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England and Wales Family Court Decisions (other Judges) |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Family Court Decisions (other Judges) >> M (A Child; Welfare Hearing) [2017] EWFC B89 (24 November 2017) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWFC/OJ/2017/B89.html Cite as: [2017] EWFC B89 |
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Blackburn Lancashire BB1 6DJ |
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B e f o r e :
Sitting as a judge of the High Court
____________________
RE M (A CHILD; WELFARE HEARING) |
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61 Southwark Street, London SE1 0HL
Tel: 020 7269 0370
[email protected]
MISS WOODS appeared on behalf of the First Respondent
MISS KOROL appeared on behalf of the Second Respondent
MISS BOWCOCK appeared on behalf of the Third Respondent
____________________
Crown Copyright ©
This Transcript is Crown Copyright. It may not be reproduced in whole or in part, other than in accordance with relevant licence or with the express consent of the Authority. All rights are reserved.
If this Transcript is to be reported or published, there is a requirement to ensure that no reporting restriction will be breached. This is particularly important in relation to any case involving a sexual offence, where the victim is guaranteed lifetime anonymity (Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992), or where an order has been made in relation to a young person.
HHJ BOOTH:
The proceedings
The background
The issues
Since the fact finding hearing
The evidence
At paragraph 122:
'I found L's father a disturbing witness. He appeared able to ignore reality and the truth without a second thought'.
At paragraph 123:
'I am satisfied that this father is capable of doing things to his daughter that most parents would find abhorrent. It is likely that his motive for behaving in this way was a warped perception that this was the best way to restore his relationship with L's mother and that as before, tragedy or near-tragedy would draw them back together… In my assessment, he is a very dangerous man'.
'He has narcissistic personality traits… Father's relationship with mother has provided him with a relationship in which his narcissism has on the whole been gratified… He was certainly emotionally abusive and controlling. He was this way in order to make sure that L's mother remained bound to him and available to meet his emotional needs… When L's mother has defied him in whatever way he will have experienced this as an attack on his superiority and self-esteem. He has responded with anxiety and fury. He has resorted to lies and manipulation to get her back because he is raging, hateful, frightened, and desperate. This is an example of "attachment rage". It was at the christening in September 2016 and thereafter when L's mother held firm in her assertion that the relationship was over. I am suggesting that this unleashed attachment rage in L's father which resulted in him obstructing L's airways on two occasions in the hope and expectation that L's mother would take him back… His narcissistic personality, his deep insecurity and/or his assumptions of his superiority and entitlement has driven him to extreme measures. He is a grave danger to other people. It seems he has little if any compunction in using/harming another person, even his own baby in order to get what he wants… There is no therapy that I can recommend for L's father'.
'I am of the view that L's father is a very dangerous man and poses such a threat to L and/or other children that any contact could be fatal'.
'L's father poses a serious threat to both L and her mother. He has sabotaged a potential placement with family members and exhibited threatening and unpredictable behaviour… L's father is intelligent and resourceful. He made no bones in discussions with me about his intention to seek out L if she is placed with her mother or anyone else known to him. It is not a question of if but when this occurs in my opinion… The risks to L's welfare now and for the rest of her minority stem from her father. There can be no confidence in predicting his behaviour, he is a very dangerous man, and L requires protection from his behaviours'.
The law
a. Throughout my deliberations I am concerned first foremost and throughout with L's welfare which must be my paramount consideration.
b. As it is the Local Authority who bring these proceedings it is for them to prove any fact upon which they intend to rely on a balance of probabilities.
c. The threshold for the making of public law orders is crossed as a result of the findings I made in the previous judgment.
d. The court can therefore go on to consider what statutory orders should be made in the best interest of L, starting from the premise that no order should be made unless it is necessary and the least intrusive order if I have to make an order.
e. The welfare of the child is the court's paramount consideration and in coming to its decision the court should apply the Welfare Checklist in Section 1(3) of the Children Act 1989.
f. The court must scrutinise the care plans of the Local Authority and determine whether they are appropriate and capable of being implemented. The court should not approve a care plan that is inchoate. It is not the role of the children's Guardian to make up for any deficiencies that they identified within the care plan.
g. The court should adopt the least interventionist approach commensurate to the risks which the child is facing Re B (Care: Interference with Family Life) [2003] 2 FLR 813 where Thorpe LJ said:
'Where the application is for a care order empowering the Local Authority to remove a child or children from the family, the judge in modern times may not make such an order without considering the rights of the adult members of the family and of the children of the family. Accordingly he must not sanction such an interference with family life unless he is satisfied that it is both necessary and proportionate and that no other less radical form of order would achieve the essential end of promoting the welfare of children'.
h. In Re B (A Child) [2016] UKSC 4 the Supreme Court emphasised the need to ensure that a care order where the plan is for adoption is a proportionate response to the harm identified. Lord Neuberger described such an order as 'a last resort' and expressed the view that, 'Before making an adoption order in such a case the court must be satisfied that there is no practical way of the authorities (or others) providing the requisite assistance and support'.
i. In Re A [2015] EWFC 11 the President of the Family Division confirmed the test to be applied where the Local Authority seeks a care plan for adoption as follows, 'In an adoption case it is for the Local Authority to prove on a balance of probabilities the facts on which it relies and if adoption is to be ordered to demonstrate that "nothing else will do" when having regard to the overriding requirements of the child's welfare'.
j. In considering the evidence of the parties the court must give itself a Lucas direction. A person may lie about a specific matter but that does not mean that they will lie about everything. An important part of the assessment is what the court thinks about the reliability of the parents' evidence. A court may be concerned if someone is found to have lied about something but that does not necessarily mean that person has lied about everything. The court will keep in mind the warning in R v Lucas [1981] QB 720 that:
'If a court concludes that a witness has lied about a matter, it does not follow that he has lied about everything. A witness may lie for many reasons, for example, out of shame, humiliation, misplaced loyalty, panic, fear, distress, confusion, and emotional pressure'.
k. There must be a holistic evaluation of all the options which might be available to the court prior to the court making its final determination that nothing else will do. Such evaluation must consider what services and support the Local Authority could provide.
l. In carrying out the holistic evaluation the court must carry out the following task as described in Re Y (Care Proceedings Proportionality Evaluation) [2014] EWCA Civ 1553 where Ryder LJ said:
'The process of deductive reasoning involves the identification of whether there are realistic options to be compared. If there are, a welfare evaluation is required. That is an exercise which compares the benefits and detriments of each realistic option, one against the other by reference to the Section 1(3) welfare factors. The court identifies the option that is in the best interests of the children and then makes a proportionality evaluation to ask itself the question whether the interference in family life involved by that best interests option is justified'.
m. What is required is a balancing exercise in which each option is evaluated to the degree of detail necessary to analyse and weigh its own internal positives and negatives and each option is then compared side by side against the competing option or options – Re G (Care Proceedings Welfare Evaluation) [2013] EWCA Civ 965.
n. In the event that the court determines that the adoptive care plan is appropriate it must go on to consider whether the placement order should be made.
o. The court, in reaching that decision, must have as its paramount consideration the child's welfare throughout his life, Section 1(2) of the Adoption of Children Act 2002. The circumstances in which the paramountcy principle applies include those where the issue is whether or not to dispense with parental consent to placement and/or adoption. As such, the court must consider the impact on the child throughout its life if it is removed from the care of its family.
p. The court in reaching that conclusion must have regard to the adoption welfare checklist in looking at all the circumstances of the case as set out in Section 1(4) of the Adoption of Children Act 2002, (a) the child's ascertainable wishes and feelings regarding the decision (considered in the light of the child's age and understanding), (b) the child's particular needs, (c) the likely effect on the child (throughout his life) of having ceased to be a member of the original family and become an adoptive person, (d) the child's age, sex, background and any of the child's characteristics which the court or agency considers relevant, (e) any harm (within the meaning of the Children Act 1989) which the child has suffered or is at risk of suffering, (f) the relationship which the child has with relatives and with any person in relation to whom the court or agency considers the question to be relevant including (i) the likelihood of any such relationship continuing and the value to the child of its own doing, (ii) the ability and willingness of any of the child's relatives or of any such person to provide the child with a secure environment in which the child can develop and otherwise to meet the child's needs, (iii) the wishes and feelings of any of the child's relatives or of any such person regarding the child.
q. The court must always consider the whole range of powers available to it in the child's case. The court must not make an order unless it considers that making an order will be better for the child than not doing so.
r. In dispensing with the parents' consent the judge must apply Section 25(1)(b) as explained in Re P (Placement Orders Parental Consent) [2008] 2 FLR 625.
The options
'He suffocated her on two occasions. He is a great risk to her. He could do anything to her. He is a massive risk to her. I have to protect her. With help, I could protect her'.
'L's mother perceived him [L's father] as someone who could take care of her. She has insight into the fact that in him she sought parenting and protection by him. Her formative experiences have left her with distorted beliefs about what comprises a good quality relationship'.
Paragraph 6.27:
'I do not mean to imply that L's mother should have known about L's father's risk that he was a danger to his child. His is extreme and unusual behaviour and I doubt that even a very well-adjusted person would have known what was going on.'
Paragraph 6.28:
'Because L's mother has been very dependent on L's father, because the relationship began when she was extremely young and she has had no other relationships with which to compare the one with L's father and because they have been together most of her life, it has been extremely difficult for her to reach the point of truly believing that he deliberately inflicted potentially fatal harm to their daughter. A process of realisation has been a gradual, faltering, and slow one'.
'My instructions are that she and L's father have definitively separated. From her account at the second interview I believe she has separated physically and emotionally from him and I would be very surprised if they were to reconcile. She is very concerned about the risks that he would pose if contact were ordered. I think she would and will be hypervigilant regarding such risks and would do everything she could to protect L should the court order contact between L and her father'.
Dr Hellin went on at paragraph 6.33:
'She appears to be truthful and straightforward which means that professionals can be better assured that she is really collaborating rather than pretending compliance'.
Dr Hellin was asked about that in her evidence. She accepted that L's mother is a dependent person and that if isolated she would be likely to be more lonely and less able to protect herself in those circumstances. Dr Hellin's assessment was the L's mother would be terrified if L's father sought her out but not if it was she who had initiated contact.
'The vulnerability of L's mother to bow to the pressure of L's father and his capacity to exert control and manipulation is what causes me grave concern when considering whether L's mother can provide safe and effective care of L throughout her childhood. L's mother has affirmed that she did not realise how serious the situation was until the finding of fact hearing and in particular when she heard L's father give evidence. L's mother presented herself to professionals that she accepted the concerns of the Local Authority prior to the finding of fact hearing. Furthermore she had information relating to the medical assessments of L that were indicating that there was no identified medical cause but still she maintained a relationship with L's father and held his views in higher regard than anyone else's'.
And she goes on to say:
'L's mother and father have been inextricably linked by their shared loss and grief and it is this co-dependency that continues to be a significant cause of concern when considering L's future care plans. It is the view of the Local Authority given the length of their relationship and their reliance upon one another which has been concealed from professionals that L's parents may struggle to sever their ties with one another and in time the risk would be that their relationship is once again resumed. Therefore it is deemed that the risk to L would be too great if she was to be placed back in the care of her mother'.
When she gave her evidence, L's social worker maintained her position and she reiterated that when she first became involved back in October 2016 L's mother expressed the view that L's father was a risk and she noted no change in L's mothers expressed thinking before or after the judgment. She was asked about the resumption of the relationship in early 2017 and she said she had no idea the relationship had been resumed and that having thought back about it a great deal that she could think of nothing that she had missed that would have alerted her to the fact that that relationship had been resumed. Her assessment of L's mother's ability to protect came back on each occasion to the risk posed by L's father, with the fear that he could seek out L and her mother, that in any event L and her mother would have to be in a state of hypervigilance for the foreseeable future, impacting both on L's mother but in particular impacting on L. L's social worker said that she accepted that in looking at mother she would have been better to have carried out a proper assessment session once or twice for an hour. She was looking for help from the psychological assessment from Dr Hellin and acknowledged that that had come in late making further assessment of mother more difficult. She said that there were multiple strands to her assessment, consisting as it did of frequent and regular contact with L's mother both by telephone and face-to-face and that she had not closed the door finally once and for all on L's mother once she discovered the deception at the time of the finding of fact hearing. She said that ultimately the context in which her assessment had to be placed was the risk of death for L and that that risk was a great risk and it was in that context that she placed her concerns that she was not confident in the changes in mother as assessed by Dr Hellin. But more importantly she needed to be able to believe what L's mother told her. She said this, 'I don't know what to believe and what not to believe. L's mother's relationship with me is superficial. Nothing raised my suspicions when they got back together. She presents herself so well'.
Have I got all the evidence that is needed?
Analysis
Proportionality
The effect on L's mother of my decision
Conclusion