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England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Decisions >> Hanratty, R v [2002] EWCA Crim 1141 (10th May, 2002) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2002/1141.html Cite as: [2002] 2 Cr App R 30, [2002] 3 ALL ER 534, [2002] EWCA Crim 1141, [2002] 2 Cr App Rep 30 |
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COURT OF APPEAL (CRIMINAL
DIVISION)
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL | ||
B e f o r e :
LORD JUSTICE
MANTELL
MR JUSTICE
LEVESON
____________________
REGINA |
Respondent | |
- and - |
||
JAMES HANRATTY deceased by his Brother Michael Hanratty |
Appellant |
____________________
Smith
Bernal Reporting Limited, 190 Fleet Street
London EC4A 2AG
Tel No: 020
7421 4040, Fax No: 020 7831 8838
Official Shorthand Writers to the
Court)
(instructed by Bindman and Partners) for the Appellant
Mr Nigel
Sweeney QC, Mr Mark Dennis and Mr David Perry
(instructed by the
Crown Prosecution Service) for the Crown
____________________
AS APPROVED BY THE
COURT
Crown Copyright ©
Lord Chief Justice: This is the judgment of the Court
INTRODUCTION
“Mr Sherrard … referred to a number of points which he says the Judge failed to make and certain evidence to which he failed to refer. This was a case lasting 21 days … and it would indeed be remarkable if every item of the evidence were referred to and in which the Judge referred to every point or comment made by Counsel on either side. Indeed, we would emphasise that it is no part of the Judge’s duty to refer to all the evidence or to mention all the points taken and comments made. His duty is to present the case on each side fairly and impartially to the jury concentrating of course on the vital issues in the case.”
In dismissing each of the grounds advanced, he went on to observe:
“[T]he summing up was clear, it was impartial, it was not only fair but favourable to the prisoner and contained no misdirections of law and no misdirections in fact on any of the important issues in the case. The Court is of the opinion that this was a clear case.”
THE FACTS
i) He had not had the gun very long: “This is like a cowboy’s gun: I feel rather like a cowboy”. … “It is a .38”.
ii) He had never shot anyone.
iii) He was very hungry, he had not eaten for two days and had been sleeping out the last two nights (which Valerie Storie thought was contradicted by his appearance); he had been in the Oxford area for the last few days. On any showing, these facts did not fit with James Hanratty’s proved movements.
iv) He had never had a chance in life; when he was a child he had been locked in the cellar for days on end and only had bread and water to drink. There was no evidence that this applied to James Hanratty.
v) He had been to remand homes and Borstal: he had done C.T. (i.e. Corrective Training) and the next thing he would get would be P.D. (i.e. Preventive Detention). He said: “I have done the lot” and that he had “done housebreaking”. Miss Storie believed he said he had done five years for housebreaking. The Crown argued that the phrase ‘I have done the lot’ was slang for the removal of all remission of sentence resulting in a requirement to serve a full custodial term. James Hanratty was one of only five prisoners at that time to have ‘done the lot’ in this sense. The defence did not accept that the phrase bore that meaning. Further, on any showing, James Hanratty was not then eligible for a sentence of Preventive Detention.
vi) He had been on the run for four months which he later changed to 18 months and that “every policeman in England” was looking for him.
vii) He did not like smoking and did not usually smoke.
viii) Having asked about the positioning of the gears when Michael Gregsten was driving, Valerie Storie concluded that he did not seem to have much knowledge of the Morris Minor car. Further, he appeared to be very nervous as a passenger and said things such as ‘Oh be careful of the lights’. On the other hand, when asked by the couple whether he drove cars he said ‘Oh yes I can drive all sorts of cars’.
“He had got a London type voice. He could not say ‘things’ and ‘think’. He said ‘Fings’ and ‘Fink’. His voice was very quiet very soft spoken, not a deep voice. I should say from his voice he was ‘twenty-ish’”.
It was not disputed that, in common with many Londoners, James Hanratty pronounced “th” as “f”.
Mr Justice Gorman: “Very large pale blue staring icy eyes?”
Miss Storie: “Staring icy eyes. He seemed to have got a pale face as I should imagine anyone would have having just shot someone. He had got brown hair combed back, no parting. The light was only on his face for a few seconds as the vehicle went past and then we were in complete darkness again.”
She stated that she did not have good eyesight but was wearing her glasses when this happened. She added to the description that he was a man in his early 20s, clean-shaven, about her height (5 ft. 3½ ins.) or a little taller, very quiet and soft-spoken, voice not deep.
“We were held up by a man with a gun who shot us. He said it was a .38. We picked him up about 9 or 9.30 at Slough … He is about my own height. He has large staring eyes. He has light fairish hair”.
John Kerr said that he made a note of Valerie Storie’s name and address, the description and the number of the car which he gave to the police; the note was not found. As to the discrepancies, Valerie Storie denied saying ‘light fairish hair’; she also denied ever saying that they had picked him up because they had not done so. These matters were fully investigated at the trial.
“Having a nice time. Be home early Friday morning for business. Yours sincerely Jim.”
The telegram was sent from a telephone bar in the forecourt of St. George’s Hall opposite the main railway station at Lime Street, Liverpool. The sender was given as “Mr P Ryan, Imperial Hotel, Russell Square, London”.
‘I know I have left my fingerprints at different places and some different things and the police want me, but I want to tell you that I did not do that A6 murder.’
The second telephone conversation took place at about 11pm on the same day; that was limited to a discussion about getting in contact with a newspaper and some conversation about James Hanratty ringing his mother.
“I understand, but, as I told you, I have got a perfect alibi for the murder … Fire away and ask me any questions you like. I will answer them and you will see I had nothing to do with the murder.”
i) After coming out of prison in March 1961, he had enquired of a man called Fisher who lived in Ealing about a gun, “a shooter to do some stick-ups”; in evidence, he also admitted that he wanted to be “a stick up man”, that he knew where to get a gun if he wanted one but going on to say words to the effect that he never owned a gun and that the whole thing was just talk.
ii) His response to being told about the cartridges found on the chair in the Vienna Hotel was to ask what size the bullets were.
iii) He had stayed at the Vienna Hotel on the night of 21 August, leaving at 9.00am the following morning of 22 August. He had then travelled to Paddington by mistake and then he went to Euston and had caught a train to Liverpool.
i) According to the officers, James Hanratty told them that the telegram had been sent on the Tuesday 22 August, the same day that he said he had arrived in Liverpool. His account (put to them and repeated in his evidence) was that he had told them at the first interview that the telegram was sent on the Thursday but that subsequently DS Acott said to him: “We have enquired about this telegram Jimmie. You said to me it was Tuesday. It was not you know.” He had replied: “You have misunderstood me DS Acott. I said Thursday.”
ii) In the course of the first interview he had said that he had thrown the Hepworth jacket away after damaging it in the course of a burglary committed in Stanmore; during the second interview, the officers alleged (although he disputed this) that he had then said that he had in fact destroyed the jacket.
iii) More important, the evidence of the officers was to the effect that at the end of each interview he had spoken of going to “kip”, and in the second interview used that word not once but twice. This was, of course, a word which Valerie Storie recollected that the gunman had used on several occasions. James Hanratty not only denied that he had used the word in interview; he denied ever using it.
“A. I was satisfied after five minutes of the parade.
Q. You were satisfied after five minutes?
A. Yes; but I wanted to be sure – I was not going to make a mistake this time.”
. . .
Q. Then you asked him to speak, or the men to speak?
A. Yes.
Q. Then you were wheeled up and down again at your request?
A. Yes.
Q. Again asked the men to speak?
A. Yes.
Q. And then wheeled up and down some more?
A. Yes.
Q. Miss Storie, one appreciates your position of course, but it is my plain duty to suggest to you, and I do suggest to you that, although you may be convinced in your own mind, you are nevertheless absolutely honest, but absolutely wrong. I make that quite plain to you.
A. I do not agree with that suggestion.”
“Q. You have described the second parade as: being wheeled up and down; I think you said, asked the men to speak; wheeled up and down again and asked them to speak again. You said that after five minutes you were sure. At what stage in the process of being wheeled up and down and asking the men to speak were you first sure in your own mind?
A. I was absolutely certain as soon as I heard him speak.
Q. The first time?
A. The first time.”
Mr Mansfield argues that the way in which the ‘aural’ identification took place was “incurably unfair” (Ground 6) and also points to the failure to provide what would now be required directions of law both as to the identification generally and the voice recognition (Grounds 14 and 15).
i) Mary Meaden who had been out with James Hanratty on occasions in September 1961 and described him as very well behaved.
ii) Mrs Willis, who lived at Knebworth and who had been robbed at gunpoint on 24 August 1961 by a man who did not resemble James Hanratty.
iii) Mrs Dalal who lived in Upper Richmond Road West and who had been robbed on 7 September 1961 by a man who had claimed he was the ‘A6 murderer’. She picked out Peter Alphon on an identity parade.
iv) Two prisoners from Brixton prison (Emery and Blythe) who said that they exercised with James Hanratty and that they had never seen Roy Langdale speak to James Hanratty.
v) Three witnesses who confirmed that two houses had been burgled in the Stanmore area on 1 October 1961 and that a black jacket had been stolen.
Lord Justice Mantell:
SUMMARY OF THE SUBMISSIONS
i) The identification made by Valerie Storie, involving as it did not only his physical appearance but also his voice (including his accent, pronunciation and use of the word ‘kip’) and his clothing. It is also possible to point to some of the things which the gunman said as being consistent with James Hanratty (including the name Jim): on the other hand, a number of the facts which she recalled did not fit with background information about him.
ii) The visual identifications by John Skillett and James Trower of James Hanratty as the erratic driver of the Morris Minor in the vicinity of Avondale Crescent (where the car used by Michael Gregsten was later found). In that regard, the prosecution also relied on the fact that Leonard in Ireland and Carol France in this country also spoke of James Hanratty’s erratic driving.
iii) In the light of the fact that the gunman appeared to be familiar with the roadworks in the Harrow area, the fact was that James Hanratty’s parents lived in Kingsbury with the result that he would, indeed, be familiar with the Harrow area.
iv) The presence, on 11 September 1961, of the two cartridge cases fired from the murder weapon, in room 24 at the Vienna Hotel. It was common ground that the room had been occupied by James Hanratty on 21 August 1961 and, on the evidence, it appeared that only one of the beds had been occupied on only one other occasion between then and the date they were found.
v) The fact that the murder weapon together with ammunition, wrapped in a handkerchief, were discovered under the back seat of a bus, that is, the very place which it was common ground James Hanratty had spoken of as a place to dispose of unwanted goods.
vi) James Hanratty’s conduct in removing the dye from his hair on 3 October 1961 when he knew that he was wanted by the police.
vii) James Hanratty’s admissions that he had made enquiries for a gun, his desire to be a “stick-up man”, and his ability to acquire a gun.
viii) The admitted lies about the stay in Liverpool with the three men on the nights of 22 and 23 August 1961 and the implausibility of one of the explanations for these lies (maintained at trial) to the effect that James Hanratty did not think that he would be able to find the house in Rhyl.
ix) The implausibility of the reason given by James Hanratty for going to Liverpool and for abandoning the search for the man who lived in Carlton or Tarleton Road or Street.
x) The evidence that the sweet shop incident occurred on Monday 21 and not Tuesday 22 August 1961, so not involving James Hanratty.
xi) The implausibility of the reason given for the telegram sent on Thursday 24 August 1961 (namely that he had promised to write to Mrs France), and the inference that this was an attempt to provide or bolster up a false alibi: the telegram had been sent at 8.40pm to arrive the following morning, at the same time he would have been travelling on the midnight train.
xii) The confession to Roy Langdale during the course of exercise in prison.
xiii) The fact that James Hanratty put forward two alibis, one of which was admittedly false and the other, also implausible, asserted only after the commencement of the trial thereby limiting the opportunity to investigate. This compounds with James Hanratty’s failure to take any steps between the 7 and 11 October 1961 (when James Hanratty was in the Liverpool area) to find the boarding house in Rhyl.
xiv) The implausibility of the reason for the visit to Rhyl, namely to find a man he had met only once before in order to sell stolen jewellery without knowing where Terry Evans was to be found or having any good reason to believe that Terry Evans was interested in buying stolen jewellery.
xv) The unsatisfactory state of the evidence emanating from Mrs Jones whose description of the house included a green bath (recollected by James Hanratty) albeit that the bathroom had a bed in it. This evidence had to be contrasted with the records which revealed only one single room in which James Hanratty could have stayed (room 4, occupied on 21, 22 and 23 August by a witness called in rebuttal) and the evidence of the guests who did stay in Mrs Jones’ house which effectively excluded James Hanratty’s presence on 22 or 23 August.
xvi) The evidence of blood group consistency, namely that James Hanratty (albeit along with 80% of 40-45% of the male population) was a group O secretor as was the semen found on Valerie Storie’s clothing (Michael Gregsten being a group AB secretor).
i) Valerie Storie had only a limited opportunity of seeing the man. Furthermore:
a) Her facial identification was weakened by her incorrect identification of the 24 September.
b) There was a conflict between her evidence and the evidence of John Kerr (the person who had discovered her); he said that Valerie Storie had spoken of the man as having light fairish hair and had said that he had been picked up at about 9.00pm or 9.30pm at Slough.
c) The mispronunciation of “th” was quite common among Londoners.
d) While some of the things said by the murderer were consistent with James Hanratty’s personal history, others were not.
e) Her description of the murderer’s knowledge of cars and how to drive them was inconsistent with James Hanratty’s experience and driving ability.
ii) The other identifying witnesses (John Skillett and James Trower) also had only limited opportunity to see the driver of the Morris Minor. Further, Edward Blackhall (Mr Skillett’s passenger) had picked out another man on 13 October (having already picked out a man on the 23 September 1961) and James Trower’s evidence was also unsatisfactory and contradicted by Paddy Hogan who gave evidence for the defence.
iii) Harold Hirons, a garage attendant who put petrol in the car while Valerie Storie and Michael Gregsten were still in it, had not identified James Hanratty.
iv) It was unlikely that the murderer would have fired two bullets before the murder and then dropped or left the two spent cartridge cases in the Vienna Hotel and that on the probabilities these two cases came to be there after the murder. The implication of this submission is that these cartridge cases must have been placed in the room by others, perhaps in an effort to implicate James Hanratty and exculpate the true culprit, possibly Peter Alphon.
v) In any event, the witnesses who gave evidence from the Vienna Hotel were unreliable: room 24 had or may have been occupied by other persons (and, in particular, by Peter Alphon) in addition to the one other person said to have occupied the room for one night between 21 August and 11 September.
vi) The use of the space under the back seat of a bus as a receptacle was not uncommon with the result that the finding of the murder weapon in such a place was not probative against James Hanratty.
vii) There were a number of concerns about the evidence of the police officers. More must have been said during the course of the interviews than was written down and there were challenges as to that which was written. Thus, there were serious issues about when and how Liverpool and the three men were mentioned and the conversation about the telegram; further, James Hanratty denied ever using the word “kip”.
viii) The interview also had to be approached with care in other respects and allowances had to be made for James Hanratty’s character and personality. Thus, his admission to the police concerning a gun and about becoming a “stick-up” man were simply examples of his being boastful. His lies about Liverpool and the three men occurred on the spur of the moment, when he could not remember the details of the Rhyl boarding house; his persistence in them because he was afraid of the consequences of changing his alibi was down to foolishness rather than anything more sinister.
ix) James Hanratty was the man in the sweet shop incident which could only have occurred on the Monday 21 or Tuesday 22 August; as there was evidence, both from prosecution and defence, that he was in London on the Monday it could only have happened on Tuesday 22 August 1961 which, by itself, demonstrated that he was not the gunman.
x) Other features of James Hanratty’s evidence were amply confirmed by independent witnesses. Thus:
a) a conversation in relation to the sale of a watch in Liverpool was confirmed by Mr Kempt;
b) he correctly described Grace Jones’ boarding house and despite her confused and unsatisfactory evidence Mrs Jones was telling the truth when she said that he had stayed at her house on 22 and 23 August.
c) he had previously met Terry Evans and did try and find him in Rhyl.
xi) The evidence given by Roy Langdale was from a suspect source. It was controverted not only by James Hanratty himself (and was inconsistent with his constant reiteration of his innocence) but also by the evidence of two other prisoners.
xii) As to the scientific evidence, there was neither blood nor fibre found on any of his clothing. The fact that he was a group O secretor did not advance the case: some 36% of the white male population were group O secretors, including Peter Alphon.
xiii) The jury knew about James Hanratty’s record and this incident was out of character. He had no previous convictions for offences involving violence, sexual assaults or dangerous driving.
THE LAW
The Role of the Court of Appeal
The statutory provisions
“Although the 1907 Act has been repeatedly amended, the scheme of the Act has not been fundamentally altered. The most notable change has been the granting by the Criminal Appeal Act 1964 and the extension by the Criminal Justice Act 1988 of a power, on the allowing of an appeal against conviction, to order a retrial. The core provision contained in section 4 of the 1907 Act is now expressed more shortly and simply in section 2 of the 1968 Act as substituted by section 2(1) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1995: “(I) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Court of Appeal- (a) shall allow an appeal against conviction if they think that the conviction is unsafe; and (b) shall dismiss such an appeal in any other case.”
The most important lesson to be learnt from this part of Lord Bingham speech is that Parliament’s overriding intention in the 1907 Act, and now in the 1968 Act, is that it should be this Court’s central role to ensure that justice has been done and to rectify injustice.
“(1) For the purposes of an appeal under this Part of this Act the Court of Appeal may, if they think it necessary or expedient in the interests of justice- (a) order the production of any document, exhibit or other thing connected with the proceedings, the production of which appears to them necessary for the determination of the case; (b) order any witness who would have been a compellable witness in the proceedings from which the appeal lies to attend for examination and be examined before the court, whether or not he was called in those proceedings; and (c) receive any evidence which was not adduced in the proceedings from which the appeal lies.
(2) The Court of Appeal shall, in considering whether to receive any evidence, have regard in particular to- (a) whether the evidence appears to the court to be capable of belief; (b) whether it appears to the court that the evidence may afford any ground for allowing the appeal; (c) whether the evidence would have been admissible in the proceedings from which the appeal lies on an issue which is the subject of the appeal; and (d) whether there is a reasonable explanation for the failure to adduce the evidence in those proceedings.
(3) Subsection (1)(c) above applies to any evidence of a witness (including the appellant) who is competent but not compellable.
(4) For the purposes of an appeal under this Part of this Act, the Court of Appeal may, if they think it necessary or expedient in the interests of justice, order the examination of any witness whose attendance might be required under subsection (1)(b) above to be conducted, in any manner provided by rules of court, before any judge or officer of the court or other person appointed by the court for the purpose, and allow the admission of any depositions so taken as evidence before the court.”
“Trial by jury does not mean trial by jury in the first instance and trial by judges of the Court of Appeal in the second. The Court of Appeal is entrusted with a power of review to be exercised with caution, mindful that the Court of Appeal is not privy to the jury’s deliberations and must not intrude into territory which properly belongs to the jury” (paragraph 17).
“The judgment in “fresh evidence” cases will inevitably therefore continue to focus on the facts before the trial jury, in order to ensure that the right question - the safety, or otherwise, of the conviction - is answered. It is integral to process that if the fresh evidence is disputed, this Court must decide whether and to what extent it should be accepted or rejected, and if it is to be accepted, to evaluate its importance, or otherwise, relative to the remaining material which was before the trial jury: hence the jury impact test. Indeed, although the question did not arise in Pendleton, the fresh evidence produced by the appellant, or indeed the Crown, may serve to confirm rather than undermine the safety of the conviction. Unless this evaluation is carried out, it is difficult to see how this Court can carry out its statutory responsibility in a fresh evidence case, and exercise its “powers of review to guard against the possibility of injustice”. However the safety of the appellant’s conviction is examined, the essential question, and ultimately the only question for this Court, is whether, in the light of the fresh evidence, the convictions are unsafe”(emphasis added).
The Admissibility of Fresh Evidence and the Two Different Grounds for Allowing an Appeal
“While reference has been made above to some of the rules which should be observed in a well-conducted trial to safeguard the fairness of the proceedings, it is not every departure from good practice which renders a trial unfair. Inevitably, in the course of a long trial, things are done or said which should not be done or said. Most occurrences of that kind do not undermine the integrity of the trial, particularly if they are isolated and particularly if, where appropriate, they are the subject of a clear judicial direction. It would emasculate the trial process, and undermine public confidence in the administration of criminal justice, if a standard of perfection were imposed that was incapable of attainment in practice. But the right of a criminal defendant to a fair trial is absolute. There will come a point when the departure from good practice is so gross, or so persistent, or so prejudicial, or so irremediable that an appellate court will have no choice but to condemn a trial as unfair and quash a conviction as unsafe, however strong the grounds for believing the defendant to be guilty. The right to a fair trial is one to be enjoyed by the guilty as well as the innocent, for a defendant is presumed to be innocent until proved to be otherwise in a fairly conducted trial.”
We would also refer to the way the subject was encapsulated by Carswell LCJ in R v Iain Hay Gordon [2002] unreported CAR (3298) at paragraph 29:
“It seems to us that it is now possible to formulate two propositions in respect of irregularities at trial, which formed the subject of a good deal of argument before us:
1. If there was a material irregularity, the conviction may be set aside even if the evidence of the appellant’s guilt is clear.
2. Not every irregularity will cause a conviction to be set aside. There is room for the application of a test similar in effect to that of the former proviso, viz whether the irregularity was so serious that a miscarriage of justice has actually occurred.”
The Effect of the Passage of Time
Admitting Fresh Evidence at the Request of the Prosecution
“. . . that this Court, empowered as it is under section 23 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 to consider the jury’s verdict in the light of fresh evidence, should do so in the light of all the fresh evidence that is available to it. We are entitled, as it seems to us, to consider whether the material which was withheld could have affected the jury’s verdict in the light of all the facts now known to this Court. If it could have done, the conviction would be unsafe. If, on the other hand, the material that has been withheld has not, on a proper analysis of the facts known to this Court, undermined in any way the verdict of the jury, then the conviction will be safe. In evaluating the significance of the evidence that has been withheld in the context of all the information now available, we consider we properly secure the rights of the defence for the purposes of article 6 of the Convention and serve the interests of justice. We acknowledge that in carrying out this exercise we are trespassing upon what at trial would be the function of the jury. But that is the inevitable consequence in any case involving fresh evidence. It seems to us that if on a proper analysis of the information available to this Court, the only reasonable conclusion is that the conviction is safe, in that the jury’s verdict in the light of all the relevant material was correct, this Court would not be carrying out its statutory obligation if it did give affect to that conclusion.”
(1) that its weight, if any, will depend on whether the appellant may be right that the explanation for the DNA findings is contamination.
(2) that if the appellant is able to show that because of lack of disclosure or the misdirections in the summing up the trial was still fatally flawed the DNA evidence will not rescue the conviction.
THE DNA EVIDENCE.
Contamination.
“As I examined the item, the piece of blue material from the knickers was in a sealed packet inside the two envelopes. I did not observe any damage to that packaging which I considered likely to be a risk of contamination. As far as I was concerned they were sealed, although the outer envelopes were not sealed there was no indication of any liquid damage on the brown paper envelopes, as might have been expected if a liquid sample had leaked onto them.”
“The handkerchief appears to be stained with some body fluid, cellular material which has bonded strongly to the cotton fabric over a number of years. There is no microscopic evidence that semen is present.”
That conclusion is supported by Roger Mann who subjected the handkerchief to chemical screening though he acknowledges the test carried out would not necessarily detect semen deposited by a male who did not produce spermatozoa. Realistically, however, it would seem to follow that the contaminant would have to be something other than semen and almost certainly liquid in form.
Mr Justice Leveson:
THE GROUNDS OF APPEAL
Valerie Storie
(1) These questions fall to be judged against the background of contemporary common law rules, as exemplified by decisions such as R v Mills and Poole [1998] AC 382 and R v Ward 96 Cr App R 1, in the light of the analysis of the proper approach of the court.
(2) The law and practice relating to disclosure at the time of the trial differs from what it is today. It is summarised in Archbold, 35th edn. (1962) as follows:
“Where the prosecution have taken a statement from a person whom they know can give material evidence but decide not to call him as a witness, they are under a duty to make that person available as a witness for the defence, but they are not under the further duty of supplying the defence with a copy of the statement which they have taken: R. v. Bryant & Dickson (1946) 31 Cr.App.R. 146. … Where a witness whom the prosecution call or tender gives evidence in the box on a material issue and the prosecution have in their possession an earlier statement from that witness substantially conflicting with such evidence, the prosecution should, at any rate, inform the defence of that fact … . In certain cases, particularly where the discrepancy involves detail, as in identification by description, it may be difficult effectively to give such information to the defence without handing to them a copy of the earlier statement: R. v. Clarke (1930) 22 Cr.App.R. 58.”
“I did have a good look at him when I was in the back of the car when I was trying to soften him up. I think I would be able to identify him. In fact I am sure I would.”
This is to be contrasted with her evidence at the committal and at trial (and, incidentally, the undisclosed interview of 11 September to which we shall come) that the “only real proper glimpse” was when she was in the front of the car, wearing her glasses as a car “came along from behind and lit up his face”.
“When I got in the back of the car there may have been cars passing. I think there were some heavy lorries. I only had an opportunity to see a side view, possibly a three quarters view whilst I was in the back when any vehicle went past. I can’t really say how many vehicles went past – not more than about 6 or 8 but I didn’t really count them. Their headlights would illuminate the man’s face for less than 10 seconds.”
“I have been interviewed by police officers on numerous occasions since this dreadful thing happened. … On one occasion I was interviewed by DS Acott for a little under 5 hours.”
There is no suggestion that Mr Sherrard then made, let alone pressed, an application to see whatever record there was. This is not a criticism of him but the fact that he did not may provide insight into the extent to which this type of material was, on what the law was then understood to be, then considered disclosable.
“He was some time ago, but I cannot say off-hand.”
The officer was not pressed further.
“I think I had better give it in detail from start to finish then.”
He was then asked whether it was the result of his own observations and he responded, “Not all of it”. Mr Sherrard, clearly concerned about what the officer might say, was prepared to leave the matter but the judge pressed. The answer upon which Mr Mansfield relies comes after a request both from Mr Sherrard and the judge to restrict himself to his own knowledge. Given that the Superintendent had specifically said that not all of the description came from his own knowledge and we do not know why this description was in the back of the notebook, it would be wrong to conclude that of his own knowledge he could describe the man’s eyes as ‘dark’.
The Identification Parade
“I was startled by the most unusual colour of the hair of the accused. I had never seen hair quite that colour before.”
At the trial she agreed with Mr Sherrard’s suggestion that the appellant stood out like “a carrot in a bunch of bananas”.
Identification of the Driver of the Morris Minor
i) At 6.30am on Wednesday 23 August, William Lee saw a grey Morris Minor being driven by a man wearing a woollen pom-pom hat on the A6 near Matlock in Derbyshire. He wrote the registration number down as 847 BHN which was the registration of Michael Gregsten’s car in the boot of which there was such a hat (although there is no evidence that the murderer otherwise was seen wearing it).
ii) At 12 midday on the same day, John Douglas, a petrol pump attendant at a garage at Birstall, north of Leicester, made a mental note of the registration number of a bluish grey car as 847 BHN occupied by a man and a woman. The man spoke with a southern accent which sounded to him as coming from Somerset.
iii) Other sightings of a car with the registration number 847 BHN were noted at 1.00pm between Hitchin and St. Ippollits (which would mean that the car stayed in the vicinity of Bedford all morning) and at 5.25pm in Coventry (which given the time the car was seen by the police in Avondale Crescent is simply not possible).
iv) Doreen Milne said she parked her grey Morris Minor in Avondale Crescent at 8.15am opposite where Michael Gregsten’s car was subsequently found without recalling any car parked opposite hers. Margaret Thompson saw police interest around what she called a grey Morris 1000 at 8.00pm and reported that it had not been there at 5.30pm when she passed with her three year-old son.
Needless to say, the sightings in Matlock, Coventry and north of Leicester are inconsistent with the Morris Minor being seen in Eastern Avenue, near Avondale Crescent, or in Avondale Crescent by 7am although it is somewhat difficult to visualise for what purpose the gunman might have made these trips and then returned to Ilford (as he must have done) using a car which he would have known the police would be seeking as soon as Michael Gregsten was identified and the car he was driving ascertained.
Concealment of the Gun
The Vienna Hotel
“Please make perfectly sure that it is a positive fact that Durrant was in the hotel at 11.30 p.m. on 22nd August 1961 – Include this in the statement please.”
There is then (presumably written by a different person) “Will be done!!”.
Interviews and the ESDA Evidence
The Rhyl Alibi
“Mrs Walker was one of the persons out of the six, supplied to you by the D.P.P.’s Dept. She had gone to the police and made a statement. When seen by us she was not definite in anything but gave the impression she wanted to be in on it.”
For our part, the only proper conclusion to draw is that her name and address had been provided before the end of the trial.
‘Copy of message handed to Det Supt. Acott at 9.10pm 15/2/62 on the instructions of D.Supt. Barron. Det. Supt. Acott said he would see that the information was handed to the defending counsel in the morning’.
“I am morally certain that no such information either oral or written was conveyed to me at the trial. 16 February 1962 was a Friday and the Judge was summing up. Had this statement or anything like it been brought to my attention, even at that stage, I would surely have asked the Judge to give me a little time to consider the implications of some information which had been provided to me. The transcript will show that at no stage did I make such an application.
I am quite sure that if there had been need to communicate information of this kind to me, it would have been done by prosecuting counsel. I am sure that this did not happen with regard to the Larman material.”
We have no hesitation in accepting Mr Sherrard’s recollection which is entirely consistent with the careful way in which he marshalled material during the trial. Equally, we do not doubt that prosecuting counsel would have acted in accordance with their duty. Unfortunately, DS Acott is now dead and cannot be asked specifically with the result that we do not know precisely what went wrong.
“On Sunday, 18th February 1962, I saw photographs in the Sunday Papers of James Hanratty and I immediately remembered that I had seen him before and also the occasion when and where I had … I particularly remember this man because of his hair, which was most outstanding being brown and dark in parts…The photographs I have been shown are definitely of the man I saw and spoke to at about 7.30 p.m. on Tuesday 22nd August 1961.”
“Quite apart from inconsistencies as to identification and detail (as well as some mutually contradictory features) there was no point in seeking to rely on the evidence of Mr Larman, Mrs Walker and Mrs Vincent because their statements (even without the test of cross-examination) did not match Hanratty’s evidence on the crucial issue of time. He could not have spoken to any of these people at 7.30 p.m. because his evidence on oath was that he did not leave Liverpool by coach for Rhyl until after 7.30 p.m. and that when he arrived at Rhyl it was late evening and dark. It was, of course, not dark at Rhyl at 7.30 p.m. That the statements in other respects did not find support from Hanratty himself added substantially to the difficulties.”
In his letter, Mr Sherrard added that, after the trial, he did see statements of Mr Larman and other potential witnesses which were considered for the purposes of appeal. He goes on to add that he need not rehearse the reasons for not seeking to adduce any of this evidence at the appeal.
Lord Chief Justice:
The Summing Up
Identification
Absence of an Explanation of the Significance of Lies
Inaccurate Summary of the Evidence of Charles France and Carole France
CONCLUSION
Friday, 10 May 2002
Court 4
Royal Courts of Justice
The judgment in this case is of considerable length and this summary only provides a brief outline of the reasons for the Court’s decision to dismiss the appeal. The judgment commences with an introduction (paras 1-12); it then refers in detail to the relevant background facts (paras 13-81). There is then a section on the law as there were points of general importance argued with regard to the role of the Court of Appeal upon which the Court was required to give a decision; namely what is the correct approach to:
• the safety of a conviction when hearing an appeal, particularly where the trial took place many years ago when the rules of practice were different from those which exist today?
• allegations that a conviction is unsafe on (a) evidential and (b) procedural grounds?
• the admissibility of fresh evidence on which the prosecution wishes to rely to show that the conviction should be upheld as being safe? (paras 81-105)
The Court having decided that the DNA evidence is admissible then gives its decision as to the effect of that evidence: (paras 106-128) and having done so proceeds to consider the merits of each of the 17 grounds of appeal (paras 128-210) and finally sets out its conclusions. (paras 211-215).
The Background
The Grounds of Appeal and the DNA Evidence
Conclusion