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	England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >> Watson v Perotti [2002] EWCA Civ 1768 (22 November 2002) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2002/1768.html Cite as: [2002] EWCA Civ 1768

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE CHANCERY DIVISION
(MR JUSTICE ETHERTON)

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London, WC2 Friday, 22nd November 2002

Friday, 22nd November 2002

1. LORD JUSTICE PETER GIBSON: Angelo Perotti seeks permission to appeal from the order made on 7th September 2002 by Etherton J on an unusual application made by Mr Perotti appearing in person. Before I set out the application and order I should explain something of the background.
2. The claimant, Kenneth Watson, in litigation with Mr Perotti, obtained various costs orders in substantial amounts against Mr Perotti. Mr Watson has been seeking to enforce those orders. The leaseholds of two London properties, 43A Ridgmount Gardens, London WC1 ("43A") and 64 Ivor Court, London NW1 ("64"), are in Mr Perotti's name. Charging orders were obtained charging those properties with the payments to Mr Watson of costs orders, it seems in sums in excess of £200,000. Mr Watson applied to Master Moncaster for an order creating and vesting in Mr Watson a term of years for the remainder of the terms of 43A and 64 held by Mr Perotti less one day, for the purposes of enabling Mr Watson to sell the properties. The Master acceded to that application. He committed the conduct of the sales to Mr Watson's legal representatives. He directed that the sales be by private treaty at prices to be fixed by the court, but subject thereto Mr Watson was to be free to proceed with the sales without further directions. The proceeds were to be paid into court. He gave the parties liberty to apply to restore the claim. The Master refused permission to appeal. That order still stands.
3. What Mr Perotti did was to write four letters in July and August 2002 to Barlow, Lyde & Gilbert ("Barlow Lyde"), Mr Watson's legal representatives, whom he entrusted with the sales. In those letters Mr Perotti made a number of enquiries and complaints. On 27th August he applied to the Chancery Vacation judge, Etherton J. He said that he sought rulings on the various matters raised in the letters. He mentioned two points in particular. One related to the selling of 43A and whether Winkworths, the estate agents, should not be the estate agents selling the property. A second point he took was in the form of a claim that because he had been required by the costs orders to pay for Mr Watson's copying charges in the earlier litigation, he should be supplied with the documents so copied on the basis that he had paid for them.
4. The judge could, in my view, have required Mr Perotti to go back to the Master on the first point. The Master had given Mr Watson and his legal representatives sole charge of the sales except for the price. However, the judge heard Mr Perotti's application and gave judgment. The evidence before the judge from Mr Watson was that Barlow Lyde had instructed both Cluttons and Winkworths to value 43A and had made Cluttons the sole selling agents. Cluttons had valued 43A at £250,000, though it had put the property on its website at £275,000. Winkworths had valued it at £5,000 less than Cluttons' valuation, £245,000. Barlow Lyde's evidence on 2nd September was that if towards the end of September there had been no substantial interest shown in 43A, consideration might be given to marketing the property via multiple agents. The only offer that had been received was for £220,000. On the question of whether there should be more than one selling agent, the judge considered it would be quite wrong to interfere with Barlow Lyde's decision to have a sole agency until the end of September, then only four weeks away. The judge also dealt with the point raised by Mr Perotti that 43A was being undervalued because Mr Perotti said he had negotiated an extension of the term of the lease. The judge said that he could not decide that point on the evidence before him but gave directions for evidence to be put in by both sides; and he directed that if there was dispute it should go before a Master.
5. The judge then dealt with Mr Perotti's second point that, because he had been asked to pay the copying charges of Mr Watson, Mr Perotti was entitled to the copies. Again I have to say that I doubt if the question was one about which Mr Perotti could properly seek a ruling from the judge without Mr Perotti putting in a claim form claiming ownership of the copies. However, the judge dealt with that point in his judgment. He said that Mr Perotti's submission proceeded on a fundamental misconception, because an order for costs in respect of photocopying disbursements of the receiving party does not operate as a form of compulsory purchase of the documents by the paying party.
6. Mr Perotti now seeks permission to appeal. His grounds of appeal are as idiosyncratic as was the application to the judge. He claims that the judge misdirected himself on various matters and that the court should consider a number of questions.
7. The first question is whether he, Mr Perotti, has been prejudiced by Barlow Lyde. That is not a proper question to seek to raise in this court. In theory he can appeal against the judge's decision expressed in his order that the sole agency should continue until the end of September, but it is pointless for Mr Perotti to seek to appeal that part of the order now that we are in November. In any event, that obviously sensible decision cannot be impugned. There was no evidence before the judge that it was unreasonable for Barlow Lyde to give reputable estate agents a sole agency, at least initially. Insofar as Mr Perotti does not want Barlow Lyde any longer to have the conduct of the sale, he cannot raise that on this application. This is not an application for permission to appeal from the Master's order. If he has particular complaints about Barlow Lyde, he should go back to the Master.
8. His second and third questions are whether Mr Watson was entitled to claim for the costs of photocopying. That is not a matter decided by the judge and cannot be raised on this appeal. Indeed, it appears to be an attempt to reopen a question of costs when it is far too late to do that. The opportunity to challenge the receiving party's bill of costs has long since expired. It is also, as it seems to me, a challenge to the charging orders, made, as they were, on the basis of the costs; and apparently such costs include photocopying. He cannot therefore advance these points on an appeal from the judge's order.
9. Fourth, he wants this court to consider the evidence that has been put in pursuant to the judge's order as to the length of the lease. That is not a ground of appeal. He does not challenge the judge's order requiring evidence to be put in.
10. Fifth, Mr Perotti says that the judge made errors in reaching the conclusion that Mr Perotti was not entitled to the documents the copying charges for which he had been made liable. The judge, in my judgment, was plainly right that Mr Perotti is under a fundamental misconception about this. An order that a litigant pays the costs of another party does not mean that the litigant acquires rights of ownership in respect of that on which the costs were expended. There is no prospect whatever of success on an appeal on this point.
11. Finally, Mr Perotti sought a ruling "whether the law or rule that all lawyers owed duties to the court not to deceive or mislead is of any relevance in practice or whether the duties are a sop to the public which is hoodwinked into believing that the courts impose a strict code of conduct on lawyers". Mr Perotti must know from his many appearances in court, including in this court, that the function of this court on an application for permission to appeal is to see whether an appeal from a lower court on a point decided by that court should be allowed to go ahead. The judge did not decide any point on the question which Mr Perotti seeks to raise. It is a wholly irrelevant grumble by him.
12. Mr Perotti has today told me of his difficulties in obtaining legal assistance. He submits that his rights under the European Convention on Human Rights have been infringed by the fact that he has not been granted legal assistance. I am afraid that is not a point which is of any relevance to the application before me. I do not believe, in any event, that the Convention confers on a litigant an unqualified right to legal assistance in any circumstances whatever the substance of the litigant's case.
13. In the light of the conclusion which I have reached that this application for permission to appeal has no merit whatsoever, I must refuse this application.
Order: Application refused.