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	England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions >> Moggridge & Anor v National Assembly for Wales & Anor [2003] EWHC 2188 (Admin) (18 July 2003) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2003/2188.html Cite as: [2003] EWHC 2188 (Admin)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

		CO/5900/2002 Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2
		18 July 2003

1. MR JUSTICE PITCHFORD: The claimants seek an order quashing compulsory purchase and side road orders made by Caerphilly Borough Council and confirmed by the National Assembly for Wales on 12 December 2002. They are the Caerphilly County Borough Council (Sirhowy Enterprise Way, Route A4084 Classified Road) Compulsory Purchase Order 2001 and the Caerphilly County Borough Council (Sirhowy Enterprise Way Route A 4084 Classified Road) (Side Roads) Order 2001.
2. The town of Blackwood lies in the Sirhowy Valley within the western extremity of the county of Gwent. It served the surrounding coalmining industrial and agricultural communities. It is in comparative industrial decline and requires economic regeneration. Caerphilly County Borough Council wishes to construct a new road between the north end of Blackwood High Street and Newbridge Road, Pontllanfraith. The scheme would form the Sirhowy Enterprise Way. The effect of the new road would be to provide a bypass from the north-west of Blackwood to the south-east without, as at present, the need to journey through the centre of Blackwood along the A408 High Street. The side roads would create or improve access to the new road from the southern end of Blackwood eastwards towards the Enterprise Way at Pontllanfraith and from the Oakdale Business Park towards the northern end of the Enterprise Way before it crossed the River Row towards Blackwood.
3. Objections to the orders were made to the National Assembly and the matter was referred to a public inquiry conducted by Mr Ian Osborne, an inspector appointed by the Assembly. Mr Osborne, in a lengthy and closely reasoned report, advised confirmation of the orders. His advice was followed by the minister on behalf of the Assembly.
4. I have permitted an amendment of the grounds of claim in order to ensure that all relevant matters are considered, so as to do justice to the claimants' challenge.
5. The grounds of challenge are now as follows:

(1) In its case to the inspector the county borough council stated its primary purpose in seeking the orders was the regeneration of the former Oakdale colliery site as a business park. The inspector found the primary purpose not justified but advised that subject to the question of legality, the orders should be confirmed in support of the secondary stated purpose, namely the substantial reduction of traffic flows through the town of Blackwood. The minister accepted that advice, concluding that the side road order effecting the link with Oakdale Business Park was lawful under section 14(1)(a)(ii) of the Highways Act 1980. The claimants argued that, since the Oakdale Business Park link road was an essential component of the primary purpose, and since the primary purpose failed, there remained no lawful justification for the compulsory purchase and side road orders. It was, it is submitted, not permissible for the National Assembly for Wales to substitute a purpose to justify confirmation. The minister considered a public interest on which the county borough council had not relied, or relied upon as its priority. Furthermore, since the claimants were challenging the primary purpose relied upon by the county borough council, they were deprived of a fair opportunity of challenging independently the secondary purpose of relief of traffic congestion in Blackwood town centre. In other words, they never addressed the question whether the weight of public interest based upon the secondary purpose outweighed contrary considerations.

(2) It is common ground that the road construction would cause disturbance of a bat population in and in the vicinity of Woodfield Park. The works could not proceed without a licence granted under regulation 44 of the Conservation (Natural Habitats etc) Regulations 1994, made pursuant to Article 16 of the EEC Habitats Directive. By regulation 3, paragraph 4 of the 1994 regulations public authorities must have regard in the exercise of their functions to the requirements of the Habitats Directive and, subject to the grant of a licence under regulation 44, it is an offence under regulation 39 to disturb protected species, of which the bat is one.

6. Article 12 of the Habitats Directive requires member states to take the requisite measures to establish a system of strict protection for the animal species listed in annex IV and it prohibits "(d) deterioration or destruction of breeding sites or resting places". Article 16 permits derogation from Article 12 if there is no satisfactory alternative "(c) in the interests of public health and public safety, or for other imperative reasons of overriding public interest, including those of a social or economic nature and beneficial consequences of primary importance for the environment". The 1994 regulations, to which I have referred, were implemented by the United Kingdom government for the purpose of implementing and complying with the Habitats Directive. Regulation 3, paragraph 4 provides:

".... every competent authority in the exercise of any of their functions, shall have regard to the requirements of the Habitats Directive so far as they may be affected by the exercise of those functions."

The claimants contend that the minister has failed to have any regard to the requirements of Article 16, but merely put off to another occasion consideration of whether a licence should be granted. The effect of the decision to confirm the orders is either (1) to prejudge the merits of the licence application in the absence of the necessary evidence or (2) to have required compulsory purchase when the scheme could not proceed upon refusal of such a licence.

7. I turn first to the issue of purposes. In its statement of reasons published under the Compulsory Purchase by Non-ministerial Requiring Authorities (Inquiries Procedure) Rules 1990, the county borough council at paragraph 4, "Objectives of the council", set out what it described as the "principal goals of the scheme as they relate to the objectives of the Council"."
8. Those objectives are identified in seven numbered paragraphs. The first is:

"To achieve the full potential of the Oakdale Business Park.

• the scheme is crucial to the full development of the Oakdale Business Park and the creation of up to 5000 jobs. Oakdale Business Park will be the largest of its kind in Wales.

• without Sirhowy Enterprise Way, development is limited by access considerations to only 70 of the 170 acres in total being available .... "

The second is "To improve economic development and regeneration". This objective is explained as a desire to provide local job opportunities over a wide area, together with sub-regional job opportunities in the neighbouring authorities of Torfaen and Blaenau Gwent. It is also designed to achieve traffic reduction by removing the necessity to travel to the coast for employment. The third is to "Provide access to strategic routes". The objective was intended to improve employment opportunities by reducing journey times and to strengthen the council's core network and road hierarchy. The fourth is "To improve access to existing industrial sites" at Penyfan, Newbridge Road and Penmaen Road, together with Croespenmaen and Woodfieldside Business Parks. The fifth is "To revitalise the urban centres" by the reduction of traffic through the centre of Blackwood, enabling commercial regeneration, revitalising commercial areas, creating opportunities for further investments, and residential development, reducing traffic and accidents in urban areas and supporting integrated transport. The sixth is "To improve local residential amenities" by improving accessibility linking both sides of the valley with each other, enabling the removal of heavy goods vehicles on Kendon Hill, improving safety and residential amenity, together with access to local markets; to improve the environment and to protect the natural environment from the impact of the road. The seventh and final is "To enhance community regeneration" by encouraging the population to remain, with their expenditure, within the local community.

9. In their statement of case to the inspector, it is noteworthy that at paragraph 1, in setting out their reasons for making the order, the county borough council commenced as follows:

"1.1 The orders are required for the improvement and construction of the A4048 through route and associated side roads, all in conjunction with the Sirhowy Enterprise Way.

1.2 The Sirhowy Enterprise Way will provide a single carriageway road between the existing A4048 at the northern end of Blackwood High Street near Sunnybank Road and Newbridge Road, Pontllanfraith. A short length of existing dual carriageway then connects the route from Newbridge Road to the A472 Mid Valleys strategic route. A single carriageway cross valley link connects the route to the southern end of Blackwood High Street at Libanus Road, whilst a single carriageway link gives access from the northern end of the new route to the Oakdale Business Park, on the site of the former Oakdale colliery complex.

.... .... ....

1.5 The scheme will improve economic development and regeneration by providing local job opportunities over a wide area of the County Borough, together with sub-regional job opportunities in the neighbouring authorities of Torfaen and Blaenau Gwent, thus helping to reduce the existing high unemployment rates in this part of South Wales. It will also achieve traffic reduction by removing the necessity to travel to the coastal belt for employment.

1.6 The scheme will significantly strengthen the Council's core network and road hierarchy and provide improved access to existing industrial areas".

Those industrial areas are identified and are the same as those contained in the statement of reasons.

10. At section 8 of his report, the inspector summarised the county borough council's submissions. At paragraph 1 he wrote:

"The main purpose for which the CPO land is required, as set out in the Statement of Reasons and the Statement of Case, is the regeneration of the former Oakdale colliery site by the present OBP. The secondary purpose is the reduction of traffic in BTC [Blackwood town centre]. The main route of the proposed SEW would run from the A4048 at Sunnybank Road across the valley, and then south and south-eastwards as far as Newbridge Road."

In describing the objectives of the proposed road at section 8, paragraph 17 of his report, he wrote:

"There are, in fact, several inter-locking objectives. As well as the primary objective of the full development of the OBP and the secondary objective of the reduction of traffic in BTC, others include the improvement of access to other industrial estates in the locality; the improvement of the town's retail economy; the reduction of traffic on the B4251, including of [heavy goods vehicles] on Kendon Hill; the reduction of accident rates; the improvement of operating conditions for bus services; and the improvement generally of links to the strategic road network."

And at paragraph 18:

"Since the various elements of the proposed SEW are inextricably linked, the scheme stands or falls as a whole. It would not be justified, therefore, for only parts of it to proceed on their own. The land included in the CPO is the minimum required for the construction of the proposed road, whilst also providing for essential landscaping. Partial confirmation of either Order, except in relation to the minor details included in Appendix A, would thus not achieve the stated objectives, and is not sought."

11. It seems to me, as submitted on behalf of the respondents, that while in the county borough council's mind the principal objective was regeneration through the Business Park, the county borough council's submissions did not lose their cogency merely because the business park's potential might not be reached for many years. As the county borough council submitted to the inspector, the scheme, quite apart from the intention to expand the business park, was justifiable for several other reasons, all connected with economic regeneration and for traffic reduction for its own sake. This is what the inspector found:

"The county borough council accepted the burden of demonstrating by clear and unambiguous evidence the necessity to expropriate private land for legitimate purposes."

The inspector, in his conclusions at section 10, paragraph 6 said:

"The council point out that the proposed [business park link] is only a side road because the 'main route' for the scheme is, in effect, the diversion of the A4048 between High Street north of [Blackwood town centre] to Newbridge Road, Pontllanfridd. The proposed main route would be classified and numbered accordingly. Whilst the proposed BPL is essential to the whole scheme, nevertheless it does not need to be part of the main route for the purposes of these Orders. There is nothing illogical, unlawful or procedurally incorrect about this."

The inspector's comment at paragraph 7 upon the submission was this:

"In my view it seems strange that the proposed BPL is no more than a side road. This prosed length of road would be about 1km and is clearly an essential part of the proposed SEW, irrespective of what is the primary objective of the scheme. Moreover, even without the full development of the OBP in the next 20 years or so, the proposed BPL would provide a valuable element of a new cross-valley route for journeys to work and for other purposes between Blackwood and Oakdale. It would also provide the northern end of an attractive route, including for [heavy goods vehicles], between the OBP and the M4 avoiding Kendon hill."

And at paragraph 8:

"Whether a side road may properly implement the main objective of the proposals could possibly have implications for the validity of the CPO. The [National Assembly for Wales] will, therefore, need to be satisfied such a long side road can properly come within the powers of section 14 and 125 of the Act. Similar considerations may apply to the proposed [southern cross valley link], which would also be a side road, though as this would more clearly fulfil the role of linking the proposed main route to the existing A4048, it would more obviously be a secondary element of the whole scheme. Notwithstanding the above, I have proceeded to deal with the other matters relating to these 2 Orders on their merits."

12. I turn next to the inspector's overall conclusions with regard to the primary and secondary purposes identified. At section 10, paragraph 78 he said:

"Given the Council's self-imposed restrictions on the development of plateau No 1 of the OBP, there is a material risk that this plateau would not be developed at all by 2020. That being the case, it would not be justified to confirm either of these Orders on the basis of the primary purpose of the proposed road being to serve this business park. The proposed BPL should, though, remain part of the CPO land as it would be an important link between the proposed main route and the existing OBP spine road.

79. The proposed road would bring immediate, real and significant benefits to [Blackwood town centre] in that it would substantially reduce traffic flows in this shopping centre, irrespective of how much of the OBP were developed. The desirability of improving conditions for shoppers in BTC has been recognised for some 30 years and is as great today, if not greater, than ever it was. Without a major improvement in the shopping environment, this centre is unlikely to maintain its present bustling prosperity, never mind raise itself into a sub-regional centre. The opportunity of providing a town centre bypass along the former railway line to the east of the buildings in High Street has now disappeared. The proposed SEW thus presents the only realistic possibility of being able substantially to improve conditions for pedestrians in this town centre. Such an improvement would have important economic as well as environmental benefit."

13. Having considered other matters, he continued at paragraph 83:

"Overall, therefore, I conclude that the environmental, economic and transport benefits of the proposed road would decisively outweigh its mainly environmental disadvantages, and would be preferable to any of the alternatives that have been identified. There is thus a compelling need in the public interest for confirmation of these two orders."

Finally, at paragraph 84:

"Consequently, provided that [the National Assembly] considered that confirmation of both Orders would come within the powers of the relevant sections of the 1980 Act under which they have been made; that there would be no insuperable problem in confirming them bearing in mind the Council's mistaken identification of the primary objective for the proposed road; and that there would be no overriding conflict with national transport policy of new road building in this essentially urban area, I conclude that both Orders should be confirmed."

14. There does in my view also appear to be a strange inconsistency in the county borough council's reasons. On the one hand the main route is said to be what amounts to a bypass of Blackwood town centre and the link to Oakdale Business Park merely a side road linking to the bypass, while on the other the principal purpose of the scheme is said to be the regeneration of the business park. Nevertheless, there is in my judgment no irrationality or illegality in the council's reliance on both purposes. The adjectives "primary" and "secondary" are not in my view ultimately critical, although I can see that if one was truly dependent on the other, they might be. Proof of the primary in preference to, or in addition to, the secondary is not in my view a precondition of rationality or legality. As the inspector pointed out, the main bypass road had independent and powerful public advantages, environmental and economic. He was in my judgment perfectly entitled to advise the National Assembly that the county borough council's primary purpose -- if that was an appropriate description in the light of all the material before the inspector -- was not justified, while its secondary purpose was.
15. The inspector did not purport to reach a concluded opinion on the validity of the compulsory purchase order: he left that to the Assembly. Mr Fletcher submits that the secondary purpose advanced was indeed dependent upon the success of the primary. Accordingly, it fell with the inspector's advice upon the primary purpose. To that extent, therefore, the failure of the primary purpose was indeed an insuperable obstacle to confirmation. I accept the submission of Mr Stephenson on behalf the county borough council that it did not. The side road under consideration is described in section 3, paragraph 2.1 of the county borough council's statement of case as follows:

"Side Road Nos 1/A and 2/A consists of a new 7.3 metre wide single carriageway link road from the new Business Park Roundabout to the southern end of the recently constructed main spine road for the Oakdale Business Park. The route is approximately 1.0km long and will provide the main access to the Business Park. Part of Rhiw Syr Dafydd Hill will be stopped up. Part of the unnamed lane leading from the B4251 to River Row will be stopped up."

Section 14 of the Highways Act 1980 in its relevant part reads as follows:

"14(1) Provision may be made by an order under this section in relation to a trunk road or a classified road, not being, in either case, a special road, for any of the following purposes

(a) for authorising the highway authority for the road ....

(ii) to construct a new highway for purposes concerned with any such alteration as aforesaid or for any other purpose connected with the road or its construction, and to close after such period as may be specified in the order any new highway so constructed for temporary purposes; ....

and references in this section, with respect to an order made thereunder, to 'the road' and 'the highway authority' are references to, respectively, the trunk road or, as the case may, be classified road to which the order relates and the highway authority for that road."

The minister concluded at paragraph 10 of her confirmation letter:

"In consideration of these Orders the Minister has firstly had particular regard to the validity of the Orders, in respect of the Business Park Link and the Southern Cross Valley Link. On this, the Minister considers that the inclusion of these highways in the lengths of new road to be constructed under the authority of the Side Roads Order is entirely lawful and proper since these are both lengths of new road which are to join a classified road, namely the new length of the A4080 (sic) and are to be constructed for purposes connected with the construction of that road. This is so that traffic can obtain access to it in the manner for which the existing road network would not make provision. The Minister is satisfied that their inclusion falls within the powers granted by Section 14(1)(a)(ii) of the Highways Act 1980."

16. It is right to observe that in paragraph 6 of the report the minister misstated section 10, paragraph 84 of the inspector's report. In paragraph 1 the minister writes that the inspector concluded that, subject to the Assembly considering that both orders came within the powers of the relevant sections of the 1980 Act, there would be no insuperable problem in confirming the orders. In fact, as I have already quoted from the inspector's report, the inspector identified more than one caveat. The first was that confirmation of both orders within the powers of the relevant sections of the 1980 Act was a matter for the Assembly; secondly, that there would be no insuperable problem in confirming them, bearing in mind the mistaken identification of the primary objective; thirdly, that there would be no overriding conflict with national transport policy on new road building in the urban area. Those were three matters which the inspector reserved for the opinion of the Assembly.
17. However, it seems to me that, in the result, that misstatement of the inspector's reservation for consideration of the Assembly is not material, since at paragraph 14 of the confirmation letter it is said:

"The Minister agrees with the Inspector's conclusions as set out at Chapter 10 of the Report and his recommendation that the Side Roads Order be confirmed, and that the Compulsory Purchase Order be confirmed subject to the modifications identified."

It follows that the minister accepted the inspector's conclusion that the county borough council's secondary purpose was established and herself concluded that the Oakdale Business Park link road was thus appropriately the subject of the side road order. Since, as I have found, there was nothing irrational or illegal upon the identification of what was described by the county borough council as their secondary purpose as justification for the orders, it seems to me that the error made in paragraph 6 of the confirmation letter is in the result immaterial.

18. Oakdale Business Park already exists. 70 acres of it have been developed. In time, that area is likely to increase. As I have already noted, a road improvement scheme at Kendon Hill to the east of the business park, designed to relieve the impact of heavy goods vehicle traffic, has already been completed. The inspector found that the link road to the Sirhowy Enterprise Way to the west was independently justifiable. That being the case, there could not in my view be any illegality or irrationality in confirming the side road order for the purpose of improvement of traffic flow generally. Neither can I see any basis in law for challenging the minister's conclusion that the new highway was to be constructed for a purpose connected with the new bypass: namely to provide access to it in a manner which the existing network would not. Indeed, I do not understand it to be challenged by Mr Fletcher that section 14 would be an appropriate authority for the making of the side road order, subject to the issue of compatibility between the primary and secondary objective and the dependence of one upon the other.
19. I turn then to the second limb of ground 1. It seems to me that the argument that the objectors were unfairly deprived of the opportunity to challenge the county borough council's secondary purpose is contradicted by the evidence. I have already drawn attention to the statement of reasons and the statement of case. I am informed, without contradiction, that at the pre-inquiry meeting the inspector required that all evidence was to be served upon the objectors within 21 days of the inquiry and that, of course, all the evidence upon which the county borough council relied was included. The objectors, it appears, manifestly did direct their fire both at the necessity for the bypass at all, and the means of providing it if it was necessary. I need refer only, without quotation, to section 9, paragraphs 1, 8, 9, 41 and 42, and section 10, paragraphs 21-28 and 35-39 of the inspector's report. Furthermore, I fail to see how it can be argued that the purposes described in the county borough council's reasons did not fairly provide the objectors with the targets at which they should aim. The whole thrust of the case was twofold: economic regeneration and traffic diversion. They were inextricably linked, not only because the latter would encourage the former.
20. Mr Fletcher's argument that the objectors had no opportunity to address the balancing exercise once the primary purpose was excluded does not in my view survive paragraph 9.1 of the report, in which the inspector writes, in describing the objections of Mr Moggridge and Mr Morgan, the claimants:

"According to both the Statement of Reasons and Statement of Case, the scheme has some 20 objectives, though it is clear that the 2 main ones are the provision of a new access route to OBP and, less importantly, the reduction of traffic in BTC, though not by much. Moreover, if town centre traffic were the only problem, the scheme as it now stands would not exist. It is only by adding the proposed access route to OBP that the scheme is anywhere near viable .... ."

It seems to me that the objectors clearly did address the question whether the scheme could be justified without the Oakdale Business Park primary purpose. There was in my judgment no procedural unfairness and the first ground of the claim must fail.

21. I turn secondly to the question whether the county borough council and the minister complied with regulation 3, paragraph 4 of the Conservation (Natural Habitats etc) Regulations 1994. The inspector expressed his conclusion in section 10, paragraphs 9-11. I quote from paragraph 9:

"It is clear that the planning permission for the proposed SEW could not be implemented without the necessary licence from [the National Assembly for Wales] to disturb bats which roost on the CPO land, mainly in holes in the side of trees which would be felled, or which feed in area, or which fly across the line of the proposed road. The Council are unlikely to make an application for this licence before October 2002. I make no comment on whether it is likely to be granted."

And at paragraph 10:

"However, a decision on the confirmation of these Orders does not need to be delayed until the matter of the bats licence has been resolved. If the Orders are confirmed before the necessary licence has been granted, the Council undertake not to serve any notice to treat in connection with the CPO until it has been granted. [That undertaking has been repeated before me.] This undertaking by a public body should be accorded substantial weight. Early confirmation of the Orders would not be onerous for any of the Objectors if notices to treat were not served until the bats licence had been granted, even if it did extend slightly the period of uncertainty about whether their land was to be acquired. If the Orders were not conformed, then an early decision might well be welcomed by the Objectors. However, if the reason for non-confirmation were wholly, or even largely, because of the absence of a bats licence, but one were subsequently granted, it is likely that the Council would then make new Orders which would seek to overcome any other reasons for non-confirmation. If objections were received to such new Orders, the present Objectors would then face a further period of uncertainty and, if they were again Objectors, would need to face a second enquiry."

Finally, paragraph 11:

"The decision on whether to confirm these Orders should be made, therefore, as soon as possible, irrespective of the timing of the decision on the likely application for a bats licence. However, if [the National Assembly for Wales] consider that confirmation of the Order should be delayed until it is known whether a licence has been granted, this would not be too inconvenient for either the council or the Objectors. Clearly, though, if confirmation of the Orders were to be refused for reasons unrelated to the bats licence, then there would be no disadvantage in the decision being made as soon as possible."

That conclusion was, in essence, repeated in section 10, paragraph 85 of the inspector's report.

22. The minister accepted this advice, saying at paragraphs 11-13 of her confirmation letter that she had considered whether a decision on the orders could be made irrespective of the timing of an application by the council for a licence to disturb bats. She noted the prohibition created by regulation 39 of the Habitats Regulations 1994. She noted the exception provided by authorisation under regulation 44, and conditions which might be attached to such a licence. She continued at paragraph 12:

"To the extent that the construction of the proposed road will result in such disturbance, damage or destruction then it will not be lawful without such a licence."

She noted that confirmation of the orders would therefore not mean, necessarily, that the scheme could proceed. A further quotation from paragraph 12:

"If an application for a licence under Regulation 44 is made to the National Assembly it will have to be considered on the basis of the entirety of the evidence available at the time. The Minister is aware that in accordance with the terms of the planning permission surveys of the bat population have been carried out and have continued during the period since the local inquiry took place. Without prejudging the significance of any evidence which will need to be considered if an application for a licence is made, the Minister anticipates that it will include this kind of up-to-date information relating to the impact on the bat population. In the circumstances, the Minister is satisfied that a decision whether to confirm these Orders can be made without prejudicing any decision on an application for a licence under regulation 44 and, indeed, that such a decision is likely to require careful consideration of evidence which was not before the inquiry."

She went on to note at paragraph 13 the inspector's own consideration of the submissions and evidence made to him, and continued:

"The Minister is mindful of the fact that the impact of the proposed road on bat habitats within and near the woodlands will need to be given careful consideration in relation to any application for a licence under regulation 44 of the Habitats Regulations, as referred to in paragraph 12 of this letter, but with respect to the present applications she agrees with the Inspector's overall conclusion at paragraph 10.83 of his report."

Thus, on the face of it, the minister clearly did have regard to the implications of the Habitats Directive and in essence concluded that no breach of Articles 12 and 16 could take place in the light of regulations 39 and 44 of the 1994 regulations.

23. However, Mr Fletcher submits that was not enough. He submits the minister should not have confirmed the orders without herself coming to the conclusion that the scheme would on balance be Article 12 and 16 compliant. In support of his argument he cites as authority R v Cornwall County Council, ex parte Hardy [2001] JPL 786. Harrison J found that pursuant to regulation 3, paragraph 2, Town and Country Planning (Environmental Impact Assessment) (England and Wales) Regulations 999, a planning authority should not have granted planning permission unless they had taken environmental information which was awaited into consideration. The planning committee having decided that further surveys were required, it was not possible to conclude that no significant nature conservation issues arose in the absence of the results of those surveys. The results were fundamental to the issue of planning consent. They could not be relegated to the status of reserved matters. The planning permission was thus unlawful.
24. This decision is not, however, in my judgment authority for the proposition which Mr Fletcher advances. The Cornwall County Council was bound to make an assessment of the impact of the proposed development on the environment and to take into account environmental information. In order to perform that function they required further information, but in the meantime proceeded to grant permission. Harrison J said, at paragraph 73:

"In my judgment, the grant of planning permission in this case was not lawful because the respondent could not rationally conclude that there were no significant nature conservation effects until they had the data from the surveys. They were not in a position to know whether they had the full environmental information required by regulation 3 before granting planning permission. I would therefore quash the planning permission dated October 25, 1999."

25. I am concerned not with a planning process which gives permission for the work to proceed, but a confirmation process which enables the acquisition of land to take place. As matter of fact, planning permission for the Sirhowy Enterprise Way was granted on 14 December 2000 under regulation 3 of the Town and Country Planning (General) Regulations 1992 subject to, amongst many other things, protection of animals. That planning permission has not been challenged. Neither the compulsory purchase or side road order, nor confirmation of them, were subject to the planning regulations of 1999 or their predecessors. There was no obligation upon the county borough council or the minister to exercise the judgment required by regulation 44 of the 1994 regulations. Neither the orders nor the confirmation could amount to breach of the directive, since neither authorised the deterioration or destruction of breeding sites or resting places of bats. They merely, as I have said, permitted compulsory purchase of land.
26. Mr Fletcher submits that the minister has in effect fettered the discretion of the National Assembly. In this regard, Mr Lewis on behalf of the Assembly has directed my attention to the opinion of Advocate-General Tizzano upon the reference of a complaint by the European Commission, Commission of the European Communities v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland Case No C-434/01. The opinion was delivered on 3 July 2003 but I am told that the case has not yet proceeded to a hearing in the European court. Having referred to Articles 12 and 16 of the Habitats Directive, and having noted the provisions of regulations 3 and 44 of the United Kingdom 1994 regulations, the Advocate General proceeded at paragraph 14 of his Opinion to say:

" .... the person concerned must first of all apply to the local planning authority for planning permission. The authority may refuse to grant permission on account of the danger of 'disturbance' of a protected species or grant it on the condition that a derogation licence under regulation 44 is obtained.

15. In exercising that discretion the planning authorities applied planning guidelines (in the case of Wales, Planning Guidance Wales 1999). Under those guidelines, in particular where there are protected species on the site in respect of which permission is sought, the local planning authorities must, before granting permission, consult the authority competent to grant derogation licences (Planning Guidance Wales paragraph 5.3.20). In any case, however, the planning permission applied for ought not to be refused 'if development can be made subject to conditions that will prevent damaging impacts on wildlife habitats .... or if other material factors are sufficient to override nature conservation considerations' (Planning Guidance Wales paragraph 5.3.21)."

27. The Advocate-General went on to observe that the issue was limited to the commission's charge against the United Kingdom that the government had failed to implement correctly Article 16(1)(c) of the directive where there was a danger of disturbing species protected by Article 12 and Annex 4. The commission argued that where planning permission had already been granted, the competent authority (that is, the authority competent to grant derogation licences) was no longer in a position to determine whether or not there was a satisfactory alternative to the development project, as required by Article 16. The government, on the other hand, maintained, first, that local planning authorities were required to have regard to the directive when exercising their functions, which meant that they may not grant planning permission where making use of that permission would raise the risk of endangering a protected species, if they were not persuaded that the conditions laid down by Article 16 had been satisfied.
28. The government argued that what was essential was that regulation 44 ensured compliance with Article 16, since it demanded a licence granted only upon the condition provided by Article 16. The fact that the authorities may base their decisions on facts communicated by one to the other did not restrict the power of discretion, "still less make binding on them the assessments expressly made on the basis of those facts by the local planning authority which granted planning permission".
29. The Advocate-General noted that it was not in dispute that the member state was required to consider whether the conditions laid down in Article 16 had been satisfied nor, on the other hand, that regulation 44 constituted full implementation of Article 16. What was in issue was whether, as applied in practice, the British system was liable to interfere with observance of the obligations imposed by the directive. The Advocate-General concluded that the final administrative decision is the responsibility of the authority competent to grant derogation licences and that those licences would not be granted unless the requirements of regulation 44 and Article 16 had been satisfied. At paragraph 41 he said:

"It also seems plain to me as to the United Kingdom government that the fact that two different authorities are called on in turn to assess the same facts is certainly not enough to make the decision of the first a prejudgment capable of binding the second, especially as, in the circumstances of this case, the authorities making their successive decisions applied different legislative models: on the one hand, the general duty to have regard to the directive laid down in regulation 3 paragraph 4, and on the other, the strict requirements under regulation 44."

The Advocate-General thus proposed that the action brought by the commission should be dismissed.

30. The United Kingdom government thus underlined the necessity for the exercise of judgment of the responsible authority under regulation 44, a judgment said to be entirely independent of the planning process.
31. Mr Lewis accepts on behalf of the National Assembly that one authority makes both the confirmation decision and the regulation 44 decision in Wales. To that extent, it is possible to distinguish the Advocate-General's opinion. However, to paraphrase, it is, he submits, a distinction without a difference since here the decision-making process can be regarded as staged. The first concerns whether the land may be acquired for a public purpose; the second concerns whether that public purpose satisfies the requirements of regulation 44. The minister expressly reserved the latter for another occasion when the existing evidence could be considered afresh, together with the necessary environmental evidence gathered in the meantime. Discretion expressly was not fettered.
32. I am invited by Mr Lewis and Mr Stephenson to pay close attention to the precise words of paragraph 4 of regulation 3 of the 1994 regulations in comparison with the words used in paragraphs 2 and 3 of regulation 3.
33. In paragraph 2 the Secretary of State, the Minister of Agriculture Fisheries and Food and the nature conservation bodies "shall exercise their functions under the enactments relating to nature conservation so as to secure compliance with the requirements of the Habitats Directive". In paragraph 3, in relation to marine areas, the competent authority "shall exercise those functions so as to secure compliance with the requirements of the Habitats Directive", while in paragraph 4, "every competent authority" shall have regard to the requirements of the Habitats Directive "so far as they may be affected by the exercise of those functions".
34. The exercise of the function being performed by the minister did not entail a breach of Articles 12 or 16 of the Habitats Directive. It seems to me that this is the appropriate analysis. Far from abdicating responsibility for regard to the Habitat Directive, the minister expressly dealt with it. She was not in the result required by the directive to make the decision whether the scheme should proceed: that was for another occasion.
35. Mr Lewis submits that the risk that the scheme will not proceed as a result of a possible refusal of a regulation 44 licence is not a reason for refusing confirmation of the compulsory purchase and side road orders. The function which the minister is performing is an assessment of the public interest whether the compulsory purchase should go ahead and in so doing should prevail over the private interests of the claimants, not whether the development will or will not proceed. He relies for this proposition upon the judgment of Laws J (as he then was) in Chesterfield Properties Plc v Secretary of State for the Environment (1997) 76 P&CR 117. In that case it was the claimant's contention that the scheme was financially unviable. Accordingly the Secretary of State could not, as he must, be satisfied that the land was required in order to secure the carrying out of development within the meaning of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 section 226(1)(a). Laws J held that it was not a condition precedent of the power to confirm a compulsory purchase order that the confirming authority must be satisfied that the development would probably be carried out. While I am not concerned here with the construction of section 226(1), I agree with the submission that the reasoning of Laws J and his citation of authority is relevant to the analysis required and supportive of the argument that the risk that the regulation 44 licence will not be granted was not a matter which need prevent confirmation of the compulsory purchase order. It seems to me that the discretion of the decision-maker in that application remains entirely unfettered and that in recognising that fact the minister performed her duty under regulation 3 paragraph 4 of the 1994 regulations.
36. Since she was not required in the performance of her function to find on a balance of probability, or to any other standard, that the licence would be granted -- accordingly that the scheme could in the result proceed -- it is my judgment that she acted lawfully and rationally in confirming the orders. Thus I find that ground 2 also fails and the claim must be dismissed.
37. MR LEWIS: I am obliged, my Lord. Could I ask for summary assessment of costs in the sum of £6,887.75. It is in fact just under one third of the costs that the claimant would have been asking, and in my submission it is both right that we should have the costs of coming to defend our decision and the sum itself is entirely reasonable. I have not had the opportunity of discussing with Mr Fletcher the sum. As I say, their costs were £18,461 and ours is indeed a bargain.
38. MR JUSTICE PITCHFORD: Never judge your own advocacy, Mr Lewis.
39. MR STEPHENSON: My Lord, I am well aware of the two sets of costs rule, of course, as your Lordship is. I am here because the authority thought it desirable I should be here, for practical reasons as much as any other. I leave it to your Lordship to decide whether my presence here has helped your Lordship in the understanding of the case and the background of the case and whether, therefore, in the circumstances of this case I should be entitled to my costs as well.
40. MR JUSTICE PITCHFORD: Can you remind me of the sum?
41. MR STEPHENSON: The sum I am asking for, my Lord, is £7,438.75. If I can paraphrase my learned friend, even if you add my costs to my learned friends, it is still a bargain compared with the other advocate's, my Lord. Can I pass my costs schedule up. It has been given to the other side, of course.
42. MR FLETCHER: May I deal with the two costs question first, perhaps. My learned friend has very fairly said, there is a rule and the rule is reasonably clear. I do not see any particular reason why there should be a breach of that rule here. The issue is not whether your Lordship was assisted by my learned friend's presence.
43. MR JUSTICE PITCHFORD: You made him a respondent, did you not?
44. MR FLETCHER: We had to. We were obliged to. It is standard form in these cases that if they are successful there is then one set of costs and not two because there is only a necessity for one counsel to sustain the order made. My Lord, there is nothing exceptional about this or special about this that makes it any different. It is a matter of choice for the borough council to decide in this case whether they choose to be represented or not. They do so at their own risk as to costs, because the rule is clear. If necessary I can take you Lordship to the authority on it but there is clear authority, as my learned friend accepts, that only one set of costs is really justifiable, unless there is something quite exceptional, which there is not here.
45. MR JUSTICE PITCHFORD: Suppose, Mr Fletcher, the council had decided to accept joint representation. There would still have been, presumably, an input from the council to the legal representatives of the National Assembly and therefore some costs would have been incurred.
46. MR FLETCHER: I do not quite follow that, my Lord, with respect.
47. MR JUSTICE PITCHFORD: Would you like me to repeat it?
48. MR FLETCHER: No, not at all. One representative makes the submissions and, in so far as he has to give instructions, he gets those instructions and the issues are issues of law. My submission would be that this is a normal case where it would be oppressive to order two sets of costs.
49. MR JUSTICE PITCHFORD: Mr Stephenson, do you have anything to add?
50. MR STEPHENSON: No, my Lord, nothing.
51. MR JUSTICE PITCHFORD: Do you agree that in the ordinary way Mr Fletcher is right: there would be single representation.In the ordinary way?
52. MR STEPHENSON: Yes, my lord, either single representation by way of joint, in which case there would have been costs incurred from our point of view; or no representation at all, us leaving the Secretary of State to get on it with it, as it were, and deal with it in the best way. We thought we should be here because of the practicalities of the background of this scheme, which we thought we would be able to assist the court with. I think, if I may say so, my Lord, with respect, we have been able to assist the court and your understanding of the full import of the order. Therefore, if we have served a purpose in being here, without which your Lordship would be deprived of certain facts and matters, then our appearance is justified. Otherwise my learned friend is right.
53. MR JUSTICE PITCHFORD: Thank you very much, Mr Stephenson.
While it has been a pleasure to see you, I do not consider that it was necessary to incur more than one set of legal costs
54. MR STEPHENSON: As your Lordship pleases.
55. MR JUSTICE PITCHFORD: I shall grant an order for costs in favour of the first respondent against the claimants, which I shall assess summarily in the sum of £6,887.75. Nothing else? Thank you all very much.