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England and Wales Care Standards Tribunal |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Care Standards Tribunal >> JMC v The Secretary Of State For Education And Skills [2006] EWCST 664(PC) (16 February 2007) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCST/2007/664(PC).html Cite as: [2006] EWCST 664(PC) |
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J.M.C.
Appellant
-AND-
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EDUCATION AND SKILLS
Case No: [2006] 664.PC.
Respondent
DECISION
Date
16 and 17 October 2006 and 17 and 18 January 2007.
Appeal
JMC appeals under section 4 of the Protection of Children Act 1999 against the decision of the Secretary of State to include him in the list maintained under Section 1 of that Act.
Attendance
For the Appellant
Mr Currie (Counsel) for the Appellant
Instructed by Thompsons, Solicitors.
The Appellant
Witnesses:
KW (17.01.07)
RW (18.01.07)
Robert Stephen
For the Respondent
Mr Auburn (Counsel) for the Secretary of State
Instructed by the Treasury Solicitor
Witnesses:
Marie Brennan (17.10.06)
S B (17.10.06)
S (17.01.07)
W (17.01.07)
Preliminary matters
(a) At the commencement of the hearing we directed that all witnesses should give evidence under oath and none should be in the tribunal room until they gave their evidence.
(b) The Respondent agreed that the evidence of Robert Nathan Stephen was accepted and there was no need for his attendance and the Appellant agreed that the evidence of Richard Simpson was accepted and there was no need for his attendance. We had also written evidence of TC and TS who did not appear before us whose evidence was in front of us in written Statement form.
(c) The Appellant indicated that if the Tribunal decided he had been guilty of misconduct within the meaning of Section 4 (3) (a) of the Protection of Children Act 1999 he would not contend that he was suitable to work with children within the meaning of Section 4(3) (b) of that Act.
(d) A Restricted Reporting Order was made under Regulation 18(1) at a preliminary hearing held in accordance with Regulation 6(1) and dated 16 June 2006. The Order was continued at the conclusion of the main hearing. The Decision is published in an anonymised form so as to protect the private lives of the stepchildren of the Appellant.
(e) On 17 January 2007 we received and accepted a third Statement of the Appellant (pages 153 a-d of the bundle).
(f) On the 16.10.06 the Tribunal viewed the video evidence of the interviews of S and W by the police and Social Services.
The Issues
In 1995/96 the Appellant was a practising Social Worker employed by the County of Avon. He was referred to the Consultancy Service in February 1996 as a result of the Child Protection conference which concluded that the accounts of S & W relating to allegations of sexual abuse by the Appellant on them were true and that the Appellant posed a potential risk to children.
The Appellant maintains in his Notice of Appeal that he did not sexually abuse S & W and that the allegations were the same as those made by S & W's mother against her previous husband which turned out to be malicious. He further alleges that the statements of the children at the time appeared to be written by "someone far in excess of their ages". He relies on the fact that the CPS did not proceed on the evidence and dropped the case and that he was never charged, cautioned, or convicted of any offence.
In his evidence to us, the Appellant stated that S & W were coached by their mother into making and sustaining false allegations against him.
Facts
- Using massage oils and massaging the children for therapeutic reasons;
- That he had bathed with the children and that S may have accidentally touched his penis;
- That he did kiss S on the lips;
- He may have touched S's leg,/ knee/ thigh in the car
Submissions
Mr Auburn, on behalf of the Secretary of State, submitted that the task of the Tribunal was to decide which version of events was most likely to have happened. He said there were only two versions, either the version whereby the Appellant had abused S & W or the version that he had not abused them:-
• Because SB wanted to leave him on 8 August;
• She had set about compiling a complex case of sexual abuse and she had persuaded the two children that they had been abused when they had not been;
• All of this had occurred between 8 and 22 August 1995;
• That they learnt their lines perfectly so as to be interviewed twice by the Police and videoed;
• That Mrs. B and the children persisted in the allegations to the Police, Social Workers, friends, Counsellors and Doctors over a long period of time;
• Ensured that the two children believed that they had been the victims of sexual abuse when she knew they were not.
He submitted that such a scenario was not credible and that the evidence given both on video by the children and by them before us was "consistent and credible".
He submitted that in any event the explanation adopted by the Appellant had "developed" throughout the case and that it was now different from the original allegation set out in the Notice of Appeal.
Mr Currie, on behalf of the Appellant, reminded the Tribunal that this was a serious allegation and that we had to be satisfied to a high standard that the allegations were true. He submitted that there was serious doubt over the credibility of the witnesses and pointed to the way in which S had given her evidence on video; that different views were taken by different professionals immediately at the time, and similarly that there were difficulties with W's evidence. He pointed to the fact that a number of those involved at the time had identified that Mrs. B was "capable of manipulating the children". He pointed out that there was no corroborative evidence at all put forward and, for those reasons, he submitted that the Tribunal should not conclude that the case had been made out by the Secretary of State.
The Law
1. The appeal is brought under section 4(3) of the Protection of Children Act 1999. This states:
"If on an appeal or determination under this section the Tribunal is not satisfied of either of the following, namely -
a. that the individual was guilty of misconduct (whether or not in the course of his duties) which harmed a child or placed a child at risk of harm; and
b. that the individual is unsuitable to work with children,
the Tribunal shall allow the appeal or determine the issue in the individual's favour and (in either case) direct his removal from the list; otherwise it shall dismiss the appeal or direct the individual's inclusion in the list."
2. The burden of proof rests on the Secretary of State to satisfy us to the civil standard both that the Appellant was guilty of misconduct that harmed a child or placed a child at risk of harm, and that he is unsuitable to work with children. We were referred to the case of C v Secretary of State for Health (CA) and looked at the case of R (on the application of N) v Mental Health Review Tribunal (Northern Region) [2006] 4 All ER 194 where all the recent cases on the standard of proof were considered. In this case Richards LJ said "Although there is a single civil standard of proof on the balance of probabilities, it is flexible in its application. In particular, the more serious the allegation or the more serious the consequences if the allegation is proved, the stronger must be the evidence before a court will find the allegation proved on the balance of probabilities." Therefore we are mindful that we must decide this on the civil standard but that given the seriousness of the allegations against the Appellant we must ensure that the evidence against the Appellant is strong.
3. As we have already recorded it is accepted by the Appellant that if we are satisfied that the Secretary of State has satisfied us that the Appellant had been "guilty of misconduct" then the Appellant accepts that he is "unsuitable to work with children."
Tribunal's conclusions with reasons
We carefully considered the written evidence submitted to the Tribunal in advance and the evidence given to us during the hearing of this appeal.
Our conclusions are:
A. In our judgement the evidence of S & W set out in the video recordings in 1995 was entirely credible and consistent. The honesty of the accounts which they gave in that video was accepted by both the Police and Social Workers who carried out the investigation into the alleged abuse as being true.
B. Whilst at the time it was suggested by certain members of Mrs. B's family that the allegations might have been made up by Mrs. B for the purpose of ending her relationship with the Appellant and that she had been capable of influencing the children to make them, we note from the written evidence and the evidence of Mrs. B before us that subsequently the views of her family changed. In any event as we will explain later in this Decision, we find such a view on the evidence that we have seen and heard to be unsustainable.
C. The evidence of S & W to us was entirely consistent with the evidence which they had given on video as children. It is clear to us that both children clearly believe that they were abused by the Appellant. It is material in our view that their Statements in writing prepared for this Tribunal were prepared before S had read the papers and seen the videos as was W's, who has never read the papers or seen the videos. We were particularly struck by the evidence of W of his ability to recollect by way of a mental image some of the abuse which he suffered. We noted that the Appellant in his evidence stated that he now accepted that both S and W believed he had abused them.
D. We have looked to see whether there is any evidence which would corroborate the evidence given by S & W of what occurred. In our judgement there is some corroborative evidence. First of all, the allegations in connection with the abuse of both children whilst in the Appellant's car are ones which are clearly founded in fact. All of the parties, including the Appellant, agree that the journeys took place and that they took place on a specific day. The allegation in respect of the assault in the car on S had stuck in her memory because it was day of the Bristol Balloon Festival.
E. Secondly the Appellant in his evidence described how, from the moment that they were married, SB had taken the opportunity of him being in the house to go out frequently in the evenings to carry out a variety of activities. This appears to us to add weight to the views expressed by S that the abuse that she suffered occurred in the evenings when she was going to bed, when her mother was out of the house. There was adequate opportunity for the alleged abuse to take place.
F. Thirdly it also appears to us that, as a Social Worker, the Appellant must have been aware of the boundaries which would be acceptable in a new family which he was entering. His admissions to the Police at the time and partly admitted in his own evidence to us of the use of massage oil and massaging the children, kissing S on the lips and touching of S's leg, knee or thigh in the car all appear to us, as it did to some of the Social Workers in the case at the time, to corroborate the allegations which were made against him. The Appellant does not deny either that the routine of putting the children to bed usually involved him sitting on or lying on the bed with them, and in W's case assisting him with his reading. The Appellant did not deny that he bathed with the children nor that this was observed on one occasion by Mrs. B who was distressed by what she saw or thought she saw in relation to his having an erection,
G. We have asked ourselves whether the Appellant's explanation is credible. Clearly at the time, a few people considered that it might be believable and even now KW and at least one of her daughters believe that his explanation is true. One social worker who was not directly involved in the case had that view. We are troubled in dealing with this question because, if it were true, we would have to accept that Mrs. B had maliciously and deliberately decided to plant in her children's mind the factual basis of the allegations; coach them in a very short period of time (in our view not more than a week between 13 and 20 August 1995) so that they could accurately recite the facts in lengthy video interviews; take both children to the sexually transmitted disease clinic in Bristol; put S into lengthy counselling; apply for criminal injuries compensation and continue to maintain that situation until the present time. She would have to do that in the hope that the children would consistently tell the same story and would not reach a time in their lives when they considered that they should tell the truth.
H. We find this explanation to be totally implausible. Neither are we persuaded that SB was motivated by a desire to obtain financial advantage for S and W by claims to the Criminal Injury compensation board. Neither do we find it significant that in June 1995 she requested the sight of S's previous file or that she inspected it shortly before the allegations of abuse came into the open. Whilst the questions raised by S and W at the time about whether the Appellant might lose his job might appear contrived we cannot say that this alone in any way supports the Appellant's case.
I. We have considered carefully the evidence of KW and RW and the other witnesses who gave evidence for the Appellant as to his character and that of Mrs. B. The evidence does not in our view support the contentions made by the Appellant.
J. We have considered the issue of the further allegation of sexual abuse against NW. Whilst we consider that the Appellant, KW or RW not openly telling us in their Statements before the matter was found out by the Respondent, committed an error of judgement, we have not taken it into account either in reaching a view as to the truthfulness of the Appellant nor in making a decision as to whether the allegations in respect of the abuse on S & W were true. Neither do we make any findings as to whether the allegation about NW was true or false.
K. On the basis that we have set out above, we prefer the evidence submitted on behalf of the Secretary of State and have no difficulty in concluding on the balance of probabilities that the allegations have been made out in respect of the abuse on S & W. We are satisfied that the evidence of the abuse was strong and the evidence for the alternative intrinsically weak. As a result the Appellant has been guilty of misconduct which actually caused serious harm to both S & W.
Order
That this appeal be dismissed. Our decision is unanimous.
We make a restricted Reporting Order under Regulation 18 (1). This Order prohibits the publication (including by electronic means) in a written publication available to the public, or the inclusion in a relevant programme for reception in England and Wales, of any matter likely to lead members of the public to identify a non professional witness. This Order shall continue in force until further order of this Tribunal.
Tony Askham Chairman
Richard Beeden Lay Member
David Cook Lay Member
16 February 2007