England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Decisions

Royal Courts of Justice

The Strand

London WC2

Wednesday 24th June 1998

B E F O R E :

MR JUSTICE BUXTON

MR JUSTICE WRIGHT

and

MR JUSTICE DAVID STEEL

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R E G I N A

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JOHN LAURENCE MANNING

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Computer Aided Transcript of the Stenograph Notes of

Smith Bernal Reporting Limited

180 Fleet Street, London EC4A 2HD

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(Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)

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MR A MALCOLM appeared on behalf of the Appellant

MR I ROSS appeared on behalf of the Crown

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JUDGMENT

( As Approved by the Court )

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Crown Copyright

Wednesday 24th June 1998

LORD JUSTICE BUXTON: Following the Court's judgment on Mr Mannings appeal in respect of his conviction, Mr Malcolm QC, on his behalf, now applies for leave to appeal against sentence.

The background and circumstances of this case are fully set out in our judgment on the conviction appeal, which should be referred to by anyone who wishes to consider this present judgment further.

The learned judge sentenced Mr Manning as follows: on five false accounting counts, that is to say counts 1, 2, 3, 8 and 9, he sentenced him to 30 months' imprisonment, all these periods being concurrent. On count 7, false accounting, he sentenced him to 18 months' imprisonment, that being concurrent; on counts 4, 5 and 6, the convictions which we have quashed, he sentenced him to a period of 30 months' imprisonment, again concurrent, and on counts 10 and 11, making a false instrument (a serious count of forgery, we will interpose), he was again sentenced to 30 months' imprisonment on each count, all those being concurrent. His total sentence, therefore, was 2 years and 6 months.

Mr Malcolm has argued today that leave should be granted because the judge, in his sentencing remarks, took account of the actual loss that had been suffered by those who were the victims of each particular count or set of counts. He points to the sentencing remarks where the judge determined, so far as counts 4, 5 and 6 are concerned - those are the counts that have been quashed - that a reasonably substantial part of the whole of the loss suffered by individuals was attributable to those counts.

We are not persuaded that, in the circumstances of this case, that is reason why leave should be granted, because we do not think it is a factor that could properly lead to a reduction in Mr Manning's overall sentence. Our reasons are as follows.

First of all, although the judge did go, through and properly went through, each of the set of offences from the point of view of loss to the persons defrauded, he said, and it was clear that he said, that a very significantly serious aspect of Mr Manning's general activities was the fact that vessels were left uninsured. He said this at page 12E of his sentencing remarks:

"A further and very significant exacerbating factor, though I bear in mind the point that there was no actual loss in the event to the owners or the ship managers, was the extent to which these vessels were left uninsured."

That, in this Court's view, was a serious, in many respects the most serious, aspect of this matter. Vessels were, by Mr Manning's activities, allowed to sail uninsured. They were allowed to be on the high seas with certificates of insurance that were not genuine. The vessel being uninsured was not only a threat to its owners, but it was also a threat to persons who might have dealings with that vessel and to the seamen who crewed it.

It is that aspect of the case that, in our judgement, the judge regarded as serious. It is an aspect that this Court regards as extremely serious. We are bound to say that, in those circumstances, the sentence that was passed on Mr Manning, the total sentence for the transaction as a whole, was something of which he could not conceivably complain.

The removal of counts 4, 5 and 6 make no difference to that. They simply remove from the list of convictions one exacerbating factor in the general pattern of dishonesty and deceit. Further, it is noteworthy that the learned judge sentenced Mr Manning to 30 months' imprisonment on many of the other counts, including the extremely serious counts, 10 and 11, of making a false instrument. Had a judge as careful as this one wished to reflect the individual loss in each transaction and thought that that was the paramount factor, he would have made up his total sentence in a different way, by attributing specific periods to each count and then making some or all of them consecutive. But was clearly the learned judge's view that 30 months was the right amount of time for each of the offences, taking them alone.

Against that basis, we consider that there is no ground upon which Mr Manning can complain of that total sentence, even with the removal of counts 4, 5 and 6. We said that he could not, in our view, legitimately complain of the original sentence. The position is no different now from what it was before the learned judge.

For those reasons, therefore, we see no prospect of this Court altering the sentence that was passed in this case and we therefore do not grant leave. We, however, thank Mr Malcolm for his helpful submissions, as always. Thank you both very much.