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	England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >> Saxena v Rushforth & Anor [2002] EWCA Civ 1129 (23 July 2002) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2002/1129.html Cite as: [2002] EWCA Civ 1129

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM CHANCERY DIVISION
(MR JUSTICE JACOB)

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2 Tuesday, 23rd July 2002

Tuesday, 23rd July 2002

1. LORD JUSTICE PILL: This is an application for an extension of time and permission to appeal an order dated 18th January 2002 by Jacob J sitting in the Chancery Division. The judge was considering a claim by Dr Saxena, in which he sought relief against the proposed defendants, Beverly Rushforth and Pricewaterhouse Cooper on the basis that they are dealing with property of which he is the trustee. The property is an SR Pharmaceutical Trust.
2. The applicant, Dr Saxena, was made bankrupt by order dated 24th April 1998. On 12th August 1998 a Grepe v Loam order was made in the bankruptcy. The bankruptcy order has now been discharged; and it is since that discharge that the present proceedings have been commenced. Jacob J had become aware of the earlier Grepe v Loam order made by Judge Maddox in Manchester when Dr Saxena had first appeared before Jacob J.
3. On 11th January 2002 Jacob J required the attendance of a representative of the defendants. When the judge became aware of the Grepe v Loam order, he made the order now sought to be appealed, which rescinded the earlier order requiring the attendance of a representative of the defendants and also ordered that further proceedings herein be transferred to the Manchester County Court for the order His Honour Judge Maddox restricting further applications by Dr Saxena applies to this application and any further proceedings herein.
4. No reasons for those orders were given by the judge.
5. The applicant made an application in the Manchester County Court in writing, having set out his complaint about the reported transfer. The matter came before the Manchester County Court. The applicant had stated the difficulties he has in travelling to Manchester. On 5th March 2002 in considering the paper application District Judge Needham ordered: 1. The claim form dated 4th January 2002 and the application dated 11th February 2000 are rejected pursuant to the order of Jacob J dated January 2002. There has been no appeal against that order. I raised that with the applicant as a possible course which he might have adopted. It is not of course for me to advise him and I neither encourage nor discourage that course. His present application is in relation to Jacob J's order.
6. On inquiry of the applicant it is clear that a further application has been made to Jacob J. The applicant has sought an injunction in relation to the trust property. By order of 17th May 2002 now supplied to the court by the applicant, Jacob J ordered: 1. That the application be refused. 2. That the order of Jacob J dated 18 January 2002 stands.
7. Before giving my decision I do refer to what may be a circularity in the proceedings in that Jacob J has transferred the matter to the Manchester County Court and the Manchester Court have declined to entertain it by virtue of paragraph 4, which I have read, of the order made by Jacob J on 18th January. It does not appear that the Manchester County Court considered the merits of the claim and whether permission to pursue it should be given. They relied on what may be a Grepe v Loam order made by Jacob J.
8. The applicant has emphasised the absence of reasons from Jacob J. The applicant says that he requested reasons and the judge declined to give them. It may be that the judge was making a fresh Grepe v Loam order on 18th January. I am not clear about that. His reference to Judge Maddox was to an order made in the bankruptcy which, on the face of it, would not cover this fresh action which the applicant has sought to bring following his discharge from bankruptcy. Moreover, it is not clear to me why in those circumstances Jacob J transferred the proceedings to the Manchester County Court. The property is in Manchester but it is not the base, I am told, of the proposed defendants, and of course is highly inconvenient to the applicant, who lives in London.
9. What I propose to do is to request Jacob J to give reasons for his decision. For me to refuse permission on the basis now available - and I am conscious that an extension of time also is sought - would, in my judgment, be unsatisfactory, having regard to the my difficulty in considering why Jacob J made the order he did and what follows from it. I accede to the applicant's request that reasons be sought. I follow the procedure recently approved in this court, Lord Phillips MR presiding, in English v Emery Reimbold & Strick Limited, (transcript 30th April 2002). At paragraph 25 the MR giving the judgment of the court stated:

"If an application for permission to appeal on the ground of lack of reasons is made to the appellate court and it appears to the appellate court that the application is well founded, it should consider adjourning the application and remitting the case to the trial Judge with an invitation to provide additional reasons for his decision or, where appropriate, his reasons for a specific finding or findings. Where the appellate court is in doubt as to whether the reasons are adequate, it may be appropriate to direct that the application be adjourned to an oral hearing, on notice to the respondent."

10. In my judgment the first of those courses is the appropriate one in this case. It is clear that there has been a history of conduct by Dr Saxena which in the view of the learned judge considering it merited a Grepe v Loam order. I am not prepared to grant permission and leave matters, as it would seem to me, in the air. I do, however, adjourn the application and ask Jacob J if he would please explain the order which he made on 18th January this year (paragraphs 3 and 4) and the reasons why he took the course he did. I am conscious of the passage of time this will involve, and I have put that point to the applicant. It is the course he seeks and I adjourn the matter accordingly.
11. I am conscious it is near the end of the term. I hope Jacob J will find it possible before the end of the term to supply the reasons. For the moment I retain the matter to myself. But, conscious as I am that arranging a hearing before me might involve further delay, I may well be prepared to release the case if in the interest of a speedy hearing that is the appropriate course. I am, however, sitting on vacation duties until 9th August and if the reasons are forthcoming before that date I would be prepared to hear the adjourned application then. As to what will happen to it after that date will be between the applicant and the listing officer.
(Application adjourned; no order for costs).