SECOND SECTION
CASE OF
ŞÜKRAN AYDIN AND OTHERS v. TURKEY
(Applications nos.
49197/06, 23196/07, 50242/08, 60912/08 and 14871/09)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
22 January 2013
This judgment will become
final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the
Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Şükran Aydın and Others v. Turkey,
The European Court of Human
Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
Guido Raimondi, President,
Danutė Jočienė,
Peer Lorenzen,
Dragoljub Popović,
Işıl Karakaş,
Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque,
Helen Keller, judges,
and Stanley Naismith, Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 4 December 2012,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that
date:
PROCEDURE
The case originated in five applications
(nos. 49197/06, 23196/07, 50242/08, 60912/08 and 14871/09) against the
Republic of Turkey lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by
five Turkish nationals, Ms Şükran Aydın, Ms Ayşe Gökkan, Mr
Ayhan Erkmen, Mr Orhan Miroğlu and Mr Mesut Bektaş (“the
applicants”), on 28 November 2006, 28 May 2007, 6 October 2008, 5
November 2008 and 10 February 2009 respectively.
The applicants were represented by Mr M.A.
Altunkalem, a lawyer practising in Diyarbakır (the first applicant), Ms R.
Doğan Yıldız and Mr Y. Aydın, lawyers practising
in Istanbul (the second applicant), Mr O. Gündoğdu, a lawyer
practising in Kars (the third applicant), Mr C. Kayhan, a lawyer
practising in Ankara (the fourth applicant) and Ms M.D. Bektaş
and Mr E. Ürküt, lawyers practising in Diyarbakır (the fifth applicant).
The Turkish Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent.
On 4 March 2010 the applications were
communicated to the Government. It was also decided to rule on the
admissibility and merits of the applications at the same time (Article 29 § 1).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The applicants were born in 1957, 1965, 1973,
1952 and 1966 and live in Diyarbakır, Şanlıurfa, Kars, Ankara and Diyarbakır respectively.
A. Application no. 49197/06
At the time of the events the applicant, Ms
Şükran Aydın, was the mayor of Bismil and was standing for election
in the parliamentary elections of 3 November 2002 as a candidate of the
People’s Democratic Party (DEHAP) in the province of Diyarbakır.
On 2 January 2003 criminal proceedings were
initiated against the applicant before the Lice Criminal Court of First
Instance for conduct contrary to Law no. 298 on the fundamental provisions governing
elections and voter registration (Seçimlerin Temel Hükümleri ve Seçmen
Kütükleri Hakkında Kanun), on the ground that on 26 October 2002 she
had campaigned for election in Kurdish.
In the course of the trial the applicant
submitted that she had partly addressed the crowd in Kurdish because the
population was Kurdish and she had taken into consideration the fact that there
were many elderly people and women in the crowd who would not understand
Turkish.
On 26 January 2005 the Lice Criminal Court of
First Instance, having examined the evidence in the case file including the
verbatim transcript of a video recording, found that the applicant had campaigned
for election in Kurdish on 26 October 2002, in breach of section 58 of Law no.
298. In accordance with section 151(2) of Law no. 298, the court sentenced the
applicant to six months’ imprisonment and to a heavy fine. Taking into account
the applicant’s good behaviour during the trial, the circumstances of the case
and her personality, the court first reduced the sentence, then commuted the
prison sentence to a fine and finally ordered a stay of execution as the
applicant had no criminal record and the judge was satisfied that she would not
reoffend.
On 11 May 2006 the Court of Cassation altered the
amount of the fine and upheld the judgment of the first-instance court. The
decision was returned to the registry of the first-instance court on
13 June 2006.
B. Application no. 23196/07
At the time of the events the applicant, Ms
Ayşe Gökkan, was standing for election in the parliamentary elections of 3
November 2002 as a candidate of the People’s Democratic Party (DEHAP) in the
province of Şanlıurfa.
On 6 November 2002 criminal proceedings were
initiated against the applicant before the Viranşehir Criminal Court of
First Instance for conduct contrary to Law no. 298 on the fundamental
provisions governing elections and voter registration, on the ground that on 27
October 2002 she had campaigned for election in Kurdish.
In the course of the trial the applicant
maintained that she had spoken in Kurdish because she was addressing a crowd of
Kurdish women who did not understand Turkish.
On 15 December 2005 the Viranşehir Criminal
Court of First Instance, having examined the evidence in the case file
including the verbatim transcript of a video recording, found that the
applicant had campaigned for election in Kurdish on 27 October 2002, in breach
of section 58 of Law no. 298. In accordance with section 151 of Law no. 298,
the court sentenced the applicant to six months’ imprisonment and to a heavy
fine. Taking into account the circumstances of the case and the applicant’s
personality, the court commuted the prison sentence to a fine and subsequently
ordered a stay of execution as the applicant had no criminal record and the
judge was satisfied that she would not reoffend.
On 29 November 2006 the Court of Cassation declined
to examine the applicant’s appeal on the ground that it was not written in
Turkish. The court altered the amount of the fine and upheld the judgment of
the first-instance court.
C. Application no. 50242/08
On 1 November 2007 criminal proceedings were
initiated against the applicant, Mr Ayhan Erkmen, who was mayor of
Dağpınar, before the Digor Criminal Court of First Instance for conduct
contrary to Law no. 298 on the fundamental provisions governing elections
and voter registration, on the ground that on 18 July 2007 he had given
a speech in Kurdish during a rally organised by Mr Alınak, who was
standing for election in the parliamentary elections as an independent
candidate in the province of Kars.
In the course of the trial the applicant
maintained that he had spoken in Kurdish so that the crowd, many of whom did
not understand Turkish, could understand him better. On 24 March 2008 the Digor
Magistrates’ Court, having examined the evidence in the case file including the
verbatim transcript of a video recording, found that the applicant had spoken
in Kurdish during an election rally on 18 July 2007, in breach of section 58 of
Law no. 298. In accordance with section 151 of Law no. 298, the court
sentenced the applicant to six months’ imprisonment. Taking into account the
applicant’s good behaviour during the trial, the circumstances of the case and
his personality, the court first reduced the sentence to five months and finally
decided to defer delivery of the judgment (hükmün
açıklanmasının geriye bırakılması) for five
years under Article 231 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
On 20 May 2008 the Digor Criminal Court of First
Instance dismissed an objection lodged by the applicant against the above-mentioned
decision.
D. Application no. 60912/08
Criminal proceedings were initiated against the
applicant, Mr Orhan Miroğlu, who had stood for election in the
parliamentary elections as an independent candidate in the province of Mersin, for conduct contrary to Law no. 298 on the fundamental provisions governing
elections and voter registration, on the ground that on 27 June 2007 he
had campaigned for election in Kurdish.
In the course of the trial the applicant
maintained that he had spoken in Turkish but that, since there were people in Mersin who spoke Kurdish, he might have greeted them in Kurdish.
On 3 April 2008 the Mersin Magistrates’ Court,
having examined the evidence in the case file including the verbatim transcript
of a video recording, found that the applicant had spoken partly in Kurdish
during an election rally on 27 June 2007, in breach of section 58 of Law no.
298. In accordance with Article 151 of Law no. 298 the court sentenced the
applicant to six months’ imprisonment. Taking into account the applicant’s good
behaviour during the trial, the circumstances of the case and his personality,
the court decided to defer delivery of the judgment for five years under
Article 231 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
On 7 July 2008 the Mersin Criminal Court of
First Instance dismissed an objection lodged by the applicant against the above-mentioned
decision.
E. Application no. 14871/09
On 16 June 2004 criminal proceedings were
initiated against the applicant, Mr Mesut Bektaş, who had stood for
election in the municipal elections of 28 March 2004 as a candidate of the
Social Democratic People’s Party (SHP) in the province of Siirt, for conduct
contrary to Law no. 298 laying down the fundamental provisions governing
elections and voter registration, on the ground that on 20 March 2004 he
had campaigned for election in Kurdish.
In the course of the trial the applicant
maintained that nothing in the speeches he had given could be construed as
constituting an offence and that it was not illegal to speak in Kurdish.
On 10 May 2005 the Siirt Criminal Court of First
Instance, having examined the evidence in the case file including the verbatim transcript
of a video recording, found that the applicant had spoken in Kurdish during an
election rally on 20 March 2004, in breach of section 58 of Law no. 298. In
accordance with section 151 of Law no. 298 the court sentenced the applicant to
six months’ imprisonment and to a heavy fine. Taking into account the applicant’s
good behaviour during the trial, the circumstances of the case and his
personality, the court first reduced the sentence and then commuted the prison
sentence to a fine. At the request of the principal public prosecutor’s office,
the Siirt Criminal Court of First Instance re-examined the applicant’s
conviction and sentence on 18 October 2005 and sentenced him to an
administrative fine. This decision was quashed by the Court of Cassation on 11 October
2006.
On 6 April 2007 the Siirt Criminal Court of
First Instance found the applicant guilty as charged. In accordance with section
151 of Law no. 298 the court sentenced the applicant to six months’
imprisonment and to a heavy fine. It later commuted the applicant’s prison sentence
to a fine. This decision was quashed by the Court of Cassation on 8 April 2008.
On 27 October 2008 the Siirt Criminal Court of
First Instance decided to defer delivery of the judgment against the applicant
for five years under Article 231 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. On 18
December 2008 the Siirt Assize Court dismissed an objection lodged by the
applicant against the above-mentioned decision.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
At the time of the events the relevant parts of
Law no. 298 read as follows:
Section 58
“... it shall be forbidden to use any language or script other
than Turkish in campaigning for election on radio or television or by other
means.”
Section 151(2)
“... persons acting in breach of the prohibitions specified in
sections 58 ... shall be liable to a prison term ranging from six months to one
year and to payment of a fine of between one million and five million liras.”
By Law no. 5980 of 8 April 2010 the relevant
part of section 58 was amended as follows:
“... During election campaigns political parties and candidates
shall primarily use Turkish.”
III. RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL MATERIALS
Article 27 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights reads, in so far as relevant, as follows:
“In those States in which ethnic ... or linguistic minorities
exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in
community with the other members of their group ... to use their language.”
Article 2 of the United Nations Declaration of 12
December 1992 on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic,
Religious and Linguistic Minorities stipulates, inter alia, as follows:
“1. Persons belonging to national or ethnic and
linguistic minorities ... have the right to ... use their own language, in
private and in public, freely and without interference or any form of
discrimination.
2. Persons belonging to minorities have the right to
participate effectively in ... public life.”
Article 5 of the UNESCO Universal Declaration on
Cultural Diversity of 2 November 2001 reads:
“All
persons have ... the right to express themselves and to create and disseminate
their work in the language of their choice and particularly in their mother
tongue...”
The principle that no prohibition should be
imposed on the use of minority languages during election campaigns is set forth
in the Recommendations of the Second Session of the Forum on Minority Issues, entitled
“Minorities and Effective Political Participation”, held in November 2009
within the United Nations.
“19. There should be no prohibition or unreasonable
restriction placed on the use of any minority language during election
campaigns, although language use should naturally be determined by assessing
how the broadest constituencies possible may be reached. As far as possible,
electoral authorities should provide voting information in both the official
language and those minority languages used by voters in the areas where they
are concentrated.”
The Framework Convention for the Protection of
National Minorities contains several provisions of relevance:
Article 9
“The Parties undertake to recognise that the right to freedom
of expression of every person belonging to a national minority includes freedom
to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas in the
minority language, without interference by public authorities and regardless of
frontiers...”
Article 10
“The Parties undertake to recognize that every person belonging
to a national minority has the right to use freely and without interference his
or her minority language, in private and in public, orally and in writing...”
Article 15
“The Parties shall create the conditions necessary for the
effective participation of persons belonging to national minorities in
cultural, social and economic life and in public affairs, in particular those
affecting them.”
On 27 February 2008 the Advisory
Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities,
in its commentary on the effective participation of persons
belonging to national minorities in cultural, social and economic life and in
public affairs, expressed the following opinion regarding the use
of minority languages in election campaigns:
“77. State Parties should ensure that parties
representing or including persons belonging to national minorities have
adequate opportunities in election campaigning. This may imply the display of
electoral advertising in minority languages. The authorities should also
consider providing opportunities for the use of minority languages in public
service television and radio programmes devoted to election campaigns and on
ballot slips and other electoral material in areas inhabited by persons
belonging to national minorities traditionally or in substantive numbers.”
Point 5.d of Recommendation 273 (2009) of
the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe,
entitled “Equal access to local and regional elections”, recommends as follows:
“[Recommends
that the Committee of Ministers urge the governments of member states:] to invite local and regional
authorities to ensure the availability of electoral material in a regional or
minority language and to give the right to candidates from minority groups to
use their mother tongue in the pre-electoral campaign in order to guarantee
equal access to local and regional elections to members of a minority.”
IV. RELEVANT COMPARATIVE MATERIAL
On the basis of the material available to the
Court in 2010 in respect of twenty-two Contracting States (Albania, Azerbaijan,
Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy,
Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, “the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, Ukraine and the United Kingdom), it appears
that the use of minority languages by candidates speaking during public election
meetings is not subject to criminal sanctions in any of the countries concerned.
THE LAW
I. JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS
The Court notes that all the applicants
complained of their conviction and sentencing under sections 58 and 151 of Law
no. 298 for having spoken Kurdish during an election campaign. Having regard to
the similarity of the applicants’ grievances, the Court is of the view that, in
the interests of the proper administration of justice, the applications should
be joined in accordance with Rule 42 § 1 of the Rules of Court.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 6, 9, 10 AND 11
OF THE CONVENTION AND ARTICLE 3 OF PROTOCOL No. 1
The applicants complained that their conviction
and sentencing simply for speaking Kurdish during an election campaign had been
in breach of their rights under the Convention. In this connection some of the
applicants made lengthy submissions regarding the incompatibility of the
domestic law with international human rights law, including the Convention.
Under this head they relied on the right to a fair trial (Article 6 - only the
fifth applicant), freedom of thought (Article 9 - only the first applicant),
freedom of expression (Article 10 - all the applicants), freedom of assembly
(Article 11 - only the second and fifth applicants) and the right to free
elections (Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 - the second, third and fifth
applicants).
The Court considers that the applicants’
complaints fall to be examined under Article 10 of the Convention alone.
Article 10, in so far as relevant, reads:
“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression.
This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart
information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless
of frontiers...
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries
with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities,
conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are
necessary in a democratic society, ...for the prevention of disorder or crime ....”
A. Admissibility
The Court notes that this complaint is not
manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention.
It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. The parties’ submissions
The Government maintained that there had been no
interference with the exercise of the applicants’ right to freedom of
expression. They submitted, however, that even if the Court were to consider
that there had been such interference, it had been in accordance with the
second paragraph of Article 10. In this connection the Government submitted
that the interference with the applicants’ freedom of expression had been based
on sections 58 and 151 of Law no. 298 and that it had pursued the legitimate
aim of protecting public order. As to whether the interference in question had
been necessary in a democratic society, the Government, quoting various
passages from the Court’s case-law on Article 10, submitted that the
domestic courts had examined the cases carefully and that their findings had
been relevant and sufficient. It considered that the domestic courts’ decisions
in the instant cases fell within the State’s margin of appreciation.
The Government also informed the Court of the
recent amendment to section 58 of Law no. 298 (see paragraph 28 above) and
submitted that, accordingly, the use of languages other than Turkish during
election campaigning no longer constituted an offence.
The applicants maintained their allegations. In
particular, some of the applicants emphasised that they had been convicted and
sentenced simply because they had spoken in their mother tongue and not because
of the content of their speeches, and that the domestic law at the time of the
events had been incompatible with international human rights law, including the
Convention. The recent amendment to the law was mentioned by some of the
applicants, who considered it as evidence that the impugned law had not pursued
a legitimate aim.
2. The Court’s assessment
a) Existence of interference
The Court observes that criminal proceedings
were initiated against the applicants for having spoken in Kurdish during an
election campaign. They were convicted. Enforcement of the sentences of Ms
Şükran Aydın and Ms Ayşe Gökkan was stayed. In respect of the
three other applicants, Mr Ayhan Erkmen, Mr Orhan Miroğlu and Mr
Mesut Bektaş, the domestic courts decided to defer delivery of the judgments
against them for five years. In view of the above, the Court considers that the
prohibition contained in section 58 of Law no. 298 at the material time
amounted to interference with the right to freedom of expression such that it
directly affected the applicants.
Such interference will contravene Article 10 of
the Convention unless it is “prescribed by law”, pursues one or more of the
legitimate aims prescribed by paragraph 2 of Article 10, and is “necessary in a
democratic society” for achieving such aim or aims.
b) Prescribed by law
The Court considers that the interference was
prescribed by law, namely by section 58 of Law no. 298.
c) Legitimate aim
The Court, due to the absence of any elaborate
reasoning on the part of the Government, is not entirely convinced that the measures taken against the applicants, in accordance with
section 58 of Law no. 298, can be said to have been in pursuance of the aim
referred to by the Government, namely the prevention of disorder. However, the
Court does not consider it necessary to determine this question because, in any
event, the key issue to be examined is whether the interference was “necessary
in a democratic society” (see, for example, Açık and Others v. Turkey, no. 31451/03, § 42, 13 January 2009).
d) Necessary in a democratic society
The test of “necessity in a democratic society”
requires the Court to determine whether the interference complained of
corresponded to a “pressing social need”. The Contracting States have a certain
margin of appreciation in assessing whether such a need exists, but it goes
hand in hand with European supervision, embracing both the legislation and the
decisions applying it, even those given by an independent court. The Court is
therefore empowered to give the final ruling on whether a “restriction” is
reconcilable with freedom of expression as protected by Article 10 (see, among
many other authorities, Perna v.
Italy [GC], no.
48898/99, § 39, ECHR 2003-V, and Association
Ekin v. France, no. 39288/98, § 56, ECHR 2001-VIII).
However, the Court’s task in exercising its
supervisory function is not to take the place of the competent domestic courts
but rather to review under Article 10 the decisions they have taken pursuant to
their power of appreciation (see Fressoz and Roire v. France [GC], no.
29183/95, § 45, ECHR 1999-I). In particular, the Court must determine
whether the reasons adduced by the national authorities to justify the
interference were “relevant and sufficient” and whether the measure taken was
“proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued” (see Chauvy and Others v.
France, no. 64915/01, § 70, ECHR 2004-VI). In doing so, the
Court has to satisfy itself that the national authorities, basing themselves on
an acceptable assessment of the relevant facts, applied standards which were in
conformity with the principles embodied in Article 10 (see, among many other
authorities, Zana v. Turkey, 25 November 1997, § 51, Reports of
Judgments and Decisions 1997-VII).
At the outset, the Court reiterates that with
the exception of the specific rights stated in Articles 5 § 2 (the right to be
informed promptly, in a language which one understands, of the reasons for one’s
arrest) and 6 § 3 (a) and (e) (the right to be informed
promptly, in a language which one understands, of the nature and cause of the
accusation against one and the right to have the assistance of an interpreter
if one cannot understand or speak the language used in court), the Convention
does not guarantee per se the right to use a particular language in
communications with public authorities or the right to receive information in a
language of one’s choice (see Mentzen v. Latvia (dec.), no. 71074/01,
ECHR 2004-XII and Kozlovs v. Latvia (dec.), no. 50835/99, 10
January 2002). In this connection, it also underlines that the Convention does
not guarantee the right to use a particular language in communications with
public authorities for electoral purposes (see Fryske Nasjonale Partij and
Others v the Netherlands, no. 11100/84, Commission decision of 12
December 1985, and Association “Andecha Astur” v. Spain, no. 34184/96,
Commission decision of 7 July 1997). The Court further reaffirms that
matters such as the choice of a parliamentary assembly’s working language falls
outside the scope of Article 10 (see, for example, Birk-Levy v. France
(dec.), no. 39426/06, 21 September 2010).
. Moreover,
the Court further stresses that as Contracting States’ linguistic policies are
influenced by a multitude of factors of a historical, linguistic,
religious and cultural nature, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to
find a common denominator. Therefore, it considers that the margin of
appreciation which the State authorities enjoy in this sphere is particularly
wide (see, mutatis mutandis, Mentzen, cited above; Bulgakov
v. Ukraine, no. 59894/00, §§ 43-44, 11 September 2007; and Baylac-Ferrer
and Suarez v. France (dec.), no. 27977/04, 25 September 2008).
. Turning
to the facts of the present cases, the Court finds that they are
distinguishable from the cases cited above because they do not concern the use
of an unofficial language in the context of communications with public
authorities or before official institutions. Rather, the cases concern a
linguistic restriction imposed on persons in their relations with other private
individuals, albeit in the context of public meetings during election
campaigns. In this connection, the Court reiterates that Article 10 encompasses
the freedom to receive and impart information and ideas in any language that
allows persons to participate in the public exchange of all varieties of
cultural, political and social information and ideas (see Eğitim ve
Bilim Emekçileri sendikası v. Turkey, no. 20641/05, § 73, 25
September 2012) and in such contexts, language as a medium of expression
undoubtedly deserves protection under Article 10.
. In the instant case, the Court considers that the main
issue before it is not whether a State should
allow the use of any language other than the official language or languages during
election campaigns in general but rather, where a restriction on such use
exists, whether its scope and the manner in which it is applied are compatible
with Article 10 standards. In this connection, the Court observes that section
58 of Law no. 298 at the material time contained a blanket prohibition on the
use of any language other than Turkish (the official language) in election
campaigning. Breaches of this provision entailed criminal sanctions ranging
from six months to one year and payment of a fine under section 151 of the same
law.
The Court observes that, contrary to the
Government’s arguments, the absolute nature of the ban in question
deprived the domestic courts of their power to exercise proper judicial
scrutiny. This is manifested clearly by the fact that the domestic courts’
examination of the cases did not go beyond checking verbatim records of video
or other recordings of the election rally to spot whether or not the applicants
spoke some Kurdish during an election period. It must therefore establish the
necessity of the interference in the present cases by examining whether the ban
on use of unofficial languages in campaigning for election in section 58 of Law
no. 298 as it stood at the material time was necessary in a democratic society.
The Court accepts that, in principle, States are
entitled to regulate the use of languages by candidates and other persons
during election campaigns and, if need be, impose certain reasonable
restrictions. However, a regulatory framework consisting of a total prohibition
on the use of unofficial languages coupled with criminal sanctions cannot be
held to be compatible with the essential values of a democratic society, such
as freedom of expression as guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention. In this
connection, the Court underlines that the language used by the applicants in
the instant case, namely Kurdish, constituted their own mother tongue as well
as the mother tongue of the population which they addressed. Some of the
applicants, in their submissions to the domestic courts, referred to the fact
that many persons in the crowd, notably the elderly and women, did not
understand Turkish, the official language of the State. These facts are not
refuted by the Government. Having regard to the specific context of elections
and to the fact that free elections are inconceivable without the free
circulation of political opinions and information (see, for example,
Communist Party of Russia and Others v. Russia, no. 29400/05, § 79, 19 June 2012), the
Court considers that the right to impart one’s political views and ideas and
the right of others to receive them would be meaningless, if the possibility to
use the language which could properly convey these views and ideas was
diminished due to the threat of criminal sanctions. In this connection, the
Court takes note that, according to the material available to it, Turkey was the only country out of twenty-two Contracting States to make the use of
minority languages by candidates speaking during public election meetings
subject to criminal penalties. It welcomes, in this respect, the fact that the
impugned legislation has now been amended (see paragraph 28).
In these circumstances and
notwithstanding the national authorities’ margin of appreciation, the
Court finds that the ban in question did not meet a pressing social need and
was not proportionate to the legitimate aim provided by the Government in their
observations. The Court therefore concludes that the interference with the
applicants’ freedom of expression arising from the ban in section 58 of Law no.
298 as it stood at the material time cannot be regarded as “necessary in a
democratic society”. There has therefore been a violation of Article 10 of the
Convention.
III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14 OF THE
CONVENTION
The first, second and fifth applicants and, in
substance, the fourth applicant further alleged that their conviction and
sentencing simply for speaking Kurdish during an election campaign had also
violated their right to freedom from discrimination under Article 14 of the
Convention, which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:
“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the]
Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as ...
language, religion ... association with a national minority.”
The Court decided to raise this issue of its own
motion in respect of the third applicant.
The Government argued that the relevant
provisions of Law no. 298 were applicable to everyone without
discrimination and that the measure imposed on the applicants did not therefore
amount to a form of “discrimination” contrary to the Convention.
The applicants maintained their allegations. In
this connection the first, second and fifth applicants claimed that the legal
provision in question had applied only to Kurds and to the Kurdish language.
The second and fifth applicants alleged that no one speaking another
language, for example English, would have been prosecuted. The fifth applicant
also maintained that the Prime Minister had been allowed to speak in Kurdish at
public meetings without being subject to prosecution.
The Court notes that this complaint is linked to
that examined above and must therefore likewise be declared admissible.
In view of its finding of
a violation of Article 10 of the Convention (see paragraph 56 above), the Court
considers that it is not necessary to rule on the applicants’ complaints under Article 14 of the
Convention taken in conjunction with Article 10.
IV. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
Some of the applicants made additional
complaints. The second applicant argued, under Article 6 of the Convention,
that she had been denied a fair hearing on account of the fact that her appeal,
submitted in Kurdish, had not been examined by the Court of Cassation because
it had not been submitted in Turkish (the official language of Turkey). The
third applicant complained, under Article 11 of the Convention, about the
taping of the rally of 18 July 2007 by gendarmes, claiming that this had had a
negative impact on him, on the other speakers and on the participants and had
deterred others from participating in the rally. The fourth applicant submitted,
under Article 13 of the Convention, that there had been no effective remedy in
domestic law by which he could challenge his conviction, owing to the lack of
any possibility of appeal to the Court of Cassation.
The Court finds, in the light of all the
material in its possession, that the applicants’ complaints in this regard do
not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out
in the Convention or its Protocols. It follows that this part of the
applications must be declared inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded,
pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
V. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article 41 of the
Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there
has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial
reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction
to the injured party.”
A. Damage
The first applicant, Ms Aydın, claimed
20,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
The second applicant, Ms Gökhan, claimed
pecuniary damage, the amount of which she left to the discretion of the Court.
She further claimed EUR 10,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
The third applicant, Mr Erkmen, claimed a total of
EUR 45,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage for the alleged violation of his
rights under Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention and Article 3 of Protocol No.
1.
The fourth applicant, Mr Miroğlu, claimed
EUR 10,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
The fifth applicant, Mr Bektaş, claimed
pecuniary damage, the amount of which he left to the discretion of the Court.
He further claimed 50,000 Turkish liras (TRY) (approximately EUR 25,226) in
respect of non-pecuniary damage.
The Government contested the above amounts.
The Court observes that the second and fifth
applicants did not submit any evidence enabling the Court to assess and
calculate the alleged pecuniary damage caused by the violation found in the
instant case; it therefore rejects their claims under this head.
The Court considers that
the applicants suffered non-pecuniary damage as a result of the
interference with their freedom of expression arising from the ban in section
58 of Law no. 298, which was incompatible with Convention
principles. The damage cannot be sufficiently compensated by the finding of a
violation. Taking into account the circumstances of the case and having regard
to its case-law, the Court awards each applicant EUR 10,000 in respect of non-pecuniary
damage.
B. Costs and expenses
The first applicant claimed EUR 3,000 in respect
of costs and expenses incurred in the domestic proceedings and EUR 3,635 for
those incurred before the Court. In support of her claims the applicant submitted
a schedule of costs prepared by her lawyer and the Diyarbakır Bar
Association’s list of recommended minimum fees.
The second applicant, relying on the Istanbul
Bar Association’s list of recommended minimum fees, claimed EUR 5,000 in
respect of costs and expenses incurred before the Court.
The third applicant claimed TRY 9,600
(approximately EUR 4,872) in respect of costs and expenses incurred before the
Court. In support of his claims the applicant submitted a schedule of costs
prepared by his lawyer and the Kars Bar Association’s list of recommended
minimum fees. He further submitted invoices relating to translation costs.
The fourth applicant claimed EUR 10,000 in
respect of costs and expenses incurred in the domestic proceedings and EUR
8,000 for those incurred before the Court. In support of his claims the
applicant relied on the Ankara Bar Association’s list of recommended minimum
fees.
The fifth applicant claimed TRY 9,000
(approximately EUR 4,500) in respect of costs and expenses incurred before the
Court. In support of his claims the applicant submitted a schedule of costs
prepared by his lawyer and the Diyarbakır Bar Association’s list of
recommended minimum fees.
The Government contested the above amounts.
According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant
is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has
been shown that these were actually and necessarily incurred and were
reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the
documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it
reasonable to award the following sums: EUR 1,500 each to Ms Gökkan and Mr
Miroğlu, EUR 2,000 each to Ms Aydın and Mr Bektaş, and EUR
3,000 to Mr Erkmen.
Finally, the Court considers unsubstantiated and
therefore rejects the first and the fourth applicants’ claims regarding costs
and expenses incurred before the domestic courts.
C. Default interest
The Court considers it appropriate that the
default interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European
Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT
1. Decides
unanimously to join the applications;
2. Declares unanimously the complaints
concerning alleged interference with the applicants’ freedom of expression and
freedom from discrimination admissible and the remainder of the complaints
inadmissible;
3. Holds unanimously that there has been a
violation of Article 10 of the Convention;
4. Holds by six votes to one that there is no
need to examine the complaint under Article 14 of the Convention;
5. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the
applicants, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes
final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following
amounts, to be converted into the currency of the
respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:
(i) EUR 10,000 (ten thousand euros) to each
applicant, plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary
damage;
(ii) EUR 1,500 (one thousand five hundred euros)
each to Ms Gökkan and Mr Miroğlu, EUR 2,000 (two thousand euros) each
to Ms Aydın and Mr Bektaş and EUR 3,000 (three thousand euros) to Mr
Erkmen, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicants, in respect of
costs and expenses;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned
three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above
amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central
Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
6. Dismisses the remainder of the applicants’
claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 22 January 2013,
pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Stanley Naismith Guido
Raimondi Registrar President
In accordance with Article 45
§ 2 of the Convention and Rule 74 § 2 of the Rules of Court, the separate
opinion of Judge H. Keller is annexed to this judgment.
G.R.A.
S.H.N
PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE KELLER
1. The majority of the Court rightly held that
Article 10 had been violated. Section 58 of Law no. 298 per se violates
the right to freedom of expression. I could not agree more with this finding,
as making it a criminal offence to use a language other than Turkish in
campaigning for election contravenes the very essence of Article 10.
2. In light of this finding, the majority took the
view that there was no need to examine the complaint under Article 14 (in
conjunction with Article 10). To my regret, I am unable to follow the
opinion of the majority in this respect.
3. I certainly understand that, in some cases, the
Court may wish to limit the scope of a ruling for reasons of procedural
economy. However, in the instant case this approach appears to be unduly
reductive. The use of language in all areas of life constitutes a core human
rights issue. Particularly in minority situations, the use of language is a
highly sensitive matter. It is therefore vital that the Court take a thorough
look at these issues.
4. In Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom, the Court found that a complaint against the prohibition of
homosexual acts under Article 14 “amounts in effect to the same complaint,
albeit seen from a different angle, that the Court has already considered in
relation to Article 8”. It therefore concluded that “there is no call to rule
on the merits of a particular issue which is part of and absorbed by a wider
issue” and that “there is no useful legal purpose to be served in determining
whether he has in addition suffered discrimination as compared with other
persons who are subject to lesser limitations on the same right. This being so,
it cannot be said that a clear inequality of treatment remains a fundamental
aspect of the case”[1].
This approach from 1981 is out of date nowadays.
If a clear inequality of treatment in the enjoyment of the right in question is
a fundamental aspect of the case, the Court has to consider the issue under
Article 14 as well.
The complaint under Article 14 in conjunction with another Convention
right is an autonomous one
to which the Court must give autonomous meaning.
5. In my view, the discrimination regarding the use
of a particular language is a fundamental aspect in this case: the applicants
formulated an arguable claim of indirect discrimination (see paragraphs 6 et
seq. below), the Government failed to respond to that claim (see paragraphs 10
and 11 below) and therefore the Government bear the burden of proof (see
paragraph 12 below).
II. Arguable claim and prima facie evidence
6. The applicants argued, inter alia, that section
58 of Law no. 298 applied only to Kurds and to the Kurdish language and that persons
were not prosecuted for using any other language (see paragraph 60 of the
judgment). This is a serious allegation, one which was communicated to the
Turkish Government.
7. It is true that the applicants did not provide
any statistical data regarding the discriminatory application or effect of section
58 of Law no. 298. However, while the Court has previously held that
statistical data may underpin a claim under Article 14, it has also found that such
data are not strictly necessary in order to establish an arguable claim.
8. The mere fact that the applicants were all
Kurdish, were living in different cities and were all prosecuted for using of
the Kurdish language is a very strong indication of the existence of indirect
discrimination.
9. Moreover, according to the Court’s case-law, it
is not for the applicant but rather for the Government to gather the relevant
materials when these lie wholly or in large part within the exclusive knowledge
of the authorities[6].
The applicants in the case at hand could only have gathered the relevant data
by requesting them from the public prosecutors’ offices and courts in Turkey. They would have depended completely on the goodwill of the national authorities. In
such a situation, the principle affirmanti incumbit probatio cannot be applied
rigorously.
III. Shifting of the burden of proof
10. Once applicants alleging indirect
discrimination establish a prima facie case thereof, this creates a rebuttable
presumption that the effect of a practice is discriminatory, and the burden
then shifts to the respondent State, which must show that the difference in
treatment is not discriminatory.
11. In the case at hand, the Government’s answer was
confined to stating that the law was applicable to all persons without
discrimination on the basis of race, colour, sex, political opinion, religion
or philosophical belief. According to the Turkish Government, the applicants’
ethnic origin was not taken into account by the domestic courts in adjudicating
the matter.
12. This, however, is not the point. The applicants
claim indirect discrimination on the basis of a law which was worded in
ethnically neutral terms but applied in a discriminatory way. Moreover, the
Government fail to cite even a single case in which individuals were prosecuted
for using a language other than Kurdish.
13. Therefore, I am of the
opinion that the Court should have examined the issue under Article 14. After having
assessed all the relevant elements and drawing inferences from the Government’s
failure to put forward any arguments showing that the impugned law was applied
in a non discriminatory manner, the Court should have come to the conclusion
that there had been a violation of Article 10 taken together with Article 14 of
the Convention.
