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	England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Decisions >> W, R v [2001] EWCA Crim 32 (12 January 2001) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2001/32.html Cite as: [2001] EWCA Crim 32

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION

		Royal Courts of Justice The Strand London WC2
		Friday 12th January 2001

Friday 12th January 2001

1. RECORDER OF BIRMINGHAM: On 2nd September 1999, in the Crown Court at Croydon, this appellant was convicted on a count on an indictment which alleged common assault. There were delays in sentencing caused by the desire to obtain some information about the appellant's psychiatric condition and he was not sentenced until 18th February 2000, almost twelve months ago. On that occasion he was sentenced to five months' imprisonment suspended for two years. The learned judge was plainly of the view that the appellant was not fully responsible for his actions. The offence was one of an attack on a building society official where the appellant had an account. The appellant lost his temper with the bank official over some minor problem about getting possession of his bank book. He assaulted the bank official, kicked him in the ribs and hit him in the back. Fortunately the injuries sustained by the victim were not serious. He was taken to hospital, but was discharged the following day.
2. The problems in this case arise from the fact that it is quite plain that the appellant is in a disturbed psychiatric condition. The Court has had the benefit of seeing a report from Dr Nayani dated 11th February 2000. In that report the psychiatrist observes that the defendant is in urgent need of psychiatric attention. The psychiatrist visited the appellant at his home, and he was living, as the psychiatrist found, and as we agree, in deplorable conditions. The psychiatrist suggested that the appropriate way of dealing with this case would be by the making of a Hospital Order under section 37 of the Mental Health Act 1983. Unhappily, the learned judge was unable to make such an order at that time because such an order requires reports from two psychiatrists and there was only one available. Moreover, the appellant made difficulties about keeping an appointment with a second psychiatrist. In these circumstances what the learned sentencing judge did was to impose a sentence of five months' imprisonment suspended for two years. It is plain from the fact of suspension that the sentencing judge took a sympathetic view of the appellant and his problems and was doing his best to impose a sentence which was just in all the circumstances.
3. We acknowledge that the sentencing judge was faced with a real problem in this case: a period of immediate custody, while fully justified on the facts of the offence, would be counterproductive so far as the appellant was concerned. It is plain that the offence was committed when the balance of his mind was in a sense disturbed. In these circumstances we make no comment on the appropriateness of the imposition of a suspended sentences.
4. However, we have reservations about the long period of suspension of the sentence. Assuming it was right to have found exceptional circumstances justifying a suspended sentence, it seems to us that the period of suspension of two years imposed too great a burden upon this appellant. There was a grave danger that under some stress his mental condition would deteriorate; that he would commit some other offence; that he might lose his temper with some other public officer, shopkeeper, bank official or somebody of that sort and find himself in trouble again. In those circumstances, the fresh sentencing court would be deprived of the opportunity to invoke a psychiatric disposal which might have been the appropriate course.
5. We note, however, that nearly twelve months has elapsed since the sentence was imposed. We think that the situation in this case can best be dealt with by varying the period of suspension from two years to one year. The appellant deserves a measure of credit for keeping out of trouble for the past year having regard to his difficulties. If he keeps out of trouble for the next few weeks until 15th February then this sentence will cease to be operative. Of course it will remain on his record if he should reoffend and will be taken into account in the usual way by any future sentencing tribunal. Accordingly, the order we make is that the period of five months' imprisonment suspended should stand but that the period of suspension should be reduced from two years to one year.