LEMO AND OTHERS v. CROATIA - 3925/10 - Committee Judgment [2014] ECHR 755 (10 July 2014)

In the case of Lemo and Others v. Croatia,

The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:

          Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska, President,
          Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos,
          Ksenija Turković, judges,
and André Wampach, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having deliberated in private on 17 June 2014,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

PROCEDURE

1. The case originated in eight applications (nos. 3925/10, 3955/10, 3974/10, 4009/10, 4054, 4128/10, 4132/10 and 4133/10) against the Republic of Croatia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by eight Croatian nationals, (“the applicants”), on the dates listed in Annex I to this judgment.

2. The applicants were represented by Ms D. Košta, a lawyer practising in Split. The Croatian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms Š. Stažik.

3. The applicants alleged, in particular, that their right to respect for their home was violated, contrary to Article 8 of the Convention.

4. On 4 March 2013 the applications were communicated to the Government.

THE FACTS

I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

5. The applicants’ personal details are listed in Annex I to this judgment.

A. Background to the case

6. On various unspecified dates during the 1970-ties the applicants moved into flats in Mlini, Dubrovnik, as employees of the publicly-owned enterprise Mlini Hotels.

7. On 3 June 1991 Parliament enacted the Protected Tenancies (Sale to Occupier) Act (Zakon o prodaji stanova na kojima postoji stanarsko pravo), which regulated the sale of publicly-owned flats previously let under protected tenancies, giving the right to holders of such tenancies of publicly-owned flats to purchase them from the provider of the flat under favourable conditions.

8. Sometime after 1991 the Mlini Hotels were privatised.

9. On various unspecified dates during the 1990-ies the applicants sought to purchase their flats from Mlini Hotels. Their requests were refused.

B. Civil proceedings

10. On various dates during the 2000-ies Mlini Hotels brought separate civil actions in the Dubrovnik Municipal Court against each of the applicants, seeking their eviction on the ground that they had no legal basis to occupy the flats.

11. The applicants lodged their counterclaims, seeking recognition of their protected tenancy on the flats they occupied as well as judgments in lieu of the contracts of sale. They argued that they had been occupying the flats at issue for lengthy periods and paid the rent and all utility bills and had the right to permanently occupy those flats.

12. On various dates the Dubrovnik Municipal Court reached decisions in the applicants’ cases. It accepted the plaintiff’s claims and dismissed the applicants’ counterclaims on the ground that the premises in dispute were not flats within the meaning of section 6 § 1(1) of the Housing Act because they did not concern a single construction unit. Furthermore, it held that the premises in question were situated in the plaintiff’s personal building designed for temporary accommodation for the plaintiff’s employees on which the applicants could not acquire protected tenancies.

13. The applicants lodged their appeals arguing that they had been living in the flats at issue for lengthy periods, that they had no other place to live and that the flats had been allocated to them for permanent occupation. The first-instance judgments were all upheld by the Dubrovnik County Court.

14. The applicants all lodged their constitutional complaints whereby they challenged the lower courts’ judgments ordering their eviction.

15. The applicants were all forcefully evicted from the flats owned by the Mlini Hotels on 19 November 2010.

II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW

16. The relevant provisions of the Housing Act (Zakon o stambenim odnosima, Official Gazette nos. 51/1985, 42/1986, 22/1992 and 70/1993) read as follows:

Section 8

“A protected tenancy cannot be acquired in respect of:

1. Flats designated for temporary or provisional accommodation...”

17. The Protected Tenancies (Sale to Occupier) Act (Zakon o prodaji stanova na kojima postoji stanarsko pravo, Official Gazette no. 27/1991 with further amendments - “the Act”) regulates the conditions of sale of flats let under protected tenancies.

The relevant provision of the Act provides as follows:

Section 4

“Every holder of a specially protected tenancy (hereinafter ‘the tenant’) may submit a written application to purchase a flat to the ... owner (‘the seller’) ... and the seller shall be obliged to sell the flat.”

18. Section 161 paragraph 1 of the Property Act (Zakon o vlasništvu i drugim stvarnim pravima, Official Gazette no 91/1996) reads as follows:

“An owner has the right to seek repossession of his or her property from a person in whose possession it is.”

19. The relevant part of the Civil Procedure Act (Zakon o parničnom postupku, Official Gazette of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia nos. 4/1977, 36/1977 (corrigendum), 36/1980, 69/1982, 58/1984, 74/1987, 57/1989, 20/1990, 27/1990 and 35/1991, and the Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia nos. 53/1991, 91/1992, 58/1993, 112/1999, 88/2001, 117/2003, 88/2005, 2/2007, 84/2008 and 123/2008) provides as follows:

Reopening of proceedings following a final judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg finding a violation of a fundamental human right or freedom

Section 428a

“(1) When the European Court of Human Rights has found a violation of a human right or fundamental freedom guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms or the additional protocols thereto ratified by the Republic of Croatia, a party may, within thirty days of the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights becoming final, file a petition with the court in the Republic of Croatia which adjudicated in the first instance in the proceedings in which the decision violating the human right or fundamental freedom was rendered, to set aside the decision by which the human right or fundamental freedom was violated.

(2) The proceedings referred to in paragraph 1 of this section shall be conducted by applying, mutatis mutandis, the provisions on the reopening of proceedings.

(3) In the reopened proceedings the courts are required to respect the legal opinions expressed in the final judgment of the European Court of Human Rights finding a violation of a fundamental human right or freedom.”

THE LAW

I. JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS

20. In view of the similarity of the applications set out in the Appendix in terms of the principal legal issues raised, the Court finds it appropriate to join them.

II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION

21. The applicants complained that the national courts had violated their right to respect for their home. They relied on Article 8 of the Convention, the relevant part of which provides:

“1. Everyone has the right to respect for ... his home ...

2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”

A. Admissibility

1. The parties’ arguments

22. The Government argued that the applicants had failed to exhaust domestic remedies. They contended that they had not presented before the national courts any complaint concerning their right to respect for their home.

23. The applicants replied that they had exhausted all available remedies before the national courts.

2. The Court’s assessment

24. The Court reiterates that the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies normally requires that the complaints intended to be made subsequently at the international level should have been raised before the domestic courts, at least in substance and in compliance with the formal requirements and time-limits laid down in domestic law. The object of the rule on exhaustion of domestic remedies is to allow the national authorities (primarily the judicial authorities) to address an allegation that a Convention right has been violated and, where appropriate, to afford redress before that allegation is submitted to the Court. In so far as there exists at national level a remedy enabling the national courts to address, at least in substance, any argument as to an alleged violation of a Convention right, it is that remedy which should be used (see Azinas v. Cyprus [GC], no. 56679/00, § 38, ECHR 2004-III).

25. Turning to the circumstances of the present case the Court notes that the applicants in their submissions before the national courts, in substance, complained about their eviction from the place where they had resided for lengthy periods. In these circumstances, the Court is satisfied that the applicants exhausted domestic remedies in respect of their complaint under Article 8 of the Convention concerning their right to respect for their home (see, by way of comparison, Paulić v. Croatia, no. 3572/06, §§ 25 and 26, 22 October 2009; Orlić v. Croatia, no. 48833/07, §§ 40 and 41, 21 June 2011; and Brežec v. Croatia, no. 7177/10, § 27, 18 July 2013). Accordingly, the complaint cannot be dismissed for failure to exhaust domestic remedies.

26. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

B. Merits

1. The parties’ arguments

27. The applicants argued that the flats at issue had been socially-owned flats which had been given to them within the system of specially protected tenancies in the former Yugoslavia. They paid rent to the State and were considered to have their housing needs met. However, the national courts had simply found that they had no right to occupy those flats and had ordered their eviction.

28. The Government accepted that the flats at issue were the applicants’ home and that ordering their eviction amounted to an interference with their right to respect for their home. However, since the applicants had not brought any arguments before the national courts concerning their right to respect for their home, the national courts had not been obliged to carry out the proportionality test.

2. The Court’s assessment

(a) Whether a right protected by Article 8 is in issue

29. The first question the Court has to address is whether the applicants may arguably claim that they had a right protected by Article 8 and - more specifically in the present case - whether the flats in question may be considered as the applicants’ home.

30. The Convention organs’ case-law is clear on the point that the concept of “home” within the meaning of Article 8 is not limited to those premises which are lawfully occupied or which have been lawfully established. “Home” is an autonomous concept which does not depend on classification under domestic law. Whether or not a particular premise constitutes a “home” which attracts the protection of Article 8 § 1 will depend on the factual circumstances, namely, the existence of sufficient and continuous links with a specific place (see Buckley v. the United Kingdom, 25 September 1996, Reports 1996-IV, §§ 52-54, and Commission’s report of 11 January 1995, § 63; Gillow v. the United Kingdom, 24 November 1986, § 46, Series A no. 109; Wiggins v. the United Kingdom, no. 7456/76, Commission decision of 8 February 1978, DR 13, p. 40; and Prokopovich v. Russia, no. 58255/00, § 36, ECHR 2004-XI (extracts)). Thus, whether a property is to be classified as a “home” is a question of fact and does not depend on the lawfulness of the occupation under domestic law (see McCann v. the United Kingdom, no. 19009/04, § 46, 13 May 2008).

31. As to the present case, it is undisputed that the applicants had lived in the flat in question for lengthy periods before their eviction. Having regard to this, the Court finds that the applicants had sufficient and continuous links with the flats at issue for them to be considered their “home” for the purposes of Article 8 of the Convention.

(b) Whether there has been an interference with the applicant’s right to respect for her home

32. The Court has so far adopted several judgments where it assessed the issue of an interference with an applicant’s right to respect for his or her home in the circumstances where an eviction order had been issued. In the case of Stanková v. Slovakia (no. 7205/02, 9 October 2007) the Court held as follows:

“57. The Court notes, and it has not been disputed between the parties, that the obligation on the applicant to leave the flat amounted to an interference with her right to respect for her home which was based on the relevant provisions of the Civil Code and the Executions Order 1995 ...”

33. Subsequently the Court held in McCann, cited above:

“47. It was further agreed that the effect of the notice to quit which was served by the applicant’s wife on the local authority, together with the possession proceedings which the local authority brought, was to interfere with the applicant’s right to respect for his home.”

34. Further, the Court has held in Ćosić v. Croatia (no. 28261/06, 15 January 2009):

“18. The Court considers that the obligation on the applicant to vacate the flat amounted to an interference with her right to respect for her home, notwithstanding the fact that the judgment ordering the applicant’s eviction has not yet been executed.”

35. The Court sees no reason to depart from this approach in the present case. It notes that eviction orders were issued against the applicants and they became final when the Dubrovnik County Court upheld the first instance judgments. The Court considers that the eviction orders issued against the applicants to leave the flats amounted to an interference with their right to respect for their home.

36. The applicants were ordered to vacate the flats in question by the national courts under Croatian laws regulating ownership, which allow an owner to seek repossession of his or her property when the possessor has no legal grounds for possession (see the relevant provision of the Property Act in paragraph 20 above).

37. In this connection the Court first reiterates that it is in the first place for the national authorities, notably the courts, to interpret and apply the domestic law, even in those fields where the Convention “incorporates” the rules of that law since the national authorities are, in the nature of things, particularly qualified to settle the issues arising in this connection (see, mutatis mutandis, Winterwerp v. the Netherlands, 24 October 1979, § 46, Series A no. 33). The Court will not substitute its own interpretation for theirs in the absence of arbitrariness (see, for example, Tejedor García v. Spain, 16 December 1997, § 31, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-VIII).

38. The possession orders in question were issued by the national courts under Croatian laws regulating ownership which allow an owner to seek repossession of his or her property when the possessor has no legal grounds for the possession. The national courts relied on section 161 of the Property Act when ordering the applicants’ eviction. The Court, noting that its power to review compliance with domestic law is limited (see, among other authorities, Allan Jacobsson v. Sweden (no. 1), 25 October 1989, Series A no. 163, p. 17, § 57), is thus satisfied that the national courts’ decisions ordering the applicants’ eviction were in accordance with domestic law (see Ćosić, cited above, § 19). The interference in question therefore pursued the legitimate aim of the protection of the rights of the owner of the flat (see Orlić, cited above, § 62).

(d) Whether the interference was “necessary in a democratic society”

39. The central question in this case is, therefore, whether the interference was proportionate to the aim pursued and “necessary in a democratic society”. The Court reiterates that whilst Article 8 contains no explicit procedural requirements, the decision-making process involved in measures of interference must be fair and such as to afford due respect to the interests safeguarded by Article 8 (see Giacomelli v. Italy, no. 59909/00, § 82, ECHR 2006-XII; Maumousseau and Washington v. France, no. 39388/05, § 62, 6 December 2007; V.C. v. Slovakia, no. 18968/07, § 141, ECHR 2011 (extracts); and Hardy and Maile v. the United Kingdom, no. 31965/07, § 219, 14 February 2012). In that respect, the Court held as follows in the case of Connors v. the United Kingdom (no. 66746/01, §§ 81-84, 27 May 2004), which concerned summary possession proceedings:

“83. The procedural safeguards available to the individual will be especially material in determining whether the respondent State has, when fixing the regulatory framework, remained within its margin of appreciation. In particular, the Court must examine whether the decision-making process leading to measures of interference was fair and such as to afford due respect to the interests safeguarded to the individual by Article 8 ...”

40. In this connection the Court reiterates that any person at risk of an interference with his or her right to a home should in principle be able to have the proportionality and reasonableness of the measure determined by an independent tribunal in the light of the relevant principles under Article 8 of the Convention, notwithstanding that, under domestic law, he or she has no right to occupy the property concerned (see, mutatis mutandis, McCann, cited above, § 50, and Orlić, cited above, § 65).

41. The Court, however, emphasises that such an issue does not arise automatically in every case concerning an eviction dispute. If an applicant wishes to mount an Article 8 defence to prevent eviction, it is for him or her to do so and for a court to uphold or dismiss the claim.

42. The Court notes that in the present case the applicants before the national courts presented arguments linked to the proportionality of their eviction, such as the fact that the flats at issue had been allocated to them by the-then owner; that they had not been allocated the flat on a merely temporary basis; and that they had been living in the flat for lengthy periods before their eviction.

43. The Court also notes that the flats at issue were allocated to the applicants in the specific circumstances which existed in the former Yugoslavia, where employees paid obligatory monthly contributions to housing funds and where a large proportion of employed persons were allocated socially-owned flats. It is to be noted that when the applicants were allocated the flats at issue, they were socially-owned. While the respondent State certainly enjoys a wide margin of appreciation in drawing up its social and housing policies, the Court notes that the proceedings for the applicants’ eviction started only in the 2000-ies, while Mlini Hotels had purchased the building where the flats were situated in the 1990-ies. Thus, in addition to noting the applicants’ longstanding occupancy of the flats and the fact that they paid the rent for them, the Court also observes that the new owner did not initially take a firm standpoint as regards the applicants’ title to occupy the flats.

44. However, when it comes to the decisions of the domestic authorities in the present case, their findings were restricted to the conclusion that under applicable national laws the applicants had no legal entitlement to occupy the flats. The national courts thus confined themselves to finding that occupation by the applicants was without legal basis, but made no further analysis as to the proportionality of the measure to be applied against the applicants, namely their eviction from the flats they had occupied for lengthy periods.

45. By failing to examine the above-mentioned arguments, the national courts did not afford the applicants adequate procedural safeguards. The decision-making process leading to the measure of interference in those circumstances was not fair and did not afford due respect to the interests safeguarded to the applicants by Article 8 (see, by way of comparison, the above-cited cases of Ćosić; Paulić; Orlić and Brežec).

46. There has, therefore, been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention in the instant case.

III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL NO. 1 TO THE CONVENTION

47. The applicants complained that they had not been able to purchase the flats they occupied. They relied on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.

48. The Government contested that argument.

49. Having regard to its findings concerning Article 8 of the Convention, the Court notes that the applicants now have an opportunity to request the reopening of the proceedings in accordance with the relevant domestic law, which would allow for a fresh examination of their claims. In these circumstances the Court finds that this complaint is not ready for consideration at this stage and should be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, Biondić v. Croatia, no. 38355/05, § 31, 8 November 2007; and Jaćimović v. Croatia, no. 22688/09, § 55, 31 October 2013).

IV. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION

50. The applicants further invoked Articles 6 and 17 of the Convention.

51. In the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court considers that this part of the application does not disclose any appearance of a violation of the Convention. It follows that it is inadmissible under Article 35 § 3(a) as manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.

V. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

52. Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

53. The second applicant, Ms Matana did not submit a claim for costs or just satisfaction. Accordingly, the Court considers that there is no call to award her any sum on that account

A. The parties’ submissions

1. Damage

54. The applicants claimed pecuniary damage in concerning their investments in the flats, the rent they had paid after eviction and costs of eviction. They all also claimed non-pecuniary damages. The first applicant, Mr Lemo claimed 161,000 Croatian kuna (HRK) in respect of pecuniary damage and 60,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage. The second applicant Ms Marija Matana claimed 15,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. The third applicant, Ms Rabrenović, claimed HRK 56,500 in respect of pecuniary damage and HRK 45,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage. The fourth applicant claimed, Mr Čučak, claimed HRK 121,500 in respect of pecuniary damage and HRK 55,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage. The fifth applicant, Ms Jazvin, claimed HRK 87,000 in respect of pecuniary damage and HRK 45,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage. The sixth applicant Mr Tomović, claimed HRK 33,000 in respect of pecuniary damage and HRK 75,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage. The seventh applicant, Ms Blašković, claimed HRK 48,000 in respect of pecuniary damage and HRK 50,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage. The eight applicant, Mr Mioč, claimed HRK 154,200 in respect of pecuniary and HRK 40,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.

55. The Government contested those claims.

2. Costs and expenses

56. The first applicant claimed HRK 19,644.66 for the costs and expenses incurred in the domestic proceedings; the third applicant claimed in that respect HRK 4,000; the fourth applicant HRK 7,930; the fifth applicant HRK 8,246.21; the sixth applicant HRK 9,000; and the seventh applicant HRK 3,514.58.

57. The first as well as fourth to eight applicants each claimed HRK 10,000 in respect of the costs and expenses incurred before the Court. The second applicant claimed EUR 1,500 in that respect.

58. The Government submitted that the costs and expenses which concerned the domestic proceedings had no connection with the proceedings before the Court, and should therefore be rejected. The costs and expenses claimed in respect of the proceedings before the Court were excessive.

B. The Court’s assessment

1. General principles

59. The Court reiterates that a judgment in which it finds a breach imposes on the respondent State a legal obligation to put an end to the breach and to make reparation for its consequences. If the national law does not allow - or allows only partial - reparation to be made, Article 41 empowers the Court to afford the injured party such satisfaction as appears to it to be appropriate (see Iatridis v. Greece (just satisfaction) [GC], no. 31107/96, §§ 32-33, ECHR 2000-XI).

60. There must be a clear causal connection between the damages claimed by the applicants and the violation of the Convention, and that this may, in an appropriate case, include compensation in respect of loss of earnings. The Court further finds that the loss of earnings applies to close relatives of the disappeared persons, including spouses, elderly parents and minor children (see, among other authorities, Imakayeva v. Russia, no. 7615/02, § 213, ECHR 2006-XIII (extracts)).

61. Wherever the Court finds a violation of the Convention, it may accept that the applicants have suffered non-pecuniary damage which cannot be compensated for solely by the findings of violations and make a financial award.

62. As to the costs and expenses, the Court has to establish first whether the costs and expenses indicated by the applicant’s representatives were actually incurred and, second, whether they were necessary (see McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom, 27 September 1995, § 220, Series A no. 324, and Fadeyeva v. Russia, no. 55723/00, § 147, ECHR 2005-IV).

2. Application in the present cases

63. The Court notes that under section 428(a) of the Civil Procedure Act an applicants may file a petition for reopening of the civil proceedings in respect of which the Court has found a violation of the Convention.

64. As regards the pecuniary damage claimed, the Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim.

65. It also notes the violations found as regards Article 8 of the Convention and accepts that the applicants have suffered non-pecuniary damage which cannot be compensated solely by the finding of a violation. The Court awards to the applicants the amounts detailed in Annex II, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicants on these amounts.

66. As regards the claims for costs, the Court partly accepts the applicants’ claims for the costs and expenses incurred before it. As regards the costs incurred before the national courts the Court notes that, following a violation found by it, the applicants may seek the reopening of the proceedings and that in the fresh proceedings the costs of the overall proceedings will be assessed. The Court therefore rejects the claims for the costs incurred before the national courts (see Škrtić v. Croatia, no. 64982/12, § 45, 5 December 2013). As regards the costs incurred before it, the Court awards to the applicants jointly EUR 3,000, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicants on these amounts.

C. Default interest

67. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

1. Decides to join the applications set out in the Appendix;

2. Declares the complaint concerning the applicants’ right to respect for their home admissible and the remainder of the applications inadmissible;

3. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention;

4. Holds

(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicants, within three months, the following amounts, to be converted into Croatian kuna at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:

(i) the amounts as indicated in Annex II, plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;

(ii) EUR 3,000 (three thousand euros) to the first, second and fourth to eighth applicants jointly, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicants, in respect of costs and expenses;

(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

5. Dismisses the remainder of the applicants’ claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 10 July 2014, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

André Wampach Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska
Deputy Registrar President

ANNEX I

Details of the applications

No	Application No	Lodged on	Applicant Date of birth Place of residence	Represented by
1.	3925/10	22/12/2009	Ante LEMO 29/09/1954 Mlini	Doris KOŠTA
2.	3955/10	22/12/2009	Marija MATANA 30/11/1957 Mlini	Doris KOŠTA
3.	3974/10	22/12/2009	Vera RABRENOVIĆ 01/01/1964 Mlini	Doris KOŠTA
4.	4009/10	23/12/2009	Mile ČUČAK 09/10/1949 Mlini	Doris KOŠTA
5.	4054/10	22/12/2009	Cmiljka JAZVIN 07/07/1950 Mlini	Doris KOŠTA
6.	4128/10	22/12/2009	Dušan TOMOVIĆ 27/02/1941 Mlini	Doris KOŠTA
7.	4132/10	22/12/2009	Marija BLAŠKOVIĆ 20/01/1950 Mlini	Doris KOŠTA
8.	4133/10	22/12/2009	Martin MIOČ 19/07/1951 Mlini	Doris KOŠTA

ANNEX II

Awards made by the Court under Article 41

Application number and name	Applicants	Non-pecuniary damage
3925/10 Lemo	Ante Lemo	EUR 7,500
3955/10 Matana	Marija Matana	EUR 7,500
3974/10 Rabrenović	Vera Rabrenović	EUR 6,200
4009/10 Čučak	Mile Čučak	EUR 7,500
4054/10 Jazvin	Cmiljka Jazvin	EUR 6,200
4128/10 Tomović	Dušan Tomović	EUR 7,500
4132/10 Blašković	Marija Blašković	EUR 6,850
4133/10 Mioč	Martin Mioč	EUR 5,500

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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> European Court of Human Rights >> LEMO AND OTHERS v. CROATIA - 3925/10 - Committee Judgment [2014] ECHR 755 (10 July 2014) URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2014/755.html Cite as: [2014] ECHR 755