SECOND SECTION
CASE OF
LÁSZLÓ KÁROLY v. HUNGARY (No. 2)
(Application no.
50218/08)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
12 February 2013
This judgment will become final in the circumstances set
out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to
editorial revision.
In the case of László Károly v. Hungary (no. 2),
The European Court of Human
Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
Guido Raimondi,
President,
Danutė Jočienė,
Dragoljub Popović,
András Sajó,
Işıl Karakaş,
Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque,
Helen Keller, judges,
and Stanley Naismith, Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 22 January 2013,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that
date:
PROCEDURE
The case originated in an application (no.
50218/08) against the Republic of Hungary lodged with the Court under Article
34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Hungarian national, Mr László Károly (“the
applicant”), on 30 September 2008.
The applicant was represented by Mr R. Garay, a
lawyer practising in Budapest. The Hungarian Government (“the Government”) were
represented Mr Z. Tallódi, Agent, Ministry of Public Administration and Justice.
The applicant alleged that he had been
ill-treated by the police.
On 16 March 2011 the application was communicated
to the Government. It was also decided to rule on the admissibility and merits
of the application at the same time (Article 29 § 1).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Budapest.
On 11 September 2000, at about 7 p.m., the
applicant became involved in an animated dispute, of unclear background, with
four plain-clothed police officers. After certain disputed incidents, three of
them handcuffed him, banged his head against the bonnet of his car and then
started to kick him. Subsequently he was committed to the Budapest VIII
District Police Department, where he alleges his beating continued; Sergeant P.
also insulted him verbally. Thereupon he was locked up in a ward for several
hours; later on he was taken to Honvéd Hospital for a medical check-up. The
Department of Traumatology established that he had the following injuries: bruises
on the back of the head and on both sides of the chest; multiple suffusions on
the back; contusions of the renal region on both sides; contusion around the
spleen.
The next day the applicant filed a criminal
complaint against the police officers involved. On 30 June 2003 the Budapest
Investigation Office discontinued the investigation. Relying on the opinion of
forensic expert Dr M., the Office was satisfied that the lesions sustained
by the applicant did not prove that he had been ill-treated.
Simultaneously, criminal proceedings were
initiated against the applicant on charges of drunken driving and violence
against an official. However, on 28 April 2005 he was acquitted.
In the ill-treatment case, the applicant filed a
motion for private prosecution. On 12 October 2006 the Székesfehérvár District
Court acquitted the police officers. The court dismissed the opinions of three
private medical experts supporting the applicant’s version of the events, and
accepted the version of the accused police officers, according to which the car
driven by the applicant on the night of the events had created a traffic
obstacle, he had been drunk, refused to abide by the instructions of the police
officers and insulted them, and the injuries he had sustained had been caused
by lawful coercion.
On 24 April 2008 the Győr Court of Appeal dismissed
the applicant’s appeal, arguing that the police measure was necessary and
proportionate. It held inter alia as follows:
“... [T]he private substitute prosecutor’s statement of serious
and lasting ill-treatment could not be verified by any of the experts. They
all, however, stated that the injuries [sustained] could result from the
applicant’s resistance to the coercive measure and the fact that he had need to
be forced down on the ground.”
In the context of the incident, the applicant
also brought an official liability action against the Budapest Police
Department, the Attorney General’s Office and other respondents.
On 28 January 2008 the Budapest Regional Court dismissed the
claim. On appeal, on 18 November 2008 the Budapest Court of Appeal reversed
this judgment and ordered each of the two main respondents to pay the applicant
500,000 Hungarian forints
as compensation for having unlawfully prosecuted him for drunken driving and for
violence against an official. Without addressing the issue of the alleged
police brutality, the Court of Appeal established that there had been
irregularities concerning the measuring of the applicant’s level of blood
alcohol, noted that it had not been sufficiently clarified if he had been in
the act of driving at all, and found that his conduct had not been proven to
have physically countered the police measure in question.
On 29 March 2010 the Supreme Court upheld this judgment.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE
CONVENTION
The applicant complained that the brutality of the
police measure applied during his apprehension amounted to inhuman treatment in
breach of Article 3 of the Convention. He also relied on Articles 5, 6 and 13
of the Convention, without developing these complaints.
The Court considers that the application falls to be examined
under Article 3 alone, which reads as follows:
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment.”
The Government contested that argument.
A. Admissibility
The Court notes that the application is not
manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the
Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds.
It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
The Government submitted that the case had been
adequately and thoroughly examined in two different court proceedings. In
consequence of comprehensive taking of evidence, the Székesfehérvár District
Court had acquitted the applicant of drunken driving and violence against an
official, while the Budapest Regional Court had also acquitted the police
officers involved of the applicant’s charges. For the Government, it followed
from this that the applicant’s version of events was not supported by evidence
beyond any doubt. The Government noted that the applicant had admitted to
having had a quarrel with the police officers, been drunk and refused to
identify himself. This had served as a legitimate ground for the police action.
Moreover, it had not been contested that the applicant had, in a heated
situation, showed resistance which could be subdued only with physical force. However,
the injuries outlined in the medical report drawn up right after the impugned
police action did not support the applicant’s allegations of lasting and
serious ill-treatment. Maintaining that the police action had been necessary
and proportionate, the Government concluded that the injuries caused by the
coercion used against the applicant could not have attained the level necessary
for finding a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.
The applicant argued that in view of the outcome
of the official liability case (see paragraph 11 above) it was proven that the
police measure in question had been unjustified and that the applicant’s
alleged violent resistance could not have necessitated the use of excessive
force. He also maintained that in the opinion of independent experts the
injuries suffered could not be explained by a simple handcuffing exercise.
The Court reiterates that Article 3 of the
Convention, as the Court has observed on many occasions, enshrines one of the
fundamental values of democratic society. Even in the most difficult of
circumstances, such as the fight against terrorism or crime, the Convention
prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment. Unlike most of the substantive clauses of the Convention and of its
Protocols, Article 3 makes no provision for exceptions and no derogation from
it is permissible under Article 15 even in the event of a public emergency
threatening the life of the nation.
The Court recalls that ill-treatment must attain a minimum
level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The
assessment of this minimum is relative: it depends on all the circumstances of
the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical and/or mental
effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim. In
respect of a person deprived of his liberty, recourse to physical force which
has not been made strictly necessary by his own conduct diminishes human
dignity and is in principle an infringement of the right set forth in Article 3
(see, among many authorities, Tekin v. Turkey, 9 June 1998, §§ 52 and
53, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-IV).
The Court notes that as a result of the disputed
police intervention, the applicant suffered bruises on the back of the head and
on both sides of the chest; multiple suffusions on the back; contusions of the
renal region on both sides; and contusion around the spleen (see paragraph 6
above).
The Court considers that the injuries suffered
by the applicant were sufficiently serious to amount to inhuman treatment
within the scope of Article 3.
It remains to be considered whether the State should be held
responsible under Article 3 for these injuries.
In view of the findings of the domestic courts
in the official liability case (see paragraph 11 above) according to which the
applicant’s behaviour had not warranted the police’s use of force, the Court is
not persuaded by the Government’s arguments designed to justify the authorities
on this basis (see paragraph 15 above). Indeed, since it has been established
by the Court of Appeal that his conduct cannot be taken to have physically
countered the police measure in question - the very lawfulness of which was
also open to doubt - the Court cannot but conclude that the use of force,
resulting in the applicant’s injuries and suffering, amounted to inhuman
treatment for which the State bore responsibility.
The foregoing considerations are sufficient to
enable the Court to conclude that there has been a violation of Article 3 of
the Convention.
II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article 41 of the
Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there
has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial
reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction
to the injured party.”
A. Damage
The applicant claimed an unspecified, “large”
amount of money in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
The Government contested this claim.
The Court considers that the applicant must have
suffered some non-pecuniary damage and awards him 5,000 euros (EUR) under this
head.
B. Costs and expenses
The applicant also claimed EUR 25,000 for the
costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and EUR 7,000 for those
incurred before the Court.
The Government contested these claims.
According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant
is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has
been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are
reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the
documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it
reasonable to award the sum of EUR 3,000 covering costs under all heads.
C. Default interest
The Court considers it appropriate that the
default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the
European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Declares the application admissible;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of
Article 3 of the Convention;
3. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at
the rate applicable at the date of settlement:
(i) EUR 5,000 (five thousand euros), plus any tax
that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR 3,000 (three thousand euros), plus any tax
that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned
three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above
amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central
Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
4. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s
claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 12 February
2013, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Stanley Naismith Guido
Raimondi
Registrar President
