Moshkovich v Council (Common foreign and security policy - Restrictive measures adopted in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine - Judgment) [2023] EUECJ T-283/22 (20 December 2023)

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	Court of Justice of the European Communities (including Court of First Instance Decisions)
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Court of Justice of the European Communities (including Court of First Instance Decisions) >> Moshkovich v Council (Common foreign and security policy - Restrictive measures adopted in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine - Judgment) [2023] EUECJ T-283/22 (20 December 2023) URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/EUECJ/2023/T28322.html Cite as: [2023] EUECJ T-283/22, EU:T:2023:849, ECLI:EU:T:2023:849

(Common foreign and security policy – Restrictive measures adopted in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine – Freezing of funds – Restrictions on movement – List of persons, entities and bodies subject to freezing of funds and economic resources – Inclusion and maintaining of the applicant’s name on the list of persons, entities and bodies concerned – Obligation to state reasons – Error of assessment – Criterion of a leading businessperson involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of Russia – Right to property – Freedom to conduct a business – Right to respect for private life – Proportionality – Principle of non-discrimination – Right to be heard)

Vadim Nikolaevich Moshkovich, residing in Tambov (Russia), represented by D. Rovetta, M. Campa, T. Bontinck, A. Guillerme, L. Burguin, M. Moretto, V. Villante and M. Pirovano, lawyers,

Council of the European Union, represented by P. Mahnič and J. Rurarz, acting as Agents,

composed of D. Spielmann, President, I. Gâlea (Rapporteur) and T. Tóth, Judges,

1 By his action on the basis of Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, Mr Vadim Nikolaevich Moshkovich, seeks annulment of (i) Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/397 of 9 March 2022 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2022 L 80, p. 31) and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/396 of 9 March 2022 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2022 L 80, p. 1) (together, ‘the initial acts’); (ii) Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/1530 of 14 September 2022 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2022 L 239, p. 149) and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1529 of 14 September 2022 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2022 L 239, p. 1) (together, ‘the acts of September 2022’); (iii) Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/572 of 13 March 2023 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2023 L 75I, p. 134) and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/571 of 13 March 2023 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2023 L 75I, p. 1) (together, ‘the acts of March 2023’), and (iv) Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/811 of 13 April 2023 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2023 L 101, p. 67) and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/806 of 13 April 2023 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2023 L 101, p. 1) (together, ‘the acts of April 2023’), in so far as those acts (together, ‘the contested acts’) enter and maintain his name on the lists annexed to those acts (‘the lists at issue’).

3 The present case falls within the context of restrictive measures adopted in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and, in particular, the Russian Federation’s military aggression against Ukraine of 24 February 2022.

4 On 17 March 2014, the Council of the European Union adopted, on the basis of Article 29 TEU, Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 78, p. 16), and, on the basis of Article 215(2) TFEU, Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 78, p. 6).

5 On 25 February 2022, in view of the gravity of the situation in Ukraine, the Council adopted, first, Decision (CFSP) 2022/329 amending Decision 2014/145 (OJ 2022 L 50, p. 1) and, second, Regulation (EU) 2022/330 amending Regulation No 269/2014 (OJ 2022 L 51, p. 1), in order, inter alia, to amend the criteria according to which natural or legal persons, entities or bodies could be subject to the restrictive measures at issue.

6 Article 2(1) and (2) of Decision 2014/145, as amended by Decision 2022/329 (‘Decision 2014/145, as amended’) reads as follows:

‘1. All funds and economic resources belonging to, or owned, held or controlled by:

(a) natural persons responsible for, supporting or implementing actions or policies which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, or stability or security in Ukraine, or which obstruct the work of international organisations in Ukraine;

(d) natural or legal persons, entities or bodies supporting, materially or financially, or benefitting from Russian decision-makers responsible for the annexation of Crimea or the destabilisation of Ukraine;

(f) natural or legal persons, entities or bodies supporting, materially or financially, or benefitting from the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine; or

(g) leading businesspersons or legal persons, entities or bodies involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine,

and natural or legal persons, entities or bodies associated with them, as listed in the Annex, shall be frozen.

2. No funds or economic resources shall be made available, directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed in the Annex.’

7 Article 1(1)(a), (b), (d) and (e) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, prohibits natural persons who satisfy essentially the same criteria as those set out in Article 2(1)(a), (d), (f) and (g) of that decision from entering into or transiting through the territory of the Member States.

8 Regulation No 269/2014, as amended by Regulation 2022/330 (‘Regulation No 269/2014, as amended’), requires measures to be adopted for the freezing of funds and lays down the detailed rules governing that freezing in terms which are identical, in essence, to those of Decision 2014/145, as amended. Article 3(1)(a) to (g) of that regulation largely reproduces Article 2(1)(a) to (g) of that decision.

10 By means of the initial acts, the applicant’s name was added at line 728 of the lists at issue, with the following reasons:

‘Vadim Nikolaevich MOSHKOVICH is a Russian entrepreneur with business interests in agriculture and real-estate development. In 2004, Vadim Moshkovich founded Rusagro Group, which is a major producer of pork, fats and sugar. Vadim Nikolaevich MOSHKOVICH is therefore involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation.

On 24 February 2022, in the aftermath of the initial stages of Russian aggression against Ukraine, Vadim Nikolaevich MOSHKOVICH, along with … 36 [other] business[persons], met with President Vladimir Putin and other members of the Russian Government to discuss the impact of the course of action in the wake of Western sanctions. The fact that he was invited to attend this meeting shows that he is a member of the closest circle of Vladimir Putin and that he is supporting or implementing actions or policies which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, as well as stability and security in Ukraine. It also shows that he is one of the leading businesspersons involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of [the Russian Federation], which is responsible for [the] annexation of Crimea and destabilisation of Ukraine.’

11 In the Official Journal of the European Union of 10 March 2022 (OJ 2022 C 114I, p. 1), the Council published a notice for the attention of the persons, entities and bodies subject to the restrictive measures provided for in Decision 2014/145, as amended by Decision (CFSP) 2022/397, and Regulation No 269/2014, as implemented by Implementing Regulation 2022/396 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.

12 By an email dated 13 April 2022, the applicant requested access to the documents that had been used as the basis for adopting the restrictive measures concerning him.

13 By letter of 28 April 2022, the Council replied to the applicant’s request referred to in paragraph 12 above and sent the information in the file with the reference WK 3060/2022, dated 8 March 2022 (‘the first WK file’).

14 On 18 May 2022, the applicant lodged a request for reconsideration of the initial acts with the Council.

15 On 14 September 2022, the Council adopted the acts of September 2022, extending the measures taken against the applicant to 15 March 2023. Those acts maintained the applicant’s name on the lists at issue on the basis of identical reasons to those set out in the initial acts.

16 On 15 September 2022, the Council published a notice in the Official Journal of the European Union for the attention of the persons and entities subject to the restrictive measures provided for in Decision 2014/145, as amended by Decision 2022/1530, and in Regulation No 269/2014, as implemented by Implementing Regulation 2022/1529 (OJ 2022 C 353I, p. 1).

17 By letter dated 15 September 2022, the Council replied to the applicant’s request for reconsideration of 18 May 2022, dismissing that request. It stated, inter alia, that it had not committed any manifest error of assessment and, in particular, that it was not contested that at the time of adoption of the initial acts the applicant was the Chairman of the Board of Directors of Rusagro Group. The Council considered that he fulfilled the criteria laid down in Article 1(1)(a), (b), (d) and (e) and Article 2(1)(a), (d), (f) and (g) of Decision 2014/145, as amended. It stated that the applicant fulfilled the criteria at issue on account of his position within Rusagro Group, one of the largest companies in the agricultural sector, a sector that provides a substantial source of revenue to the Russian Government. It also stated that the applicant’s meetings with President Putin demonstrated the close relationship between the Russian State, embodied by its president, and the applicant’s company, and the mutual support and loyalty that exists between them.

18 On the same day, the applicant, through his representative, asked the Council to provide any new documents relating to him that had been added to the file since April 2022.

20 On 25 November 2022, the applicant, on the basis of Article 86 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, lodged a first statement of modification of the application. The Council submitted its observations on that statement on 21 December 2022.

21 On 22 December 2022, the Council sent a letter to the applicant informing him of its intention to maintain the restrictive measures against him on the basis of reasons for inclusion which had been slightly amended, introducing, in addition to amendments to his name, the information that the company Rusagro Group was ‘rated first among agricultural holdings in 2021 in Russia’. It also annexed to that letter the evidential file WK 17692/2022 INIT (‘the second WK file’) which supplemented the first WK file. The second WK file is divided into two parts, the first part concerning the applicant and the second part, the agricultural sector.

22 On 20 January 2023, the applicant submitted observations on the Council’s letter of 22 December 2022.

23 On 13 March 2023, the Council adopted the acts of March 2023, containing the reasons set out in paragraph 21 above, and it extended the measures taken against the applicant to 15 September 2023.

24 By letter of 14 March 2023, the Council informed the applicant of the maintenance of his name on the lists. That letter was accompanied by the file WK 903/2023 containing the applicant’s observations of January 2023.

25 On 13 April 2023, the Council adopted the acts of April 2023. Those acts made no amendment to the summary of reasons. However, they deleted from the identification information the statement that the applicant was a minority owner of Sberbank.

26 The applicant lodged a statement of modification on 23 May 2023. The Council submitted its observations on that statement on 16 June 2023.

29 In support of the action, the applicant puts forward a first plea in law, alleging breach of the right to effective judicial protection and infringement of the obligation to state reasons, a second plea, alleging an error of assessment, a third plea, alleging a failure to comply with the principle of proportionality and breach of the right to property, of the right to respect for private life and of the freedom to conduct a business, and a fourth plea, alleging a failure to comply with the principle of non-discrimination. Furthermore, in the two statements of modification, he also invokes a fifth plea alleging breach of the right to be heard and of the obligation on the Council to review its decision.

A. The first plea in law, alleging breach of the right to effective judicial protection and infringement of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and infringement of the obligation to state reasons and of Article 296 TFEU

30 In the first place, the applicant claims that the formal statement of reasons for the inclusion of his name on the lists at issue is either almost absent or contradictory, or does not comply with the obligation of specificity borne by the Council, and, in any event, is incomplete.

31 In the second place, according to the applicant, the statement of reasons does not allow him reliably to understand the extent of the allegations against him. The summaries of reasons in respect of the contested acts, the first WK file and the defence are inconsistent. It follows from the summaries of reasons that the legal basis for inclusion of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue is the listing criteria under Article 1(1)(a) and (e) and Article 2(1)(a) and (g) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, as well as under Article 3(1)(a) and (g) of Regulation No 269/2014, as amended. However, the first WK file refers to the listing criteria under Article 1(1)(b), (d) and (e) and Article 2(1)(d), (f) and (g) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, as well as under Article 3(1)(d), (f) and (g) of Regulation No 269/2014, as amended. Furthermore, in the defence, the Council invokes all those criteria, namely those specified in Article 1(1)(a), (b), (d) and (e) and Article 2(1)(a), (d), (f) and (g) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, as well as in Article 3(1)(a), (d), (f) and (g) of Regulation No 269/2014, as amended.

32 In the third place, the applicant submits that the listing criteria under Article 1(1)(b) and (d) and Article 2(1)(d) and (f) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, as well as under Article 3(1)(d) and (f) of Regulation No 269/2014, as amended, are not set out with sufficient precision in the summaries of reasons. Accordingly, the applicant did not understand that he had been listed for the reason that he had obtained a benefit from the Russian Government or Russian decision-makers, nor that the mere fact of his carrying out activities in the agricultural sector was sufficient to constitute support for the Russian Government or decision-makers. Likewise, he was unable to understand why his mere presence at a meeting with President Putin was sufficient to constitute such support. Furthermore, a WK file does not overcome the absence of explanations in the summary of reasons. Accordingly, given the inconsistencies between the criteria referred to, it is impossible for the applicant to understand the reasons for his listing.

34 According to settled case-law, the right to effective judicial protection, which is affirmed in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’), requires that the person concerned must be able to ascertain the reasons upon which the decision taken in relation to him or her is based, either by reading the decision itself or by requesting and obtaining disclosure of those reasons. That is without prejudice to the power of the court having jurisdiction to require the authority concerned to disclose that information, so as to make it possible for him or her to defend his or her rights in the best possible conditions and to decide, with full knowledge of the relevant facts, whether there is any point in his or her applying to the court having jurisdiction, and in order to put the latter fully in a position to review the lawfulness of the decision in question (see judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 100 and the case-law cited).

35 It must also be recalled that the statement of reasons required by Article 296 TFEU must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the institution which adopted the measures in such a way as to enable the person concerned to ascertain the reasons for the measures for the purpose of assessing whether they are well founded and to enable the court having jurisdiction to exercise its power of review (see judgment of 1 June 2022, Prigozhin v Council, T‑723/20, not published, EU:T:2022:317, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).

36 The statement of reasons required by Article 296 TFEU must be appropriate to the measure at issue and the context in which it was adopted. The requirements to be satisfied by the statement of reasons depend on the circumstances of each case, in particular the content of the measure in question, the nature of the reasons given and the interest which the addressees of the measure, or other parties to whom it is of direct and individual concern, may have in obtaining explanations. In particular, it is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law or to provide a detailed answer to the considerations set out by the person concerned when consulted prior to the adoption of that same measure, since the question whether the statement of reasons is sufficient must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question. Consequently, the reasons given for a measure adversely affecting a person are sufficient if that measure was adopted in a context which was known to that person and which enables him or her to understand the scope of the measure concerning him or her (see judgment of 1 June 2022, Prigozhin v Council, T‑723/20, not published, EU:T:2022:317, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited).

37 As regards an act of the Council which imposes a restrictive measure, the statement of reasons must identify the actual and specific reasons why the Council considers, in the exercise of its discretion, that such a measure must be adopted in respect of the person concerned (see judgment of 25 March 2015, Central Bank of Iran v Council, T‑563/12, EU:T:2015:187, paragraph 55 and the case-law cited).

38 It must also be borne in mind that the obligation to state reasons, by which the Council is bound, relates, on the one hand, to the indication of the legal basis of the measure adopted and, on the other hand, to the circumstances which enable it to hold that one or other of the listing criteria is satisfied in the case of the party concerned (see judgment of 12 February 2020, Mende Omalanga v Council, T‑176/18, not published, EU:T:2020:61, paragraph 45 and the case-law cited).

39 Furthermore, it must be noted that the absence of any specific statement of the criterion applied with regard to a person does not necessarily lead to an infringement of the obligation to state reasons, provided that it is sufficiently clear from reading the statement of reasons adopted by the Council which criteria it applied in respect of that person (see judgment of 11 September 2019, Topor-Gilka and WO Technopromexport v Council, T‑721/17 and T‑722/17, not published, EU:T:2019:579, paragraph 79; see also, to that effect, judgment of 30 November 2016, Rotenberg v Council, T‑720/14, EU:T:2016:689, paragraph 51). However, such explicit reference is indispensable where, in its absence, the parties concerned and the Courts of the European Union are left uncertain as to the precise legal basis (judgment of 25 March 2015, Central Bank of Iran v Council, T‑563/12, EU:T:2015:187, paragraph 68).

40 Lastly, it must be recalled that the question of the statement of reasons, which concerns an essential procedural requirement, is separate from that of the evidence of the alleged conduct, which concerns the substantive legality of the act in question and involves assessing the truth of the facts set out in that act and the characterisation of those facts as evidence justifying the use of restrictive measures against the person concerned (judgments of 15 November 2012, Council v Bamba, C‑417/11 P, EU:C:2012:718, paragraph 60, and of 9 December 2014, Peftiev v Council, T‑441/11, not published, EU:T:2014:1041, paragraph 146; see also, to that effect, judgment of 16 November 2011, Bank Melli Iran v Council, C‑548/09 P, EU:C:2011:735, paragraph 88).

41 In the present case, in the first place, it must be held that the reasons set out in paragraphs 10 and 21 above cover the criterion provided for in Article 1(1)(a) and in Article 2(1)(a) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, and in Article 3(1)(a) of Regulation No 269/2014, as amended (‘criterion (a)’) by stating that the applicant is ‘supporting or implementing actions or policies which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, as well as stability and security in Ukraine’. Furthermore, the criterion provided for in Article 1(1)(e) and in Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, and in Article 3(1)(g) of Regulation No 269/2014, as amended (‘criterion (g)’), is also covered, inasmuch as it is stated that the applicant is one of the ‘leading businesspersons involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of [the Russian Federation], which is responsible for [the] annexation of Crimea and destabilisation of Ukraine’. Accordingly, even though the statement of reasons does not refer expressly to the provisions establishing criterion (a) and criterion (g), it necessarily relates to those provisions given that it is worded almost identically to them.

42 In the second place, as regards the criteria provided for in Article 1(1)(b) and in Article 2(1)(d) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, and in Article 3(1)(d) of Regulation No 269/2014, as amended (‘criterion (d)’), and in Article 1(1)(d) and Article 2(1)(f) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, and in Article 3(1)(f) of Regulation No 269/2014, as amended (‘criterion (f)’), it must be stated that, contrary to criteria (a) and (g), it is not sufficiently clear from a reading of the reasons given for the contested acts that the Council included the applicant’s name on the lists at issue under those criteria.

43 It must be recalled that criteria (d) and (f) cover persons ‘supporting, materially or financially,’ or ‘benefiting from’ ‘Russian decision-makers’ or ‘the Government of the Russian Federation’, respectively.

44 However, first, there is nothing in the reasons set out in paragraphs 10 and 21 above which attests to any ‘benefit’ which the applicant derives from Russian decision-makers or the Government of the Russian Federation.

45 Second, as regards the applicant potentially ‘supporting, materially or financially’ ‘Russian decision-makers’ or the ‘Government of the Russian Federation’, it must be observed that the summary of reasons claims that ‘the fact that he was invited to attend this meeting shows that he is a member of the closest circle of Vladimir Putin and that he is supporting or implementing actions or policies which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, as well as stability and security in Ukraine’. As it was noted in paragraph 41 above, that wording is almost identical to that of criterion (a), and the person concerned will immediately establish a link with that criterion.

46 Admittedly, the criteria set out in Decision 2014/145, as amended, and in Regulation No 269/2014, as amended, are not mutually exclusive. It must also be recognised that there may be some overlap between, on the one hand, supporting actions or policies undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, or its stability or security, to which criterion (a) relates, and, on the other hand, materially or financially supporting Russian decision-makers or the Government of the Russian Federation, to which criteria (d) and (f) relate. Nevertheless, the reproduction word for word of criterion (a) within the summary of reasons is such as to preclude the applicant identifying another criterion linked to a form of support such as that support is set out in criteria (d) and (f). It is therefore apparent from the foregoing, having regard to the case-law cited in paragraph 39 above, that criteria (d) and (f) cannot be clearly linked to the summaries of reasons.

47 Accordingly, the statement of reasons for the contested acts can only be assessed so far as concerns criteria (a) and (g).

48 In this connection, the reference, in the summary of reasons, first, to the applicant’s status as an entrepreneur with business interests in agriculture and real-estate development, in particular through Rusagro Group, a major producer of pork, fats and sugar and, second, to his attendance with 36 other businesspersons at a meeting, on 24 February 2022, in the presence of President Putin and members of the Russian Government, in order to discuss the impact of the course of action in the wake of Western sanctions (‘the meeting of 24 February’), enables him to understand the statement in the reasons that he is a leading businessperson involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, namely criterion (g).

49 Likewise, as regards criterion (a), the reference, in the reasons for the contested acts, to the applicant’s participation in the meeting of 24 February enabled him to understand why the Council had regarded him as supporting or implementing actions or policies which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.

50 Since the reasons, so far as they concern criterion (a) and criterion (g), provide an autonomous and sufficient statement of reasons for the contested acts, it must be held that the Council complied with the obligation laid down in Article 296 TFEU.

51 That finding cannot be called into question by the applicant’s arguments seeking to challenge the merits of the reasons on the basis of which his name was included and maintained on the lists at issue by the contested acts, which will be examined in connection with the plea alleging an error of assessment.

53 The Court considers it useful to begin by examining the merits of the inclusion of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue under criterion (g).

54 In the first place, it must be pointed out that criterion (g) provides that leading businesspersons or legal persons, entities or bodies involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine, shall be included on the lists at issue.

55 In that regard, it must be observed that criterion (g) must be interpreted as meaning that it covers the revenue provided by the sector in which the applicant is involved, and not the applicant’s own revenue or that of the undertaking in which he is involved. That finding follows from the wording of that criterion and the objectives pursued by the legislation governing the restrictive measures at issue, namely to increase the pressure on the Russian Federation and the cost of the latter’s actions seeking to undermine Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence and to promote a peaceful settlement of the crisis.

56 In the second place, without there being any need to rule on the admissibility of the plea of illegality of criterion (g), raised by the applicant for the first time at the stage of the reply, it must be held that that plea cannot be upheld.

57 According to Article 277 TFEU, any party may, in proceedings in which an act of general application adopted by an institution, body, office or agency of the European Union is at issue, plead the grounds specified in the second paragraph of Article 263 in order to invoke before the Court of Justice of the European Union the inapplicability of that act.

58 In addition, according to settled case-law, the Courts of the European Union must, in accordance with the powers conferred on them by the FEU Treaty, ensure the review, in principle the full review, of the lawfulness of all EU acts in the light of the fundamental rights forming an integral part of the EU legal order. That obligation is expressly laid down by the second paragraph of Article 275 TFEU (see judgments of 28 November 2013, Council v Fulmen and Mahmoudian, C‑280/12 P, EU:C:2013:775, paragraph 58 and the case-law cited, and of 28 November 2013, Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft, C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776, paragraph 65 and the case-law cited).

59 The fact remains that the Council has a broad discretion as regards the general and abstract definition of the legal criteria and the detailed rules for the adoption of the restrictive measures (see, that that effect, judgment of 21 April 2015, Anbouba v Council, C‑630/13P, EU:C:2015:248, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited). Consequently, rules which are general in scope and define those criteria and those detailed rules, such as the provisions of the contested acts setting out the criteria at issue with which the present plea is concerned, are subject to a restricted judicial review, limited to checking that the rules governing procedure and the statement of reasons have been complied with, that the facts are materially accurate, that there has been no error of law and no manifest error of assessment of the facts or misuse of power (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 July 2009, Melli Bank v Council, T‑246/08 and T‑332/08, EU:T:2009:266, paragraphs 44 and 45).

60 The applicant claims that criterion (g) is imprecise and incoherent and infringes his fundamental rights and his rights of defence on the ground that he was penalised on account of the ‘objective’ fact of his involvement in the agricultural sector, whereas many persons and companies prominent in that sector have not been subject to restrictive measures.

61 First of all, in this connection, attention must be drawn to the fact that the Council has a broad discretion enabling it, when appropriate, not to impose restrictive measures on such a person, where the Council considers that, in the light of the objectives of those measures, it would not be appropriate to do so (judgment of 22 April 2015, Tomana and Others v Council and Commission, T‑190/12, EU:T:2015:222, paragraph 243).

62 Next, it must be stated that the discretion conferred on the Council in criterion (g) is not contrary to the requirement of predictability, since that criterion is sufficiently clear and predictable to meet the requirements of legal certainty and is part of a legal framework which is clearly delimited by the objectives pursued by the legislation governing the restrictive measures at issue, recalled in paragraph 55 above, in essence the need, in the light of the seriousness of the situation, to put pressure on the Russian authorities so that they bring to an end their actions and policies destabilising Ukraine.

63 Lastly, criterion (g) is directed in a targeted and selective manner at leading businesspersons and legal persons involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Russian Government. In that regard, in the light of the importance of certain economic sectors for the Russian economy, there is a rational connection between the targeting of leading businesspersons involved in those sectors which provide a substantial source of revenue to the Russian Government and the objective of the restrictive measures (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 September 2018, Rosneft and Others v Council, T‑715/14, not published, EU:T:2018:544, paragraph 157).

64 Therefore, the applicant’s arguments alleging the illegality of criterion (g) must be rejected.

65 In the third place, it must be noted that the second plea must be regarded as alleging an error of assessment and not a manifest error of assessment. Although it is true that the Council has a degree of discretion to determine on a case-by-case basis whether the legal criteria on which the restrictive measures at issue are based are met, the fact remains that the Courts of the European Union must ensure the review, in principle the full review, of the lawfulness of all EU acts (see judgments of 3 July 2014, National Iranian Tanker Company v Council, T‑565/12, EU:T:2014:608, paragraphs 54 and 55 and the case-law cited, and of 26 October 2022, Ovsyannikov v Council, T‑714/20, not published, EU:T:2022:674, paragraph 61 and the case-law cited).

66 Moreover, it must be recalled that the effectiveness of the judicial review guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter requires, inter alia, that the Courts of the European Union ensure that the decision by which restrictive measures were adopted or maintained, which affects the person or entity concerned individually, is taken on a sufficiently solid factual basis. That entails a verification of the factual allegations in the summary of reasons underpinning that decision, with the consequence that judicial review cannot be restricted to an assessment of the cogency in the abstract of the reasons relied on, but must concern the question whether those reasons, or, at the very least, one of those reasons, deemed sufficient in itself to support that decision, is substantiated (judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 119).

67 That assessment must be carried out by examining the evidence and information not in isolation but in its context. The Council discharges the burden of proof borne by it if it presents to the Courts of the European Union a set of indicia sufficiently specific, precise and consistent to establish that there is a sufficient link between the entity subject to a measure freezing its funds and the regime or, in general, the situations, being combated (judgment of 1 June 2022, Prigozhin v Council, T‑723/20, not published, EU:T:2022:317, paragraph 72; see also, to that effect, judgment of 21 April 2015, Anbouba v Council, C‑630/13 P, EU:C:2015:247, paragraph 53).

68 It is for the competent EU authority to establish, in the event of challenge, that the reasons relied on against the person concerned are well founded, and not the task of that person to adduce evidence of the negative, that those reasons are not well founded (see judgment of 15 June 2017, Kiselev v Council, T‑262/15, EU:T:2017:392, paragraph 63 and the case-law cited).

69 It is in the light of those rules of case-law that the substance of the applicant’s arguments must be examined.

70 In that regard, a distinction must be drawn between the initial acts, the acts of September 2022 and the acts of March and April 2023.

71 The applicant submits that the documents produced by the Council do not provide any evidence to substantiate (i) that the agricultural sector provides a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, (ii) that the real-estate development sector constitutes a substantial source of revenue for that government, (iii) that the applicant is involved in the latter sector, (iv) that Rusagro Group provides a substantial source of revenue to that government, and (v) that the applicant is part of the so-called closest circle of President Putin and that he supports or implements actions or policies which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, as well as stability and security in Ukraine.

73 The applicant submits that the evidence on which the Council based its decision to include his name on the list annexed to the initial acts consists of a mere compilation of press articles and messages from social media and internet sites. First, the Council did not make an effort to extract an official list of the attendees of the meeting held on 24 February, but instead used a Twitter discussion thread. Nor did it examine the official transcript of that meeting.

74 Second, he argues that the evidence taken from Wikileaks is not reliable and was obtained illegally. The Council thus failed to check not only the author and the reliability of that screenshot, but also its date, which was from 2010. Through that evidence, the Council invoked a special relationship between the applicant and Sberbank, but does not explain how that information is relevant in the light of the listing criteria. In addition, he submits, that claim is incorrect. Lastly, while accepting that the General Court has, in the past, taken into consideration material from Wikileaks, he submits that it requires that material to be at least credible and the evidence concerned should not be taken into consideration.

75 Third, the applicant observes that the Council produced a press release referring to the signing of a strategic cooperation agreement by Rusagro Group and Sberbank. In that regard, he submits that such framework agreements are declaratory in nature and that, to date, no action has been undertaken under that agreement.

76 Fourth, the applicant submits in the reply that neither the article produced by the Council in the defence entitled ‘The importance of Russia’s agricultural sector in the MENA geopolitics’, nor the claim in that article that the Russian agricultural sector accounts for 4% of gross domestic product (GDP) and employs 10% of the workforce were cited in the summary of reasons or in the WK file and therefore neither of them were used at the time of the adoption of the initial acts, with the result that they could not be relied upon by the Council. Moreover, the article is not a sufficiently reliable item of evidence as the assertions made do not provide any source and the author is not independent.

77 The Council submits, as regards the article referred to in paragraph 76 above, that it shows the importance of the agricultural sector for the Russian economy. It specifies that the article predates the events leading to the adoption of the initial acts by almost a year. Furthermore, the applicant does not contest the content of that study.

78 It should be noted that the activity of the Court of Justice and the General Court is governed by the principle of the unfettered evaluation of evidence and it is only the reliability of the evidence before them which is decisive when it comes to the assessment of its value. In addition, in order to assess the probative value of a document, regard should be had to the credibility of the account it contains, and in particular to the person from whom the document originates, the circumstances in which it came into being, the person to whom it was addressed and whether, on its face, the document appears to be sound and reliable (see judgment of 24 November 2021, Al Zoubi v Council, T‑257/19, EU:T:2021:819, paragraph 72 (not published) and the case-law cited).

79 In addition, in the absence of investigative powers in third countries, the assessment of the EU authorities must rely on publicly available sources of information, reports, articles in the press, intelligence reports or other similar sources of information (see judgment of 1 June 2022, Prigozhin v Council, T‑723/20, not published, EU:T:2022:317, paragraph 59 and the case-law cited).

80 Furthermore, it must be noted that the situation of conflict in which the Russian Federation and Ukraine are involved makes it extremely difficult in practice to access certain sources, to expressly state the primary source of certain information and to potentially gather evidence from persons who are prepared to be identified. The ensuing difficulties of investigation may therefore constitute a barrier to the production of precise evidence and objective information (see, to that effect, judgments of 21 April 2015, Anbouba v Council, C‑605/13 P, EU:C:2015:248, paragraph 46, and of 24 November 2021, Al Zoubi v Council, T‑257/19, EU:T:2021:819, paragraph 73 (not published)) .

81 In the present case, the Council provided the first WK file containing seven items of evidence in order to justify including the applicant’s name on the lists annexed to the initial acts. It should be noted that this is publicly available information, namely:

– extracts from the Twitter account of a journalist indicating the participants in the meeting of 24 February (item No 1);

– an article on the Roscongress site, an economic forum, presenting the applicant (item No 2);

– an article from Sberbank’s internet site published on 16 June 2016 (item No 4);

– an article from the ‘The Bell’ internet site published on 13 March 2021 (item No 5);

– an article from the Rusagro Group’s internet site prefacing the annual report for 2020 (item No 6);

– an article from the press agency Interfax published on 29 September 2021 (item No 7).

82 In the first place, it is necessary to reject the applicant’s assertion that the Council relies, to include his name on the lists annexed to the initial acts, on a mere compilation of press articles and messages from social media and internet sites, since it is apparent from paragraph 79 above that, in the absence of investigative powers in third countries, the assessment of the EU authorities must in fact rely on publicly available sources of information, reports, articles in the press or other similar sources of information.

83 In the second place, as regards the applicant’s assertion that the Council did not take the trouble to extract an official list of the participants in the meeting of 24 February, but relied on a Twitter thread without examining the official transcript, it must be stated that the purpose of item No 1 is exclusively to attest to the presence of the applicant among other businesspersons at that meeting. Accordingly, it is sufficient to note that the applicant acknowledges that he attended that meeting.

84 In the third place, as regards item No 3, consisting of a document from Wikileaks, it must be recalled that diplomatic cables made public through the latter have already been taken into consideration under the principle of the unfettered evaluation of evidence. Thus, in the case which gave rise to the judgment of 6 September 2013, Persia International Bank v Council (T‑493/10, EU:T:2013:398, paragraphs 94 and 95 (not published)), it was held that since the applicant was not involved in the disclosure of the diplomatic cables, the possibly unlawful nature of that disclosure could not be held against it.

85 In the present case, it must be pointed out that the applicant disputed the statement in item No 3 that he had a special relationship with Sberbank and that he was a minority owner of that bank. In that regard, without addressing at the present stage the issue of the merits of that statement, it must be noted that, despite its lack of a date, the probative value of that source cannot be completely ruled out. Therefore, in the analysis of the substance, that source must be viewed in the context of the other evidence produced by the parties.

86 In the fourth place, as regards item No 4, it is sufficient to state that the applicant merely argues that strategic cooperation agreements such as that signed between Rusagro Group and Sberbank are declaratory in nature and that no action was taken under that agreement, and that such a statement does not concern the probative value of that source.

87 In the fifth place, as regards the applicant’s argument that neither the article ‘The importance of Russia’s agricultural sector in the MENA geopolitics’, nor the claim contained in that article that the Russian agricultural sector accounts for 4% of GDP and employs 10% of the workforce were cited in the summary of reasons or in the first WK file and that neither of them were used at the time of the adoption of the initial acts, it must be borne in mind that the review of substantive legality incumbent on the Court must be carried out, as regards in particular cases involving restrictive measures, in the light not only of the material set out in the summaries of reasons for the acts at issue, but also in the light of the material provided by the Council, in the event of challenge, to the Court in order to establish that the facts alleged in those summaries are made out, provided that the Council had that material at its disposal when it adopted those acts (see judgment of 1 June 2022, Prigozhin v Council, T‑723/20, not published, EU:T:2022:317, paragraph 52 and the case-law cited).

88 In the present case, the article at issue, dated 1 March 2021, predates the initial acts and is available online. However, the Council has not demonstrated that it had that article at its disposal when it adopted those acts. It must be pointed out that the General Court has already held in the judgment of 15 June 2017, Kiselev v Council (T‑262/15, EU:T:2017:392, paragraph 104), that it cannot be presumed that the Council was aware of every document concerning the applicant merely because that document was public. Accordingly, it must be stated that that article does not form part of the evidence on which the Council relied in order to adopt the initial acts and cannot be taken into account to ascertain whether those acts are well founded.

89 According to the applicant, the Council did not provide any evidence that the agricultural sector and the applicant’s involvement in that sector provided a substantial source of revenue to the Russian Government. First, the applicant submits that the agricultural sector does not provide a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation. He does not dispute that that sector is important for the Russian economy, since it aims to ensure the implementation of the right to food. He observes that the Council does not provide sufficient guidance regarding the meaning of the terms ‘substantial’ and ‘revenue’. The applicant argues that what is meant is tax revenue. However, taxes on the agricultural sector do not contribute substantially to the budget. Moreover, even if personal income tax were taken into account, which the applicant contests, that revenue would only be 0.47% of total taxes paid. He also states that the Council has not provided specific and concrete evidence that the contribution from the agricultural sector was substantial because of the value added tax (VAT) and import and export duties collected. In addition, public expenditure for the development of the sector is higher than its tax contribution. Lastly, he argues that the imposition of restrictive measures against a person on account of his or her agricultural activities contradicts EU policy for reasons of food security.

90 Second, the applicant’s business interests in the agricultural sector do not provide a substantial source of revenue to the Russian Government. He states that the Council’s working documents are incorrect as regards his indirect stake in Ros Agro, a Cypriot holding company of Rusagro Group, that stake being only 43.12%. He is not, therefore, a majority owner. In addition, besides the fact that the entire agricultural sector hardly brings any revenue to the government, the direct tax contribution of Rusagro Group is insignificant. An expert appointment by the applicant considers that, for the majority of Rusagro Group’s income, the corporate profit tax rate has been 0%. Furthermore, even those tax amounts that are paid using the 20% rate do not go to the federal budget in their entirety. The amounts derived from the water tax are insignificant for their part and the VAT is paid by the consumer. Accordingly, the amounts paid in that respect by Rusagro Group cannot represent a contribution to the federal budget.

91 Third, the applicant claims that the Council has not proved that the applicant’s involvement in the real-estate development sector provides a substantial source of revenue and the basis for that assertion is not stated either in the initial acts or in the first WK file. The Council merely stated that the applicant had founded the company Avgur Estate in 1992 and failed to point out that he had sold it. In addition, the line of argument set out in the defence that it would not be possible to acquire such an important position on the land market without having interests in that sector is not included in the summary of reasons.

92 Fourth, in relation to the applicant’s presence at the meeting of 24 February, the Council made a manifest error of assessment in considering, on that basis, that he was a member of President Putin’s inner circle, or that he was one of the leading businesspersons active in economic sectors providing a source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation. The applicant considers that his attendance at that meeting cannot be an indication of a personal relationship with the president. He states that the meeting was formal and did not include any actual discussion of geopolitical issues, but concerned domestic policy. The presence of businesspersons at that meeting was intended to show the Russian Government’s commitment to a normal business environment. That type of meeting is common, not only with Russian and foreign businesspersons, but also in other countries.

93 Lastly, fifth, the applicant notes that the Council has not explained what is meant by ‘closest circle’ or ‘inner circle’. The applicant emphasises that he is not a member of such a circle and is not involved in politics. Furthermore, his disagreement with government policy in the agricultural sector, expressed at a meeting held on 11 March 2021, seriously affected his business activities. That criticism was followed by an unusually high number of audits by the government agencies. Rusagro Group was also denied agricultural subsidies. Furthermore, even before those statements, Rusagro Group experienced a certain degree of pressure from the authorities where the Federal Security Bureau and the Federal Tax Service had ‘raided’ his premises. For example, he sold his real-estate development company because he was not able to obtain development permits from the City of Moscow (Russia).

95 It is necessary to examine, first, whether the applicant is a leading businessperson and, second, whether he is involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation.

96 It must be noted, as a preliminary point, that, having regard to the wording of criterion (g), the persons to which that criterion applies must be regarded as leading on account of their importance in the sector in which they are involved and of the importance of those sectors for the economy.

97 In the present case, it must be pointed out that the applicant himself states that he is a well-known Russian businessman and philanthropist.

98 In the first place, it is apparent from the summary of reasons and the first WK file that the applicant is involved in the agriculture sector. In that regard, the applicant does not dispute that, at the date of adoption of the initial acts, he was Chairman of the Board of Directors of Rusagro Group, described in items Nos 2 and 5 respectively as the largest vertical agricultural holding in Russia and the country’s biggest agricultural holding. In the preface to its annual report for 2020, constituting item No 6, the applicant himself presents that undertaking as the largest producer of sunflower oil and consumer margarine, the second-largest producer of industrial fats and mayonnaises and the third-largest producer of pork and sugar in the country. Moreover, he states that Rusagro Group holds the fourth spot among the top landowners in Russia. Furthermore, the fact that the applicant’s shareholding in Ros Agro, the holding company for Rusagro Group, quoted in the London (United Kingdom) and Moscow stock exchanges, was, at the date of adoption of the initial acts, 43.12%, as the applicant argues, or approximately 70%, as follows from items Nos 2 and 7, attests in any event to the essential role and the business interests of the latter within that company.

99 In the second place, it must be stated that Rusagro Group does not confine itself to being a producer of agricultural commodities, but is diversifying its activities in Russia. In item No 6, the applicant draws attention to his successes in the retail sector in proposing sugar brands such as Russkii Sakhar, Chaikofsky, Khoroshy and Mon Café, which represented, in 2020, 46% of the white lump sugar market, and Brauni brand, which represented 29% of the brown lump sugar market. He likewise states in the same item of evidence that brands of oil and mayonnaise also hold a significant share in local markets.

100 In the third place, although the undisputed presence of the applicant at the meeting of 24 February is not in itself decisive, that factor supports his characterisation as a leading businessperson which is apparent from paragraphs 96 to 99 above. The applicant was among the 37 persons who solely out of all the leading businesspersons in Russia were invited to that meeting. In point 124 of the application, he indeed gave a link to a press article in which the Press Secretary of President Putin announced as follows:

‘President [Putin] has a meeting with representatives of the Russian business community … These are the heads of our largest enterprises, organisations, companies in various sectors of the economy. These are the people who are the biggest employers.’

101 In the light of the foregoing, it must be held that the Council adduced a set of indicia that were sufficiently specific, precise and consistent to demonstrate that the applicant was a leading businessperson.

102 That finding cannot be called into question, first, by the applicant’s argument that his attendance at the meeting of 24 February cannot be an indication of a personal relationship with President Putin or of the fact that he is a member of the latter’s closest circle. In that respect, he submits that his business activity has been affected on account of his disagreement with government policy on the agricultural sector, which constitutes an example of the fact that he can hardly be considered to be a member of the inner circle of that president. In the present case, it is sufficient to observe that it is not necessary to be a member of the closest circle of the president in order to be a leading businessperson and that the mere presence of the applicant at the meeting of 24 February gathering the heads of the most important undertakings in Russia reinforces that status, as is apparent from paragraph 100 above.

103 Furthermore, in respect of the argument alleging the applicant’s disagreement with government agricultural policy, it must be noted that the applicant stated, at a meeting by videoconference with President Putin on 11 March 2021, that he believed that the government measures concerning export duty on sunflower oil were not really beneficial. The Council indeed confirms the existence, in 2021, of such a disagreement that led to consequences in the form of repetitive tax and antitrust audits. However, the existence of those audits is not such as to demonstrate that the applicant is not a leading businessperson. In that regard, it must be held that such a concept does not necessarily mean the capacity directly to change government decisions. On the contrary, it could be claimed that the fact the applicant shared his view demonstrated that he was well-established in the business sphere, allowing him to express an opinion on economic policy and, accordingly, supported his status as a leading businessperson.

104 Second, as regards whether the statement that the applicant is a minority owner of Sberbank is incorrect, it is sufficient to note that that information is included only in the identifying information in respect of the applicant, and does not call into question the reasons substantiating his status as a leading businessperson.

(2) The issue of whether the sectors in which the applicant is involved provide a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation

105 It is necessary to examine whether the Council could, without committing an error of assessment, hold that the applicant was involved in economic sectors that provided a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation.

106 It must be noted, as a preliminary point, that neither Decision 2014/145, as amended, nor Regulation No 269/2014, as amended, defines the concept of a ‘substantial source of revenue’. However, the definition of the term ‘revenue’ proposed by the applicant according to which only direct tax revenue originating from undertakings in the sector should be taken into account cannot be accepted since nothing in the wording of criterion (g) rules out the taking into account of other types of revenue.

107 At the outset, it must be observed, first, on the one hand, that it is apparent from item No 5 that President Putin declared, in his speech on 11 March 2021 referred to in paragraph 103 above, that the crisis on the commodity markets was over and that the trends for 2021 showed multi-year highs meaning good profits for Russian exporters. On the other hand, it is specified in that item that the authorities were struggling to control prices for grain, vegetable oil and sugar, which were rising fast. Those authorities also raised the issue of putting in place export taxes. Second, item No 7 also illustrates that the Chief Executive Officer of Rusagro Group saw potential to improve performance in 2021 despite the previous year’s record and government regulation of prices for and exports of agricultural products. Accordingly, it is apparent from items Nos 5 and 7 that exports in the agriculture sector were flourishing, that the prices of agricultural goods had increased and that export taxes had been put in place.

108 Next, it must be noted that the applicant does not dispute those findings. On the contrary, he confirms and supports them. First, the applicant maintains in his letter of 18 May 2022 that the Russian agricultural sector is among the important producers of agricultural commodities in the world and one of the top five grain exporters. Second, he stated, in his speech at the meeting of 11 March 2021 mentioned in paragraphs 103 and 107 above, to have seen, during the last decade, not only the growth of agricultural output generally, but also the increasing share of agricultural products in overall national growth. Third, the articles annexed to the application confirm the increase in the price of flour mentioned, in the context of growth of the world demographic, wars and climatic phenomena reducing harvests in other grain-producing regions. Fourth, the applicant points out, on various occasions, that in 2021 Rusagro Group alone exported approximately 102.6 million United States dollars’ (USD) (approximately EUR 90.2 million) worth of agricultural products to the European Union, more than USD 198.35 million (approximately EUR 174.3 million) worth to Türkiye and even more than that to the rest of the world. In that connection, since those amounts originate solely from Rusagro Group, which was admittedly the leader of an agricultural sector which numbered, in 2021, approximately 30 500 entities, it must be stated that those amounts are even higher if the entire sector is taken into account.

109 In short, in the light of all the foregoing, it must be found that the agricultural sector, which gives rise to significant exports also leading to an inflow of liquidity, constitutes a substantial source of revenue for the Government of the Russian Federation, notwithstanding the undisputed fact that that sector receives subsidies.

110 That finding is reinforced by the applicant’s presence at the meeting of 24 February with President Putin, members of the Russian Government and 36 other leading businesspersons. That meeting, the aim of which was to discuss the impact of the choices to be made following Western sanctions while Russia had just instigated its aggression against Ukraine, took place during a crucial period for the government and the economy and bears out the economic importance of the agricultural sector in which the applicant operates.

112 First, as regards the report of 17 May 2022 of a Russian expert in tax law, adduced by the applicant in order to substantiate his assertion that the tax revenue provided by the agricultural sector to the Russian budget represents only an insignificant tax contribution in relation to the total tax revenue of the Russian Federation’s budget, it must be recalled that, in order to assess the evidential value of a document, regard should be had to the credibility of the account it contains and regard should also be had in particular to the person from whom the document originates, the circumstances in which it came into being, the person to whom it was addressed and whether, on its face, the document appears to be sound and reliable. In the present case, it must be observed that that report was drawn up at the applicant’s request for the purposes of his defence in the present action and, as such, is of limited probative value (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 February 2018, Klyuyev v Council, T‑731/15, EU:T:2018:90, paragraph 124).

113 In any event, even if the limited direct tax contribution of undertakings in the agricultural sector were to be proven, it does not imply that that sector does not provide a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation. That argument disregards the payment of other indirect revenue, such as the VAT collected on goods from that sector, employees’ income tax and social security contributions. Even though those taxes are paid by consumers, employees or undertakings in the sector, depending on the situation, the fact remains that they may constitute a substantial source of revenue and that nothing in the wording of criterion (g) prevents them from being taken into account, as is apparent from paragraph 106 above.

114 Second, as regards the applicant’s argument that the Council cannot infer from his tax payment that he supports the regime, since such a payment constitutes a legal obligation applicable to all taxpayers (judgment of 6 October 2015, Chyzh and Others v Council, T‑276/12, not published, EU:T:2015:748, paragraph 169), it must be pointed out that the case-law relied on in support of that claim concerned another criterion in relation to support for the regime, whereas, in the circumstances here, the criterion concerns a sector providing a substantial source of revenue. Consequently, that argument cannot succeed.

115 Third, the applicant’s argument that, in essence, his business interests and those of Rusagro Group in the agricultural sector do not provide substantial revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation must be rejected as ineffective. As is apparent from paragraph 55 above, it is sufficient to note that criterion (g) covers the revenue provided by the sector in which the applicant is involved and not his revenue, or that of the undertaking with which he is associated.

116 Fourth, as regards the applicant’s argument that the Council did not prove that his involvement in the real-estate development sector constituted a substantial source of revenue, it is admittedly mentioned in the summary of reasons that the applicant has business interests in agriculture and real-estate development. In that regard, the Council impliedly accepts the applicant’s claim that he sold his company Avgur Estate, involved in a real estate project in Moscow, which is moreover apparent from item No 2. However, the reference, in the summary of reasons, to the applicant’s business interests in real-estate development must be read in the light of the applicant’s statement, referred to in item No 6, that Rusagro Group holds the fourth spot among the top landowners in Russia. As a result, that information merely confirms the position of Rusagro Group and of the applicant within the Russian agricultural sector.

117 In the light of all the foregoing, it must be held that the Council has adduced a set of sufficiently specific, precise and consistent indicia capable of demonstrating that the applicant was a leading businessperson involved in an economic sector providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation.

118 Accordingly, in respect of the initial acts, the second plea in law must be rejected inasmuch as it is based on an error of assessment by the Council having regard to criterion (g).

119 According to the case-law, with regard to the review of the lawfulness of a decision adopting restrictive measures, and having regard to their preventive nature, if the Courts of the European Union consider that, at the very least, one of the reasons mentioned is sufficiently detailed and specific, that it is substantiated and that it constitutes in itself sufficient basis to support that decision, the fact that the same cannot be said of other such reasons cannot justify the annulment of that decision (see judgment of 28 November 2013, Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft, C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776, paragraph 72 and the case-law cited).

120 Consequently, there is no need to examine the plea in law alleging an error of assessment on the part of the Council having regard to criterion (a).

121 In his first statement of modification, the applicant claims that the Council did not take account of his resignation from Rusagro Group on 10 March 2022. He argues that the Council thus failed to provide any evidence as to why his former positions would be relevant for the purposes of the renewal of the restrictive measures. In addition, it did not show, even several months after the applicant’s resignation and his attendance at the meeting of 24 February, the existence of a sufficient link between the applicant and the regime, in relation to the situation in Ukraine.

123 It is important to bear in mind that restrictive measures are measures of a precautionary and, by definition, provisional nature, the validity of which always depends on whether the factual and legal circumstances which led to their adoption continue to apply and on the need to persist with them in order to achieve their objective. It follows that it is for the Council, in the course of its periodic review of those restrictive measures, to conduct an updated assessment of the situation and to appraise the impact of such measures, in order to determine whether they have made it possible to attain the objectives pursued by the initial inclusion of the names of the persons and entities concerned on the list at issue or whether the same conclusion in respect of those persons and entities can still be drawn (see judgment of 26 October 2022, Ovsyannikov v Council, T‑714/20, not published, EU:T:2022:674, paragraph 67 and the case-law cited).

124 In addition, in order to justify retaining a person’s name on the list, the Council is not prohibited from basing its decision on the same evidence justifying the initial inclusion, re-inclusion or previous retention of the name of the person concerned on the list, provided that (i) the reasons given for inclusion remain unchanged and (ii) the context has not changed in such a way that that evidence is now out of date. That context includes not only the situation of the country in respect of which the system of restrictive measures was established, but also the particular situation of the person concerned (see judgment of 26 October 2022, Ovsyannikov v Council, T‑714/20, not published, EU:T:2022:674, paragraph 78 and the case-law cited).

125 In the present case, it follows from Article 6 of Decision 2014/145, as amended, that the contested acts are kept under constant review and are renewed, or amended as appropriate, if the Council deems that their objectives have not been met. Article 14(4) of Regulation No 269/2014, as amended, provides for its part that the list annexed is to be reviewed at regular intervals and at least every 12 months.

126 In connection with the acts of September 2022, it must be observed, as is apparent from paragraph 15 above, that the reasons given for inclusion remained the same as those of the initial acts. In addition, to justify maintaining the applicant’s name on the lists, the Council relied on the same evidence as that included in the first WK file.

127 It is therefore necessary, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 124 above, to ascertain whether the context, objectives and individual situation of the applicant allowed the inclusion of his name to be maintained on the basis of unchanged reasons.

128 As regards the general context linked to the situation in Ukraine, it must be stated that, at the date of the acts of September 2022, the gravity of the situation in Ukraine persisted.

129 Likewise, the restrictive measures were still justified having regard to the objective pursued, namely to exert pressure on the Russian Government and to increase the costs of the Russian Federation’s actions seeking to undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.

130 As regards the applicant’s argument that the Council failed to take into account his resignation from Rusagro Group on 10 March 2022, it must be noted that that position was admittedly still included in the identifying information in respect of the applicant in the acts of September 2022. However, that position is not included in the summary of reasons. In addition, it must be noted that the reason according to which the applicant has business interests in the agriculture sector is not affected by that resignation. It is not in dispute that the applicant has a significant shareholding in Ros Agro, of at least 43%. Therefore, that resignation cannot affect the characterisation of the applicant as a leading businessperson involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Russian Government. Accordingly, the Council was correct to find that the applicant’s individual situation had not changed in a way such that the evidence in the file in connection with the initial inclusion of his name had become out of date.

131 Therefore, having regard to the gravity of the situation in Ukraine and of the fact that the objectives aimed at by the restrictive measures have not been achieved and of the absence of new evidence concerning the applicant’s individual situation, the Council did not commit any error of assessment in maintaining his name on the lists at issue.

132 The second plea in law, so far as it concerns the acts of September 2022 and inasmuch as it is based on an error of assessment on the part of the Council having regard to criterion (g), must therefore be rejected. Consequently, as is apparent from paragraph 120 above, there is no need to examine the plea in law alleging an error of assessment on the part of the Council having regard to criterion (a).

133 In the first place, the applicant reiterates that he has no connection with the military operation in Ukraine. In addition, he disputes the relevance of his participation in the meeting of 24 February in the presence of President Putin so far as concerns the acts of March and April 2023 on the grounds that that evidence is out of date. Furthermore, he submits that nothing in the second WK file substantiates his involvement in the real-estate development sector. He points out, first, that benefiting from ownership of agricultural land in terms of using it for real-estate development projects is denied and, second, that his past interests in real-estate development projects should be disregarded both for the purposes of the acts including his name in the lists and those maintaining it on those lists.

134 In the second place, the applicant reiterates that he holds 43.12% of the shares in Ros Agro, the publicly listed holding company for Rusagro Group, and submits that he cannot be equated with Ros Agro or Rusagro Group. In addition, he submits that item No 6 contains errors. Thus, the revenue relied upon in support of the claim in the amended reasons that Rusagro Group is ‘rated first among agricultural holdings … in Russia’ was obtained in 2020 and not in 2021. Furthermore, some agricultural companies obtained higher revenue than Rusagro Group and that company is therefore not the top agricultural group in Russia. Moreover, item No 5 contradicts the statement that the applicant was not strongly affected by the impact of sanctions and the statement that Rusagro Group owns 637 000 hectares of land, whereas item No 5 mentions 686 000 hectares.

135 In the third place, the applicant observes that he has never denied the existence of subsidies supporting the agricultural sector in Russia and that those measures decrease the revenue of the Russian Government rather than increasing it. The applicant also submits that the GDP has no direct link with the government’s revenue. Furthermore, he submits that the volume of exports is not indicative of the government’s revenue and repeats that nobody can be the subject of restrictive measures on account of payments resulting from legal obligations. Lastly, he submits that evidence item No 7 is undated and that, since the hyperlink does not work, it is not sufficiently credible.

137 As a preliminary point, attention must be drawn to the fact that the second WK file is divided into two parts, the first part concerning the applicant and the second the agricultural sector.

138 As regards the evidence relating to the applicant and to the undertaking Rusagro Group, seven new items of evidence were produced in the first part of the second WK file, namely:

– an article of 10 March 2023 from the ‘Interfax’ internet site stating that the applicant has decided to leave the Board of Directors and his position as Chairman of the Board of Directors of Rusagro Group (item No 1);

– an article of May 2022 from the PricewaterhouseCoopers internet site stating that the applicant had reduced his stake in Rusagro Group to below 50% (item No 2);

– an article of 3 June 2022 from the ‘Interfax’ internet site stating that the applicant has divested his stake in the startup Assistagro (Item No 3);

– an article of 14 June 2022 from the Russian ‘Business Information Agency’ internet site stating that Rusagro Group has changed its procedure for participation in stock exchanges (item No 4);

– an article from the ‘Korovainfo’ internet site of 14 November 2022 stating that Rusagro Group’s profit for the three quarters of 2022 decreased by 96% on account of the exchange rate, a reduction in prices and an increase in costs, as well as giving other indicators attesting to the growth of the group such as an increase in revenue of 16% over that period and profitability at the previous year’s level (item No 5);

– an article of 7 June 2022 from the ‘theKo.ru’ internet site stating that, despite unprecedented sanctions, agricultural holding companies are relatively stable, that the Russian Federation can rely on the dependence of certain countries such as the Republic of Türkiye and the Maghreb on Russian grain, sugar and vegetable oil and that vertically integrated holding companies, such as Rusagro Group, which ‘in the rating of the largest … [Russian] agricultural holdings … took first place’, are the most resistant to sanctions on account of their diversification (item No 6);

– an article of 15 April 2022 from the ‘Organized crime and corruption reporting project’ internet site stating that the Cypriot authorities had revoked the applicant’s passport (item No 7).

139 As regards the agricultural sector, the Council produced new evidence in the second part of the second WK file, namely:

– a speech of the Russian Prime Minister at an agro-industrial exhibition in autumn 2022, published on the government’s internet site; the Prime Minister states, inter alia, that agriculture has obtained record results; he stresses the country’s food security and the importance of exports; he also mentions the State programme for agricultural development amounting to 280 thousand million Russian roubles (RUB) (approximately EUR 2.7 thousand million) in respect of 2022, and a wish to help exporters (item No 1);

– an internet site from a Russian law firm indicating that the tax system is aimed at reducing the tax burden on taxpayers involved in agricultural production (item No 2);

– an article from the Russian ‘Veterinary Medicine and Life’ internet site indicating that the Russian Minister of Agriculture declared that it expected agricultural exports to exceed USD 40 thousand million in respect of 2022 (approximately EUR 38 thousand million), turned towards the Middle East, Africa and Latin America; it is also stated that the Ministry will continue to support the promotion of Russian goods in overseas markets (item No 3);

– data from the ‘Trading Economics’ internet site indicating that the GDP from the Russian agriculture sector was RUB 638.9 thousand million (approximately EUR 6.2 thousand million) in the second quarter of 2022 and that it was set to be RUB 931.4 thousand million by the end of the following quarter (approximately EUR 9 thousand million) (item No 4);

– an article from the press agency Reuters of 3 October 2022 indicating that the Russian Minister of Agriculture declared that the Russian Federation might start to provide financing to foreign importers of its grain since the sanctions put in place were affecting the financial instruments (item No 5);

– an article from the ‘Poultry world’ internet site of 10 March 2022, updated on 12 May 2022, indicating the aim of the Russian Government to invest RUB 818 thousand million (approximately EUR 8 thousand million) in export-orientated agricultural projects and that exports of Russian agricultural products should rise from USD 30.5 thousand million (approximately EUR 29 thousand million) in 2020 to USD 37 thousand million (approximately EUR 35 thousand million) in 2024 (item No 6);

– an article from the ‘Idaho Wheat’ internet site, undated, indicating that the Russian Federation has collected USD 1.9 thousand million (approximately EUR 1.8 thousand million) in revenue from grain export taxes ‘this season’ and was benefiting from the world food crisis (item No 7);

– an article of 16 September 2022 from the think tank Carnegie Endowment for International Peace indicating that, despite record harvests, grain exports from Russia decreased by 22% in July and August 2022 (item No 8);

– a bar chart from the ‘statista’ internet site indicating that, in 2021, Russian agriculture was second in terms of the proportion of GDP, representing 4.2% of the total GDP, after fuel and energy (item No 9);

– a bar chart from the ‘statista’ internet site indicating that from 2011 to 2021, agriculture represented between 3% and 4% of Russian GDP (item No 10).

140 In the present case, it must be found that the reasons for the acts of March and April 2023 have not, in essence, changed since the insertion of the comment that Rusagro is ‘rated first among agricultural holdings in 2021 in Russia’ completes the information already present according to which Rusagro Group is a major producer of pork, fats and sugar and that the applicant has business interests in agriculture. In addition, it must be recalled that the Council produced new items of evidence in the second WK file.

141 In the first place, it should be observed that the general context of the situation in Ukraine, in respect of the threats to its territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence, has not changed since the adoption of the initial acts.

142 In the second place, as regards the applicant’s situation, it should be noted that he is still a leading businessperson. First, he maintains that he still holds 43.12% of the shares in Ros Agro, the holding company of Rusagro Group. Second, as is apparent from paragraphs 98 and 99 above, items Nos 2, 5 and 6 of the first WK file describe Rusagro Group as the largest vertical agricultural holding in Russia, the country’s biggest agricultural holding, the largest Russian undertaking producing sunflower oil and consumer margarine, the second-largest producer of industrial fats and mayonnaise and the third-largest producer of pork and sugar. Third, those statements are supported by items Nos 5 and 6 of the first part of the second WK file.

143 In that connection, first, it is apparent from item No 5 of the first part of the second WK file that Rusagro Group is an agro-industrial company including 6 sugar refineries, 2 feed mills, 13 pig complexes and land of more than 686 000 hectares. In addition, it is stated that Rusagro Group’s sales of pork, sugar, corn and sunflower oil grew in 2022, which enabled an increase in the group’s revenue of 16% to RUB 182.3 thousand million (approximately EUR 1.8 thousand million), while maintaining the group’s profitability at the level of the previous year.

144 Second, it is apparent from item No 6 in the first part of the second WK file that vertically integrated agricultural companies such as Rusagro Group are the most resistant to sanctions on account of their successful diversification. Moreover, as regards the statement in item No 6 according to which ‘in the rating of the largest … agricultural holdings for 2021, Rusagro took first place with revenues of [RUB] 159 [thousand million]’, the validity of which is challenged by the applicant, it must be held that according to that item of evidence, Rusagro Group’s strength does not lie in that alleged rating, but in its specialisation in staples and in its orientation towards the Chinese market, where there are fewer logistical problems. Accordingly, even if the statement, in the reasons, that Rusagro is ‘rated first among agricultural holdings in 2021 in Russia’ is erroneous, it must be pointed out that the reasons according to which the applicant has ‘business interests in agriculture’ and that Rusagro Group is a ‘major producer of pork, fats and sugar’ are based on a set of sufficiently specific, precise and consistent indicia demonstrating that the applicant is a leading businessperson.

145 That finding cannot be called into question by the applicant’s arguments. First, as regards the argument derived from item No 5 in the first part of the second WK file according to which Rusagro Group’s profit decreased by 96%, it must be pointed out that the undertaking still makes substantial profits and that that decrease concerns only the third quarter of 2022.

146 Second, as regards the applicant’s argument that the evidence regarding the meeting of 24 February is out of date, it must be recalled that that evidence is not decisive, but supports the fact that the applicant is a leading businessperson. In addition, it does not appear to be out of date having regard to the absence of a change in the international context.

147 Third, whether Rusagro Group owns 637 000 or 686 000 hectares of land, as attested to in items Nos 6 and 5 respectively, has little bearing in the light of the proportionally slight – and thus immaterial – difference between those two pieces of data.

148 In the second place, as regards the economic sector in which the applicant is active, it must be observed that the considerations set out in paragraphs 107 to 109 above apply. Furthermore, first, the fact that the agricultural sector provides a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation is supported by the GDP of that sector. Contrary to what is submitted by the applicant, who argues that GDP has no direct link with government revenue, it must be stated that GDP constitutes relevant data since it concerns the standard measurement of added value created as a result of the production of goods and supply of services in a country over a given period. Accordingly, it must be found that the information originating from items Nos 4, 9 and 10 in the second part of the second WK file attests to the significant size of the agricultural sector and to the substantial revenue it produces. The GDP of that sector amounted to RUB 638.9 thousand million (approximately EUR 6.2 thousand million) in the second quarter of 2022, was expected to be RUB 931.4 thousand million (approximately EUR 9 thousand million) by the end of the next quarter and, in 2021, represented the second-largest sector of the Russian Federation’s economy, amounting to between 3.5% and 4.2% of the total GDP.

149 Second, it must be found that items Nos 3 and 6 in the second part of the second WK file attest to exports providing a substantial source of revenue. It is thus apparent from item No 3 that the Russian Minister of Agriculture expected agricultural exports to exceed USD 40 thousand million (approximately EUR 38 thousand million) in 2022 with exports to the Middle East, Africa and Latin America. In addition, according to the forecasts mentioned in item No 6, the exports of Russian agricultural goods were expected to increase from USD 30.5 thousand million (approximately EUR 29 thousand million) in 2020 to USD 37 thousand million (approximately EUR 35 thousand million) in 2024. Furthermore, although item No 7 is admittedly undated, it supports the fact that the Russian Government profits from the exports of agricultural products. Moreover, as is apparent from paragraphs 106 and 113 above, the indirect revenue from the entire agricultural sector, such as export duty, VAT collected on products from the sector, income tax and social security contributions, constitutes, in the present case, a substantial source of revenue for the Government of the Russian Federation, notwithstanding the subsidies paid to certain undertakings in the sector.

151 First, it is true that item No 8 states that grain exports decreased by 22% in July and August 2022. However, that decrease in exports does not represent all the exports of the agricultural sector and, despite that decrease, those exports remain a substantial source of revenue, as is apparent from paragraph 149 above.

152 Second, as regards the applicant’s arguments as to the fact that a person’s name cannot be included on the list of restrictive measures on account of payments resulting from legal obligations and as to the unsubstantiated nature of the applicant’s interests in the real-estate development sector, they must be rejected for the same reasons as those set out in paragraphs 114 and 116 above, which are also valid in respect of the maintaining acts.

153 Third, as regards the claimed absence of a link between the applicant and the military operation in Ukraine, it must be recalled that criterion (g) does not require such a link to be demonstrated. It is sufficient for the applicant to be a leading businessperson involved in a sector which provides a substantial source of revenue to the Russian Government.

154 Therefore, the second plea in law must be rejected with respect to the acts of March and April 2023, to the extent that it is founded on an error of assessment by the Council in the application of criterion (g). Consequently, as is apparent from paragraph 120 above, there is no need to examine the plea in law alleging an error of assessment on the part of the Council in the application of criterion (a).

155 In the light of paragraphs 118, 132 and 154 above, the second plea in law must thus be rejected in its entirety.

C. The third plea in law, alleging breach of the principle of proportionality of the right to property, of the right to respect for private life and of the freedom to conduct a business

156 The applicant submits that the restrictive measures breach the principle of proportionality. The Council’s interpretation of criterion (g) amounts to a situation in which any person having attended a meeting with representatives of the Russian Government or paying taxes may be subject to sanctions on that basis alone. That approach is inconsistent with the policy of the targeted restrictive measures. Furthermore, in view of the objective of imposing sanctions on those who threaten the sovereignty of Ukraine or who support those who threaten it, the applicant argues that the implemented measures are inappropriate. It is disproportionate to sanction a person solely on the basis of his or her tax contribution given that failure to comply with those tax obligations may lead to severe penalties. Moreover, the restrictive measures are inconsistent with EU policy seeking to ensure global food security. Lastly, the absence of proportionality is supported by the applicant’s profile as a philanthropist.

157 In addition, the contested acts breach the applicant’s fundamental rights, especially his rights to respect for private life, his right to property and his right to the freedom to conduct a business. As a result, he can no longer travel to Member States or use his property in the European Union. He also fears that he can no longer travel to the United States, where his children live, or to the United Kingdom. Furthermore, the measures affect a company that he partly owns, even though that company is not subject to the sanctions. What is more, the applicant states that his Cypriot nationality has been withdrawn, as has that of his wife and children. Consequently, he is not able to enjoy his rights as a citizen of the European Union, in particular freedom of establishment and freedom of movement. None of the interferences mentioned are legitimate for the purposes of Article 52(1) of the Charter. First, the restrictions imposed do not respect the essence of his rights to freedom and were imposed on the basis of collective guilt. Second, the applicant points out that the restrictions lack any genuine ability to achieve their alleged goal.

159 It should be borne in mind that the right to property is among the general principles of EU law and is enshrined in Article 17 of the Charter. The right to respect for private life is recognised by Article 7 of the Charter. Similarly, the freedom to conduct a business is enshrined in Article 16 of that charter.

160 In the present case, the restrictive measures imposed on, inter alia, the applicant constitute protective measures, which are not supposed to deprive the persons concerned of their property, the right to respect for their private life or their freedom to conduct a business. However, the measures in question undeniably entail a restriction of the exercise of the applicant’s right to property and affect his private life and his freedom to conduct a business (see, to that effect, judgment of 30 November 2016, Rotenberg v Council, T‑720/14, EU:T:2016:689, paragraph 167).

161 Nevertheless, according to settled case-law, in EU law those fundamental rights do not have absolute protection, but must be viewed in relation to their function in society (see judgment of 12 March 2014, Al Assad v Council, T‑202/12, EU:T:2014:113, paragraph 113 and the case-law cited).

162 It must be recalled in that connection that, under Article 52(1) of the Charter, ‘any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by [the] Charter must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms’ and ‘subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others’.

163 Thus, in order to comply with EU law, a limitation on the exercise of the fundamental rights at issue must satisfy four conditions. First, the limitation must be ‘provided for by law’. Second, the limitation at issue must respect the essence of the freedom at issue. Third, the limitation must genuinely meet an objective of general interest, recognised as such by the European Union. Fourth, the limitation at issue must be proportionate (see, to that effect, judgments of 15 June 2017, Kiselev v Council, T‑262/15, EU:T:2017:392, paragraphs 69 and 84 and the case-law cited, and of 13 September 2018, VTB Bank v Council, T‑734/14, not published, EU:T:2018:542, paragraph 140 and the case-law cited).

165 In the first place, the restrictive measures in question which are imposed on the applicant by the contested acts are ‘provided for by law’, since they are set out in acts of general application that have a clear legal basis in EU law and since they have a sufficient statement of reasons as regards their scope and the reasons justifying their application to the applicant (see, to that effect, judgment of 5 November 2014, Mayaleh v Council, T‑307/12 and T‑408/13, EU:T:2014:926, paragraph 176 and the case-law cited).

166 In the second place, the restrictive measures at issue, namely restrictions on movement and freezing of funds, respect the essence of the freedom at issue. They are temporary and reversible. The initial acts, like the acts of September 2022 and of March and April 2023, apply for six months and are kept under constant review, as is provided for in Article 6 of Decision 2014/145, as amended.

167 It must also be recalled that Article 1(6) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, provides for the possibility of granting exemptions from the restrictions on movement. Likewise, Article 2(3) and (4) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, and Article 4(1), Article 5(1) and Article 6(1) of Regulation No 269/2014, as amended, provide for the possibility (i) of authorising the use of frozen funds in order to meet basic needs or to meet certain commitments, and (ii) of granting specific authorisations permitting funds, other financial assets or other economic resources to be released.

168 In the third place, as it was noted in paragraph 55 above, the restrictive measures at issue are intended to exert pressure on the Russian authorities so that they bring to an end their actions and policies destabilising Ukraine. That is an objective which falls within those pursued under the common foreign and security policy and referred to in Article 21(2)(b) and (c) TEU, such as the consolidation of and support for democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law, and the preservation of peace, prevention of conflicts and strengthening of international security and the protection of civilian populations.

169 In the fourth place, it must be noted that the principle of proportionality, as a general principle of EU law, requires that measures adopted by the EU institutions do not exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to attain the objectives pursued by the legislation in question. Consequently, when there is a choice between several appropriate measures, recourse must be had to the least onerous, and the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued (see judgment of 27 February 2014, Ezz and Others v Council, T‑256/11, EU:T:2014:93, paragraph 205 and the case-law cited).

170 In that regard, case-law provides that, with regard to judicial review of compliance with the principle of proportionality, the EU legislature must be allowed a broad discretion in areas which involve political, economic and social choices on its part, and in which it is called upon to undertake complex assessments. Accordingly, the legality of a measure adopted in those fields can be affected only if the measure is manifestly inappropriate having regard to the objective which the competent institution is seeking to pursue (see judgment of 28 November 2013, Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft, C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776, paragraph 120 and the case-law cited).

171 As regards the appropriateness of the measures at issue, with reference to objectives of general interest as fundamental to the international community as those mentioned in paragraph 168 above, those measures cannot, as such, be regarded as inappropriate (see, to that effect, judgment of 3 February 2021, Boshab v Council, T‑111/19, not published, EU:T:2021:54, paragraph 150 and the case-law cited).

172 In addition, as regards their necessity, it should be noted that alternative and less restrictive measures, such as a system of prior authorisation, are not as effective in achieving the objectives pursued, having regard in particular to the possibility of circumventing the restrictions imposed (see, to that effect, judgment of 3 February 2021, Boshab v Council, T‑111/19, not published, EU:T:2021:54, paragraph 151 and the case-law cited).

173 What is more, as stated in paragraphs 166 and 167 above, those restrictions are temporary and reversible and provide for the possibilities for exemptions. Accordingly, it must be held that the disadvantages caused to the applicant are not disproportionate in relation to the importance of the objective pursued by the contested acts.

175 First, as regards the argument that the restrictive measures at issue are disproportionate on account of the dangers to which they give rise for global food security, it is sufficient to state that the object of the contested acts is not trade in agricultural products and that no causal link has been shown between the inclusion of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue and risks for global food security. In addition, it is apparent from paragraph 168 above that the objectives of those acts are specifically to exert pressure on the Russian authorities so that those authorities bring to an end their actions destabilising Ukraine, actions which constitute the primary cause of the threat to global food security, as is apparent from the documents produced both by the applicant and by the Council.

176 Second, as regards the applicant’s argument that the members of his family have difficulties using their personal property in the European Union, it is sufficient to note that the restrictive measures at issue do not apply to those family members, their names not being included on the lists at issue. They are therefore not subject, in a personal capacity, to any restriction on the use of their personal funds and assets or concerning their entry into or transit through the territory of the Member States (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 January 2015, Gossio v Council, T‑406/13, not published, EU:T:2015:7, paragraph 122). Lastly, it must be stated that the applicant has not established why interference with his private and family life is disproportionate, in the circumstances of the case and in the light of the legitimate objectives pursued by the measures at issue (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 April 2016, Ben Ali v Council, T‑200/14, not published, EU:T:2016:216, paragraph 281).

177 Third, as regards the applicant’s argument relating to decisions of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland or the United States of America and the decision revoking his Cypriot nationality, it must be stated that any measures adopted against him by third States or by a Member State in the exercise of its powers with respect to citizenship cannot be imputed to the contested acts.

178 Fourth, the applicant’s argument derived from the alleged impossibility for the company Granada Capital CY Limited, which he states he partially owns, to carry out its day-to-day activities, must be rejected. Even if that claim were proven, the applicant could make use of the possibility mentioned in paragraph 167 above to request the release of certain funds to satisfy the basic needs of that legal person.

179 It follows from the foregoing that the contested acts did not breach the principle of proportionality and did not constitute a disproportionate interference with the applicant’s right to property, his right to respect for private life and his freedom to conduct a business.

D. The fourth plea in law, alleging breach of the fundamental principle of non-discrimination

181 The applicant submits that the Council breached the fundamental principle of non-discrimination by including his name on the list of restrictive measures simply because his company was active in a sector paying substantial amounts of tax to the Russian Government, which he denies. He observes that foreign shareholders of large Russian or foreign companies operating in sectors that generate larger amounts of revenue than the agricultural sector have not been targeted. Consequently, the Council has treated differently comparable situations without any objective justification.

183 It must be observed that the principle of equal treatment, which constitutes a fundamental principle of law, prohibits comparable situations from being treated differently or different situations from being treated in the same way, unless such difference in treatment is objectively justified (see judgment of 31 May 2018, Kaddour v Council, T‑461/16, EU:T:2018:316, paragraph 152 and the case-law cited).

184 In the present case, it must be observed that restrictive measures were adopted against the applicant following an individual assessment, based on solid evidence and that it is apparent from the examination of the second plea in law that he satisfies criterion (g), which means that the Council was entitled to apply such measures to him.

185 In those circumstances, even if the Council had in fact failed to adopt measures freezing the funds of certain persons meeting the criteria at issue and to examine, carefully and impartially, all the relevant evidence relating to those persons or entities, such an argument must be disregarded, because the principle of equal treatment and non-discrimination and the principle of sound administration must be reconciled with the principle of legality (see, to that effect, judgments of 14 October 2009, Bank Melli Iran v Council, T‑390/08, EU:T:2009:401, paragraph 59, and of 3 May 2016, Post Bank Iran v Council, T‑68/14, not published, EU:T:2016:263, paragraph 135).

E. The fifth plea in law, raised in the first and second statements of modification, alleging breach of the right to be heard and the breach by the Council of its obligation to reconsider

187 The applicant argues that the Council failed to examine carefully and impartially whether the reasons alleged against him were well founded. First, as regards the acts of September 2022, he states that the first WK file was not updated at all. Thus, the letter dated 15 September 2022 does not explain why the observations submitted were not considered sufficient to question the inclusion of his name on the lists. Consequently, the applicant’s rights of defence, in particular his right to be heard, and the obligation to reconsider under Article 3(3) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, and Article 14(2) of Regulation No 269/2014, as amended, were breached.

188 Second, as regards the acts of March and April 2023, the applicant states that the Council confined itself to making broad statements which only created a false impression that his observations had been taken into account. In particular, he points out that 11 months and two maintaining acts were necessary to rectify the fact that, in April 2023, he was not a minority owner of Sberbank.

190 It must be recalled that, in the case of a decision to freeze funds by which the inclusion of the name of a person or entity already appearing on the list of persons and entities whose funds are frozen is maintained, the adoption of such a decision must, in principle, be preceded by notification of the incriminating evidence and by allowing the person or entity concerned an opportunity to be heard (see, to that effect, judgments of 21 December 2011, France v People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran, C‑27/09 P, EU:C:2011:853, paragraph 62, and of 15 September 2021, Boshab v Council, T‑107/20, not published, EU:T:2021:583, paragraph 78).

191 The right to be heard prior to the adoption of acts maintaining the name of a person or an entity on a list of persons or entities to which the restrictive measures apply is necessary where, in the decision maintaining a person’s name on that list, the Council has included new evidence against him or her, namely evidence which was not taken into account in the initial decision to include his or her name on the list (see judgment of 12 February 2020, Amisi Kumba v Council, T‑163/18, EU:T:2020:57, paragraph 54 and the case-law cited).

192 However, where the maintenance of the name of the person or entity concerned on a list of persons or entities to which restrictive measures apply is based on the same reasons as those which justified the adoption of the initial act without any new evidence being admitted in that person or entity’s regard, the Council is not required, in order to respect that person or entity’s right to be heard, to communicate to him, her or it the incriminating evidence again (judgment of 22 June 2022, Haswani v Council, T‑479/21, not published, EU:T:2022:383, paragraph 85; see also, to that effect, judgment of 7 April 2016, Central Bank of Iran v Council, C‑266/15 P, EU:C:2016:208, paragraphs 32 and 33).

193 In the present case, in the first place, as regards the acts of September 2022, the Council rejected the applicant’s request for reconsideration by letter of 15 September 2022, on the ground that the applicant’s observations did not cast doubt on its assessment that the decision to enter the applicant’s name on the lists at issue relied on a sufficiently solid factual basis. In doing so, the Council informed the applicant of the maintenance of his name on the lists for the same reasons as those which justified the adoption of the initial acts. Accordingly, in the light of the facts, it must be held that the Council was not required to communicate to the applicant the incriminating evidence again in order to respect his right to be heard. Moreover, attention must be drawn to the fact that the Council gave the applicant the possibility to submit fresh observations by 2 November 2022 at the latest, and that the latter did not avail himself of that opportunity.

194 In the second place, as regards the acts of March and April 2023, it must be recalled that the Council notified the applicant on 22 December 2022 of its intention to maintain his name on the lists at issue, sending him the amended draft reasons and the second WK file. In addition, the applicant was able to lodge observations on that letter on 20 January 2023, after the Council had extended the deadline within which they could be submitted. The latter replied to those observations in its letter of 14 March 2023 informing the applicant of the adoption of the acts of March 2023 and annexed file WK 903/2023. Consequently, it must be held that the adoption of the acts of March and April 2023 was preceded by a communication of the incriminating evidence against the applicant and that the latter had an opportunity to be heard.

196 First, as regards the alleged lack of a substantial response to the applicant’s arguments, the Council is not required to reply in detail to the considerations expressed by the applicant upon being consulted prior to the adoption of the maintaining acts.

197 Second, as regards the applicant’s designation as a minority owner of Sberbank, it is sufficient to point out that that argument in fact seeks to claim an error of assessment. Moreover, as it was found in paragraph 104 above, that factor is not capable of casting doubt on the merits of maintaining the inclusion of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue under criterion (g).

199 It follows that the action must be dismissed in its entirety, without there being any need to grant the applicant’s request for the production of documents.

200 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, he must be ordered to pay the costs in accordance with the form of order sought by the Council.

Court of Justice of the European Communities (including Court of First Instance Decisions)