HB v EIB (Civil service - Dismissal - Judgment) [2021] EUECJ T-689/20 (15 December 2021)

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(Civil service – EIB staff – Dismissal – Manifest error of assessment – Principle of sound administration – Lack of competence of the author of the act)

European Investment Bank (EIB), represented by G. Faedo and K. Carr, acting as Agents, and by B. Wägenbaur, lawyer,

ACTION under Article 270 TFEU and Article 50a of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union seeking annulment of the decision of the EIB of 27 April 2020 terminating the applicant’s employment,

composed of H. Kanninen, President, N. Półtorak (Rapporteur) and M. Stancu, Judges,

1 The applicant, HB, a former member of staff of the European Investment Bank (EIB), entered the service of the EIB on 1 February 2011 as an administrative assistant assigned to the department dedicated to the Jaspers initiative (‘the department in question’).

2 Under the terms of the contract which she signed on 21 December 2010, the applicant was initially recruited for a period of three years. On 24 July 2013, the applicant’s fixed-term contract was extended, by addendum, for a further period of three years, from 1 February 2014 to 31 January 2017.

3 On 29 September 2016, the applicant was offered a permanent contract, as of 1 February 2017. It was stated in that contract that, without prejudice to the other grounds for termination, it would expire automatically at the end of the notice period given by the EIB upon termination or alteration of the bank’s mandate under the Jaspers initiative.

4 On 30 March 2020, the applicant met with the Head of the ‘Coordination’ Division, who informed her of the EIB’s intention to terminate her contract because of a significant reduction in the contribution of the European Commission to the budget of the Jaspers initiative and a decrease in the workload of the department in question to which she was assigned, with the result that there was no longer any operational justification for maintaining her post.

5 By email of 8 April 2020, the applicant submitted observations on the proposed termination of her contract of employment.

6 By email of 27 April 2020, the Deputy Secretary-General of the EIB informed the applicant of the EIB’s decision to terminate her contract with effect from 31 October 2020 (‘the contested decision’).

7 By letter of 12 May 2020, signed by the Director of Human Resources Operations and the Head of the ‘Salaries, Pensions, Health Insurance and Recruitment’ Division, the decision to terminate the applicant’s contract of employment was formally confirmed.

8 On 27 May 2020, the applicant submitted a request for review of the contested decision.

9 By decision of 16 October 2020 (‘the decision rejecting the request for review’), the EIB rejected the appellant’s request for review.

10 By application lodged at the Court Registry on 17 November 2020, the applicant brought the present action.

11 By a separate document lodged at the Court Registry on 26 November 2020, the applicant applied for legal aid, in accordance with Article 147 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court. That application was registered under the reference T‑689/20 AJ.

12 By order of 8 March 2021, the President of the First Chamber of the General Court granted the applicant legal aid.

13 The Court (First Chamber) decided, in accordance with Article 106(3) of the Rules of Procedure, to give judgment in the case without holding an oral hearing.

– annul the contested decision and, so far as is necessary, the decision rejecting the request for review;

16 The applicant is seeking annulment of the contested decision and, so far as is necessary, the decision rejecting the request for review.

17 It must be observed that, according to the case-law, a claim for annulment formally directed against a decision rejecting a request for review has the effect of bringing before the Court the act adversely affecting the applicant which forms the subject matter of that procedure, except where the scope of that decision differs from that of the act forming the subject matter of the review procedure. Where that decision contains a re-examination of the applicant’s situation in the light of new elements of law or of fact, or where it changes or adds to the original act, it is a measure subject to review by the judicature which will take it into consideration when assessing the legality of the contested measure, or will even regard it as an act adversely affecting the applicant replacing the contested measure (see, by analogy, judgment of 10 March 2021, AM v EIB, T‑134/19 P, EU:T:2021:119, paragraph 33).

18 In the present case, it should be noted that the decision rejecting the request for review confirms the contested decision and does not have a different scope from that decision.

19 Consequently, the applicant’s claim for annulment must be understood as being directed against the contested decision, the legality of which will be examined having regard to the grounds set out in the decision rejecting the request for review.

20 In support of the action, the applicant relies on three pleas in law, alleging, respectively:

– first, manifest errors of assessment, breach of the principle of sound administration and breach of the duty to have regard for the welfare of staff;

– second, the arbitrary nature of the contested decision and breach of the principle of sound administration;

21 The Court considers it appropriate to begin by examining the third plea, relating to the formal legality of the contested decision, and then to examine the first and second pleas which concern the substantive legality of that decision.

Third plea in law: the lack of competence of the author of the contested decision

22 By the third plea, the applicant claims that it is apparent from the EIB’s statutes that the President of the EIB is the authority with the power to recruit and dismiss the EIB’s staff and that, notwithstanding a delegation of powers to the Director-General of Personnel and a sub-delegation of powers to the Director of Human Resources Operations and to the Head of the ‘Salaries, Pensions, Health Insurance and Recruitment’ Division, the Deputy Secretary-General, who signed the contested decision, did not have the necessary powers to terminate her employment.

24 In the present case, it is apparent from Annex D.3 to the rejoinder that the power to sign contracts within the EIB lies with the President of the EIB and that a delegation of powers to the Director-General of Personnel and a sub-delegation of powers to the Director of Human Resources Operations and to the Head of the ‘Salaries, Pensions, Health Insurance and Recruitment’ Division were granted on 3 and 17 September 2019, respectively.

25 It is also apparent from Annex A.1 to the application that, by letter of 12 May 2020, signed by the Director of Human Resources Operations and the Head of the ‘Salaries, Pensions, Health Insurance and Recruitment’ Division, the EIB’s decision to terminate the applicant’s contract of employment was formally confirmed to her.

26 Furthermore, since the Director of Human Resources Operations and the Head of the ‘Salaries, Pensions, Health Insurance and Recruitment’ Division had the power to sign contracts, that power cannot be reduced merely to the conclusion of contracts, but must be understood as also encompassing their termination.

27 It follows that, by signing the letter of 12 May 2020, the Director of Human Resources Operations and the Head of the ‘Salaries, Pensions, Health Insurance and Recruitment’ Division necessarily endorsed the contested decision, with the result that the applicant is not justified in claiming that that decision was taken by an authority which lacked competence merely because she was given prior notice of it by the Deputy Secretary-General.

28 It is apparent from the foregoing that the third plea must be dismissed as unfounded.

First plea in law: manifest errors of assessment, breach of the principle of sound administration and breach of the duty to have regard for the welfare of staff

– First part: manifest error of assessment as regards the ground relating to budgetary restrictions

30 By the first part of the first plea, the applicant submits, in essence, that the EIB committed a manifest error of assessment in stating that the Commission’s contribution to the budget for the operation of the Jaspers initiative (‘the budget in question’) had been significantly reduced.

31 In particular, the applicant asserts, first, that the budget in question regularly fluctuated between 2015 and 2020 and, second, that the specific grant agreement of 2020, like all specific grant agreements concluded since 2016, ensured that, in the event of a fluctuation in that budget, that fluctuation should have no impact on the staff already made available to the Jaspers initiative.

32 In addition, the applicant claims that, by a decision of the Management Committee of the EIB adopted in 2019, which had been the subject of a staff note of 12 April 2019, it had been decided to extend the duration of the posts relating to mandates expiring before the end of 2021 until the end of 2022, so that the budget necessary to retain her post was available.

33 The applicant also relies on comments which A allegedly made on 8 April 2020 at a staff meeting, confirming that the Jaspers initiative had given rise to a mandate running until the end of 2020, so that staff contracts linked to that mandate are not affected by fluctuations in the budget in question. In that regard, the applicant attached to her reply, as Annex C.1, a USB stick containing a sound recording which she herself made at that meeting on 8 April 2020, in order to adduce evidence of the comments which she attributed to A in the application.

35 In that regard, it should be recalled that the EIB is free to structure its administrative units taking into account a number of factors, such as the nature and scope of the tasks assigned to them and the budgetary possibilities, and changes in its priorities. That freedom includes the power to abolish posts and to change the tasks allocated to surviving posts, in the interests of better organisation of work, and the power to reassign tasks previously carried out by the holder of an abolished post (judgment of 13 July 2018, SQ v EIB, T‑377/17, EU:T:2018:478, paragraph 104).

36 It is also apparent from the case-law that a body such as the EIB enjoys a broad discretion in defining its staff management policy and in determining the details of that policy. Moreover, the response to budgetary concerns involves taking into account economic developments and financial variables in the context of which the EIB also has a wide discretion. Consequently, the judicial review carried out by the Court in this area must be limited. The Court must therefore confine itself to examining whether the EIB’s assessments are vitiated by a manifest error or whether it manifestly exceeded the limits of its discretion (judgment of 12 February 2014, Bodson and Others v EIB, F‑83/12, EU:F:2014:15, paragraph 161).

37 An error may be said to be manifest only where it is easily perceptible and can be clearly detected by reference to the criteria to which the exercise of the decision-making power in question is subject. Consequently, in order to establish that the administration committed a manifest error in assessing the facts such as to justify the annulment of a decision, the evidence, which it is for the applicant to adduce, must be sufficient to make the findings of the administration implausible. In other words, the plea of manifest error must be rejected if, in spite of the evidence put forward by the applicant, the assessment in question can be accepted as still being true or valid (see, to that effect, judgments of 12 February 2019, TV v Council, T‑453/17, not published, EU:T:2019:83, paragraph 53 and the case-law cited, and of 24 September 2019, US v ECB, T‑255/18, not published, EU:T:2019:680, paragraph 111 and the case-law cited).

38 In the present case, it is apparent from the content of the contested decision that the applicant’s employment was terminated due to significant alterations to the EIB’s mandate under the Jaspers initiative, which reason was, moreover, expressly provided for in her contract of employment (see paragraph 3 above).

39 In order to justify those significant alterations to the EIB’s mandate, the applicant was informed, inter alia, that the Commission’s contribution to the budget in question for 2020 had been significantly reduced, from an amount initially planned in 2019 of EUR 36 million, then reduced to EUR 34 million, to reach an actual amount of EUR 31 million.

40 The applicant, for her part, states in the application that the budget in question was EUR 45 million in 2017, 2018 and 2019, before decreasing to EUR 38.75 million in 2020.

41 It is apparent from the documents in the file that the specific grant agreements provided that the amounts which had to be allocated by the Commission to the budget in question were EUR 31 million for 2020, EUR 36 million for 2017 to 2019, EUR 32 million for 2016 and EUR 29.5 million for 2015.

42 Thus, it must be held that, independently of previous fluctuations, the announced amount of the Commission’s contribution to the budget in question actually decreased over the recent period from EUR 36 million for the years 2017 to 2019 to EUR 31 million for 2020.

43 The applicant has not adduced sufficient evidence to render implausible the assessment that that reduction in the budget in question could lead to the removal of one or more posts within the department in question.

44 It follows that the assessment in the contested decision that the Commission’s contribution to the budget in question had been significantly reduced between 2019 and 2020, which justified the termination of the applicant’s employment, is not vitiated by any manifest error of assessment.

45 Furthermore, it must be pointed out that the amounts relied on by the applicant are not the amounts of the various contributions from the Commission, but correspond to the total amounts of the budget in question, which, moreover, also experienced a significant reduction between 2019 and 2020, down from EUR 45 million to EUR 38.75 million.

46 As to the applicant’s claim that the specific grant agreements concluded since 2016 provided that, in the event of a fluctuation in the budget, that fluctuation should not affect the staff already made available to the Jaspers initiative (see paragraph 31 above), it must be pointed out, as the EIB rightly stated, that that assertion is based on an incorrect reading of those agreements.

47 Indeed, as the EIB states, that reference appears only in the notes prepared by its services for the attention of the Management Committee, notes in which the latter was requested to approve those grant agreements. The sole purpose of that reference was to inform the Management Committee that the budget forecasts did not have an impact on the staff made available to the Jaspers initiative and could not be understood as forming part of those specific grant agreements. By that reference, the EIB’s services merely indicated to the Management Committee that, in order to carry out the necessary activities to fulfil the mandate under the Jaspers initiative for a given year whilst respecting the amount provided for in the specific grant agreement for that year, it was not necessary to mobilise budgetary or human resources over and above those already existing and made available until then for the implementation of that mandate.

48 As regards the comments attributed by the applicant to A, which A allegedly made on 8 April 2020 at a staff meeting, it should be noted that the EIB disputes, in the rejoinder, the admissibility of Annex C.1 to the reply, referred to in paragraph 33 above. It submits in particular, first, that the production of that evidence was late at that stage of the proceedings and, second, that the use of that recording is unlawful in these proceedings before the Court, since the person in question was not informed of that recording and did not consent to it.

49 In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, under Article 85(1) of the Rules of Procedure, evidence produced or offered is to be submitted in the first exchange of pleadings. Under Article 85(2) of the Rules of Procedure, the main parties are allowed to produce or offer further evidence in the reply or rejoinder in support of their arguments, provided that the delay in the submission of such evidence is justified.

50 It must be observed that the submission, together with the reply, of the document mentioned in paragraph 33 above, which, moreover, concerns a meeting held on a date prior to the date on which the application was lodged, was made out of time for the purposes of Article 85 of the Rules of Procedure. Consequently, since the applicant has failed to put forward any justification for that late submission, that document must be rejected as inadmissible under those provisions.

51 Lastly, even assuming that, by her arguments, the applicant seeks, in essence, to rely on a breach of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations in the light of clear and precise assurances given to her by means of a staff note of 12 April 2019, it must be observed that the right to claim protection of legitimate expectations requires three conditions to be satisfied. First, precise, unconditional and consistent assurances originating from authorised and reliable sources must have been given to the person concerned by the European Union authorities. Second, those assurances must be such as to give rise to a legitimate expectation on the part of the person to whom they are addressed. Third, the assurances given must comply with the applicable rules (judgment of 12 September 2018, PH v Commission, T‑613/16, not published, EU:T:2018:529, paragraph 65).

52 In the present case, it must be held that no precise assurance was given to the applicant such as to give rise to any legitimate expectation concerning the continuity of her employment. Indeed, her contractual situation, without any ambiguity, provided for the possibility of terminating her contract in the event of the termination or alteration of the EIB’s mandate under the Jaspers initiative (see paragraph 3 above), so that the note relied on by the applicant is not sufficient to create uncertainties about that contractual situation of which she was perfectly aware.

53 It follows that, in the present case, the conditions required for a finding that there was an infringement of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations are not satisfied.

54 It is apparent from the foregoing that the first part of the first plea must be rejected as unfounded.

– Second part: manifest error of assessment as regards the ground claiming a lower workload

55 By the second part of the first plea, the applicant submits, in essence, that the workload of the ‘Smart Development’ Division (‘the division in question’), to which she was assigned within the department in question, was not lower than that of the other divisions of that department and that, as a result, the EIB committed a manifest error of assessment in taking the view that the requirements of the service did not justify keeping the applicant in her post.

56 In addition, the applicant claims that the workload of the division in question increased by 17% between 31 December 2019 and 2 September 2020, that is to say, the strongest workload progression of all the divisions of the department in question for the same period.

58 In the present case, it is apparent from the content of the decision rejecting the request for review that, in order to justify significant alterations to the mandate of the EIB resulting in the termination of the applicant’s employment, the applicant was informed that the workload of the division in question, measured in terms of the number of ongoing assignments per expert, had the lowest in the department in question, and that, therefore, this showed relative over-staffing in comparison to the other divisions.

59 It is apparent from the documents before the Court that on 2 September 2020 the division in question was one of those with the lowest workload among all the divisions making up the department in question, with 21 ongoing assignments and an average of 2.1 assignments per expert, compared with 43 assignments in 2015. It is also apparent from the file that the average number of assignments per expert in the division in question went from 4.3 in 2015 to 1.8 in 2019.

60 Furthermore, although the applicant illustrates her assertions using a number of tables and graphs intended to establish, year by year, the workload per expert of each of the divisions of the department in question, it must be found that the workload of the division in question, notwithstanding a slight rebound over part of 2020, experienced a greater downward trend than in the other divisions over the period covering 2015 to 2020, which is, moreover, perfectly illustrated by the graphs produced by the applicant in support of the action.

61 The applicant has not adduced any evidence sufficient to render implausible the assessment that that greater reduction in the workload compared with the other divisions of the same department was likely to lead to the removal of one or more posts within the division in question.

62 It follows that the assessment in the contested decision that there was a reduction in the workload of the division in question, to which the applicant was assigned, which was greater than in the other divisions of the department in question, with the result that that could justify the termination of the applicant’s employment, is not vitiated by any manifest error of assessment. The second part of the first plea must therefore be rejected as unfounded.

– Third part: manifest error of assessment of the interests of the service, breach of the principle of sound administration and breach of the duty to have regard for the welfare of staff

63 By the third part of the first plea, the applicant claims, first, that she does not know of anyone who, like her, had a permanent contract which was terminated as a result of the budgetary restrictions alleged by the EIB and that she was the only member of staff whose contract was terminated because of those budgetary restrictions.

64 The applicant compares her situation with that of three former colleagues performing similar duties, but whose fixed-term contracts were either renewed or converted into permanent contracts, even though, in the applicant’s submission, it would have been financially more advantageous for the EIB to let one of those three persons go rather than to terminate her employment. The applicant infers from that fact that, by terminating her contract rather than the contract of one of those three former colleagues, the EIB committed a manifest error of assessment contrary to the interests of the service.

65 Second, the applicant claims that, by not offering her the possibility of reassignment or transfer before terminating her employment, the EIB failed to take into consideration the interests of the applicant, in breach of its duty to have regard for the welfare of officials and of the principle of sound administration.

67 It is apparent, in essence, from the case-law that the concept of the interests of the service relates in particular to the proper functioning of the institution in general. In that regard, it is common ground that the institutions have a wide discretion in the organisation of their departments in accordance with the tasks conferred on them and, with a view to that, in the allocation of the staff at their disposal (see, to that effect, judgment of 4 December 2018, Schneider v EUIPO, T‑560/16, not published, EU:T:2018:872, paragraph 53 and the case-law cited).

68 In addition, having regard to the wide discretion enjoyed by the institutions in the assessment of the interests of the service, review by the Court of compliance with the condition relating to the interests of the service must be limited to the question whether the institution remained within reasonable limits, which are not open to criticism, and did not use its discretion in a manifestly incorrect fashion (see, to that effect, judgment of 4 December 2018, Schneider v EUIPO, T‑560/16, not published, EU:T:2018:872, paragraph 54 and the case-law cited).

69 Thus, an institution is, for example, entitled to consider, when exercising the wide discretion it enjoys in the organisation of its services, that the interests of the service justify a measure reassigning an official or member of staff, taken within the operational framework of the reorganisation of the institution’s administrative structures (see, to that effect, judgment of 4 December 2018, Schneider v EUIPO, T‑560/16, not published, EU:T:2018:872, paragraph 55 and the case-law cited).

70 Furthermore, it must be borne in mind that, when the administration uses its discretion to adopt a decision to terminate an employment contract, it must take into consideration all the factors which may affect its decision and take all necessary steps to ensure that those factors are present before terminating the employment of a member of staff. In particular, the competent authority must take account of the interests of the service, but also, in order to satisfy its duty of care, of the interests of the staff member concerned (see judgment of 11 June 2019, TO v EEA, T‑462/17, not published, EU:T:2019:397, paragraph 88 and the case-law cited).

71 Indeed, even if it is true that the competent authority has a wide discretion in assessing the interests of the service and that, therefore, review by the EU Courts must be confined to the question whether the authority concerned remained within reasonable bounds and did not use its discretion in a manifestly incorrect way when taking a decision concerning the situation of a staff member, the duty to have regard for the welfare of staff, which reflects the balance of reciprocal rights and obligations between the official authority and its staff, requires that it take into consideration all the factors that may affect its decision and in particular the interests of the member of staff concerned (see judgment of 4 December 2013, ETF v Schuerings, T‑107/11 P, EU:T:2013:624, paragraph 91 and the case-law cited).

72 In the present case, it should be noted that it is apparent from the case-law cited in paragraphs 67 to 69 above that the concept of the interests of the service concerns the organisation, by an institution, of its services according to its operational needs, in the light of the tasks entrusted to it. By submitting that it would have been financially more advantageous for the EIB to let another member of staff go rather than the applicant, so that the termination of her employment was decided on the basis of a manifest error of assessment of the interests of the service, the applicant is mistaken about the scope of that concept and disregards the issue of the operational needs of the EIB, and in particular of the department in question. The concept of the interests of the service, which covers the operational needs of a service or institution, cannot be reduced to the real or perceived financial consequences for the budget of that institution of a decision falling within its freedom to structure the various administrative units of which it is composed.

73 It is therefore necessary only to examine whether, in the light of the terms of the applicant’s contract of employment, the applicable provisions and all the other factual circumstances of the case, including the budgetary restrictions and a reduction in the workload within the division in question, the EIB committed a manifest error of assessment in terminating that contract of employment in compliance with its duty to have regard for the welfare of officials.

74 At the outset, it must be held that the reduction in the budget granted to the department in question and the reduction in the workload of the division in question may be regarded as a valid reason for terminating employment, especially since the applicant’s employment contract expressly provided that it could be terminated in the event of an alteration to the EIB’s mandate under the Jaspers initiative.

75 However, and although the applicant had been reassigned five times since she took up her post in 2011, it is clear that there is nothing in the file to indicate that, before terminating her employment, the EIB examined the possibilities of reassigning the applicant again, at least within another division of the department in question less affected by a reduction in the workload. Although the EIB is not required, depending on the circumstances, to reassign the applicant, such an examination could nevertheless be regarded as taking the applicant’s interests into account and, therefore, as compliance with the duty to have regard for the welfare of officials.

76 However, it is apparent from the contested decision that the applicant was encouraged to take part in recruitment procedures within the EIB and that she was informed that former members of staff assigned to the department in question had done so successfully. In particular, the contested decision contains information that the applicant could have been a candidate for a vacant post within the EIB. In addition, it was proposed to the applicant that she be dispensed from service for the total duration of her notice period, from 31 March 2020, that is to say for a period of seven months, in order to enable her to adapt to the situation and to have sufficient time to take any number of measures.

77 Thus, it cannot be argued that the applicant completely lacked any framework to enable her to find other employment, if necessary by following the selection procedures within the EIB, in which she was encouraged to take part. On the contrary, it appears that the proposals made to her, both to take part in certain selection procedures and to be dispensed from service for a period of seven months, in particular in order to enable her to take the steps necessary to find other employment, may be regarded as taking her interests into account and, therefore, as compliance with the duty to have regard for the welfare of officials.

78 Accordingly, it must be held that the EIB took due account of the applicant’s interests. The principle of sound administration and the duty to have regard for the welfare of officials were therefore not breached.

79 Consequently, the third part of the first plea must be rejected and, therefore, the first plea must be rejected in its entirety as unfounded.

Second plea in law: the arbitrary nature of the contested decision and breach of the principle of sound administration

80 In support of the second plea, the applicant submits, in essence, that the decision to select her post and terminate her employment contract was arbitrary, in so far as it is, in her submission, quite astonishing that, of all the staff members of the department in question holding a permanent contract, she was the only one whose employment was terminated. The applicant adds that, in the context of budgetary restrictions alleged by the EIB, the failure to draw up a staff reduction plan is contrary to the principle of sound administration.

82 In the present case, the applicant’s employment was terminated due to a significant reduction in the Commission’s contribution to the budget of the Jaspers initiative and a decrease in the workload of the division in question to which she was assigned. It is apparent from the analysis carried out in paragraphs 41 to 44 and 58 to 62 above that those grounds were not vitiated by a manifest error of assessment.

83 In that respect, as regards the assertion that the contested decision was arbitrary, having been adopted in breach of the principle of equal treatment, it must be observed that the applicant ignores the information communicated to her before the reply was lodged, concerning the termination of the employment relationship with other members of staff for the same reasons (see paragraph 89 below). In particular, it should be noted that, in its letter of 22 December 2020, the EIB informed the applicant that another staff member’s employment had been terminated for the same reasons as hers and that the fixed-term contracts of two other members of staff had not been renewed for those same reasons.

84 Thus, it must be held that the applicant’s argument that she was the only member of staff whose employment was terminated has no factual basis.

85 As regards the question whether the EIB was required to draw up a plan to reduce staff numbers before terminating the applicant’s employment, it should be noted at the outset that there is nothing in the file to indicate that the applicable regulatory framework required the EIB to draw up such a plan.

86 Consequently, it must be held that, when the EIB adopted the contested decision relating to the termination of the applicant’s contract, it complied with its obligations under the principle of sound administration.

87 In those circumstances, it must be held that the two complaints submitted in the context of the second plea are unfounded and, therefore, the second plea must be rejected as unfounded.

88 In her reply, the applicant requested that the Court adopt a measure of organisation of procedure requesting the EIB to produce the contracts, and the decisions terminating those contracts, of staff members of the department in question who, like her, were employed under a permanent contract and whose employment had been terminated for the same reasons as hers.

89 In the rejoinder, the EIB submits that it has already responded to the applicant’s request as part of the exchanges preceding the termination of her employment and submits as an annex the letter by which it informed the applicant that another staff member’s employment had been terminated for the same reasons as hers and that two other members of staff with fixed-term contracts had not had their contracts renewed for the same reasons. On that occasion, the EIB also informed the applicant that it was not in a position to provide her with the decisions terminating those contracts because of considerations relating to the protection of personal data.

90 Under Article 88(1) of the Rules of Procedure, measures of organisation of procedure may be taken at any stage of the proceedings either of the Court’s own motion or on the application of a main party. According to Article 89 of the Rules of Procedure, the purpose of those measures is to ensure that cases are prepared for hearing, procedures carried out and disputes resolved under the best possible conditions. Such measures may, in particular, consist of asking the parties to produce any material relating to the case (Article 89(3)(d) of the Rules of Procedure).

91 It should also be recalled that the Court must assess the usefulness of the measures of organisation of procedure requested by one of the main parties (see judgment of 20 March 2019, Hércules Club de Fútbol v Commission, T‑766/16, EU:T:2019:173, paragraph 28 and the case-law cited).

92 To enable the Court to determine whether it is conducive to the proper conduct of the procedure to order the production of certain documents, the party requesting production must identify the documents requested and provide the Court with at least minimum information indicating the utility of those documents for the purposes of the proceedings (judgment of 17 December 1998, Baustahlgewebe v Commission, C‑185/95 P, EU:C:1998:608, paragraph 93; see, also, judgment of 16 October 2013, TF1 v Commission, T‑275/11, not published, EU:T:2013:535, paragraph 117 and the case-law cited). Thus, it fell to the applicant, inter alia, to put forward precise and relevant reasons to explain how the evidence in question could be relevant to the resolution of the dispute (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 July 2016, Oikonomopoulos v Commission, T‑483/13, EU:T:2016:421, paragraph 253 (not published)).

93 In the present case, in the light of the documents before the Court and in view of the applicant’s pleas, complaints and arguments, such a measure is neither relevant nor necessary for the purpose of ruling in the action.

94 The applicant merely puts forward general arguments to the effect that it may be inferred from the claim that she was the only person whose employment was terminated for the reasons relied on by the EIB in the contested decision that the EIB acted arbitrarily towards her by adopting that decision.

95 First, the applicant has not adduced any evidence capable of leading the Court to doubt the veracity of the information contained in the EIB’s letter referred to in paragraph 88 above and, second, the production of specific examples of decisions or contracts illustrating the EIB’s contentions does not provide relevant information over and above what is contained in that letter for the purposes of examining the argument that the applicant was the only person whose employment was terminated by the EIB for the reasons relied on in the contested decision.

96 It follows that the request for a measure of organisation of procedure must be rejected.

98 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party must be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, she must be ordered to bear her own costs and to pay those incurred by the EIB, in accordance with the form of order sought by the EIB.

2. Orders HB to bear her own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Investment Bank (EIB).

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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Court of Justice of the European Communities (including Court of First Instance Decisions) >> HB v EIB (Civil service - Dismissal - Judgment) [2021] EUECJ T-689/20 (15 December 2021) URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/EUECJ/2021/T68920.html Cite as: EU:T:2021:891, [2021] EUECJ T-689/20, ECLI:EU:T:2021:891

Court of Justice of the European Communities (including Court of First Instance Decisions)