Assi v Council (Common foreign and security policy - Restrictive measures adopted against Syria - Freezing of funds - Judgment) [2021] EUECJ T-256/19 (24 November 2021)

BAILII is celebrating 24 years of free online access to the law! Would you consider making a contribution?
No donation is too small. If every visitor before 31 December gives just £1, it will have a significant impact on BAILII's ability to continue providing free access to the law.
Thank you very much for your support!

(Common foreign and security policy – Restrictive measures adopted against Syria – Freezing of funds – Errors of assessment – Proportionality – Right to property – Right to pursue an economic activity – Misuse of powers – Obligation to state reasons – Rights of the defence – Right to a fair trial)

Bashar Assi, residing in Damascus (Syria), represented by L. Cloquet, lawyer,

Council of the European Union, represented by S. Kyriakopoulou and V. Piessevaux, acting as Agents,

APPLICATION under Article 263 TFEU for annulment of Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2019/87 of 21 January 2019 implementing Decision 2013/255/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Syria (OJ 2019 L 18 I, p. 13), of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/85 of 21 January 2019 implementing Regulation (EU) No 36/2012 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria (OJ 2019 L 18 I, p. 4), of Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/806 of 17 May 2019 amending Decision 2013/255/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Syria (OJ 2019 L 132, p. 36), of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/798 of 17 May 2019 implementing Regulation (EU) No 36/2012 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria (OJ 2019 L 132, p. 1), of Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/719 of 28 May 2020 amending Decision 2013/255/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Syria (OJ 2020 L 168, p. 66), and of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/716 of 28 May 2020 implementing Regulation (EU) No 36/2012 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria (OJ 2020 L 168, p. 1) in so far as those acts concern the applicant,

composed of S. Gervasoni, President, L. Madise and J. Martín y Pérez de Nanclares (Rapporteur), Judges,

having regard to the written part of the procedure and further to the hearing on 22 October 2020,

Background to the dispute and events subsequent to the bringing of the action

1 The applicant, Mr Bashar Assi, is described by the Council of the European Union as a businessperson of Syrian nationality with interests and activities in multiple sectors of Syria’s economy.

2 Strongly condemning the violent repression of peaceful protest in Syria and calling on the Syrian authorities to exercise restraint instead of force, the Council of the European Union adopted, under Article 29 TEU, Decision 2011/273/CFSP of 9 May 2011 concerning restrictive measures against Syria (OJ 2011 L 121, p. 11). In view of the seriousness of the situation, the Council imposed an arms embargo, a ban on exports of material which might be used for internal repression, restrictions on admission to the European Union and the freezing of the funds and economic resources of certain persons and entities responsible for the violent repression against the Syrian civilian population.

3 The names of the persons responsible for the violent repression against the Syrian civilian population and of the persons, natural or legal, and entities associated with them are listed in the annex to Decision 2011/273. According to Article 5(1) of that decision, the Council, acting upon a proposal by a Member State or the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, may amend that annex. The applicant’s name was not included in that annex when that decision was adopted.

4 Since some of the restrictive measures against the Syrian Arab Republic fall within the scope of the FEU Treaty, the Council adopted, on the basis of Article 215(2) TFEU, Regulation (EU) No 442/2011 of 9 May 2011 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria (OJ 2011 L 121, p. 1). The content of that regulation is largely identical to that of Decision 2011/273 but provides for the release of frozen funds in certain circumstances. The list of persons, entities and bodies identified as being either responsible for the repression in question or associated with those responsible, set out in Annex II to that regulation, is identical to the list in the annex to Decision 2011/273. Under Article 14(1) and (4) of Regulation No 442/2011, where the Council decides to subject a natural or legal person, entity or body to the restrictive measures referred to, it is to amend Annex II accordingly and, furthermore, to review the list in that annex at regular intervals and at least every 12 months.

5 By Decision 2011/782/CFSP of 1 December 2011 concerning restrictive measures against Syria and repealing Decision 2011/273 (OJ 2011 L 319, p. 56), the Council considered it necessary, in view of the gravity of the situation in Syria, to impose additional restrictive measures. For the sake of clarity, the measures imposed by Decision 2011/273 were grouped together with the additional measures into a single legal instrument. Decision 2011/782 provides, in Article 18 thereof, for restrictions on admission to the territory of the European Union of the persons whose names are listed in Annex I and, in Article 19, for the funds and economic resources of the persons and entities whose names are listed in Annex I and Annex II to be frozen.

6 Regulation No 442/2011 was replaced by Council Regulation (EU) No 36/2012 of 18 January 2012 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria (OJ 2012 L 16, p. 1).

7 Decision 2011/782 was replaced by Council Decision 2012/739/CFSP of 29 November 2012 concerning restrictive measures against Syria and repealing Decision 2011/782 (OJ 2012 L 330, p. 21), which was itself replaced by Council Decision 2013/255/CFSP of 31 May 2013 concerning restrictive measures against Syria (OJ 2013 L 147, p. 14).

8 On 12 October 2015, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2015/1836 amending Decision 2013/255 (OJ 2015 L 266, p. 75). On the same day, it adopted Regulation (EU) 2015/1828 amending Regulation No 36/2012 (OJ 2015 L 266, p. 1).

9 According to recital 6 of Decision 2015/1836, ‘the Council … assessed that because of the close control exercised over the economy by the Syrian regime, an inner cadre of leading businesspersons operating in Syria [wa]s only able to maintain its status by enjoying a close association with, and the support of, the regime, and by having influence within it’ and ‘the Council considers that it should provide for restrictive measures to impose restrictions on admission and to freeze all funds and economic resources belonging to, owned, held or controlled by those leading businesspersons operating in Syria, as identified by [it] and listed in Annex I, in order to prevent them from providing material or financial support to the regime and, through their influence, to increase pressure on the regime itself to change its policies of repression’.

10 The wording of Articles 27 and 28 of Decision 2013/255 was amended by Decision 2015/1836. Those articles now provide for restrictions on the entry into, or transit through, the territories of the Member States and for the funds of ‘leading businesspersons operating in Syria’ to be frozen, unless there is ‘sufficient information that [those persons] are not, or are no longer, associated with the regime or do not exercise influence over it or do not pose a real risk of circumvention’.

11 Regulation 2015/1828 amended, inter alia, the wording of Article 15 of Regulation No 36/2012 in order to incorporate therein the new listing criteria defined by Decision 2015/1836 and inserted into Decision 2013/255.

12 By Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2019/87 of 21 January 2019 implementing Decision 2013/255 (OJ 2019 L 18 I, p. 13), and by Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/85 of 21 January 2019 implementing Regulation No 36/2012 (OJ 2019 L 18 I, p. 4) (together, ‘the initial measures’), the applicant’s name was inserted at line 270 of Table A of the lists of the names of natural and legal persons, entities or bodies subject to restrictive measures in Annex I to Decision 2013/255 and in Annex II to Regulation No 36/2012 (together, ‘the lists at issue’), with the following reasons being given:

‘Leading businessperson operating in Syria, with interests and activities in multiple sectors of Syria’s economy, including his roles as founding partner of Fly Aman airline and Chairman of the Board of Directors of “Aman [Dimashq]”; a joint venture involved in the development of Marota City, a regime-backed luxury residential and commercial development. Assi benefits from and/or supports the regime through his position as Chairman of the Board of Directors of “Aman [Dimashq]”.’

13 On 22 January 2019, the Council published in the Official Journal of the European Union a Notice for the attention of the persons subject to the restrictive measures provided for in Decision 2013/255 and in Regulation No 36/2012 (OJ 2019 C 27, p. 3).

14 By letter of 20 February 2019, the applicant’s representative objected to the inclusion of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue and asked the Council to disclose to him the documents supporting that listing.

15 By letter of 12 March 2019, first, the Council informed the applicant’s representative that, in essence, the applicant’s observations were not such as to call into question the decision to include the applicant’s name on the lists at issue. Secondly, the Council provided him with the document bearing the reference WK 50/2019 INIT, dated 10 January 2019, containing the evidence in support of the reasons for that listing.

16 On 17 May 2019, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2019/806 amending Decision 2013/255 (OJ 2019 L 132, p. 36), which extended the application of the latter decision until 1 June 2020; on the same day, the Council also adopted Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/798 amending Regulation No 36/2012 (OJ 2019 L 132, p. 1) (together, ‘the 2019 maintaining acts’). The applicant’s name was maintained at line 270 of Table A of the lists at issue on the basis of reasons identical to those set out in the initial measures (‘the 2019 reasons’).

17 By letter of 20 May 2019, the Council informed the applicant’s representative of the adoption of the 2019 maintaining acts and of the possibility of submitting a request, before 28 February 2020, that the decision to maintain the applicant’s name on the lists at issue be reconsidered.

18 By letter of 28 February 2020, the applicant, through his representative, objected to his name being maintained on the lists at issue.

19 By letters of 16 and 22 April 2020, the Council informed the applicant, first of all, of its intention to maintain his name on the lists at issue for reasons that differ in part from those set out in the 2019 reasons. Next, the Council invited him to submit his observations on the proposed reasons for listing before 4 May 2020. Lastly, the Council provided him, first, with the document bearing the reference WK 3599/2020 INIT of 6 April 2020, and then the document bearing the reference WK 3599/2020 REV 1 of 20 April 2020 – which included a translation into French of the evidence that was in Arabic – containing the evidence in support of the proposed reasons for listing that differ in part from those in the 2019 maintaining acts.

20 By letter of 4 May 2020, the applicant challenged the proposed reasons for listing on which the Council intended to rely as well as the reliability and accuracy of document WK 3599/2020 REV 1.

21 On 28 May 2020, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2020/719 amending Decision 2013/255 (OJ 2020 L 168, p. 66), which extended the application of the latter decision until 1 June 2020, and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/716 implementing Regulation No 36/2012 (OJ 2020 L 168, p. 1) (together, ‘the 2020 maintaining acts’). The applicant’s name was maintained at line 270 of Table A of the lists at issue for reasons that differ in part from those set out in the 2019 maintaining acts (‘the 2020 reasons’). The Council justified the adoption of restrictive measures concerning the applicant by giving the following reasons:

‘Leading businessperson operating in Syria, with interests and activities in multiple sectors of Syria’s economy, including his roles as founding partner of Fly Aman airline and, until May 2019, Chairman of the Board of Directors of Aman [Dimashq], a joint venture involved in the development of Marota City, a regime‐backed luxury residential and commercial development. Assi benefits from and/or supports the Syrian regime through his business activities. On [30 January 2020], he founded the Aman Facilities company with and on behalf of Samer Foz.’

22 By letter of 2 June 2020, the Council informed the applicant’s representative of the adoption of the 2020 maintaining acts and of the possibility of submitting a request, before 1 March 2021, that they be reconsidered. The Council also informed the applicant’s representative that, in essence, the observations submitted in his letters of 28 February and 4 May 2020 were not such as to call into question the decision to maintain the applicant’s name on the lists at issue.

23 By application lodged at the Court Registry on 15 April 2019, the applicant brought the present action for annulment of the initial measures in so far as they concern the applicant.

24 By separate document lodged at the Court Registry on 30 July 2019, the applicant modified the application under Article 86 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, with the result that the application also seeks annulment of the 2019 maintaining acts in so far as they concern the applicant. The applicant also reiterated the form of order set out in the application.

25 On 8 August 2019, the Council lodged the defence and the observations on the first statement of modification at the Court Registry.

27 By decision of 17 October 2019, the President of the General Court, pursuant to Article 27(3) of the Rules of Procedure, reassigned the case to a new Judge-Rapporteur, attached to the Fourth Chamber.

30 By way of measures of organisation of procedure provided for in Article 89(3)(a) of the Rules of Procedure, on 22 July 2020, the Court asked the Council to answer a series of questions. The Council answered the questions within the prescribed period.

31 By separate document lodged at the Court Registry on 13 August 2020, the applicant, under Article 86 of the Rules of Procedure, modified the application a second time, with the result that the application also seeks annulment of the 2020 maintaining acts in so far as they concern the applicant. The applicant also reiterated the form of order set out in the application and in the first statement of modification and put forward new arguments.

32 On 2 October 2020, the Council submitted its observations on the second statement of modification.

33 The parties presented oral argument and replied to the questions put by the Court at the hearing on 22 October 2020.

– annul the initial measures, the 2019 maintaining acts and the 2020 maintaining acts (together, ‘the contested measures’) in so far as they concern the applicant;

– in the alternative, should the Court annul the contested measures in so far as they concern the applicant, order that the effects of Implementing Decision 2019/87 and of Decisions 2019/806 and 2020/719 be maintained in so far as they concern the applicant, until the annulment of Implementing Regulations 2019/85, 2019/798 and 2020/716 takes effect in so far as they concern the applicant.

36 In support of his action, the applicant relies on six pleas, alleging (i) errors of assessment; (ii) infringement of the principle of proportionality; (iii) infringement of the right to property and the freedom to pursue an economic activity; (iv) ‘abuse of power’; (v) infringement of the obligation to state reasons; and, lastly, (vi) infringement of the rights of the defence and of the right to a fair trial.

37 It is appropriate to examine, first of all, the fifth plea and then the sixth plea, before examining the first plea, the fourth plea and, lastly, the second and third pleas taken together.

38 The applicant submits that the statement of reasons provided by the Council does not satisfy the obligation incumbent on the EU institutions under the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU. Specifically, the applicant claims that the statement of reasons adopted in the contested measures does not enable him to identify the disputed transactions. Furthermore, he adds that the Council did not ‘genuinely’ examine the statement of reasons adopted, which is ‘purely formal’ and was not properly thought out by the Council.

40 It should be borne in mind that, in accordance with settled case-law, the purpose of the obligation to state the reasons on which an act adversely affecting an individual is based, which is a corollary of the principle of respect for the rights of the defence, is, first, to provide the person concerned with sufficient information to make it possible to ascertain whether the act is well founded or whether it is vitiated by a defect which may permit its legality to be contested before the EU judicature and, secondly, to enable the latter to review the legality of that act (see judgment of 13 September 2013, Makhlouf v Council, T‑383/11, EU:T:2013:431, paragraph 60 and the case-law cited).

41 It should also be noted that the statement of reasons required by Article 296 TFEU must be appropriate to the measure at issue and must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the institution which adopted the measure in such a way as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the measure and to enable the court having jurisdiction to exercise its power of review (see judgment of 13 September 2013, Makhlouf v Council, T‑383/11, EU:T:2013:431, paragraph 61 and the case-law cited).

42 The statement of reasons for an act of the Council which imposes a measure freezing funds must make it possible to identify the actual and specific reasons why the Council considers, in the exercise of its discretionary power of assessment, that that measure must be adopted in respect of the person concerned (see judgment of 13 September 2013, Makhlouf v Council, T‑383/11, EU:T:2013:431, paragraph 63 and the case-law cited).

43 However, the requirements to be satisfied by the statement of reasons depend on the circumstances of each case, in particular the content of the measure in question, the nature of the reasons given and the interest which the addressees of the measure may have in obtaining explanations (see judgment of 13 September 2013, Makhlouf v Council, T‑383/11, EU:T:2013:431, paragraph 64 and the case-law cited).

44 It is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law, inasmuch as the question whether the statement of reasons for a measure meets the requirements of Article 296 TFEU must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (see judgment of 13 September 2013, Makhlouf v Council, T‑383/11, EU:T:2013:431, paragraph 65 and the case-law cited).

45 In particular, the reasons given for a measure adversely affecting a person are sufficient if that measure was adopted in a context which was known to that person and which enables that person to understand the scope of the measure concerning him or her (see judgment of 13 September 2013, Makhlouf v Council, T‑383/11, EU:T:2013:431, paragraph 66 and the case-law cited).

46 Lastly, it should be borne in mind that the obligation to state the reasons on which an act is based is an essential procedural requirement, to be distinguished from the question whether the reasons given are correct, which goes to the substantive legality of the contested act. The reasoning on which an act is based consists in a formal statement of the reasons on which that act is based. If those reasons are vitiated by errors, the latter will vitiate the substantive legality of the act, but not the statement of reasons in it, which may be adequate even though it sets out reasons which are incorrect (see judgment of 5 November 2014, Mayaleh v Council, T‑307/12 and T‑408/13, EU:T:2014:926, paragraph 96 and the case-law cited).

47 In the present case, first, it should be noted that the applicant’s argument that the Council did not carefully examine the statement of reasons adopted seeks, in fact, to challenge the factual evidence relied on by the Council. Since that argument seeks to call into question not the sufficiency of the statement of reasons for the contested measures specifically, but rather the status of leading businessperson operating in Syria and the existence of links between the applicant and the Syrian regime, it must be examined in the context of the first plea, alleging errors of assessment.

48 Secondly, as regards the reasons why the restrictive measures concerning the applicant were adopted and maintained, it should be noted that the reasons for listing the applicant’s name have remained unchanged between the adoption of the initial measures and that of the 2019 maintaining acts. By contrast, the reasons for listing the applicant’s name were partially amended when the 2020 maintaining acts were adopted. Thus, as regards the initial measures and the 2019 maintaining acts, the Council gave the following reasons for including the applicant’s name on the lists at issue:

49 Subsequently, in the 2020 maintaining acts, the Council gave the following reasons for including the applicant’s name on the lists at issue:

‘Leading businessperson operating in Syria, with interests and activities in multiple sectors of Syria’s economy, including his roles as founding partner of Fly Aman airline and, until May 2019, Chairman of the Board of Directors of Aman [Dimashq], a joint venture involved in the development of Marota City, a regime‐backed luxury residential and commercial development. Assi benefits from and/or supports the Syrian regime through his business activities. On [30 January 2020], he founded the Aman Facilities company with and on behalf of Samer Foz.’

50 First of all, it should be recalled that the general listing criteria laid down in Articles 27(1) and 28(1) of Decision 2013/255, as amended by Decision 2015/1836, which are reproduced, as regards the freezing of funds, in Article 15(1)(a) of Regulation No 36/2012, as amended by Regulation 2015/1828, provide that persons and entities benefiting from or supporting the Syrian regime are to be subject to restrictive measures. Similarly, Article 27(2)(a) and (3) and Article 28(2)(a) and (3) of Decision 2013/255, as amended by Decision 2015/1836, which are reproduced, as regards the freezing of funds, in Article 15(1a)(a) and (1b) of Regulation No 36/2012, as amended by Regulation 2015/1828, provide that the category of ‘leading businesspersons operating in Syria’ is to be subject to restrictive measures, unless there is sufficient information that they are not, or are no longer, associated with the regime or do not exercise influence over it or do not pose a real risk of circumvention.

51 It should be inferred from the reasons for including the applicant’s name on the lists at issue, referred to in paragraphs 12, 21, 48 and 49 above, that the applicant’s name was included and maintained on the lists at issue because of, first, his status as a leading businessperson operating in Syria and, secondly, his links to the Syrian regime. In other words, the listing of the applicant’s name is based, first, on the criterion defined in Articles 27(2)(a) and 28(2)(a) of Decision 2013/255, as amended by Decision 2015/1836, and in Article 15(1a)(a) of Regulation No 36/2012, as amended by Regulation 2015/1828 (criterion of a leading businessperson operating in Syria), and, secondly, on the criterion defined in Articles 27(1) and 28(1) of that decision and in Article 15(1)(a) of that regulation (criterion of association with the regime).

52 Next, it should be noted that the actual and specific reasons which led the Council to include and maintain the applicant’s name on the lists at issue are stated sufficiently clearly to enable the applicant to understand them. First, the 2019 reasons relate to clear facts concerning the applicant, namely his interests and activities in Syria’s economy, including, on the one hand, his status as founding partner in the company Fly Aman and, on the other hand, his capacity as chairman of the board of directors of Aman Dimashq. Secondly, the 2019 reasons refer clearly to the support which the applicant provides to the Syrian regime and to the benefit which he derives from that regime because of his position as chairman of the board of directors of Aman Dimashq, a company which is involved in the development of the Marota City project, backed by the Syrian regime. Thirdly, the 2019 reasons state that the applicant is a leading businessperson operating in Syria.

53 The 2020 reasons refer to facts which are set out clearly and contain three substantial changes compared with the 2019 reasons. First, the 2020 reasons state that, until May 2019, the applicant held the position of chairman of the board of directors of Aman Dimashq. Secondly, they clearly refer to the fact that the applicant, with and on behalf of Mr Samer Foz, founded the Aman Facilities company on 30 January 2020. Thirdly, it is apparent from the 2020 reasons that the applicant provides support to the Syrian regime and benefits from it through his business activities. Although the latter element is less detailed when compared with the other facts mentioned in that statement of reasons, it can be understood, without difficulty, from reading that statement as a whole that the Council refers to the applicant’s activities as set out in the first sentence of the 2020 reasons. The Council confirmed that interpretation at the hearing.

54 Moreover, the pleas and arguments raised by the applicant in his pleadings indicate, first, that he was put in a position to ascertain the reasons for the measures concerning him so as to be able to challenge them effectively before the EU judicature and, secondly, that he was aware of the context in which the measures were adopted.

55 Lastly, the fact that the Council failed to set out in detail the disputed transactions which led to the applicant’s name being included on the lists at issue cannot lead to a finding that it infringed its obligation to state reasons, since, in accordance with the case-law referred to in paragraphs 44 and 45 above, the Council is not required to specify all the relevant facts and points of law and the applicant was put in a position to understand the scope of the measures concerning him.

56 It must be concluded that the statement of the reasons on which the contested measures are based is comprehensible and sufficiently precise to enable the applicant to ascertain the reasons which led the Council to take the view that including and maintaining his name on the lists at issue was justified and to challenge their legality before the EU judicature, and to enable the latter to exercise its power of review.

The sixth plea, alleging infringement of the rights of the defence and the right to a fair trial

58 The applicant submits, in essence, that the contested measures infringe his rights of the defence and his right to a fair trial, as provided for in Article 48(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’) and Article 6(3) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on 4 November 1950, in so far as the Council failed to hear him before those measures were adopted.

59 In that regard, the applicant claims that he was unable to submit his observations in a timely fashion, that is to say, prior to the adoption of the contested measures. In his view, there was no urgency or any risk that he would compromise the effectiveness of the contested measures by being heard prior to their adoption. By contrast, the opportunity to be heard a posteriori did not prevent him from suffering losses.

61 It should be borne in mind that observance of the rights of the defence includes, inter alia, the right to be heard, which is enshrined in Article 41(2)(a) of the Charter (see judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 99 and the case-law cited).

62 Article 52(1) of the Charter nevertheless allows limitations on the exercise of the rights enshrined in the Charter, provided that the limitation concerned respects the essence of the fundamental right in question and, subject to the principle of proportionality, that it is necessary and genuinely meets objectives of general interest recognised by the European Union (see judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 101 and the case-law cited).

63 Lastly, the question whether there is an infringement of the rights of the defence must be examined in relation to the specific circumstances of each particular case, including the nature of the act at issue, the context of its adoption and the legal rules governing the matter in question (see judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 102 and the case-law cited).

65 It should be borne in mind that the EU judicature distinguishes between, on the one hand, the initial entry of a person’s name on the lists imposing restrictive measures and, on the other, the maintenance of that person’s name on those lists (judgment of 30 April 2015, Al-Chihabi v Council, T‑593/11, EU:T:2015:249, paragraph 40).

66 First, as regards the initial measures, including the applicant’s name on the lists at issue, the EU authorities cannot be required to communicate the reasons for those measures before the name of a person or entity is entered on the lists imposing restrictive measures for the first time (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 January 2015, Makhlouf v Council, T‑509/11, not published, EU:T:2015:33, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).

67 So that its effectiveness may not be jeopardised, such a measure must, by its very nature, be able to take advantage of a surprise effect and to apply immediately. In such a case, it is as a rule enough if the institution notifies the person or entity concerned of the reasons and affords it the right to be heard at the same time as, or immediately after, the decision is adopted (judgment of 21 December 2011, France v People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran, C‑27/09 P, EU:C:2011:853, paragraph 61).

68 In the present case, the notification of the reasons for including the applicant’s name on the lists at issue was published in the Official Journal of the European Union on 22 January 2019.

69 In addition, by letter of 20 February 2019, the applicant’s representative, in essence, asked the Council to disclose to him the documents in support of the inclusion of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue, which the Council did by letter of 12 March 2019.

70 Therefore, it must be held that, in the present case, the fact that the applicant was not heard prior to the initial entry of his name on the lists at issue constitutes a justified limitation of his rights of the defence within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraph 62 above.

71 That conclusion cannot be invalidated by the applicant’s unsubstantiated argument that there was no urgency or any risk of him compromising the effectiveness of the initial measures by being heard prior to their adoption, while the opportunity to be heard a posteriori did not prevent him from suffering losses.

72 Secondly, as regards the 2019 maintaining acts and the 2020 maintaining acts, it should be borne in mind that, in the case of acts by which the name of a person or entity already included on the lists imposing restrictive measures is maintained, the surprise effect is no longer necessary in order to ensure that those measures are effective, with the result that the adoption of such acts must, in principle, be preceded by notification of the incriminating evidence and by affording the person or entity concerned an opportunity to be heard (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 December 2011, France v People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran, C‑27/09 P, EU:C:2011:853, paragraph 62).

73 In that regard, the Court of Justice has made clear that the element of protection afforded by the requirement of notification of incriminating evidence and the right to make representations before the adoption of decisions maintaining the name of a person or entity on a list of persons or entities subject to restrictive measures is fundamental and essential to the rights of the defence. This is all the more the case because the restrictive measures in question have a considerable effect on the rights and freedoms of the persons and groups concerned (judgment of 21 December 2011, France v People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran, C‑27/09 P, EU:C:2011:853, paragraph 64).

74 However, where maintaining the name of the person or entity concerned on a list of persons or entities subject to restrictive measures is based on the same reasons as those which justified the adoption of the initial measure without new evidence being adduced, the Council is not obliged, in order to respect the right of that person or entity to be heard, to notify it again of the evidence adduced against it (see, to that effect, judgment of 7 April 2016, Central Bank of Iran v Council, C‑266/15 P, EU:C:2016:208, paragraphs 32 and 33 and the case-law cited). There is a requirement to notify incriminating evidence, however, where there is new evidence on which the Council relies in order to update the information concerning the personal situation of the person or entity concerned or the political and security situation in the country against which the restrictive measures regime was adopted (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 February 2020, Kande Mupompa v Council, T‑170/18, EU:T:2020:60, paragraph 72).

75 In the present case, it should be borne in mind that, as indicated in paragraph 16 above, first, the 2019 maintaining acts did not change the reasons for listing the applicant’s name set out in the annexes to the initial measures. In addition, by letter of 12 March 2019, that is to say, before the adoption of the abovementioned acts, the Council sent to the applicant’s representative document WK 50/2019 INIT, containing the evidence supporting the reasons for the initial inclusion of his name on the lists at issue.

76 In addition, the Council, in response to the measures of organisation of procedure, stated that it had not collected new evidence in connection with the applicant in support of the reasons for including the applicant’s name on the lists at issue between the date of adoption of the initial measures and that of the 2019 maintaining acts.

77 Accordingly, it follows from the foregoing that the Council did not infringe the applicant’s rights of the defence in such a way as to justify the annulment of the 2019 maintaining acts in so far as they concern the applicant.

78 Secondly, it should be borne in mind, as was pointed out in paragraph 21 above, that the 2020 maintaining acts partially amended the reasons for listing the applicant’s name set out in the annexes to the initial measures and to the 2019 maintaining acts.

79 In the present case, it is apparent from the file that, by letters of 16 and 22 April 2020, the Council informed the applicant, first of all, of its intention to maintain his name on the lists at issue for partially different reasons and notified him of the proposed partially amended reasons for listing. In addition, the Council provided him with document WK 3599/2020 REV 1, which contains the evidence in support of the said proposed reasons. In addition, the Council invited the applicant to submit his observations on the proposed partially amended reasons for listing before 4 May 2020, which the applicant did. Lastly, by letter of 2 June 2020, the Council informed the applicant of the adoption of the 2020 maintaining acts, maintaining his name on the lists at issue for reasons that differ in part from the 2019 reasons.

80 Therefore, as regards the 2020 maintaining acts, it follows from the foregoing that the Council, by sending to the applicant, prior to the adoption of the abovementioned acts, first, a copy of the proposed partially amended reasons and, secondly, the document containing the evidence in support of those proposed reasons and by inviting him to submit observations both on the proposed partially amended reasons and on the evidence, respected the rights of the defence of the person concerned.

82 In the first place, the applicant denies being a leading businessperson operating in Syria. In that regard, he disputes the evidence relied on by the Council to include his name on the lists at issue. In particular, the applicant claims that he is a mere employee of Aman Holding JSC. He acknowledges that, in the course of his duties, he was entrusted with the task of representing Aman Holding in the board of directors of Aman Damascus JSC (‘Aman Dimashq’) and held the position of chairman of the board of directors of the latter company. However, he maintains that he resigned from his position within Aman Holding and that, consequently, in the course of his duties, he no longer represents that company as a member of the board of directors of Aman Dimashq. In that regard, he claims that Aman Dimashq is not a regime-backed joint venture and that, in the context of the Marota City project, he has not developed expropriated land from persons displaced by the conflict in Syria, which would have prevented those persons from being able to return to their homes. In the reply, he claims that the land on which the Marota City project will be developed was not the scene of conflicts between opposition forces and the Syrian regime and that the neighbourhoods of Damascus (Syria) in that area were never destroyed during the armed conflict which took place in Syria. Lastly, he denies holding any share in the joint venture Aman Dimashq. In addition, the applicant disputes, first, holding any share in Fly Aman and, secondly, being a founding partner of that company since, before the formation of Fly Aman became effective, he was replaced as a founder and shareholder.

83 In the second place, as regards the 2020 maintaining acts, the applicant disputes the new reason for listing his name and submits, in that respect, that his position within Aman Facilities OPLLC is not such as to confer on him the status of leading businessperson operating in Syria, since that company has a low capital and a limited scope of activities. In addition, Aman Facilities is not a branch or a subsidiary of Aman Holding and is not sponsored by the latter or by Mr Foz.

84 In the third place, the applicant denies having any links to the Syrian regime.

85 In the fourth place, the applicant maintains that none of the exhibits in document WK 50/2019 INIT refers to his alleged link to the Syrian regime, but that those exhibits relate mainly to Mr Foz.

87 It should be borne in mind that the effectiveness of the judicial review guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter requires, inter alia, that the EU judicature ensure that the decision by which restrictive measures were adopted or maintained, which affects the person or entity concerned individually, is taken on a sufficiently solid factual basis. That entails a verification of the factual allegations in the summary of reasons underpinning that decision, with the consequence that the judicial review is not limited to the assessment of the cogency in the abstract of the reasons relied on, but focuses on whether those reasons, or, at the very least, one of those reasons, deemed sufficient in itself to support that decision, is substantiated (judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 119).

88 It is for the EU judicature, in order to carry out that examination, to request the competent EU authority, when necessary, to produce information or evidence, confidential or not, relevant to such an examination (see judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 120 and the case-law cited).

89 It is the task of the competent EU authority to establish, in the event of challenge, that the reasons relied on against the person or entity concerned are well founded, and not the task of that person or entity to adduce evidence of the negative, that those reasons are not well founded (judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 121).

90 For that purpose, there is no requirement that that authority produce before the EU judicature all the information and evidence underlying the reasons alleged in the measure sought to be annulled. It is however necessary that the information or evidence produced should support the reasons relied on against the person or entity concerned (judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 122).

91 If the competent EU authority provides relevant information or evidence, the EU judicature must then determine whether the facts alleged are made out in the light of that information or evidence and assess the probative value of that information or evidence in the circumstances of the particular case and in the light of any observations submitted in relation to them by, among others, the person or entity concerned (judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 124).

92 In accordance with the Court of Justice’s case-law, the assessment as to whether a listing was well founded must be carried out by examining the evidence not in isolation, but in the context in which it fits (see, to that effect, judgments of 21 April 2015, Anbouba v Council, C‑630/13 P, EU:C:2015:247, paragraph 51, and of 21 April 2015, Anbouba v Council, C‑605/13 P, EU:C:2015:248, paragraph 50).

93 Lastly, in carrying out the assessment of the importance of what was at stake, which forms part of the review of the proportionality of the restrictive measures at issue, account may be taken of the context of those measures, of the fact that there was an urgent need to adopt such measures intended to put pressure on the Syrian regime to stop the violent repression against the population and of the difficulty of obtaining more specific evidence in a State at civil war and having an authoritarian regime (judgment of 21 April 2015, Anbouba v Council, C‑605/13 P, EU:C:2015:248, paragraph 46).

94 It should be borne in mind, as is apparent from paragraphs 50 and 51 above, that the listing of applicant’s name is based, first, on the criterion defined in Articles 27(2)(a) and 28(2)(a) of Decision 2013/255, as amended by Decision 2015/1836, and in Article 15(1a)(a) of Regulation No 36/2012, as amended by Regulation 2015/1828 (criterion of a leading businessperson operating in Syria), and, secondly, on the criterion defined in Articles 27(1) and 28(1) of that decision and in Article 15(1)(a) of that regulation (criterion of association with the regime).

95 It is in the light of those considerations that it is necessary to examine the applicant’s first plea and, first of all, his arguments seeking, in essence, to call into question the first reason for listing, namely that the applicant is a leading businessperson operating in Syria.

96 First of all, in order to justify including and maintaining the applicant’s name on the lists annexed to the initial measures and to the 2019 maintaining acts, the Council produced document WK 50/2019 INIT containing publicly available information, namely links to websites, press articles and screenshots from:

– the website ‘Aliqtisadi’, accessed on 28 September 2018, which is a business news website written in Arabic stating that the applicant is the chairman of the board of directors of Aman Dimashq; according to that webpage, the applicant is a founding partner of Fly Aman;

– Damascus Cham Holding’s website ‘Damacham.sy’, the page of which dated 5 September 2017 was accessed on 20 September 2018 and according to which the founding general meeting of Aman Dimashq took place on 7 October 2017 at the Damascus Cham Holding headquarters, which is located on the site of the Marota City project; according to that website, the applicant was appointed chairman of Aman Dimashq’s board of directors and he is the representative of Aman Holding; in addition, that website indicates that the applicant has a strong track record and that he has occupied various managerial posts in the field of real estate management and development; moreover, the project carried out by Aman Dimashq is, in view of its scale, one of the most important and largest of the Marota City project and the investment value exceeds 150 thousand million Syrian pounds (SYP);

– the Syrian website ‘7al.net’, containing an article headed ‘Two Employees of a Businessman, Samer Foz, Founded an Airline’, published on 10 April 2018, which states that the applicant and businessman Mr Khaldoun Al Zoubi founded a new airline, Fly Aman, in Damascus; according to that article, the applicant and Mr Al Zoubi are employed by a company owned by Mr Foz; that article states that the Syrian Ministry of Internal Trade and Consumer Protection ratified the articles of association of Fly Aman, in which the applicant owns 10% of the shares; in addition, Fly Aman carries out information services for passengers and cargo, owns, purchases, leases, charters and invests in aircraft, arranges flight plans and provides consultancy services, ground services and agency services; lastly, according to that article, the civil aviation sector in Syria is experiencing great difficulties as a result of the military operations that have been ongoing for more than seven years and which have led to the cessation of tourist traffic and the termination of services at certain airports;

– the website of Syrian newspaper Wall Street Journal which, in an article published on 5 September 2017, headed ‘Out of Syria’s Chaos, a Tycoon Builds a Fortune’, gives details of Mr Foz’s various business deals, who is reported to have built a fortune out of a war that shattered his country; in addition, the article states that Mr Foz stayed close to the Syrian Government throughout the war and subsequently did business with it; lastly, the article describes the companies owned by Mr Foz and names Aman Holding as the umbrella company;

– the website ‘The Syria Report’, which mentions a first article, published on 17 April 2018, containing a list of joint ventures created between Damascus Cham Holding and private investors, including Aman Dimashq, which was created in September 2017 by, on the one hand, Mr Foz, as sole shareholder of the latter through his company Aman Holding and, on the other, the company owned by the Damascus Governorate, Damascus Cham Holding, in order to develop the Marota City project; it is stated that Mr Foz owns the majority share in that joint venture and that Aman Dimashq has a capital of 18.9 million United States dollars (USD) (approximately EUR 16.8 million); the list of projects developed by that joint venture is set out in detail and reference is made to the development of three sky and five residential buildings, with a total investment cost of SYP 150 thousand million (approximately USD 312 million, or approximately EUR 278.1 million); then a second article, published on 1 June 2018, headed ‘Factsheet: Marota City, Syria’s Most Controversial Investment Project’, where it is stated that the development project for the upscale city referred to as ‘Marota City’ is a project backed by the Syrian regime under Decree No 66/2012, which allowed the expropriation and redevelopment of land, including of certain lower socio-economic tiers of land, including the Mazzeh neighbourhood, called Basateen Al-Razi, situated in Damascus; Marota City is the new name given to the neighbourhood covering 2.15 million square metres; that area is close to the city centre, the embassies and the security services, which makes it attractive to real estate developers; that article states that private company Damascus Cham Holding is owned by the Damascus Governorate and created, with Mr Foz in July 2017, the joint venture Aman Dimashq, with a capital of SYP 10 thousand million (USD 18.9 million); that article adds that Aman Holding owns the majority share in the joint venture and has three representatives on its board of directors; in addition, it is stated that, in September 2017, Damascus Cham Holding granted Aman Dimashq the right to build 3 skyscrapers with up to 70 floors each and 5 residential buildings, valued at USD 312 million; lastly, according to that article, Mr Foz has become one of the most powerful economic players and his ascent to the upper echelons of Syria’s business elite is attributed to his close ties to the President Mr Bashar Al-Assad;

– the website ‘Open Democracy’, which, in an article published on 5 September 2017 headed ‘Militias and Crony Capitalism to Hamper Syria Reconstruction’, mentions the benefits which the Syrian regime derives from Decree No 66/2012, in particular as an investment instrument for rapid and large-scale development projects benefiting allies of the regime, operating at the same time as a punitive force against populations opposed to the regime; according to that article, the development of residential projects will be carried out by holding companies owned by governorates or municipalities, but the development and management of those projects will be contracted to private sector companies owned by investors linked to the regime; in addition, that article states that, in August 2017, Aman Holding, managed by Mr Foz, who has close links to the Syrian regime, announced its contribution to the reconstruction of the Basateen Al-Razi area in the Mazzeh neighbourhood of Damascus, in partnership with the Damascus Governorate through its company Damascus Cham Holding;

– the website ‘Syrian Law Journal’, which, on a page of 14 May 2018, reveals that Decree No 66/2012 laid down the zoning requirements for the areas of Damascus that would be allocated to the Marota City project; Decree No 19/2015, for its part, enabled private companies to be established by public entities with the aim of managing and investing the assets belonging to the various governorates; according to that source, the Damascus Governorate was therefore able to create, in 2016, Damascus Cham Holding with the objective of developing the Marota City project; it is stated that the Damascus Governorate wholly owns Damascus Cham Holding and the Governor of Damascus is the chairman of that company;

– the Syrian Government’s website ‘66.damascus.gov.sy’, which, on a page dated 18 September 2012, reproduces the part of Decree No 66/2012 identifying the two areas in Damascus designated for a residential and commercial development project;

– the website ‘The Foundation for Strategic Research’, which, in an article published in April 2018, sets out the motives behind the adoption of Decree No 66/2012; that source states that, according to the Syrian authorities, Decree No 66/2012 sought to improve the living conditions of inhabitants by replacing poorly constructed properties with more modern and comfortable ones; according to that article, only two residential areas of Damascus, the inhabitants of which supported the opposition, were designated in that decree, while the decree left intact neighbourhoods of Damascus where the inhabitants live in similar conditions, but, by contrast, supported the Syrian regime; lastly, the article states that the decree will facilitate the rapid development of major development projects as a source of enrichment for businesspersons close to the regime, while serving as a punitive instrument against sections of the population opposed to the Syrian regime;

– the website ‘The Syrian Observer’, which, in an article published on 6 April 2018, headed ‘Alliance of Companies Monopolizes New Damascus Development Organizations’, states that businesspersons close to the Syrian regime are investing in new development projects driven by that regime in Damascus and its suburbs; according to that source, those businesspersons are selected by the Syrian regime on the basis of their obedience, loyalty and foreign business links;

– the website ‘Brookings Institution’, which published a report dated June 2018 headed ‘Beyond Fragility: Syria and the Challenges of Reconstruction in Fierce States’ referring to the measures adopted by the Syrian regime, including Decree No 66/2012, in order to seize land and property, punish opponents, reward persons close to the Syrian regime and governors, reassert authority in the territory, tighten control over the Syrian economy and ‘alter’ Syria’s demography to achieve what Mr Bashar Al-Assad has described as a ‘healthier and more homogeneous society’; according to that report, the Syrian regime, on the basis of new and pre-existing legislation, expropriated neighbourhoods in Damascus that were known as pro-opposition areas and property belonging to displaced persons suspected of supporting the opposition in order to benefit certain businesspersons; lastly, according to that article, the development project for the luxury city ‘Marota City’ is cited in that report as the most vivid example of that policy.

97 Next, in order to justify maintaining the applicant’s name on the lists set out in the annexes to the 2020 maintaining acts, the Council produced, in addition to document WK 50/2019 INIT, document WK 3599/2020 REV 1 containing publicly available information, namely links to websites, press articles and screenshots from:

– the website ‘Aliqtisadi’, the ‘who is who’ page of which, accessed on 13 March 2020, states, on a first page, that the applicant has been the chairman of the board of directors of Aman Dimashq since 2017; according to that page, the applicant is a founding partner of Fly Aman; lastly, that site states that the applicant is the director and owner of Aman Facilities; on a second page, also accessed on 13 March 2020, that website states that Aman Facilities, created on 30 January 2020, specialises in tourism and hotel services and belongs to the applicant; according to that source, the creation of the single-member company with limited liability was approved by the Syrian Ministry of Internal Trade and Consumer Protection; lastly, according to the registration certificate of Aman Facilities, which that website states that it was able to access, the company’s fields of activity are as follows: management of hotels, private facilities and establishments dedicated to tourism, services or the administration, consultancy activities in the field of tourism and services;

– the website ‘Eqtsad News’, the article from which, headed ‘Mr Bashar Assi, Mr Foz’s New Henchman for Investments’, was published on 1 February 2020 and describes the links between Mr Foz, a controversial businessperson, and the applicant, in particular the manner in which Mr Foz uses the applicant’s name to create new companies; according to that article, prior to the inclusion of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue, the applicant was unknown to the public, except as a lawyer and active man holding numerous positions on the boards of directors of private companies; that article states that Mr Foz subsequently made him a founding partner of Fly Aman, which had yet to be set up; in addition, according to that source, Mr Foz then took steps to use the applicant to set up companies in his name, and the latest transaction was obtaining authorisation from the Syrian Ministry of Internal Trade and Consumer Protection for Aman Facilities; the article also states that Mr Foz’s name does not appear in the file for the request for authorisation; lastly, according to that website, the applicant was chosen by Mr Foz to act as chairman of the board of directors of Aman Dimashq.

98 At the outset, it must be pointed out that, at the hearing, the applicant claimed, in essence, that the document bearing the reference WK 3599/2020 INIT did not include a version translated into English of the three articles which it contains. In that regard, it is apparent from the pleadings that the Council provided, at the applicant’s request, a new version of document WK 3599/2020 INIT, namely document WK 3599/2020 REV 1, which includes a translation into French of those articles, with the result that the applicant’s argument is, in any event, ineffective.

99 Consequently, all the evidence in document WK 3599/2020 REV 1 is relevant for the purpose of assessing the legality of the contested measures.

100 The applicant disputes the reliability of the evidence submitted by the Council in document WK 50/2019 INIT, claiming that that document is merely a compilation of screenshots of partisan websites and press articles, devoid of any probative value and not ‘seriously documented’.

101 More specifically and first, as regard the articles from the websites ‘7al.net’ and ‘Wall Street Journal’, the applicant submits that they are press articles which, by their very nature, are not updated and include imprecise and fragmented information.

102 Secondly, as regards the website ‘The Syrian Observer’, the applicant states, first of all, that it is a Syrian news publication company which claims to be ‘editorially and politically independent’. Next, the applicant submits that the main function of that website is to translate articles from Syrian publications into English without, however, verifying the content of those publications. That website also states that it does not endorse the viewpoints expressed in the abovementioned publications. Furthermore, according to that website, articles are selected on the basis of two criteria, namely the seriousness of the publication and the extent to which the article reflects the authors’ political positions.

103 Thirdly, as regards the website ‘The Syria Report’, the applicant notes, first of all, that that Syrian news website is structured around a ‘large database of news, data and statistics, including a database of Syrian institutions’. It is primarily an economic news bulletin. Next, the applicant states that A is the founder and editor of the website ‘The Syria Report’ as well as the co-founder of the website ‘The Syrian Observer’. According to the applicant, that explains why the websites ‘The Syria Report’ and ‘The Syrian Observer’ often publish the same information and opinions in different forms and in different publications. In so doing, those websites give the impression that the published information is widely shared by different media and could therefore be considered as objective. Furthermore, the applicant expresses doubts about the integrity of A, who, according to the applicant, in his capacity as visiting fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, works closely with the EU institutions, including the Council, on issues concerning Syria, in particular in view of the fact that he has published reports on Syria’s war economy and decentralisation during the war. In that context, the applicant claims, in essence, that the Council uses its links to A in order to obtain articles supporting the policies that it intends to apply before those articles are published on those websites, in order to use them subsequently as justification for restrictive measures to be adopted or for newly adopted ones. In support of that claim, the applicant produces a page taken from the website ‘News Deeply’ containing a short description of A and an article headed ‘Analysis: No Funds to Foot Syria’s Reconstruction Bill’. Lastly, the applicant submits that the website ‘The Syria Report’ failed to comply with journalistic rules of professional conduct, since it never approached the applicant in order to verify the content of the information published on its website or to seek his views on that information.

104 In the reply to the measures of organisation of procedure adopted by the Court, the Council maintains that it has no information concerning the sources on which it relied other that what can be inferred from document WK 50/2019 INIT. Next, it reproduces information that is publicly available on the internet concerning the websites ‘The Syria Report’, ‘The Foundation for Strategic Research’, ‘The Syrian Observer’, ‘Brookings Institution’, ‘Open Democracy’, ‘Wall Street Journal’, ‘Syrian Law Journal’ and ‘Aliqtisadi’.

105 It should be recalled, first, that in carrying out the assessment of the importance of what was at stake, which forms part of the review of the proportionality of the restrictive measures at issue, account may be taken of the context of those measures, of the fact that there was an urgent need to adopt such measures intended to put pressure on the Syrian regime in order for it to stop the violent repression against the population, and of the difficulty in obtaining more specific evidence in a State at civil war and having an authoritarian regime (judgment of 21 April 2015, Anbouba v Council, C‑605/13 P, EU:C:2015:248, paragraph 46).

106 Secondly, pursuant to settled case-law, the activity of the Court of Justice and of the General Court is governed by the principle of the unfettered evaluation of evidence, and it is only the reliability of the evidence before them which is decisive when it comes to the assessment of its value. In addition, in order to assess the probative value of a document, regard should be had to the credibility of the account it contains, and in particular to the person from whom the document originates, the circumstances in which it came into being, the person to whom it was addressed and whether, on its face, the document appears to be sound and reliable (see, to that effect, judgments of 14 March 2018, Kim and Others v Council and Commission, T‑533/15 and T‑264/16, EU:T:2018:138, paragraph 224, and of 12 February 2020, Kande Mupompa v Council, T‑170/18, EU:T:2020:60, paragraph 107 (not published)).

107 In the present case, as regards the applicant’s argument that most of the press articles are not ‘seriously documented’, it should be pointed out that the state of war in Syria makes it difficult, if not impossible, in practice, to gather evidence from persons who are prepared to be identified and the ensuing difficulties of investigation and the danger to which those providing information are exposed constitute a barrier to the production of precise sources of personal conduct in support of the regime (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 April 2015, Anbouba v Council, C‑605/13 P, EU:C:2015:248, paragraph 46, and Opinion of Advocate General Bot in Anbouba v Council, C‑605/13 P and C‑630/13 P, EU:C:2015:2, point 204).

108 Furthermore, the applicant does not specify how the information in the articles from websites, in particular ‘7al.net’ and ‘Wall Street Journal’, is imprecise and fragmented. In addition, the applicant has not explained how the failure to update the articles on which he seeks to rely deprives them of all soundness and reliability on the date stated. In any event, press articles, whose function is to report on the existence of a situation at a given point in time, cannot be criticised for not being updated. If the situation evolves, it may be the subject of a new press article. Consequently, in the absence of a more detailed explanation from the applicant, the failure to update such sources is not a relevant criterion for assessing whether they are sound and reliable. That argument must therefore be rejected.

109 Furthermore, it should be observed, first of all, that the evidence in document WK 50/2019 INIT, the probative value of which is disputed by the applicant, comes from digital information sources of various origins, not only local but also foreign. Thus, the local information sources include ‘The Syria Report’, the leading source of economic, business and financial information on Syria, which is independent and not connected with any religious, social or political organisation; ‘The Syrian Observer’, an online news service which essentially collects and translates into English news content produced by the official Syrian press, opposition groups to the regime or civil society and which is financed by donors, among which the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs; ‘Aliqtisadi’, 1 of the 10 main websites dedicated to business life in the Middle East; ‘Syrian Law Journal’, a site specialising in legal matters and covering news from Syria in that field and in the economic and business fields. The foreign information sources include ‘Open Democracy’, a website that examines social and political issues whose founders are active in established media and in political activism and whose contributors include internationally known figures; ‘Brookings Institution’, a leading US think tank; ‘The Foundation for Strategic Research’, an independent not-for-profit organisation recognised in France as a public benefit foundation. In addition, the Council produced pages from the websites of Damascus Cham Holding and the Syrian Government. Those various sources relay corroborating information, with the result that the applicant cannot rely solely on the fact that they are screenshots of websites and press articles in order to challenge their soundness and reliability.

110 Moreover, as regards the applicant’s arguments relating to the website ‘The Syrian Observer’, it should be noted, first of all, that the description of that source of information contains nothing to cast doubt on its reliability. On the contrary, by indicating in a transparent manner that the content of the articles published on that website is not systematically verified, that source informs its readers that it may be necessary to cross-reference the information communicated by the published articles in order to assess its veracity. That is why it is also useful that that website publishes articles from various sources, some close to the Syrian regime and others opposing it. Accordingly, that argument must be rejected.

111 The same applies to the applicant’s arguments concerning the website ‘The Syria Report’. More specifically, as regards the claim that that publication failed to comply with journalistic rules of professional conduct, it is clear that, first of all, the applicant does not specify the rules under which he should have been approached by that website. Furthermore, there is nothing in the file to indicate that the applicant reacted to that alleged failure to comply with such rules, in particular by bringing an action for defamation. Lastly, in any event, the fact that the applicant was not contacted in order to verify the information relayed, even if that were true, is not, in itself, sufficient to refute the reliability of the information published on that website. That argument must therefore be rejected.

112 Next, as regards, first, the applicant’s claim that the websites ‘The Syrian Observer’ and ‘The Syria Report’ essentially publish the same information in order to make it appear objective, it is clear, first of all, that the applicant has adduced no evidence demonstrating this alleged collusion. Nor does it follow from document WK 50/2019 INIT that the information published on those two websites is so similar as to attest to any such collusion. At the hearing, in support of his claim, the applicant argued that the two articles whose reliability is disputed present information in the same way, which attests to the subjectivity of their authors concerning the Marota City project and the fact that that project is said to support the Syrian regime. Lastly, at the hearing, he claimed that ‘The Syria Report’ is the Council’s first source of information. In that regard, it should be noted that, irrespective of the fact that A is the editor of the website ‘The Syrian Observer’ and co-founder of the website ‘The Syria Report’, the fact that two sources publish the same information cannot be sufficient to call into question the reliability of that information, since it is commonplace, in journalism, for different newspapers or news sites to relay the same facts. Lastly, at the hearing, the applicant acknowledged that some of the facts reported on the website ‘The Syria Report’ are correct, with the result that, even if, as he claims, they were presented subjectively by the author, they are nonetheless reliable. Consequently, that argument must be rejected.

113 As regards, secondly, the doubts expressed by the applicant as to A’s integrity, it is clear that the applicant has not put forward any evidence in support of that claim. The applicant’s brief description of A does not mention the existence of relations between A and the Council. Nor can that circumstance be inferred from the article headed ‘Analysis: No Funds to Foot Syria’s Reconstruction Bill’ of which A is the author. Lastly, the applicant also fails to explain what interest A would have in publishing articles supporting the policies which the Council intends to apply in order for those articles to be used subsequently as justification for restrictive measures to be adopted or for newly adopted ones. That argument must therefore be rejected.

114 In the light of the foregoing, the Court finds, in the absence of any material in the file capable of calling into question the reliability of the sources used by the Council, that they must be regarded as sound and reliable, within the meaning of the case-law referred to in paragraph 106 above.

115 It is necessary to ascertain whether all of the evidence submitted by the Council discharges the burden of proof incumbent on it under the case-law referred to in paragraph 89 above and thus constitutes a set of indicia sufficiently specific, precise and consistent to substantiate the first reason for listing.

116 In that regard, the Council took the view that the applicant is a leading businessperson operating in Syria because of his interests and activities in multiple sectors of Syria’s economy. As regards the initial measures and the 2019 maintaining acts, the evidence submitted by the Council in document WK 50/2019 INIT relates to three activities, namely his status as founding partner of Fly Aman airline, then his status as chairman of the board of directors of Aman Dimashq, a joint venture involved in the Marota City project, and, lastly, his duties within Aman Holding which are linked to his status as chairman of the abovementioned board of directors. As regards the 2020 maintaining acts, in addition to the abovementioned activities, the additional evidence submitted by the Council in document WK 3599/2020 REV 1 mentions the applicant’s creation of Aman Facilities, with and on behalf of Mr Foz.

118 As regards the reason set out in the contested measures relating to his status as founding partner of Fly Aman, it is apparent from the evidence from the websites ‘Aliqtisadi’, ‘Eqtsad News’ and ‘7al.net’ that the applicant is a founding partner of Fly Aman. In addition, the website ‘7al.net’ states that the Syrian Ministry of Trade and Consumer Protection has ratified the articles of association of Fly Aman, 10% of which belong to the applicant.

119 In that regard, first, the applicant denies holding any share in Fly Aman and submits that, in any event, it would be a minority share. In support of his claim, he produces the first version of Fly Aman’s articles of association, dated 22 February 2018 and signed by the Syrian Companies Directorate, and Fly Aman’s registration certificate dated 28 May 2018. Secondly, the applicant denies being a founder of Fly Aman and submits that, before the formation of Fly Aman became effective, company B had replaced him as a founding member.

120 It should be noted that Fly Aman’s registration certificate of 28 May 2018 states that the founders of the undertaking are Mr Al Zoubi and company B. Furthermore, it is apparent that company B is a shareholder of Fly Aman alongside Mr Al Zoubi. However, the applicant’s name is not mentioned. Nonetheless, the first version of the articles of association of Fly Aman, dated 22 February 2018 and signed by the Syrian Companies Directorate, designates the applicant as founder and partner of Fly Aman and states that he owns 10% of the undertaking’s capital. In that regard, it should be noted that the applicant has not shown that Fly Aman’s articles of association of 22 February 2018 had not produced legal effects between that date and the date of the registration certificate of 28 May 2018, in view of the fact that the company was not formed even though its articles of association were ratified by the Syrian Companies Directorate. At the hearing, however, he confirmed that it was not a first version, but rather the definitive statutes of Fly Aman, pending registration with the Syrian Companies Directorate. Lastly, the applicant acknowledges that he has not adduced evidence of the transfer of his title to company B, designated as founding partner in the registration certificate dated 28 May 2018. It must be recalled that the applicant’s name was included on the lists at issue because of his status as founding partner of Fly Aman airline and not as a mere shareholder. In any event, the applicant contradicts himself in his pleadings, since, while disputing being a shareholder, he acknowledges that he is one by submitting that he is only a minority shareholder. Furthermore, it should be added, as regards the 2020 maintaining acts, that the evidence from the websites ‘Aliqtisadi’ and ‘Eqtsad News’, taken from document WK 3599/2020 REV 1, mention that the applicant is a founding partner of Fly Aman.

121 It follows from the foregoing that the applicant has not succeeded in challenging the reason stating that he was a founding partner of Fly Aman when it was formed on 22 February 2018. Thus, the reason for listing concerning the fact that the applicant is a founding partner of Fly Aman airline, which is stated in the contested measures, is well founded.

122 As regards the reason relating to the applicant’s status as chairman of the board of directors of Aman Dimashq, it is apparent from the information from the websites ‘Aliqtisadi’ and ‘Damacham.sy’ that the applicant was appointed chairman of the board of directors of Aman Dimashq. That appointment took place, according to the website ‘Damacham.sy’, following the first general meeting of that company, held on 7 October 2017, at the headquarters of Damascus Cham Holding in Marota City.

123 On that point, as the Council points out, the applicant admits that he held the position of chairman of the board of directors of Aman Dimashq.

124 The applicant nevertheless claims that his professional situation has evolved, since he no longer holds the position of chairman of the board of directors of Aman Dimashq. In that regard, he submits a first letter of 28 May 2019, addressed to the board of directors of Aman Holding, whereby he submitted his resignation, which was accepted in a letter of the same date. The applicant provides a second letter of 29 May 2019, sent by the chairman of the board of directors of Aman Holding to Aman Dimashq, together with a registration certificate of Aman Dimashq, dated 1 July 2019, which show that he no longer represents Aman Holding on the board of directors of Aman Dimashq and that he has been replaced. Consequently, he claims that he is no longer chairman of that board of directors.

125 First, in the context of the examination of the legality of the initial measures and of the 2019 maintaining acts, it should be noted that the proof of the applicant’s resignation and of his replacement as chairman of the board of directors of Aman Dimashq is irrelevant. The applicant’s resignation was accepted on 28 May 2019, that is to say, after the date on which the initial measures and the 2019 maintaining acts were adopted, namely 21 January and 17 May 2019 respectively.

126 It is settled case-law that the legality of an EU measure must be assessed on the basis of the facts and the law as they stood at the time when the measure was adopted (see judgments of 3 September 2015, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Commission, C‑398/13 P, EU:C:2015:535, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited, and of 4 September 2015, NIOC and Others v Council, T‑577/12, not published, EU:T:2015:596, paragraph 112 and the case-law cited). Consequently, since the applicant’s resignation occurred after the adoption of the initial measures and the 2019 maintaining acts, it cannot call into question the legality of those acts.

127 Secondly, concerning the 2020 maintaining acts, it should be noted that, as regards the reason relating to the applicant’s status as chairman of the board of directors of Aman Dimashq, the Council maintained the applicant’s name on the lists at issue, citing precisely the date of his resignation as alleged by the applicant, namely May 2019. It means that the Council has admitted as established the fact that the applicant was no longer chairman of the board of directors of Aman Dimashq as from May 2019.

128 It is clear from the case-law that the fact that a person has ceased to hold a position within a structure does not, in itself, mean that that former position is irrelevant, since past activities could influence that person’s behaviour. However, the case-law shows that, taken in isolation, a person’s former positions cannot justify the inclusion of that person’s name on the lists in question. If the Council wished to rely on that person’s past activities, it would have to put forward sound and consistent evidence from which it could reasonably be inferred that that person maintains links with the structure which employed him or her at the date of adoption of the contested act, justifying the inclusion of that person’s name on the lists, after the termination of that person’s activities within that structure (see, by analogy, judgments of 6 September 2013, Bateni v Council, T‑42/12 and T‑181/12, not published, EU:T:2013:409, paragraphs 64 and 65, and of 18 February 2016, Jannatian v Council, T‑328/14, not published, EU:T:2016:86, paragraph 40).

129 In the present case, it is not apparent from document WK 3599/2020 REV 1 that the Council submitted sound and consistent evidence, within the meaning of the case-law referred to in paragraph 128 above, from which it could reasonably be inferred that the applicant maintained links with the structure which employed him on the date of adoption of the contested measure. Thus, document WK 3599/2020 REV 1 does not contain any evidence capable of justifying that, despite the applicant’s resignation in May 2019, that entry should be maintained in the reasons for listing. In particular, the Council neither explains nor demonstrates how the fact that the applicant was chairman of the board of directors of Aman Dimashq until May 2019 justifies, on the date of adoption of the 2020 maintaining acts, using that factor to establish his status as a leading businessperson operating in Syria. In that regard, it has not shown that the applicant maintained special links with Aman Dimashq. It must also be noted that, at the hearing, the Council acknowledged that the applicant had left his position by resigning, but only referred to his other commercial activities in order to justify, on account of their importance, the applicant’s classification as a leading businessperson operating in Syria.

130 Accordingly, it must be concluded that, as regards the 2020 maintaining acts, the Council could not rely on the reason relating to his status as chairman of the board of directors of Aman Dimashq until May 2019 in order to demonstrate his status as a leading businessperson operating in Syria.

– The applicant’s participation, as chairman of the board of directors of Aman Dimashq, a joint venture involved in the development of the Marota City project, in a regime-backed luxury residential and commercial development

131 As regards, first, the reason set out in the initial measures and the 2019 maintaining acts, relating to his status as chairman of the board of directors of Aman Dimashq, a joint venture involved in the development of the Marota City project, a regime-backed luxury residential and commercial development, it is apparent from the articles from the websites ‘The Syria Report’ (articles published on 17 April and 1 June 2018) and ‘Open Democracy’ that Aman Dimashq is a joint venture which was created by Mr Foz and Damascus Cham Holding with a capital of USD 18.9 million to develop several buildings for the Marota City project.

132 In that respect, as regards, specifically, the Marota City project, mentioned in the reasons for including the applicant’s name on the lists at issue, it is apparent from the evidence produced by the Council, in particular the websites ‘Open Democracy’, ‘The Syria Report’ (article published on 1 June 2018) and ‘Damacham.sy’, that that project is completed in the neighbourhood of Damascus called Basateen Al-Razi (Mazzeh).

133 In addition, it should be noted that it is apparent both from the website ‘Damacham.sy’ and ‘The Syria Report’ (articles published on 17 April and 1 June 2018) that the investments planned by Aman Dimashq in the Marota City project are particularly large, since they amount to SYP 150 thousand million, that is to say, approximately USD 312 million. On that basis, the website ‘Damacham.sy’ considers that it is one of the largest contributions to the Marota City project.

134 Those elements are, in essence, confirmed by the applicant. He acknowledges in the application that the company objects of Aman Dimashq consist in the development of new residential, commercial and leisure buildings on a portion (approximatively 3.1% of the size) of the plots of the Marota City project contributed in kind in the capital of Damascus Cham Holding, which oversees the rights to 30% of the plots of the Marota City project, the total size of which covers 2.15 million square metres.

135 As regards, secondly, the reasons set out in the 2020 maintaining acts, it is sufficient to note that, since it has been established, in paragraph 130 above, that, in order to demonstrate the applicant’s status as a leading businessperson operating in Syria, the Council could not rely on the reason relating to his position as chairman of the board of directors of Aman Dimashq until May 2019, it cannot, a fortiori, use his participation in the Marota City project in that capacity in order to demonstrate that status.

136 It is apparent from the websites ‘Aliqtisadi’, ‘Damacham.sy’, ‘Wall Street Journal’, ‘Open Democracy’ and ‘The Syria Report’ (article published on 17 April 2018) that, first, the applicant is employed within Aman Holding, of which he is the representative on the board of directors of Aman Dimashq, and that, secondly, Aman Holding is owned by Mr Foz. The applicant did not dispute that information and, on the contrary, confirmed it.

137 First, in the context of the examination of the legality of the initial measures and the 2019 maintaining acts, it should be noted that, because of his position within Aman Holding, the applicant was elected chairman of the board of directors of Aman Dimashq, a company in which important businesspersons, such as Mr Foz, are involved, but also political figures, such as the Governor of Damascus, President of Damascus Cham Holding, as is apparent from the website ‘Syrian Law Journal’, without being challenged by the applicant. In his pleadings, the applicant also stated that he worked full time as chairman of the board of directors of Aman Dimashq. However, being chosen by such persons and figures for such an important position within an undertaking making very large investments is a significant factor which must be taken into account in assessing whether the applicant has the status of leading businessperson operating in Syria.

138 Secondly, in the context of the examination of the legality of the 2020 maintaining acts, it must be recalled that the applicant was no longer chairman of the board of directors of Aman Dimashq, as the Court has found in paragraph 130 above.

139 Furthermore, it is apparent from the file that the applicant kept his position at Aman Holding for approximately one year after the date of his resignation. Moreover, in response to a question put by the Court at the hearing, the applicant stated that his salary had been reduced by half. In particular, his contract of employment with Aman Holding stipulated that he was paid SYP 1 250 000 (approximately EUR 2 526.60) per month. In addition, he claims that he is no longer as involved in Aman Holding’s projects, given that he oversees fewer projects. Moreover, in his pleadings and as was confirmed at the hearing, the applicant requested from Aman Holding authorisation to create Aman Facilities, on account of the fact that he was receiving remuneration from Aman Holding and intended to adopt a trade name close to that of Aman Holding, which indicates that he did not have complete freedom to lead as he pleased his business endeavour. Lastly, the applicant claims that Aman Holding would assist him in finding a lawyer to represent him and pay any legal costs he would incur in an action against the restrictive measures in dispute.

140 It follows that links do remain between the applicant and Aman Holding, but that they have significantly changed compared with those that existed when the initial measures and the 2019 maintaining acts were adopted. The applicant maintains, without being contradicted by the Council, that he no longer oversees projects and that Aman Holding allowed him to keep that position until he found another source of income. Furthermore, since the applicant is no longer a company representative but a mere employee of Aman Holding, it cannot be accepted that his activities within that company would make him a leading businessperson. Accordingly, it must be concluded that, as regards the 2020 maintaining acts, the Council could not, in order to establish the applicant’s status as a leading businessperson operating in Syria, rely on his status as an employee of Aman Holding.

141 As regards the new reason set out in the 2020 maintaining acts, it should be noted that the applicant admits having created Aman Facilities and justifies this in the light of the difficulties in finding employment following the adoption by the Council of the initial measures and of the 2019 maintaining acts.

142 First, it should be noted that the date of creation of Aman Facilities indicated in the reasons on which the 2020 maintaining acts are based does not correspond to the date relied on by the applicant in the second statement of modification. Those reasons state that the company was created on 30 January 2020, which is confirmed by the article from the website ‘Aliqtisadi’. By contrast, the applicant states that the company was formed in May 2019, only a few days before his resignation from his position as company representative of Aman Holding took effect, namely on 28 May 2019. Furthermore, according to the registration certificate of Aman Facilities, produced by the applicant, the company was created on 23 May 2019. Lastly, the statement by Syria International Islamic Bank also confirms that it was created prior to 30 January 2020, since repayment of the loan granted for setting up that company began on 10 November 2019. That difference in the dates is not, however, such as to affect the legality of the 2020 maintaining acts because, even if the Council relied on an incorrect date, the fact remains that the applicant acknowledges having set up that company before the adoption of those acts.

143 Secondly, it is apparent from the article from the website ‘Aliqtisadi’ that Aman Facilities operates in the tourism sector and provides hotel services. According to that article, the company’s fields of activity are as follows: management of hotels, private facilities and establishments dedicated to tourism, services or the administration, consultancy activities in the field of tourism and services. The applicant claims that Aman Facilities provides cleaning and sterilisation services to certain undertakings and facilities, which may include hotels, but he denies, however, that that company operates or develops hotel and tourist activities. In support of his argument, he produces two contracts for the provision of services the object of which confirms that Aman Facilities provides cleaning and sterilisation services in a hotel. The applicant also produces the registration certificate of Aman Facilities, dated 22 January 2020, which, however, confirms the description of the objects of Aman Facilities as reproduced in the article ‘Aliqtisadi’. Therefore, the two contracts for the provision of services and the registration certificate for Aman Facilities do not call into question the list of the fields of activity referred to in the article ‘Aliqtisadi’ and, therefore, the relevance of that article.

144 Thirdly, as regards the part of the 2020 reasons mentioning that the applicant created Aman Facilities with and on behalf of Mr Foz, it should be noted that the Council produced only one article intended to substantiate this, namely the article headed ‘Bashar Assi, Mr Foz’s New Henchman for Investments’, from the website ‘Eqtsad News’, which refers to the links between Mr Foz and the applicant. According to that article, Mr Foz uses the name of the applicant to set up new companies. It was in the context of that collaboration that the applicant allegedly received authorisation from the Syrian Ministry of Trade and Consumer Protection for setting up Aman Facilities.

145 It should be noted that, on that point, the applicant lodged a sworn statement, drawn up by a manager of Syria International Islamic Bank and dated 13 August 2020, which attests to the existence of a loan amounting to SYP 20 million (approximately EUR 26 000), granted to the applicant as well as the repayment schedule for that loan, starting on 10 November 2019. According to the applicant, that bank loan was used to finance part of the start-up costs of Aman Facilities, the other part being financed from his private funds. In that regard, the Council stated at the hearing that it could not be ruled out that the applicant had other sources of funding through Mr Foz or another bank, even though it admitted having no evidence to support that statement.

146 It follows from the foregoing that the applicant has demonstrated, without being effectively contradicted by the Council, that he took out a personal loan to set up Aman Facilities. Similarly, it is apparent from the article from the website ‘Eqtsad News’ that the applicant was given authorisation to create that company by the Syrian Ministry of Trade and Consumer Protection. However, it does not follow that Aman Facilities was officially created by the applicant and Mr Foz.

147 Fourthly, at the hearing, the Council relied on the similarity between the names Aman Holding and Aman Facilities to highlight the link between Mr Foz and the applicant and thus demonstrate that, in reality, Aman Facilities was created on behalf of Mr Foz. The applicant, for his part, justifies that choice as being an asset for marketing purposes, in order to gain visibility and develop his activities, by benefiting from the prestige of Aman Holding.

148 In that regard, it is sufficient to note that the fact that the names of those two companies have the word ‘Aman’ in common does not constitute sufficient evidence in itself to show that Aman Facilities was created with and on behalf of Mr Foz. Similarly, even though the applicant stated that he chose the name Aman Facilities in order to benefit from Aman Holding’s reputation, it is not apparent from any evidence in document WK 3599/2020 REV 1 that Aman Facilities was thus named as a result of his association with Aman Holding or that Mr Foz approved such a course of action.

149 Fifthly, there is no evidence in document WK 3599/2020 REV 1 that Aman Facilities’ activity benefits Mr Foz, or even Aman Holding.

150 Sixthly and lastly, even though it is apparent from the file that Mr Foz owns Aman Holding, it is important to note that the reasons for listing in the 2020 maintaining acts relate to the link between Aman Facilities and Mr Foz and makes no mention of a link between Aman Holding and Aman Facilities.

151 It follows from all of the foregoing that, although the applicant admits having created Aman Facilities, it cannot be said that he acted on behalf of Mr Foz by creating that company. It follows from the case-law that in view of the situation in Syria, the Council discharges the burden of proof borne by it if it presents to the EU judicature a set of indicia sufficiently specific, precise and consistent to establish that there is a sufficient link between the person subject to measures freezing his or her funds and the regime being combated (judgment of 21 April 2015, Anbouba v Council, C‑605/13 P, EU:C:2015:248, paragraph 52). In that sense, the only piece of evidence produced by the Council to demonstrate that the new reason for listing is well founded does not satisfy the requirements stemming from that case-law, having regard in particular to the applicant’s submission of evidence and arguments to the contrary.

– Conclusion on the applicant’s status as a leading businessperson operating in Syria

152 In the first place, as regards the initial measures and the 2019 maintaining acts, it must be concluded from all of the foregoing that the Council has adduced a set of indicia sufficiently specific, precise and consistent to establish that the applicant was indeed (i) the chairman of the board of directors of Aman Dimashq, which was involved in carrying out the large-scale project that is Marota City, (ii) Aman Holding’s representative and (iii) a founding partner of Fly Aman. Thus, the Council was fully entitled to conclude that the applicant was a leading businessperson operating in Syria.

153 That conclusion cannot be called into question by the applicant’s other arguments.

154 First, the applicant denies being a leading businessperson operating in Syria because he is a mere employee of Aman Holding, as his employment contract of 11 October 2017 demonstrates. That argument cannot, however, succeed. First of all, as admitted by the applicant, he was entrusted, in the course of his duties, with the task of representing Aman Holding on the board of directors of Aman Dimashq and was appointed chairman of the board of directors of Aman Dimashq. Thus, he cannot, for the period during which he carried out those duties, be regarded as being a ‘mere’ employee. Moreover, the applicant has not shown convincingly that, in the circumstances of the present case, being an employee is not compatible with being a leading businessperson.

155 Secondly, the applicant’s claim that he cannot be a leading businessperson operating in Syria because of both his personal and professional background demonstrating that he belongs to the middle class cannot succeed either. His humble beginnings, even if established, clearly did not prevent him from climbing the corporate ladder which led him to be elected chairman of the board of directors of Aman Dimashq. In particular, even if the information given by the website ‘Damacham.sy’ relating to his professional experience is excessively flattering for promotional purposes, it cannot hide the fact that he was appointed to the highest position of a joint venture responsible for investing USD 18.9 million in a project described as a large-scale project, which is sufficient to demonstrate that he cannot be regarded as still belonging to the middle class, in particular in the light of the structure of Syria’s economy.

156 Thirdly, the applicant claims that he has no share in Aman Dimashq, as is shown by Article 8 of the articles of association of the company, which he produced. According to that company’s articles of association, its shareholders are Damascus Cham Holding, which holds 49% of the shares, Aman Holding, which holds 40% and, lastly, Foz Trading, which holds 11%. Aman Holding and Foz Trading therefore own, together, the majority of the shares and of the votes at the company’s general meeting. Nevertheless, even if it were well founded, that assertion does not call into question the applicant’s position of chairman of the board of directors of Aman Dimashq, which was taken into account in order to justify his status as a leading businessperson operating in Syria in the initial measures and the 2019 maintaining acts.

157 Fourthly, the applicant submits that the Marota City project is not built on expropriated land. He submits, to that effect, that the land on which the Marota City project is built was never subject to compulsory expropriation, but rather was the subject of negotiation with the owners of unregulated housing situated on that land. In that regard, the applicant maintains that 359 transactions for the acquisition of those properties were carried out, their approximate total value being SYP 8.856 thousand million (that is to say EUR 18 335 403). The applicant produced, by way of illustration, evidence concerning the payment of the price to the owners in 20 of those 359 transactions. In addition, he adds, in essence, that a rent allowance was paid to the owners of unregulated housing who did not wish to sell their property. Lastly, the applicant claims, in essence, that that land was not the scene of conflicts between opposition forces and the Syrian regime and that the neighbourhoods of Damascus in that area were never destroyed during the armed conflict which took place in Syria.

158 It should be noted that the arguments set out in paragraph 157 above are irrelevant. In that regard, according to recital 6 of Decision 2015/1836, ‘the Council has assessed that because of the close control exercised over the economy by the Syrian regime, an inner cadre of leading businesspersons operating in Syria [wa]s only able to maintain its status by enjoying a close association with, and the support of, the regime, and by having influence within it’ and ‘the Council considers that it should provide for restrictive measures to impose restrictions on admission and to freeze all funds and economic resources belonging to, owned, held or controlled by those leading businesspersons operating in Syria, as identified by the Council and listed in Annex I, in order to prevent them from providing material or financial support to the regime and, through their influence, to increase pressure on the regime itself to change its policies of repression’.

159 It follows that the criterion of ‘leading businessperson operating in Syria’ presupposes, inter alia, support by the Syrian regime and is intended to prevent persons belonging to that category from providing material or financial support to that regime. Thus, the question whether the Marota City project is built on expropriated land or whether that land was the scene of conflicts has no bearing on the applicant’s participation in a project backed by the Syrian regime and, thus, on the application of that criterion to the present case.

160 Fifthly, the applicant claims that he succeeded in rebutting the presumption of a link between him and the Syrian regime. In that regard, he submits, in essence (i) that it was for the Council to demonstrate that the conditions laid down in Article 27(3) and Article 28(3) of Decision 2013/255, as amended by Decision 2015/1836, were not met and (ii) that it adduced material evidence rebutting that presumption.

161 In that regard, it should be noted that, in the present case, the applicant’s name was included on the lists at issue pursuant to Decision 2013/255, as amended by Decision 2015/1836. In this respect, Decision 2015/1836 introduced, inter alia, as an objective, autonomous and sufficient listing criterion, that of ‘leading businesspersons operating in Syria’, with the result that the Council is no longer required to demonstrate that there is any association between that category of persons and the Syrian regime, as understood under Decision 2013/255 before it was amended, or between that category of persons and the support provided to, or the benefit derived from, the regime, since being a leading businessperson operating in Syria is sufficient for the restrictive measures in question to be applied to a person. Thus, it does not follow from Decision 2013/255, as amended by Decision 2015/1836, that it is for the Council to provide evidence that the condition of being a leading businessperson as well as that of having sufficient links to the regime are both met (see, to that effect, judgments of 11 September 2019, HX v Council, C‑540/18 P, not published, EU:C:2019:707, paragraph 38; of 9 July 2020, Haswani v Council, C‑241/19 P, EU:C:2020:545, paragraphs 71 to 74; and of 4 April 2019, Sharif v Council, T‑5/17, EU:T:2019:216, paragraphs 55 and 56 (not published)).

162 To that effect, the Court held that it is possible to infer from the criterion relating to the category of ‘leading businesspersons operating in Syria’ a rebuttable presumption that such individuals are associated with the Syrian regime (see, to that effect, judgment of 4 April 2019, Sharif v Council, T‑5/17, EU:T:2019:216, paragraph 106, and order of 11 September 2019, Haswani v Council, T‑231/15 RENV, not published, EU:T:2019:589, paragraph 60). That presumption applies where the Council has been able to show that the person is not only a businessperson operating in Syria, but can also be described as a ‘leading’ businessperson. As is clear from the wording of recital 6 of Decision 2015/1836, it is the influence that that category of persons is likely to exercise on the Syrian regime that the Council aims to exploit by urging them, through the restrictive measures it adopts in their regard, to put pressure on the Syrian regime to change its policies of repression. Thus, once the Council has succeeded in demonstrating the influence that a businessperson may have on that regime, the link between that person and the Syrian regime is presumed.

163 In addition, it should be recalled that compliance by the General Court with the rules relating to the burden of proof and the taking of evidence as regards restrictive measures requires the General Court to respect the principle established in the settled case-law referred to in paragraph 89 above and reiterated by the Court of Justice in its judgment of 11 September 2019, HX v Council (C‑540/18 P, not published, EU:C:2019:707, paragraphs 48 to 50), according to which, in essence, the burden of proof lies with the institution in the event of a challenge to the merits of the reasons for listing. The Court of Justice thus held that the burden of proving the existence of sufficient information, within the meaning of Articles 27(3) and 28(3) of Decision 2013/255, as amended by Decision 2015/1836, showing that the person concerned was never, or is no longer, associated with the Syrian regime, did not exercise influence over the regime and did not pose a real risk of circumvention of the restrictive measures adopted in respect of that regime did not fall on the person concerned (see, to that effect, judgments of 14 June 2018, Makhlouf v Council, C‑458/17 P, not published, EU:C:2018:441, paragraph 86, and of 11 September 2019, HX v Council, C‑540/18 P, not published, EU:C:2019:707, paragraphs 50 and 51).

164 Consequently, an excessive standard of proof may not be imposed on the applicant in order to rebut the presumption of a link to the Syrian regime. Therefore, the person concerned must be considered to have succeeded in rebutting the presumption of a link to the Syrian regime if he or she puts forward arguments or evidence capable of seriously calling into question the reliability of the evidence submitted by the Council or the Council’s assessment, in particular in the light of the conditions laid down in Articles 27(3) and 28(3) of Decision 2013/255, as amended by Decision 2015/1836, or if he or she produces before the EU judicature a set of indicia establishing that he or she was not, or is no longer associated with the Syrian regime, that he or she did not exercise influence over the regime and that he or she did not pose a real risk of circumvention of the restrictive measures, in accordance with Articles 27(3) and 28(3) of that decision (judgment of 8 July 2020, Zubedi v Council, T‑186/19, EU:T:2020:317, paragraph 71).

165 In the present case, the applicant merely claims that he firmly and without reserve condemns the wrongdoings committed by the Syrian regime, but does not substantiate that claim with any concrete evidence, with the result that it cannot succeed.

166 Consequently, the applicant failed to present any argument or evidence which might cast doubt on the reliability of the evidence submitted by the Council or on the assessment that should have been made of that evidence, nor did he put forward any specific evidence which would enable the Court to conclude that he was not, or was no longer, associated with that regime, that he did not exercise influence over that regime or that he did not pose a real risk of circumvention of the restrictive measures.

167 In the light of all the foregoing, the Court finds that the first reason for including the applicant’s name on the lists at issue on account of his status as a leading businessperson operating in Syria was sufficiently substantiated, so that, in the light of that criterion, the decision to include and maintain the applicant’s name on the lists at issue, stemming from the initial measures and the 2019 maintaining acts, is well founded.

168 According to the case-law, having regard to the preventive nature of decisions adopting restrictive measures, if the EU judicature considers that, at the very least, one of the reasons mentioned is sufficiently detailed and specific, that it is substantiated and that it constitutes in itself a sufficient basis to support that decision, the fact that the same cannot be said of other such reasons cannot justify the annulment of that decision (see judgment of 28 November 2013, Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft, C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776, paragraph 72 and the case-law cited).

169 Accordingly, it is necessary, without there being any need to examine the merits of the other complaints raised by the applicant seeking to call into question the second reason for listing, to reject the first plea, so far as concerns the initial measures and the 2019 maintaining acts, as unfounded.

170 In the second place, as regards the 2020 maintaining acts, it follows from the foregoing that the Council has adduced a set of indicia sufficiently specific, precise and consistent to establish that the applicant was the founding partner of Fly Aman and had set up Aman Facilities. However, it failed to prove that the applicant had an important position within Aman Holding, as is apparent from paragraphs 139 and 140 above. Similarly, the Council has adduced no evidence that Aman Facilities was created with and on behalf of Mr Foz. Lastly, the Council wrongly relied on the applicant’s status as chairman of the board of directors of Aman Dimashq until May 2019 and on his participation on that basis in the Marota City project.

171 First, it must be noted that, as is apparent from the article of the website ‘Eqtsad News’, Fly Aman has yet to be set up. The applicant also submitted, without being challenged by the Council on this point, that Fly Aman was not operational. Secondly, the applicant confirms that he created Aman Facilities. However, the formation of Aman Facilities, the company objects of which are described in paragraph 143 above, is not sufficient to establish by itself the status of leading businessperson operating in Syria. The applicant also stated at the hearing, in reply to a question from the Court, that that company employed a very small number of employees, no more than five, which the Council has not disputed. In those circumstances, the Council cannot be regarded as having demonstrated, to the requisite standard, the applicant’s status as a leading businessperson operating in Syria when the 2020 maintaining acts were adopted.

172 Therefore, as regards the 2020 maintaining acts, the first reason for listing is not sufficiently substantiated; it is therefore necessary to examine the second reason for listing.

173 It should be borne in mind that, as is apparent from the 2020 maintaining acts, the second reason for listing concerns the applicant’s support to the Syrian regime and the benefit that he derives from that regime by reason of his commercial activities.

174 It is therefore necessary to identify the commercial activities in question.

175 Clearly, the commercial activities for which the applicant is regarded by the Council as supporting, and as benefiting from, the Syrian regime are the same as those which led it to regard him as a leading businessperson operating in Syria.

176 In that regard, it cannot be excluded that, for a specific person, the reasons for listing might overlap to a certain extent, in that a person may be considered to be a leading businessperson operating in Syria and also regarded as benefiting, in the course of his or her activities, from the Syrian regime or supporting it through those same activities. That is apparent, specifically, from the fact that, as is established in recital 6 of Decision 2015/1836, close association with the Syrian regime and support to it by that category of persons are one of the reasons for which the Council decided to establish that category. The fact remains that, even in such a situation, these are separate criteria (judgment of 23 September 2020, Kaddour v Council, T‑510/18, EU:T:2020:436, paragraph 77).

177 First, it must be inferred from the conclusions drawn in paragraphs 130 and 135 above that, since the applicant was not chairman of the board of directors of Aman Dimashq on the date on which the 2020 maintaining acts were adopted, he cannot be regarded as benefiting from the Syrian regime on that basis nor as supporting it on account of his participation in the Marota City project.

178 Secondly, it has been established, in paragraph 121 above, that the applicant is the founding partner of Fly Aman. However, the applicant claims that Fly Aman is not operational. It should be noted, in that regard, that it is apparent from the article from the website ‘Eqtsad News’ that Fly Aman has yet to be set up. There is no evidence in documents WK 50/2019 INIT and WK 3599/2020 REV 1 that the applicant benefits, in his capacity as founding partner of that company, from the Syrian regime or that he supports it. Admittedly, according to the website ‘7al.net’, the civil aviation sector in Syria is experiencing great difficulties as a result of ongoing military operations, which have led to the cessation of tourist traffic and the termination of services at certain airports. However, the Council did not rely on that consideration in its pleadings to justify a possible link between the formation of the company and the Syrian regime.

179 Thirdly, although it is apparent from paragraph 139 above that links remain between the applicant and Aman Holding, it is not apparent from any of the evidence in documents WK 50/2019 INIT and WK 3599/2020 REV 1 that the applicant benefits, in that capacity, from the Syrian regime or that he supports it. In that regard, the applicant stated that he no longer oversees projects within Aman Holding. In particular, he adduced evidence that he had been replaced as representative of Aman Holding and elected chairman of the board of directors of Aman Dimashq. He justified keeping his status as an employee temporarily, pending his finding another source of income. Thus, the support and benefit which the applicant receives from his former employer do not constitute direct evidence that he supports or benefits from the Syrian regime.

180 Fourthly and lastly, as regards Aman Facilities, although it is apparent from paragraph 146 above that the applicant obtained authorisation from the Syrian Ministry of Trade and Consumer Protection for its formation, the mere fact of forming a company, employing a limited number of employees, is not sufficient to support the conclusion that the applicant benefits from and supports the Syrian regime. In that regard, the website ‘Eqtsad News’ mentions ties between the applicant and Mr Foz, in that the latter is said to use the applicant’s name to set up new companies, including Aman Facilities. However, that information is not borne out by any other evidence contained in WK 3599/2020 REV 1. In addition, it must be noted that no information contained in document WK 3599/2020 REV 1 shows that the applicant supports, specifically, the Syrian regime through Aman Facilities.

181 In the light of all of the foregoing, it must be found that the second reason for including the applicant’s name on the lists at issue because of his association with the Syrian regime is not sufficiently substantiated, with the result that the decision to maintain the applicant’s name is unfounded.

182 Therefore, as regards the 2020 maintaining acts, the first plea must be upheld and, accordingly, they must be annulled in so far as they concern the applicant, without it being necessary to examine the fourth, second and third pleas raised in support of the action in respect of those acts.

183 In support of his plea, the applicant argues that the Council adopted the contested measures in order to target not the Syrian regime but the applicant himself, although he has at all times, first, complied with the sanctions ordered by the European Union and the international community and, secondly, remained independent of the Syrian regime. In submitting that argument, the applicant must be regarded as pleading a misuse of powers.

185 It should be borne in mind that a measure is vitiated by misuse of powers only if it appears on the basis of objective, relevant and consistent evidence to have been taken with the exclusive or main purpose of achieving an end other than that stated or of evading a procedure specifically prescribed by the Treaty for dealing with the circumstances of the case (see judgment of 25 November 2014, Safa Nicu Sepahan v Council, T‑384/11, EU:T:2014:986, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited).

186 In the present case, the applicant merely raises suspicions as to the existence of an ‘abuse of power’ and does not explain how the Council pursued an objective other than that which is apparent from recital 6 of Decision 2015/1836, namely exerting pressure on the Syrian regime in order for it to change its policies of repression. The applicant has in no way substantiated that claim or adduced any evidence or argument in support of it.

187 In the light of the foregoing and as regards the initial measures and the 2019 maintaining acts, the fourth plea must be rejected.

The second and third pleas, taken together, alleging infringement of the principle of proportionality, the right to property and the freedom to pursue an economic activity

188 First, the applicant claims that the restrictive measures concerning him are disproportionate. The applicant submits that, in view of the fact that is deprived of any international trade contact and therefore excluded from his professional environment, he can hardly pursue his profession. In practice, the restrictive measures prevent him from pursuing any professional activity and from carrying out any economic activity in his professional and private life.

189 Secondly, he takes the view, in essence, that the contested measures infringe his right to property and his freedom to pursue an economic activity, which also constitutes an infringement of the First Additional Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.

190 Thirdly, the applicant submits, in the first and second statements of modification, that the extension of the restrictive measures concerning him pursuant, respectively, to the 2019 maintaining acts and the 2020 maintaining acts exacerbates the disproportionate consequences of those measures for him.

192 It should be borne in mind that it is apparent from case-law that the fundamental rights relied on by the applicant, namely the right to property, enshrined in Article 17 of the Charter, and the freedom to pursue an economic activity, enshrined in Articles 15 and 16 of the Charter, are not absolute rights and that their exercise may be subject to restrictions justified by objectives of general interest pursued by the European Union. Thus, any restrictive economic or financial measure entails, ex hypothesi, consequences affecting the right to property and the freedom to pursue an economic activity of the person or entity subject to that measure, so causing harm to that person or entity. The importance of the aims pursued by the restrictive measures at issue is, however, such as to justify negative consequences, even of a substantial nature, for the persons or entities concerned (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 March 2015, Central Bank of Iran v Council, T‑563/12, EU:T:2015:187, paragraph 115).

193 Furthermore, while respect for fundamental rights is a condition for the legality of EU acts, according to established case-law, those fundamental rights do not enjoy absolute protection under EU law, but must be viewed in relation to their function in society. Consequently, restrictions may be placed on the use of those rights, provided that they actually correspond to objectives of general interest pursued by the European Union and do not constitute, in the light of the aim pursued, a disproportionate and intolerable interference which would undermine the very substance of the rights thus guaranteed (see judgment of 13 September 2013, Makhlouf v Council, T‑383/11, EU:T:2013:431, paragraph 97 and the case-law cited).

194 Moreover, it is clear from settled case-law that the principle of proportionality, which is one of the general principles of EU law and is referred to in Article 5(4) TEU, requires that measures implemented through provisions of EU law be appropriate for attaining the legitimate objectives pursued by the legislation at issue and must not go beyond what is necessary to achieve them (see, to that effect, judgments of 15 November 2012, Al-Aqsa v Council and Netherlands v Al-Aqsa, C‑539/10 P and C‑550/10 P, EU:C:2012:711, paragraph 122; of 25 June 2015, Iranian Offshore Engineering & Construction v Council, T‑95/14, EU:T:2015:433, paragraph 60 (not published); and of 14 March 2017, Bank Tejarat v Council, T‑346/15, not published, EU:T:2017:164, paragraph 149).

195 As regards the initial measures and the 2019 maintaining acts, concerning the applicant’s right to property and freedom to pursue an economic activity, it is true that those rights are restricted by the restrictive measures concerning him, since he cannot, inter alia, make use of any of his funds which may be situated in the territory of the European Union, nor transfer them to the European Union, unless given special authorisation.

196 However, in the present case, the adoption of restrictive measures against the applicant is appropriate, since it is compatible with an objective of general interest as fundamental to the international community as the protection of civilian populations. The freezing of the funds, financial assets and other economic resources, and the prohibition on entry into the territory of the European Union in respect of persons identified as being involved in supporting the Syrian regime cannot, in themselves, be regarded as inappropriate (see judgment of 13 September 2013, Makhlouf v Council, T‑383/11, EU:C:2013:431, paragraph 100 and the case-law cited).

197 As regards the allegedly disproportionate nature of the inclusion of the applicant’s name on the lists annexed to the 2019 maintaining acts, it should be borne in mind that Article 28(6) of Decision 2013/255, as amended by Decision 2015/1836, and Article 16 of Regulation No 36/2012, as amended by Regulation 2015/1828, provide for the possibility, first, to authorise the use of frozen funds to meet essential needs or to satisfy certain commitments and, secondly, to grant specific authorisation for the release of certain funds, other financial assets or other economic resources (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgments of 3 September 2008, Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission, C‑402/05 P and C‑415/05 P, EU:C:2008:461, paragraph 364, and of 15 November 2012, Al-Aqsa v Council and Netherlands v Al-Aqsa, C‑539/10 P and C‑550/10 P, EU:C:2012:711, paragraph 127).

198 It follows that, given the overriding importance of the protection of civilian populations in Syria, any restrictions on the applicant’s rights caused by the initial measures and the 2019 maintaining acts are justified by an objective of general interest and are not disproportionate to the aims pursued.

199 Lastly, as regards the extension of the temporal application of the restrictive measures adopted in respect of the applicant, pursuant to the 2019 maintaining acts, which, according to the applicant, exacerbates the disproportionate consequences of those measures for him, it should be pointed out that, in the context of such restrictive measures, the Council is required to carry out a periodic re-examination, in accordance with the second and third sentences of Article 34 of Decision 2013/255, as amended by Decision 2015/1836, and with Article 32(4) of Regulation No 36/2012, as amended by Regulation 2015/1828, which entails, each time, the possibility for the person or entity concerned to put forward arguments and submit facts supporting its assertions (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 July 2020, Haswani v Council, C‑241/19 P, EU:C:2020:545, paragraphs 106 and 107).

200 Accordingly, the Council was entitled, on the basis of a re-examination of whether to maintain the applicant’s name on the lists annexed to the 2019 maintaining acts, to decide to extend those restrictive measures until 1 June 2020.

201 In the light of all of the foregoing and as regards the initial measures and the 2019 maintaining acts, the second and third pleas, taken together, must be rejected and, consequently, the action must be dismissed.

Conclusion on the action and the temporal effects of the annulment of the 2020 maintaining acts

202 It follows from the examination of the six pleas raised by the applicant in support of his action that the latter must be dismissed in so far as it seeks to secure the annulment of the initial measures and of the 2019 maintaining acts. By contrast, on account of the fact that the first plea, alleging errors of assessment, as regards the 2020 maintaining acts, was upheld, the action must be upheld in so far as it seeks to secure the annulment of those acts in so far as they concern the applicant.

203 In that regard, the Council claimed, in its third head of claim, that, should the Court annul the contested acts in so far as they concern the applicant, the Court should order that the effects of Implementing Decision 2019/87 and Decisions 2019/806 and 2020/719 be maintained in so far as they concern the applicant, until the partial annulment of Implementing Regulations 2019/85, 2019/798 and 2020/716 takes effect in so far as they concern the applicant.

204 First of all, as regards Implementing Regulation 2020/716, it should be borne in mind that, under the second paragraph of Article 60 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, by way of derogation from Article 280 TFEU, decisions of the General Court declaring a regulation to be void are to take effect only as from the date of expiry of the period for bringing an appeal referred to in the first paragraph of Article 56 of that statute or, if an appeal has been brought within that period, as from the date of dismissal of the appeal.

205 In those circumstances, in the absence of an appeal, the Council has a period of two months, extended on account of distance by a period of 10 days, as from the notification of the present judgment, to remedy the infringements established by adopting, if appropriate, new restrictive measures concerning the applicant.

206 Next, as regards Decision 2020/719, it should be noted that that decision was amended by Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/855 of 27 May 2021 amending Decision 2013/255 (OJ 2021 L 188, p. 90), which replaced the list with effect from 29 May 2021 and extended the application of the restrictive measures, as regards the applicant, until 1 June 2022.

207 Therefore, as at today’s date, the applicant is subject to a new restrictive measure. It follows that the annulment of Decision 2020/719, in so far as it concerns the applicant, does not entail the removal of his name from the list.

208 Consequently, it is not necessary to maintain the effects of Decision 2020/719.

209 Under Article 134(3) of the Rules of Procedure, where each party succeeds on some and fails on other heads, the parties are to bear their own costs. However, if it appears justified in the circumstances of the case, the Court may order that one party, in addition to bearing its own costs, pay a proportion of the costs of the other party.

210 In the present case, the Council must be ordered to bear its own costs and to pay half of the applicant’s costs.

1. Annuls Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/719 of 28 May 2020 amending Decision 2013/255/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Syria and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/716 of 28 May 2020 implementing Regulation (EU) No 36/2012 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria in so far as they concern Mr Bashar Assi;

3. Orders the Council of the European Union to bear its own costs and to pay half of those of Mr Assi;

The sixth plea, alleging infringement of the rights of the defence and the right to a fair trial

– Conclusion on the applicant’s status as a leading businessperson operating in Syria

The second and third pleas, taken together, alleging infringement of the principle of proportionality, the right to property and the freedom to pursue an economic activity

Conclusion on the action and the temporal effects of the annulment of the 2020 maintaining acts

	[Home] [Databases] [World Law] [Multidatabase Search] [Help] [Feedback]
	Court of Justice of the European Communities (including Court of First Instance Decisions)
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Court of Justice of the European Communities (including Court of First Instance Decisions) >> Assi v Council (Common foreign and security policy - Restrictive measures adopted against Syria - Freezing of funds - Judgment) [2021] EUECJ T-256/19 (24 November 2021) URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/EUECJ/2021/T25619.html Cite as: ECLI:EU:T:2021:818, [2021] EUECJ T-256/19, EU:T:2021:818

Court of Justice of the European Communities (including Court of First Instance Decisions)