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MIRANDA, R v. [2000] EWCA Crim 11 (15th February, 2000)
Case No: 9903071Z3
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
(CRIMINAL DIVISION)
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
Tuesday 15th February 2000
B e f o r e :
THE LORD CHIEF JUSTICE OF ENGLAND AND WALES
(LORD BINGHAM OF CORNHILL)
MR JUSTICE GARLAND
MR JUSTICE
NELSON
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REGINA
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JUAN
CARLOS MIRANDA
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(Transcript of the Handed Down Judgment of
Smith Bernal Reporting Limited, 180 Fleet Street
London EC4A 2HD
Tel No: 0171 421 4040, Fax No: 0171 831 8838
Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)
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Nicholas Hamblin appeared on behalf of the appellant.
Mark Bishop and Kennedy Talbot (instructed by HM Customs and Excise)
appeared on behalf of the Crown.
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Judgment
As Approved by the Court
Crown Copyright ©
MR JUSTICE NELSON:
1. On the 6th July 1998 in the Crown Court at Croydon, the Appellant pleaded
guilty to conspiracy to defraud (Count 1) and conduct which must have involved
the commission of a VAT Act offence contrary to section 72(1) or (3) of the
Value Added Tax Act 1994 contrary to section 72(8) of the same Act. (Count
2)
2. On the 1st April 1999 he was sentenced to 33 months imprisonment on each
count concurrent.
3. On the same date a confiscation order was made under section 71 of the
Criminal Justice Act 1988 in the sum of £436,340, payable within 24
months. In default of payment the Appellant was ordered to serve 15 months
imprisonment, consecutive to the term imposed for the conspiracy to defraud and
VAT offence.
4. A further count under section 72 of the VAT Act was ordered to lie on the
file.
5. The Appellant's co-accused, Roy Sam, was convicted after trial of the
conspiracy to defraud (Count 1) and sentenced to 10 months imprisonment
suspended for 18 months. He was acquitted on two other counts. Paul Cavadino
and John Chisnell were acquitted on the conspiracy to defraud and a VAT Act
offence. The Appellant appeals against his sentence of imprisonment, and the
confiscation order, by leave of the Single Judge.
The Facts.
6. The Appellant traded as Antares Importacione y Distribucion (Antares) from
premises in Seaford, East Sussex. He also traded in Tenerife in the Canaries,
and had other business interests there. His wife was a partner in Antares. This
business involved, amongst other things, the export of soft drinks from the
United Kingdom to the Canary Islands.
7. The Appellant opened an account for Antares with Britvic International
Limited from whom he purchased soft drinks for export. The soft drinks meant
for export were priced at a cheaper rate that those for internal sale, and were
not subject to VAT. The Appellant sold a substantial quantity of these export
only soft drinks to UK customers at a higher price than he had paid for them,
and charged and received VAT though he never paid that on to the Customs and
Excise.
8. There were two elements to the fraudulent operation. Firstly, Britvic were
prevented from making the additional profit on the drinks which they might have
made if there had been an available market for selling those drinks at the
higher internal UK market price. False bills of lading, purporting to confirm
the shipping details of exported goods, were prepared to deceive Britvic into
thinking that the goods were indeed going to be and had been exported. The
Appellant enlisted help from his co-accused Sam, a director of the freight
forwarders used by Antares, who arranged for the collection of containers from
Britvic and their onward internal distribution. Secondly, VAT was charged on
the subsequent sale of drinks to UK customers but not accounted for to Customs
and Excise.
9. The conspiracy commenced in August 1995. The first order to Britvic for
export only soft drinks was placed on the 17th September 1995. Thereafter the
Appellant continued to place such orders with Britvic and though some of these
were genuinely for export and the goods duly exported, many were simply
diverted into the UK market.
10. Britvic became suspicious after learning that a quantity of drink sold for
export to Antares had turned up in a cash and carry in Wembley. They met the
Appellant on the 6th March 1996 in order to satisfy themselves that he was
indeed exporting their goods as he said he was. The Appellant agreed to produce
bills of lading in order to prove to Britvic that the goods had been
exported.
11. Undeterred by Britvic's suspicions, the Appellant continued with his
fraudulent operation. On the 28th March 1996 a VAT officer visited the
Appellant who told him that he had only a few UK sales. He did not tell the VAT
officer that he was buying from Britvic for export and then selling in the UK
and charging VAT on the sales. Although he says in his interview in September
1996 that he was about to declare all the VAT that he had collected on his UK
sales and account for it to Customs and Excise just before his arrest, he had
in fact completed and signed a VAT return for the period 1st May 1996 to 31st
May 1996 claiming a repayment, and made no reference in that return to receipt
of VAT on his UK sales.
12. The potential loss of profit to Britvic on UK sales was £293,584. The
VAT which he should have paid but did not pay was calculated at £63,467.
There was no evidence before the Crown Court as to whether there was an
available UK market which would have enabled Britvic to have made the whole of
that potential profit.
13. The Appellant was arrested and his premises searched on the 20th June 1996.
When he was interviewed on the 26th September 1996 he accepted that he had been
diverting goods meant for export but claimed that he had meant to regularise
the position with Customs and Excise just before he was arrested. He made a
short statement in July 1998 implicating Roy Sam and offered to give evidence
against him. Sam was duly tried and convicted on the conspiracy count but the
Appellant was not called as a witness at that trial.
Antecedents.
14. The Appellant is 34 and married with two young children. He was of previous
good character. He is described as a man of great ability in the character
references provided for the Court, and this fact is borne out by the fact that
people are still prepared to employ him in the full knowledge of his
convictions. He suffers at present from reactive depression and his wife has
suffered seriously from depression as a result of his conviction and
imprisonment. Two letters sent to this Court by the Appellant and his wife of
the 3rd December 1999 and the 10th December 1999 respectively indicate the
extent to which the Appellant and his family have found his time in prison
particularly hard to bear.
The Pre-Sentence Report.
15. The Appellant says in his statement that the idea of the fraudulent scheme
was introduced to him by one of his customers. It is said in the pre-sentence
report that it was "clever but not illegal", but the Judge rightly found that
the contemporaneous documentation shows that he was fully aware of the fact
that his conduct was unlawful. In fact the Appellant admitted deceiving Britvic
and said that he became greedy as the operation increased.
16. He was born in the Canary Isles and came to Britain when he was three. He
had an established import export business in Spain and then moved back to
England and continued trading with a partner in Tenerife. He said that the
partner stole some £400,000 from the business however and left debts of
half that amount. The Appellant had subsequently formed another business which
he had built up into the sole source of family income. The Probation Officer
considered that the risk of re-offending was low. The effect of a custodial
sentence was that his business would collapse with the inevitable consequences
for its creditors. It would have a considerable impact on his family and the
possibility of a Community Sentence was mooted. He was said to be eligible for
Community Service.
17. The Appellant said that he has indeed been made bankrupt on the 4th June
1999.
18. The prison report indicates that the Appellant is a model prisoner fully
aware of the gravity of his offence, and remorseful.
The Confiscation Order.
19. The following dates are relevant:-
6.7.98 The Plaintiff pleaded guilty. Sentence was adjourned until after the
trial of the co-accused and the Prosecution served a statement under section
73(1)(a) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. The court was informed that there
was a dispute as to whether the Defendant had benefited from his offences and
how much could be recovered. The Appellant was ordered to respond to the
Prosecution statement by 7.9.98
8.7.98 -24.7.98 The co-accused were tried resulting in the conviction of Sam
and the acquittal of the other co-accused. Sentencing of the Appellant and Sam
fixed for 2.10.98.
7.9.98 The Appellant failed to serve his response to the Prosecution
statement.
1.10.98 The date for sentencing was vacated because the Judge was unavailable.
24.11.98 Fixed as the new date for sentencing.
24.11.98 Date for sentencing vacated on the written application of the
Appellant on the grounds that his wife was unwell. Sentencing later fixed for
25.2.99.
25.2.99 Court unable to deal with sentence. Adjourned to 31.3.99
29.3.99 The Appellant put in his response to the Prosecution statement under
section 73(1)(a).
30.3.99 - 1.4.99 The Appellant and Sam are sentenced and Confiscation Orders
made.
In his response to the Prosecution statement under section 73(1)(a) the
Appellant served a statement and in addition relied upon the affidavit which he
had sworn on the 8th January 1998 for the purposes of the application for a
restraint order made by the Customs and Excise.
20. The amount of benefit which the Appellant had received from his offences
was formally agreed at £436,340. The Court had therefore to determine the
amount to be recovered against the Appellant under the Act. Mr Ian Beazley of
the National Investigation Service of the Customs and Excise, who had prepared
the Prosecution statement gave evidence, as did the Appellant. In accordance
with R-v- Crutchley and Tonks (1994) 15 Cr App R (S) at 637
citing the case of Layode (unreported) the Judge found that it
was for the Appellant, to satisfy the court to the civil standard of proof,
that his realisable assets amounted to a figure less than the amount of
benefit. The Judge found that the Appellant had failed to discharge this
burden, a number of features of his evidence being unsatisfactory. The
Appellant did not seem to be truthful and treated his partnership assets as
though they were entirely separate from his own as a way of hiding his own
assets. The Judge found that money came in freely and considerable sums were
available to the Appellant to satisfy his requirements. He had produced nothing
to substantiate what he said about the loss of his funds in Tenerife to his
former business partner. In his affidavit in the restraint proceedings he had
claimed that legal action was being taken to reclaim the embezzled money but
was unable to produce any evidence. The Judge found that he was concealing
assets and accordingly it was necessary to make an order against him the in the
whole sum of the benefit of £436,340.
Sentencing Remarks.
21. When passing sentence the Judge said that the Appellant was a man of good
character and successful in business. He had properly and fairly acknowledged
that the fraudulent scheme was his idea. He was a man of excellent talent and
brighter than average. He had however had a warning from Britvic that he should
not go on with the fraud but had continued and drawn in Sam. Whilst the fraud
was not very elaborate, arrangements for false bills of exchange and other
arrangements had been made with an element of cunning to cover the fact that
the goods for export were not being exported. The Judge said that it was of
very great importance that the Appellant had pleaded guilty.
22. The Judge acknowledged that this was not the only business he ran, nor was
it the only way he ran his business. He had quite a successful business and it
was not necessary for him to have done what he knew was not only wrong but
illegal. The submission that he thought it was clever but not illegal was not
accepted. The Judge said that it may be that others had put him up to it but it
was not accepted that there was any great pressure on him. He said he intended
to pay the VAT, which was dubious. Only a custodial sentence could be passed.
The plea, delay and assistance and information offered to the Customs and
Excise would be taken into account.
23. In his sentencing remarks the Judge made, on the face of the transcript,
two remarks which suggested that he was confused as to whether it was Sam or
the Appellant who pleaded guilty. In fact Sam had been convicted by the jury
and the Appellant had pleaded guilty. When the sentencing remarks are taken as
a whole however it is quite plain that the Judge expressly acknowledged that
the Appellant had pleaded guilty and expressly gave him credit for doing so. It
may indeed be as Prosecution counsel suggested, that there may have been an
error in the transcription of some of the remarks.
24. In his grounds of appeal and submissions before this Court it is said that
whilst the sentence was correct in principle, its length was excessive given
the plea, good character, the admissions in interview, the offer to give
evidence for the Prosecution, the fact that the fraudulent operation only
lasted some eight months, and the contents of the pre-sentence report.
25. Further, as no reference was made in the sentencing remarks to the medical
report which concluded that the Appellant had reactive depression, it is
submitted that either no or too little attention was paid to that report. The
Appellant had a genuine offer of a job in London, had excellent personal
references from his bank and accountant and others, his wife was not in good
health either, suffering (on the basis of the medical evidence not available to
the Judge but available to this Court) from clinical depression which was
deteriorating. The effect of the sentence of imprisonment on the Appellant's
family was not sufficiently reflected in the sentence. The bankruptcy and good
behaviour in prison were also further matters in mitigation which had arisen
since sentence.
The Appeal against Sentence.
26. If the Judge had given a full discount for the plea of guilty it appeared
that his starting point was 48 months which it was submitted was too high. The
Court's attention was drawn to the cases of R-v- Cleary (1991) 13 Cr App
R (S) 237, R-v- Dayan (1993) 15 Cr App R (S) 223 and R-v-Lai
(1993) 15 Cr App R (S) 143. The range of sentences in these cases which
are not dissimilar on their facts, was between 2 years and 2½ years. But
the Appellant's persistence in the fraud in this case after Britvic had voiced
their suspicions of his activities to him, and the VAT officer had questioned
him about his business, indicates a real determination to break the law and
hence a high degree of criminality. We are satisfied on the material put before
the Judge, and before this Court, that whilst the sentence was severe, it
cannot properly be described as manifestly excessive. This part of the appeal
is therefore dismissed.
The Appeal against the Confiscation Order.
27. The relevant statutory framework is that set out in the Criminal Justice
Act 1988 as amended by the Criminal Justice Act 1993. The Proceeds of Crime Act
1995 does not apply as the starting date of the conspiracy was in August 1995
and hence before the 1st November 1995, the relevant date under the 1995
Act.
28. The Appellant's submissions are firstly, that the time limit for the
determination of the confiscation proceedings expired on the 6th January 1999,
six months after the date of the Appellant's plea of guilty with the
consequence that those proceedings, which were not heard until the 1st April
1999 should be quashed, and secondly that the Judge wrongly exercised his
discretion on the evidence given and should have found that the recoverable
assets were £46,000 and not £436,340. Grounds B(b) and B(c) in the
original grounds, namely the submission that the Judge should not have taken
into account the matrimonial home and that he should have exercised his
discretion so as to make no confiscation order, were abandoned at the hearing
of the appeal.
29. Section 71 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 as amended by the Criminal
Justice Act 1993 (the Act) gives the Crown Court the power to make a
confiscation order against an offender where:-
"(a) he is found guilty of an offence to which this Part of this Act applies;
and
(b) it is satisfied -
(i) that he has benefited from that offence.. and
(ii) that his benefit is at least the minimum amount." Section 71(1) and
72(2)(a)(b)(i)(ii)
30. Section 72 of the Act provides that the Court cannot exercise the power to
make a confiscation order unless the prosecutor has given written notice to the
Court to the effect that "it appears to him, that were the Court to consider
that it ought to make such an order, it would be able to make an order
requiring the offender to pay at least the minimum amount" (72(1)).
72(2) provides:-
"if the Prosecutor gives the court such a notice, the court shall determine
whether it ought to make a confiscation order."
31. Section 72(4) states:-
"if the court determines that it ought to make such an order, the court shall,
before sentencing or otherwise dealing with the offender in respect of the
offence or, as the case may be, any of the offences concerned, determine the
amount to be recovered in his case by virtue of this section and make a
confiscation order for that amount specifying the offence or offences."
Section 72(5) provides that where a confiscation order is made against a
Defendant the court shall take account of that order before imposing any fine
or making any other payment order against him.
32. Where, under section 73(1) of the Act the Prosecutor tenders to the Court a
statement relevant:-
"(i) to determining whether the Defendant has benefited from the offence..
or
(ii) to an assessment of the value of the Defendant's benefit from the
offence.."
and the Defendant accepts any of those allegations, the court may for the
purpose of determining or making an assessment treat the acceptance as
conclusive.
33. Where a Prosecutor's statement has been served, the Court, under section
73(2), may require the Defendant to indicate to what extent he accepts the
Prosecutions statement and if in any respect he doesn't, to indicate the
matters he proposes to rely on. The Defendant may be treated as accepting the
allegations, with certain exceptions, if he fails to comply with this
requirement (section 73(3)).
34. If the Defence statement is accepted in any part by the Prosecutor, that
acceptance may be treated by the Court as conclusive. The Defendant may
indicate a matter for the purposes of section 73(2) either orally before the
Court or in writing. (Section 73(5)).
Section 72A gives the Court power to postpone confiscation order
determinations. The relevant part of the section states:-
"72A(1) where a court is acting under section 71 above but considers that it
requires further information before -
(a) determining whether the Defendant has benefited as mentioned in section
71(2)(b)(i) above;
(b) determining whether his benefit is at least the minimum amount; or
(c) determining the amount to be recovered in his case by virtue of section
72
above
it may, for the purpose of enabling that information to be obtained, postpone
making that determination for such period as it may specify.
(2) More than one postponement may be made under subsection (1) above in
relation to the same case.
(3) Unless it is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances, the Court
shall not specify a period under subsection (1) above which:-
(a) by itself; or
(b) where there have been one or more previous postponements under
subsection (1) above or (4) below, when taken together with the earlier
specified period or periods
exceeds 6 months beginning with the date of conviction."
35. The Court may also postpone making its determination where the Defendant
appeals against his conviction, but such postponement shall not exceed three
months after the date on which the appeal is determined or otherwise disposed
of unless the court is satisfied there are exceptional circumstances. Section
72A(4) and (6)
36. Section 72A(5) and (7) provide that:-
"a postponement or extension under subsection (1) or (4) above may be made
-
(a) on application by the Defendant or the Prosecutor or
(b) by the Court of its own motion
(7) where the Court exercises its power under subsection (1) or (4) above, it
may nevertheless proceed to sentence, or otherwise deal with, the Defendant in
respect of the offence or any of the offences concerned."
37. Section 73A was inserted by the Proceeds of Crime Act 1995 and hence not in
force at the material time in this case. It should be noted however that the
section enables the Court to order the Defendant to give information to assist
it in carrying out its functions under the Act. This reinforces the view that
`information' under section 72A has a wide meaning and includes information
from any other source such as the Prosecution, or a third party. There is no
reason why `information' should exclude information included in any section 73
statement or response.
38. The Appellant submits that the confiscation order proceedings were embarked
upon on the 6th July 1998 when he pleaded guilty and the Prosecution served the
Prosecutor's statement under section 73(1)(a) having then or shortly before
served written notice under section 72(1). The Court was informed orally on
that day that there would be a dispute as to the amount of the benefit and how
much could be recovered from the Defendant. In those circumstances the Court
ordered the Defendant to make his response to the Prosecutor's statement under
section 73(2). No determination was made that day but, it is submitted, the
confiscation order proceedings clearly had commenced.
39. The six months time limit under section 72A starts to run on the date on
which the offender is either found or pleaded guilty. (R-v- Shergill and
others (1999) Crim LR 591.) The Court of Appeal there treated the six
months period as a general limitation period and held that in the absence of
exceptional circumstances the Court had no power to specify a period of
postponement which exceeded six months beginning with the date of the verdict
or the plea of guilty to the offences in question. As no step in the
confiscation order proceedings had been taken within six months on the facts of
that case it was too late for the Prosecution to make their application for
confiscation orders when they gave their written notice under section 71(1)(a).
This case was decided after the Proceeds of Crime Act 1995 was in force and
was, the Crown submit therefore dealing with a different statutory framework.
It is conceded that it does however determine that the six month period starts
to run from the date of conviction or plea of guilty rather than from some
later date such as date of sentence.
40. The Appellant submits that by ordering him to give his response under
section 73(2) the Court was seeking to secure further information under section
72A and was acting under section 71 in so doing. The six month time limit
therefore came into play and, as it was conceded by the Crown that no
application had been made under section 72A for an extension or postponement of
time, and because no period of postponement specified and no exceptional
circumstances found, the Prosecution was out of time after the 6th January 1999
when the six months period expired. The confiscation order should therefore be
quashed.
41. The Prosecution submit that before the Crime Proceeds Act 1995 came into
force the Court had a discretion as to whether to make a confiscation order or
not (section 72(2) and (4)), whereas under the 1995 Act, once benefit to the
offender is established the Court has to make a confiscation order under
section 71(1A) and (1B).
42. Under section 72(2) the Court had to determine whether it ought to make a
confiscation order, described by the Crown as making a "primary determination".
Such a determination it is submitted, has now been abolished by the 1995 Act.
As the Judge in this case had not made his primary determination until his
ruling on the 1st April 1999, he was not until then acting under section 71.
The order made under section 73(2) requiring the Defendant to serve his
response to the Prosecutor's statement could be made before any primary
determination had been made by the Court. Thus, the Crown submit, the Judge was
at no time acting under section 72A to postpone the determinations as he had
not got that far. This argument is reinforced, it is said, by the ruling made
by the Judge when he acknowledged that his first task was to determine whether
to make a confiscation order. The six months time limit on the Crown's case
never started to run.
43. The distinction must be drawn, the Crown submit, between a postponement of
determination under section 72A because of a need for more information, and a
simple adjournment of sentencing, which of necessity involves the adjournment
of the determination of the confiscation order. In such circumstances the
general provisions of section 72 apply simply requiring the sentence to follow
the confiscation order as it did in this case.
44. The interpretation of these amended provisions is not without difficulty.
We have resolved any ambiguity in what is in essence a limitation period
imposed by section 72A in the Appellant's favour. There is no reference in the
Act to a "primary determination", no doubt for the good reason that in practice
the court, as happened here, decided whether it ought to make a determination
at the same hearing as deciding what the recovery ought to be in such a case.
The Prosecutor's statement was likely, as occurred here, to deal with both
whether the Defendant had benefited and the extent to which he had benefited.
Any defence response under section 73(2) is likely to, as here, deal with the
Defendant's case as to whether there has been any benefit, the value of that
benefit, and the amount that might be realised under section 71(6), and the
Court is therefore likely to look at all the evidence in the round before
deciding whether a confiscation order ought to be made, and if so, in what
amount. The concept of a "primary determination" is an artificial and
unnecessary concept as far as the construction of the Act is concerned and in
so far as its application in practice is concerned.
45. The time limit under section 72A is applicable where the following
conditions are satisfied:-
(1) the court is acting under section 71
(2) the court requires further information before determining whether the
Defendant has benefited, or whether his benefit is at least the minimum amount,
or determining the amount to be recovered in his case
(3) the court postpones the determinations for the purpose of enabling that
information to be obtained.
(1) Was the court acting under section 71.
46. As soon as the court embarks upon the process of deciding whether to
exercise the power under section 71 it can be said that it is acting under that
section. Where, as here, the written notice from the Prosecutor under section
72(1) has been served and where, as here, the Prosecutor's statement under
section 73(1)(a) has also been served on the court and on the Defendant, the
process of acting under section 71 has been commenced. This was demonstrated on
the facts of this case by the Defendant indicating orally that the Prosecutor's
statement was not accepted as to benefit or its value, and by the court
ordering under section 73(2), that the Defendant respond to the Prosecutor's
statement.
47. We are satisfied that on the facts of this case the court was acting under
section 71 as from the 6th July 1998 when the plea of guilty was entered, the
Prosecutor's statement served, the defence indication given that the
Prosecutor's statement was disputed, and the order made that the Defendant
should respond to that statement.
(2) Further Information.
48. As the Prosecutor's statement was disputed, the court was not in a position
to be able to make the determinations set out in 72A(a)(b)(c) without further
information. That information had to come in part from the Defendant, and was
to be provided by the response he was ordered to make under section 73(2) even
if the Court had decided to seek yet further information (which it did not)
from the prosecution or a third party such as the Spanish police. By making his
response the Defendant was providing the court with further information as to
whether he had benefited, the value of any such benefit and the amount to be
realised. The information given in the Prosecutor's statement and the defence
response under section 73 of the C J A would, together with any evidence given
in the trial and any evidence given in the confiscation hearing itself, enable
the court to make its determination. (R-v-Dickens (1990) 2 QB 102
(A Drug Trafficking Offence Act case but relevant to confiscation orders under
the CJA.))
49. We are satisfied therefore that the court in acting as it did on the 6th
July 1998 must have considered that it required further information before it
could make its determinations.
(3). Postponement made to obtain the information.
50. The adjournment was ordered, on the face of it for two purposes; firstly to
adjourn the appellant's sentence until after such time as his co-accused had
been tried and secondly to postpone the determination of the confiscation order
proceedings until such time as the court had the necessary further information
to make those determinations.
51. It cannot properly be said in the view of this Court that when the matter
was adjourned on the 6th July 1998 the adjournment was solely for the purpose
of adjourning sentence and merely had the co-incidental effect of also
adjourning the confiscation proceedings. The confiscation proceedings
themselves plainly had to be postponed until such time as the court was
provided with the necessary information in order to make its determination.
52. We are therefore satisfied that a postponement under section 72A was made
here even though neither the court nor the parties may have focused on that
section when dealing with the matter on the 6th July 1998.
53. In such circumstances the six month period applies unless there were
exceptional circumstances for it to be extended. No application was made for
any extension beyond the six month period on the grounds of exceptional
circumstances, and it is not submitted that there were any exceptional
circumstances which could have satisfied the court that it was appropriate to
specify a period longer than six months. The court did not consider
"exceptional circumstances" under section 72A(3) and cannot, and on the facts
could not, have been satisfied that they existed so as to justify specifying a
period exceeding six months.
54. We therefore conclude that the court had no jurisdiction to make a
confiscation order after the expiry of six months from the date of the plea of
guilty in this case. The order that the appellant pay £436,340 and serve
15 months imprisonment in default of payment, is quashed. The appeal against
the confiscation order is therefore allowed.
© 2000 Crown Copyright
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