them in practice
through effective investigation and prosecution (see, mutatis
mutandis, M.C. v. Bulgaria, cited above, §§
149-153).
- Turning
to the facts of the present case, the Court notes that after the
conclusion of the court proceedings, prosecutor C.C.’s decision
of 1 December 2004 discharging V.R. of the accusations against
him ended up as the final determination in the case concerning the
applicant’s allegation of rape (see paragraph 28 above). The
Court notes that this decision was adopted without some important
investigative measures having been conducted. In particular, since
the central task in this case was to determine whether the sexual
intercourse had been consensual, it was imperative to form an opinion
concerning each party’s credibility. That could have been done
by questioning people known to the applicant and V.R., such as
friends, neighbours, teachers and others who could have shed light on
the trustworthiness of their statements. However, none of the above
has been done before the adoption of the decision of 1 December
2004. The Court further notes that two individuals (V.D. and A.S.)
out of three who had been with the applicant and V.R. immediately
before and after the alleged rape have not been questioned. Finally,
the Court considers that the investigating authorities could have
also sought an opinion from a specialised psychologist.
- The
Court attaches particular weight to the fact that the prosecutors in
charge of the case admitted themselves that the investigation had not
been completed on 1 December 2004. In particular, it is noted that on
26 November 2004 prosecutor V.C. considered that the
investigation was not yet complete, as he intended to question
several more witnesses, and therefore requested one more month to
complete it. The request was accepted by V.C.’s superior.
However, only a few days later, on 1 December 2004, for reasons
best known to the Singerei District Prosecutor’s Office,
another prosecutor, C.C., issued the decision exonerating V.R. of the
charge of rape without questioning any further witnesses or
conducting any other investigative measures. Nevertheless, it appears
that even C.C. did not consider the investigation to be completed,
because he ordered its continuation in the very text of the decision
of 1 December 2004.
- In
view of the above, the Court, without expressing an opinion on the
guilt of V.R., finds that the investigation of the applicant’s
case fell short of the requirements inherent in the State’s
positive obligations to effectively investigate and punish all forms
of rape and sexual abuse. The Court thus finds that in the present
case there has been a violation of the respondent State’s
positive obligations under Article 3 of the Convention. In view of
this conclusion it also holds that no separate issue arises under
Articles 8, 13 and 14 of the Convention.
II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
- Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
- The
applicant claimed 30,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary
damage. She submitted that she had suffered severe shame, anguish and
distress. After the conclusion of the proceedings which had cleared
V.R. of all charges, she had also been seen as a liar, which had
caused her additional distress.
- The
Government disputed the amount claimed by the applicant and
reiterated their position that there had been no violation in the
present case. Alternatively, they considered that a finding of a
violation would in itself constitute sufficient just satisfaction in
the present case.
- Having
regard to the violations found above, the Court considers that an
award of just satisfaction for non-pecuniary damage is justified in
this case. Making its assessment on an equitable basis, the Court
awards the applicant EUR 10,000.
B. Costs and expenses
- The
applicant also claimed EUR 19,200 for costs and expenses incurred
before the Court. The applicant submitted relevant documents in
support of her claims.
- The
Government objected and argued that the amount was excessive.
- The
Court awards EUR 2,000 for costs and expenses.
C. Default interest
- The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should
be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank,
to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Declares the application admissible;
- Holds that there has been a procedural violation
of Article 3 of the Convention;
- Holds that no separate issue arises under
Articles 8, 13 and 14 of the Convention;
- Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 10,000 (ten
thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that
may be chargeable, and EUR 2,000 (two thousand euros) in respect of
costs and expenses, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the
applicant, to be converted into Moldovan lei at the rate applicable
at the date of settlement;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
- Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s
claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 15 May 2012, pursuant to
Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Santiago Quesada Josep Casadevall
Registrar President
