[Home] [Databases] [World Law] [Multidatabase Search] [Help] [Feedback]
	England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions >> Hoskin, R (on the application of) v Northampton Crown Court [2009] EWHC 2265 (Admin) (19 August 2009) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2009/2265.html Cite as: [2009] EWHC 2265 (Admin)

[New search] [Printable RTF version] [Help]

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2A 2LL
		19th August 2009

1. MR JUSTICE WYN WILLIAMS: This is the hearing of a claim for judicial review of a decision of HHJ Bray sitting at the Northampton Crown Court. The decision was made on 3rd August 2009 and the decision which is impugned in these proceedings was the decision by HHJ Bray to refuse the claimant bail.
2. As I understand it, permission to apply for judicial review was granted in this case on the papers and, to repeat, this is the hearing of the substantive claim. HHJ Bray and/or the Northampton Crown Court have not appeared at these proceedings by counsel. The CPS, as interested party, has appeared. Counsel for the CPS has indicated factors which he submits make the decision made by HHJ Bray a reasonable one, but he was also frank enough to concede that there are factors apparently favouring the grant of bail and he acknowledged that, throughout the proceedings before HHJ Bray, the prosecution stance was that it did not oppose bail.
3. The relevant circumstances in summary are as follows. The claimant is subject to the following proceedings. He faces three charges of attempting to defraud Natwest Bank in Northampton. These charges are proceeding in the Northampton Crown Court. The date of the alleged offence is said to be 4th March 2009 and the amount involved in the alleged attempted fraud is some £18,000. The claimant also faces charges which are within the jurisdiction of the Guildford Crown Court relating to a similar alleged offence. This offence is either defrauding or attempting to defraud the Natwest Bank in Camberley of £17,800, an offence alleged to have been committed on 18th February 2009. Finally the claimant is on police bail to attend the Maidenhead police station in relation to an another similar offence, this one having allegedly occurred on 20th February 2009. It can be seen from this short recital therefore that the allegation is that the claimant has committed a number of comparatively serious offences of dishonesty in the months of February and March of this year.
4. The history of the relevant proceedings and grants of bail are as follows, and I take this from the claimant's statement of facts and grounds. On 4th March 2009, the claimant was arrested and taken to Northampton police station in relation to the matters involving the Northampton Natwest Bank. Having been arrested and taken to the police station, he was then released on unconditional bail. He returned to the Northampton police station on 6th May and was granted unconditional bail to attend the Northampton Magistrates' Court on 20th May 2009. On 6th May, however, he was arrested and taken to the Guildford police station. On the following day he was charged with the offences which relate to the Natwest Bank at Camberley but then granted unconditional bail to attend the Woking Magistrates' Court on 18th June. The first appearance at court was 20th May, at the Northampton Magistrates' Court. The claimant answered to his bail and was granted unconditional bail to attend the Northampton Crown Court on 3rd August. On 18th June, the date when the claimant was obliged to surrender to bail at the Woking Magistrates' Court, he did so, and he was then granted unconditional bail to attend the Guildford Crown Court. That hearing is scheduled for 18th September 2009.
5. The claimant was arrested in relation to the matter which is the subject of investigation by the Maidenhead police on 6th July 2009. He was taken to the police station and thereafter released on unconditional bail, this being police bail, to a date in September. The claimant's first appearance before a Crown Court was 3rd August 2009 and it was on this occasion that the judge, HHJ Bray, refused bail to the claimant.
6. It is obvious from the bare recital of the facts that the claimant is a number of months away from a trial, assuming that this is to be a trial. No plea and directions hearing has taken place in relation to the Camberley Natwest Bank fraud. No charge has yet been preferred in relation to Maidenhead, although counsel for the claimant frankly acknowledges that a charge is very likely, and no date has been set for any trial in relation to the alleged offences committed in Northampton. To repeat, it is obvious that meaningful trial proceedings are many months away.
7. The course of events before HHJ Bray are set out in the statement of facts and grounds. There is no response from the Northampton Crown Court to this application and there is no transcript of what occurred before HHJ Bray. The absence of a transcript, of course, is unfortunate, since that is the best indicator of what transpired before the learned judge. Nonetheless, counsel for the interested party accepts the likelihood that the statement of facts and grounds put in on behalf of the claimant is an accurate summary of what transpired before the learned judge.
8. I pick up the history of what occurred at paragraph 12 of the statement of facts. The hearing opened with the judge enquiring about whether the alleged defence in this case (I interpose to say it is a defence of duress) was one raised when the claimant was interviewed by the police. An exploration then took place of whether or not that defence was raised. At the conclusion, the judge apparently indicated a view that what was said in interview did not amount to the defence of duress. In paragraph 13, the claimant recites that the judge asked where the claimant resided. Defence counsel informed the judge that the claimant resided in Dagenham and the judge's observation in relation to that was that the defendant was a resident of east London. The suggestion is made in the statement of facts that this was somehow a relevant factor in the mind of the judge, though it is to be observed that that is not one of the reasons the judge gave for refusing bail.
9. When it became clear that the judge was considering remanding the claimant in custody, his counsel asked for time to prepare to make a full bail application. The learned judge granted time. Initially it was a short period, but I am satisfied the judge granted sufficient time for a proper bail application to be made and one was made before the learned judge.
10. The grounds of the bail application are set out in paragraph 16 of the statement of facts. I do not propose to repeat them during the course of this judgment. I am quite satisfied that those grounds were advanced to the learned judge. In summary, the claimant is a man of mature years. He has a settled address. He lived at that address with his wife and two children. He has no previous convictions. He cares for two disabled parents and the police have seized his passport. The judge was also told that the claimant was willing to abide by any conditions which the court considered suitable. As I have indicated earlier, the stance of the prosecution throughout the hearing before HHJ Bray was that it did not oppose bail.
11. The judge apparently remanded the claimant in custody for the principal reason that there was a substantial risk that he would fail to surrender to his bail. The grounds upon which the judge reached that conclusion were that the claimant faced similar matters at the Guildford Crown Court and that, if convicted, he was likely to receive a substantial sentence of imprisonment which would pressurise him into absconding. The judge also apparently took into account a curious feature of this case. As I understand it, even before the attempted frauds were committed, the claimant had gone to a police station to report that he was being asked to engage in these frauds by sophisticated criminals. Quite what significance this has to the question of bail is not readily apparent. According to the statement of facts, HHJ Bray seemed to consider that this feature was a aggravating factor of the offence and a feature to be taken into account when assessing the likelihood of the claimant absconding.
12. Before me, counsel for the interested party makes the pertinent observation that the claimant committed these offences with sophisticated criminals, they could be described as gangsters, and that they might themselves provide a reason why the claimant has a motive to abscond since he might fear that he might be the subject of violence at their hands. This fear might well arise, submits counsel, since he has given information about these individuals, albeit by providing only their first names.
13. It seems to me that those may well be features to be taken into account on a bail application. It is not apparent to me, however, that they were ever raised before the learned judge by the prosecution, indeed the probability is that they were not, and it is not apparent that the judge's thought processes were such that he was taking those factors into account when reaching a decision to deny bail.
14. I should quash the decision of the learned judge only if I consider that it is unreasonable or irrational and I should treat those concepts robustly. There is a wide margin available to a decision-maker on matters of this kind and this court should be slow to interfere with the decision of an experienced circuit judge confronted with an application for bail.
15. Despite those strictures, however, I have reached the conclusion that this can be categorised as an unreasonable decision. If the reasons given by the learned judge for denying bail are accurately reflected in paragraph 18 of the statement of facts, it seems to me that the learned judge has wholly failed to take cognisance of the history of these proceedings as I have described earlier. The claimant has been remanded on bail on many occasions in the history of these proceedings and yet has answered promptly on each occasion. Further, the claimant has no previous convictions, he has a settled home address, he has a wife and a family and he is willing to abide by onerous conditions. None of these factors seem to have featured in the reasoning of the learned judge. In my judgment, the fact that the claimant would likely receive a sentence of imprisonment if convicted, which of course is the probability if he is convicted, is a factor to be taken into account but no more than a factor, and, on the basis of the information before me, it seems likely that the learned judge placed disproportionate weight upon the fact that the claimant was facing a prison sentence if convicted of the offences with which he is charged.
16. It may also be that the judge took into account an immaterial factor when reaching the conclusion that his visit to the police was an aggravating feature of the offence. Even if it was an aggravating feature of the offence, I am struggling to see how it could be relevant to the issue of whether or not bail should be granted.
17. It seems to me therefore that this is a decision which I should be prepared to quash on the grounds that it is unreasonable. I do not, however, consider that I should go further and in effect indicate openly that my view is that bail should be granted. The plain fact is that, before me, counsel for the prosecution has advanced reasons which may, and I only emphasise may, persuade a judge hearing a contested application that it is not appropriate to grant bail. It is for the prosecution to decide the stance it wishes to take upon the bail application which will follow from the quashing of the decision of HHJ Bray. If they take the stance that bail should not be opposed, it may be that a judge will be persuaded that bail should be granted. If, on the other hand, they advance reasons as to why bail should not be granted, it would not be correct of me to prejudge or preempt the decision of the judge who would hear a contested application, if contested it turns out to be.
18. Accordingly, I propose to quash the decision of HHJ Bray. I do not myself think it appropriate to grant the claimant bail. I do, however, direct that a bail application should be listed at the Northampton Crown Court on the first available date that the court can sensibly accommodate such an application.
19. MR ARCHER: I am grateful, my Lord.
20. MR BARRY: My Lord, two points. One an extremely minor, I think, slip of the tongue early in the judgment, that the Maidenhead matters related to an offence on 4th March. It was in fact an offence on 20th February.
21. MR JUSTICE WYN WILLIAMS: Sorry, yes.
22. MR BARRY: But, finally, in light of your Lordship's judgment, I wonder if it would assist, I am sure it would assist the judge considering bail to have a transcript of this ruling so the position is quite clear to them as to what has been said and perhaps significantly what has not been said.
23. MR JUSTICE WYN WILLIAMS: Yes. Well, I think it is open to either party to apply for a transcript but I have to say that is likely to cause a delay, which is probably unfounded. I have every faith that between you you can produce a summary of my judgment, if nothing else.
24. MR BARRY: Very well.
25. MR JUSTICE WYN WILLIAMS: I would certainly be prepared, once you have agreed it, as I hope you would in the course of hours as opposed to days, to initial it myself, so that you can send it to me for my approval, and I think that is probably a better and quicker method, and certainly more cost efficient, than trying to get a transcript to Northampton in a quick timescale.
26. MR BARRY: Certainly.
27. MR JUSTICE WYN WILLIAMS: All right. Thank you both very much.
28. MR BARRY: My Lord, can I apologise again that we were not here when the case should have come on.
29. MR JUSTICE WYN WILLIAMS: No, that is all right. All it meant is that you did not get a chance to come on first.
30. MR BARRY: Thems the breaks.
31. MR JUSTICE WYN WILLIAMS: Right.