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	England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >> Bon Bleu Ltd v Perez & Anor [2002] EWCA Civ 1912 (16 December 2002) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2002/1912.html Cite as: [2002] EWCA Civ 1912

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE MAYOR'S & CITY OF LONDON COURT
(His Honour Judge Marr Johnson)

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2 Monday, 16th December 2002

LORD JUSTICE WARD:

1. Mr Perez seeks permission to appeal against the order made by His Honour Judge Marr Johnson in the Mayor's and City of London County Court on 20th May 2002. By the order drawn by the court, judgment was entered against Mr Perez for £63,883.34. On the face of the order that is incorrect and the County Court should correct it under the slip rule. I say that because it is plain on the face of the order that the judgment was entered, first, for the sum of £44,013.49, being the balance of monies due and owing for goods sold and delivered, together with £9,869.85 for contractual interest. If my arithmetic is what I hope it is, that might add up to £53,000-odd, but not £63,000.
2. But that, alas, is the greatest hope I can offer Mr Perez, who makes his application most courteously and in a way which leads me to be extremely sorry for him. He ran a clothing business. Whether Jane Miller, the second defendant, was truly a partner or an employee may not much matter. The claimants, Bon Bleu Ltd, sold goods to that business and claimed the balance of monies due and owing. The evidence to support the claim was provided by a Mr Baker, who gave evidence to the judge.
3. The applicant's first but insuperable difficulty is that the judge accepted Mr Baker as a witness of truth. Where, in civil litigation, the judge sees a party, hears the evidence and decides that that person is telling the truth, it is virtually impossible for the Court of Appeal to upset that finding. Having accepted the truth of the witness's evidence, the judge was bound to find that monies were due.
4. Mr Perez's case was not helped by two further facts. The first is that there was in evidence before the judge (though quite how it got before him I do not know) a statement apparently made by Mr Perez to the police. He was reporting to the Kent Constabulary that two debt collectors had called to collect this debt and had threatened him with serious physical violence - threatening, in fact, to kill him. Those threats had been investigated by the police. I am not able to say what action has been taken, or should be taken, but, unfortunately for Mr Perez, he apparently told the police and made a statement to the effect that he owed the claimants some £43,000 and he acknowledged that he would have to repay it at some time.
5. The second difficulty that he faced was that apparently his stance changed during the course of the trial and he had simply put the claimants to proof. He was saying to the judge that in fact no credit was extended to him. He makes a good point to me: that it is highly unlikely that aggressive traders like the claimants would have allowed him to run up consistently, month after month, tens of thousands of pounds of debt. He submits that that is so unlikely as to indicate that there was no money outstanding at all. It is a point of substance, but the judge had to deal with it and the judge did not accept it. Those are matters for the trial judge to decide.
6. Mr Perez's tragedy, I think, is that he did not treat this as a case ever likely to go the full course. He believed it was (if I may use the expression) a "try-on" and he did not actually expect the claimants to turn up and prove their case. For that reason he did not instruct solicitors, which is what he ought to have done. It is now, sadly, too late for him to do that and, sympathetic as I am to his predicament, I fear that there is absolutely no prospect of success in this application. I am duty bound, therefore, to dismiss it.
7. The claimants will have to do what they can lawfully - I emphasise "lawfully" - to recover their debt. Mr Perez will take such steps as he is advised to deal with his position, one of which may be having to resort to some voluntary bankruptcy arrangement or petition for his own bankruptcy. Those are matters entirely for him and I say no more about it.
8. My duty, unfortunately, is to dismiss this application.
Order: application for permission to appeal dismissed.