THIRD SECTION
CASE OF
HAUSER v. SLOVAKIA
(Application no.
12583/09)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
5 February 2013
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Hauser v. Slovakia,
The European Court of Human
Rights (Third Section), sitting as
a Committee composed of:
Luis López Guerra, President,
Ján Šikuta,
Nona Tsotsoria, judges,
and Marialena Tsirli, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 15 January 2013,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that
date:
PROCEDURE
The case originated in an
application (no. 12583/09) against the Slovak Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Slovak national, Mr Viliam Hauser (“the applicant”), on 19
February 2009.
The Government of the Slovak Republic (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms M. Pirošíková.
On 3 May 2010 the application was communicated to
the Government.
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The applicant was born in 1970. He is serving a
life term in the Leopoldov prison.
On 22 March 2004 the applicant claimed
compensation before the Bratislava I District Court for damages allegedly
caused by legal malpractice of his former lawyer.
On 31 August 2004 the District Court exempted the
applicant from the obligation to pay the court fees.
Subsequently, between 22 October 2004 and 4
August 2008, the District Court appointed one-by-one four legal-aid lawyers for
the applicant who appealed against the appointment or refused to take up the
legal representation submitting that they were in a friendly relationship with
the defendant or that their illness or business prevented them from providing
legal aid to the applicant.
The Bratislava Regional Court, on the appeal of
the appointed lawyers, twice quashed the District Court’s decisions to appoint
a legal-aid lawyer and remitted the matter for a new determination and in one
instance it dismissed the attorney’s appeal.
On 24 September 2008 the Constitutional Court
dismissed the applicant’s complaint about alleged delays before the District
Court. It held that the District Court had been proceeding in a continuous
manner and that short periods of inactivity of the court had not violated the
applicant’s right invoked. It further held that the lawyers’ refusals to take
up the legal representation were supported by reasonable grounds and therefore
the delays caused by this fact could not be attributable to the District Court.
By a decision of 12 January 2009 the District
Court appointed a fifth legal-aid lawyer and in March 2009 it requested the
applicant to eliminate shortcomings in his action within ten days.
The applicant’s legal-aid lawyer asked for
extension of the given time-limit or alternatively the appointment of another
legal-aid lawyer on account of her temporary illness presumably to last until the
end of April 2009.
On 10 November 2009 the District Court
repeatedly requested the lawyer to complete the petition.
On 15 March 2010 the lawyer requested that her
appointment be quashed. The District Court dismissed her request and on 2
September 2010 again requested her to amend the petition.
The proceedings are still pending.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION
The applicant complained that the length of the
proceedings had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement, laid
down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ...,
everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ...
tribunal...”
A. Admissibility
The Government referred to the Constitutional
Court’s finding that there had been no violation of the applicant’s right to a
hearing within
a reasonable time during the period covered by its decision of 24 September
2008. In their submission, his complaint in respect of that period was
therefore manifestly ill-founded. As to the subsequent period, the Government
argued that the applicant should have sought redress by means of a fresh
complaint to the Constitutional Court. Since he has failed to do so, he did not
exhaust domestic remedies as required by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention.
The Court notes that the applicant claimed
compensation before the District Court for damages allegedly caused by his
former lawyer. It observes that at that time and during the whole proceedings
the applicant was in prison and thus had limited possibilities to contact a
lawyer willing to take up his case. The Court further observes that at the time
of the Constitutional Court’s judgment on the applicant’s complaint the
proceedings had been pending for four years and more than six months at two levels
of jurisdiction. It notes in particular that during that period the courts,
after having appointed the first legal-aid lawyer to represent the applicant,
dealt exclusively with the appeals and correspondence of lawyers appointed as
legal-aid representatives who had refused to represent him.
. The
Court has already held that in discharging its obligation to provide parties to
proceedings with legal aid when it is provided by domestic law, the State must
display diligence so as to secure to those persons the genuine and effective
enjoyment of the rights guaranteed under Article 6 of the Convention. The Court
has also held that an adequate institutional framework should be in place so as
to ensure effective legal representation for entitled persons and a sufficient
level of protection of their interests (see, mutatis mutandis, Bąkowska v. Poland,
no. 33539/02,
§§ 46 and 47, 12 January 2010, with further references).
Having regard to the above, the Court considers that
in the present case it was the State’s responsibility to ensure that the legal aid
was promptly and effectively safeguarded so as to secure the applicant’s right
to a hearing within a reasonable time.
In view of all the circumstances and bearing in
mind that the Convention is intended to guarantee rights that are not
theoretical or illusory, but rights that are practical and effective (see, for
example, Jakub v. Slovakia, no. 2015/02, § 56, 28 February 2006), the
Court considers that the Constitutional Court’s assessment of the applicant’s
claim cannot be accepted.
Since the applicant was unable to obtain redress
before the Constitutional Court, the Court concludes that, as to the period of
the proceedings following the Constitutional Court’s decision, he was not
required, for the purposes of Article 35 § 1 of the
Convention, to have again recourse to the
remedy under Article 127 of the Constitution (see the recapitulation of the
relevant principles in Becová v. Slovakia (dec.), no. 23788/06,
18 September 2007). The Government’s objection must therefore be
dismissed.
. The
Court further considers that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded
within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. There are no other
grounds for its inadmissibility. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
The Court notes that the proceedings are still
pending. Their overall duration has been so far approximately eight years and
more than eight months at two levels of jurisdiction.
The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of
the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of
the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the
case, the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what was at
stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other authorities, Frydlender
v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII).
The Court has frequently found violations of
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in
the present case (see Frydlender, cited above).
Having examined all the material submitted to
it, the Court considers that the Government have not put forward any fact or
argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the
present case. Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers
that in the instant case the length of the proceedings was excessive and failed
to meet the “reasonable time” requirement.
There has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there
has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
The applicant claimed 6,000 euros (EUR) in respect of
non-pecuniary damage.
The Government contested the claim.
The Court considers that the applicant must have sustained
non-pecuniary damage. Ruling on an equitable basis, it awards him EUR 5,200
under that head.
B. Costs and expenses
The applicant also claimed costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and for those incurred before the Court. However, he did not specify the amount and requested that a sum which the Court normally
awards in similar cases be granted.
The Government contested the claim arguing that
the applicant had failed to specify and support it with necessary documents.
According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant
is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has
been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and were
reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the information
in its possession and the above criteria, the Court finds it appropriate to
award the applicant, who was not represented before the Court by a lawyer, EUR
50 for postage and other out-of-pocket expenses which he incurred in the
context of filing and pursuing his application.
C. Default interest
The Court considers it appropriate that the
default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the
European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Declares the application admissible;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;
3. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months:
(i) EUR 5,200 (five thousand and two hundred euros),
plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR 50 (fifty euros), plus any tax that may be
chargeable, in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned
three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above
amounts at
a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during
the default period plus three percentage points;
4. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s
claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 5 February 2013,
pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Marialena Tsirli Luis
López Guerra
Deputy Registrar President
