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	England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >> B (A Child), Re [2002] EWCA Civ 1844 (9 December 2002) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2002/1844.html Cite as: [2002] EWCA Civ 1844

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM COVENTRY COUNTY COURT
(HER HONOUR JUDGE FISHER)

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London, WC2 Monday, 9th December 2002

1. LORD JUSTICE THORPE: This is an application by Mr B for permission to appeal an order made by Her Honour Judge Fisher sitting in the Coventry County Court on 16th April 2002. The order laid down a schedule of contact between Mr B and his son, H, for the remainder of this year. The provision reflected plans that the respondent had already made for the summer holidays and also H's enrolment in a school in Marbella, commencing September 2002. On the face of it, this application for permission is distinctly unpromising. After all, the judge was exercising a broad discretion. She was making provision only for a future period of about eight months. Furthermore, the application for permission is listed with only two weeks of those eight months yet to run, and during that two week period Mr B is entitled to have contact with H for a period of five continuous days, commencing 21st December. Clearly, what now matters is not the water that has passed under the 2002 bridge but the water that must flow for the immediate future throughout the 2003 year.
2. Despite the very limited prospect of this court interfering with the order made on 16th April, I have directed an adjournment to a hearing on notice next week. These are the reasons I have taken that step. First of all, Judge Fisher in her extempore judgment made it plain that, if H was not resident in Spain with the respondent, then the applicant had to be notified of any removal with as much notice as practicable. It seems to me that the obvious purpose of the judge was to ensure that the applicant had notice of periods when H might be staying at the respondent's Leamington home, to enable him to have additional contact. That provision was not reflected in the order drawn by the court, and arguably it should be inserted under the provisions of the slip rule.
3. The second reason that I have directed a further hearing is that Mr B informs me that he has been denied any information as to the dates of future school holidays for H. He says that his approach to the school has led to refusal, information, he was told, is only available to the feepayer. Mr B has parental responsibility and is entitled to that sort of information. That is an issue of very simple proportions that needs to be reflected in any order of the court.
4. The third reason that I direct a hearing on notice is that Mr B says he has on several occasions proposed mediation but has been rebuffed by the respondent. The onus on a parent who has obtained leave to remove a child permanently from the jurisdiction to ensure the maximum possible compensatory contact between the father and the child is a heavy one. The issue of continuing contact needs to be approached by the respondent with a spirit of generosity that should find due fruition in mediation rather than in litigation. It may be that this case could be referred to a mediator under the ADR scheme of the Court of Appeal.
5. Of course, future contact has to be agreed or decided and reflected in an order to replace the order of 16th April which is now time expired. Mr B tells me that there have been a number of communications, commencing with an e-mail from his wife which he received early in November. Unfortunately, he has not brought any of that material to court today. Although the focus has now shifted from the 2002 year to the 2003 year, Mr B still has an arguable point that the judge was wrong in principle on 16th April not to ensure that periods of separation between child and father were much more restricted than those which she allowed. Accordingly, it can be said on Mr B's behalf that, unless this order is challenged as a matter of principle, there is a danger that it will set the pattern for future orders that emerge in the Coventry County Court.
6. I deliver this brief judgment so that Messrs Penmans, who represent the respondent, know what it is that they must be prepared to deal with on the 19th. I am also mindful of the fact that Mr B has informed me this morning that the mother's arrival in this jurisdiction for the forthcoming holiday is fixed for either the 18th or the 19th, he knows not which. I fully understand that on the next occasion on the 19th, the mother herself may not be able to come to this court. But at least her solicitors, Penmans, have more than a week in which to take her instructions and make the preparations which I have directed. I will order the transcript to be expedited so that it can be sent to Penmans before the end of this week.

Order: Application adjourned to be heard on notice on 19th December 2002 as per judgment; transcript to be expedited.