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	England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions >> South Kesteven District Council, R (on the application of) v Grantham Magistrates Court & Ors [2010] EWHC 1419 (Admin) (11 May 2010) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2010/1419.html Cite as: [2010] EWHC 1419 (Admin), [2011] Env LR 3

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

		Sitting at: Birmingham Civil Justice Centre Priory Courts 33 Bull Street Birmingham B4 6DS
		11th May 2010

MR JUSTICE WYN WILLIAMS:

1. At the material time, the interested parties were the occupiers of the Waggon and Horses public house in the village of Caythorpe. In recent years they have from time to time held events in the garden of the public house. On some occasions at least, a marquee has been erected in the garden and music has been played inside the marquee for the benefit of the persons attending the particular function. From about 2006 the playing of music in the marquee has led at least some of the residents of the village to make complaints about the noise thereby generated.
2. On 13 May 2008 the claimant served abatement notices upon the interested parties. The relevant part of the abatement notices are as follows. First, in bold at the top of the notice, there appears the following:

"Abatement Notice in Respect of Statutory Nuisance"

Immediately above that heading the party served is informed that the notice is issued and served pursuant to section 80 of the Environmental Protection Act 1990. In the body of the first page of the document, he is told what steps are prohibited. In the instant case, the notice required the interested parties, immediately from the service of the notice, to prohibit the recurrence of a statutory nuisance which had arisen from noise from amplified music. There were two abatement notices served, respectively, on each of the interested parties.

3. Following the service of the notices, members of staff of the claimant engaged in discussions with the interested parties about how best to comply with the notices. As I understand it, a few days after service a discussion took place between Mr Bartholomew, one of the two interested parties, and the claimant's representative about the possibility of fitting a noise-limiting device. That conversation took place over the telephone between Mr Bartholomew and the Environmental Health Officer who has become most knowledgeable about the interested parties' activities. Her name is Ms Coulthard.
4. Within days of the service of the abatement notice, there was a further complaint of noise nuisance. As I understand it, an event took place at the public house on 17 May which involved the playing of music, but when Ms Coulthard investigated the noise at approximately 10.40pm in the evening, she was not satisfied that a statutory nuisance existed at that time. It is convenient at this stage to mention that her investigation on 17 May 2008 related to the area immediately adjacent to the public house, and also related to the home of Mr and Mrs Ruddle; in particular Ms Coulthard investigated the level of noise which was apparent in the bedroom of that home.
5. On 20 September 2008 the interested parties held another event at the public house. Again, as I understand it, the marquee was erected and music was played. The music was produced by a band and a discotheque. Again, there were complaints about the noise, and Ms Coulthard visited the public house. She arrived at the public house at 8.50pm in the evening. In a witness statement which she made subsequently, she said this:

"Loud music from inside the marquee on the premises was clearly audible from inside my car parked on the street outside the adjacent house. At 21:00 I entered 55 High Street [that is, the house in question], Caythorpe. I was advised by the occupiers that the music started at around 20:00. The disco music from the marquee was clearly audible inside the house, with tracks being recognisable, including a song by Shania Twain. The bass beat was particularly intrusive. I went into the bedroom where the monitoring had been undertaken, the music was clearly audible and very intrusive. The same could be said in a further bedroom and also in the lounge. I spent some time in the house and there was no improvement. The television in the lounge was turned up louder than would be considered normal. It was my opinion that the requirements of the abatement notice had been breached on this occasion. I left at 21:35."

6. Reaching the view, as she had, that there had been a breach of the abatement notices, the next question for the Ms Coultard and the claimant was what to do about it. It suffices that I say for the purposes of this judgment that the claimant decided to prosecute the interested parties for a breach of the abatement notice. The summons which the Magistrates issued specified the alleged offence as follows:

"…on or about the 20^th September 2008 you failed to comply with a required of a noise abatement notice by failing to prohibit noise nuisance at the premises known as the Waggon and Horses, 57 High Street, Caythorpe, NG32 3DR in contravention of s.80(4) of the Environmental Protection Act 1990."

7. The case came on for hearing on 14 May 2009. The claimant was represented by a solicitor, Mr Rushworth. The interested parties were not represented. The case was heard by a bench of lay Magistrates. The only notes of what occurred are those which were prepared by Mr Rushworth very soon after the hearing had taken place. The decision made by the Magistrates was that the interested parties were not guilty of the offence alleged against them. The reason why the Magistrates reached that conclusion was because they considered that the interested parties had proved a statutory defence, to which I will refer in a moment. It was possible that the Magistrates could have concluded that there had been no statutory nuisance at the material time, and therefore no breach of the abatement notice. But on the basis of the information put before me, emanating both from the claimant and, belatedly, the Magistrates' Court, it seems clear that the Magistrates concluded as they did because they considered that the statutory defence was made out.
8. I turn next to the notes of the hearing which Mr Rushworth made, and which are in the bundle of documents before me. His notes contain a summary of the hearing, but it is quite a detailed summary. The notes show that Mr Rushworth opened the case to the Magistrates, and then they identify the evidence which was put before the Magistrates on behalf of the prosecution. Dealing first with the evidence, the prosecution adduced written evidence from the occupiers of number 55 High Street – Mr and Mrs Ruddle - which was to the effect that they considered that they were the victims of a statutory nuisance on 20 September 2008. The prosecution also adduced written evidence from its licensing officer and evidence was adduced orally from Ms Coulthard, who gave evidence along the lines of the witness statement to which I have referred earlier. The notes made by Mr Rushworth record that Ms Coulthard was cross-examined, but they do not contain any detail of what the cross-examination was about.
9. After the close of the prosecution case, both interested parties gave evidence and were cross-examined. It seems clear from the notes that the substance of what the interested parties had to say centred around whether or not a nuisance had existed at the time of Ms Coulthard's visit, it being the case for the interested parties that it had not.
10. During the course of Mr Rushworth's opening, he had quite properly alerted the Magistrates to the statutory defences available to the interested parties. He had done so, to repeat quite properly, since they were unrepresented, and it was obviously appropriate that the Magistrates should be made aware of any material or statutory provision which might cause them to conclude that the interested parties were not guilty of the offence alleged against them. Mr Rushworth drew the Magistrates' attention in particular to section 80(7) of the 1990 Act. It is probably a convenient moment for me to set out the relevant statutory provision. Section 79 of the 1990 Act provides by subsection (1) that a number of matters constitute statutory nuisances for the purposes of the Act. Included among the list of such matters, at subparagraph (g) of subsection (1), is the following:

"Noise emitted from premises so as to be prejudicial to health or a nuisance."

Section 80 of the Act is headed "Summary Proceedings for Statutory Nuisances". Subsection (1) reads:

"Where a local authority is satisfied that a statutory nuisance exists, or is likely to occur or recur, in the area of the authority, the local authority shall serve a notice ("an abatement notice") imposing all or any of the following requirements—

(a) requiring the abatement of the nuisance or prohibiting or restricting its occurrence or recurrence."

Subsection (4) of the same section provides:

"If a person on whom an abatement notice is served, without reasonable excuse, contravenes or fails to comply with any requirement or prohibition imposed by the notice, he shall be guilty of an offence."

Subsection (7) reads as follows:

"Subject to subsection (8) below, in any proceedings for an offence under subsection (4) above in respect of a statutory nuisance it shall be a defence to prove that the best practicable means were used to prevent, or to counteract the effects of, the nuisance."

Subsection (8) specifies that that defence is not available in respect of noise nuisance, except where the nuisance arises on industrial, trade or business premises.

11. As I have said, that provision was drawn to the attention of the Magistrates by Mr Rushworth, acting on behalf of the claimant. Mr Rushworth's notes reveal that at some point during the interested parties' evidence, the Clerk to the Justices intervened. The Clerk suggested, in the absence of the Justices, that the evidence being given by the interested parties related more to mitigation, as opposed to whether or not they had any defence to the allegation which had been brought against them. Mr Rushworth's notes suggest that the Clerk suggested that they might like to consider a change of plea in the light of what they were telling the Magistrates. Be that as it may, the interested parties declined to change their plea, and the case continued to the conclusion to which I have referred. Mr Rushworth's notes conclude by saying this about the manner in which the Magistrates communicated their decision:

"The Magistrates read out the decision, and found both defendants not guilty, as in their opinion the defendants had managed to establish the defence of best practicable means."

12. In due course, the claimant asked the Magistrates to state a case. I need not set out the history surrounding what occurred in any detail; it suffices that I say that ultimately the Magistrates refused to state a case, indicating that they regarded the application as frivolous. As a consequence of that decision, the claimant commenced these proceedings. Ostensibly, what I have before me is an application for judicial review of the Magistrates' refusal to state a case. But as I shall now describe, events have moved on from that position.
13. Following the issuing of these proceedings, the Magistrates put in a document in which they sought to persuade the court to refuse the application for permission to bring proceedings for judicial review. Their opposition was unsuccessful, because on 21 January 2010, Silber J granted permission for these proceedings to be brought. Following the grant of permission, it seems clear that some work was done in the Magistrates' Court to elucidate why it was that the Magistrates reached their conclusion that the interested parties were not guilty of the offence alleged. The result has been that the Deputy Justice's Clerk sent to both the claimant's solicitor, and, as I understand it, the court, what can be described as a reasonably detailed statement signed by Mrs R Gulson (the person who was the chair of the bench) which sets out the basis upon which the Magistrates reached the decision that the interested parties were not guilty of the offence alleged. That statement confirms much of what is contained within Mr Rushworth's notes; for example, the statement confirms that Mr Rushworth read statements from Mr and Mrs Ruddle, the relevant occupiers, and Mr Harrison, the claimant's licensing officer. It also confirms that Mr Rushworth called Ms Coulthard to give oral evidence.
14. The summary of the oral evidence given by Ms Coulthard, set out in Mrs Gulson's statement, is as follows:

"Her evidence was that a Noise Abatement Notice had been served on 13^th May 2008. She attended the village on 17^th May 2008 but formed the view that the Notice had not been breached. However, following complaints on 20^th September her opinion was that noise emanating from the premises that evening was such as to breach the notice.

She stated that she had received a telephone call from Mr Bartholomew saying he was going to install a noise limiting device. She stated that she was not aware whether the noise limiter was in operation on 20^th September because the installation of one does not necessarily mean that the noise nuisance will be abated -- it is a device that is usually used indoors. When asked by Mr Rushworth about the most effective means of abating the noise her reply was that the music could have been played indoors or it could have been turned down."

Mrs Gulson's statement then goes on to deal with the evidence of the interested parties:

"[There was one further quotation from Ms Coulthard's evidence]. In cross-examination by Mr Bartholomew she accepted that the telephone call from him about the installation of the noise limiter was on 16^th May. He had asked her what level to set it at and she had suggested 45. She also accepted that she had not visited the marquee on 20^th September but stated that double-lining it would make very little difference."

The statement of Mrs Gulson then continues with a summary of the evidence given by the interested parties:

"Mr Bartholomew gave evidence on his own behalf. His opening statement was that they had done everything they could to abate the noise nuisance. He explained that because they live in the village they try and keep the neighbours happy. The event of 20^th November was a wedding function with fewer than one hundred guests. In the past he had fitted a noise limiting device having sought the Council's advice. On the evening of 20^th September they took the following steps:

-- gave advance notice to neighbours asking them to telephone if the noise became too loud;

-- specifically instructed the DJ to keep the noise down;

-- double lined the marquee;

-- walked around the outside of the marquee checking that the noise was kept down;

-- ensured that there was no noise after midnight."

Mrs Gulson summarised the evidence of the other interested party as follows:

"Ms Tomlinson also gave evidence on her own behalf and agreed that they had done everything they could to keep the noise down. She said that they had discussed the event way in advance because of the noise abatement notice: because they are the only place in the community to hold such events they want to ensure they get everything right. She agreed that they had walked around the marquee and that they would have told the DJ to turn the music down if they thought the noise levels were being exceeded but they did not believe they were. She said that they had taken such measures successfully in the past. Although they had music it did not have to be loud to be enjoyable. Under cross examination from Mr Bartholomew she confirmed that they had had music at the function on 17^th May (also a wedding) when noise levels were not exceeded."

The reasons why the Magistrates reached their conclusion are set out in the penultimate paragraph on Mrs Gulson's statement. It reads:

"Upon retiring the issue for us was whether the defendants had proved that they had used the best practical means to prevent or counteract the effects of the noise nuisance. We took account of Ms Coulthard's evidence that the best practical means of abating the noise would have been to have had the music indoors or to have turned it down and reminded ourselves that 'practicable' means 'reasonably practicable'. The evidence of Mr Bartholomew was that he had specifically instructed the DJ to keep the music down as well as taking other measures. The evidence of Ms Tomlinson was that they had taken identical measures on 17^th May. The evidence of Ms Coulthard was that, having herself attended on 17^th May, she took the view that there was no statutory noise nuisance on that day. We therefore reached the conclusion that, having taken measures on 17^th May to prevent or counteract the effect of the noise nuisance and having been successful, the defendants had proved to us that they had used the best practicable means to prevent or counteract the effect of the noise nuisance on 20^th September 2008."

15. I have no doubt but that the statement of Mrs Gulson provides the best possible evidence of the reasoning process undertaken by the Magistrates in reaching their conclusion. Mr Wignall, who appears on behalf of the claimant, accepts that without reservation. And given that state of affairs, he submits that I should now treat this application for judicial review not as formulated, namely for an order compelling the Magistrates to state a case, but rather as a review of the reasons given by the Magistrates for reaching their conclusion. He submits, with considerable force, that a great deal of unnecessary time and expense would be spent if I were simply to order the Magistrates to state a case, when the reality is that the court now has before it everything which would permit it to review the substantive decision made by the Magistrates.
16. I accept what Mr Wignall has to say on this aspect. It seems to me that it would be wholly disproportionate for me to say, if that were to be my conclusion, that the Magistrates should state a case with the consequence that a case would be stated and another judge of the Administrative Court would then be called upon to adjudicate whether or not the Magistrates had made an error of law. The plain fact is that on the basis of Mrs Gulson's statement this court is in a position to determine conclusively whether or not the Magistrates did make an error of law; and to repeat, it would be a complete waste of time to go through two stages, when one will do.
17. Accordingly, I propose to treat this judicial review now as a review of the substantive decision of the Magistrates. Mr Wignall attacks the decision of the Magistrates essentially on two interlinking bases. He submits that the Magistrates confused themselves and/or conflated the notion about whether or not there was a statutory nuisance at all, with the issue of whether or not the statutory defence had been made out. Second, he submits in relation to the statutory defence, that the Magistrates reached a conclusion which no reasonable bench properly directing itself could have reached on the evidence placed before it.
18. It seems to me that the first task for the Magistrates when considering this case was to decide whether or not there was a breach of the abatement notice on the date alleged. That is the offence which was laid against the interested parties, and that was the first issue for determination by the Magistrates. There would only be a breach of the abatement notice if, as a matter of fact, the Magistrates concluded that a noise nuisance existed on the evening of 20 September. There is nothing in the documentation before me which begins to persuade me that it would have been open to the Magistrates to conclude that there was no noise nuisance. The evidence of Mr and Mrs Ruddle stood unchallenged; on the basis of their evidence alone, it was probably the case that a noise nuisance was proved. But there was the evidence of Ms Coulthard; she also gave clear and apparently compelling evidence that a noise nuisance existed on the evening of 20 September. Although the interested parties apparently sought to persuade the Magistrates that no nuisance existed, it seems clear from what Mrs Gulson has written that the Magistrates found that a nuisance had been proved. That, of course, is entirely consistent with the short reasons for the acquittal given at the time of the hearing, namely that the statutory defence had been proved.
19. It does seem to me, however, that the Magistrates may well have conflated the issue of whether or not a nuisance existed with the statutory defence. Upon analysis of the penultimate paragraph of Mrs Gulson's letter, it seems to be central to the Magistrates' reasoning that because no nuisance had existed on 17 May therefore the steps taken by the interested parties on 20 September were the best practicable means to prevent a nuisance. It does not seem to me that that follows at all. Ms Coulthard's evidence about 17 May was that there was no nuisance. The issue of proving the statutory defence simply did not arise. On 20 May the Magistrates, as I have found, were accepting that a nuisance existed; hence, the need to consider the statutory defence. I use the expression "hence the need to consider the statutory defence" advisedly; on the basis of the statutory provisions set out earlier in this judgment, it seems to me that the statutory defence arises only if a noise nuisance is established. The offence is failing to comply with the abatement notice; there is no failure to comply with the abatement notice if no statutory nuisance exists. Accordingly, to repeat, the statutory defence arises only after an acceptance or proof of breach of the abatement notice.
20. Was it open to the Magistrates to conclude that the statutory defence had been proved? Let me return to the relevant statutory provision. The interested parties would have to prove that they had taken the best practicable means to prevent or counteract the effects of the nuisance. In section 79(9) of the 1990 Act, the phrase "best practicable means" is to be interpreted by reference to the following provisions:

"(a) 'practicable' means reasonably practicable having regard among other things to local conditions and circumstances, to the current state of technical knowledge and to the financial implications;

"(b) the means to be employed include the design, installation, maintenance and manner and periods of operation of plant and machinery, and the design, construction and maintenance of buildings and structures."

21. In the present case, the interested parties' evidence, as summarised by Mrs Gulson in her statement, suggested that they had advised their neighbours of the event, and asked them to telephone if the noise had become too loud; given an instruction to the disc jockey to keep the noise down; double-lined the marquee; and had walked around the outside of the marquee checking that the noise was kept down. In my judgment, on the basis of such information as is contained in Mrs Gulson's statement, it is very difficult to understand how the Magistrates could have concluded that the interested parties had taken the best practicable means to prevent or counteract the effects of the nuisance. As was pointed out in evidence by Ms Coulthard, at least one alternative, which simply was not addressed at all, was having the music played inside the public house. That simply does not feature in the reasoning process which is set out in Mrs Gulson's statement.
22. In St Albans District Council v Patel [2008] EWHC 2767 (Admin), Forbes J had this to say about section 80(7) and section (79)(9) of the 1990 Act:

"14. Mr Reed submitted, uncontroversially, that the expression "best practical means" must be construed having regard to the factors set out in section 79(9) of the 1990 Act but requires, ultimately, that a decision be reached that the person relying on that defence has established that he used the best practicable means on the balance of probabilities. Mr Reed contended that if the means undertaken are not established to be the best then the defence has not been made out. I agree with those submissions which, as I have indicated, are essentially uncontroversial and not in dispute.

15. It was Mr Reed's submission that, in order to be satisfied that the statutory defence under section 80(7) has been established, the court must reach the conclusion that the means employed were the best practicable to prevent or counteract the effects of the nuisance in question when compared with any other means or methods which are before the court for its consideration and which, on their face, are practicable and have the ability to prevent or counteract the effects of the nuisance more effectively than has been achieved by the defendant. Mr Reed submitted that, in short, the defendant must establish why all other obvious or, on the face of it, practicable means are not practicable, otherwise it has not been established that the best practicable means have been used. Again, I agree with those submissions which were, in effect, uncontroversial."

I would take a great deal of persuading that I should depart in any way from the views expressed by Forbes J in the St Albans case, he being such an experienced and knowledgeable judge of this court. I intend to adopt precisely the approach adopted by Forbes J in the St Albans case.

23. That being so, it does not seem to me to be permissible for the Magistrates in this case to have reached the conclusion on section 80(7) that they did, when they simply had no regard, so far as I can see, to the possibilities raised by Ms Coulthard in her evidence, the primary one being that the music could have been played indoors and not in the marquee. It may very well be that the interested parties could have explained to the Magistrates why Ms Coulthard's suggestion was not reasonably practicable; however, that does not appear to have occurred. Indeed, they appear to have said nothing upon that topic.
24. In those circumstances, and following the guidance given by Forbes J, I simply do not see how it was open to the Magistrates to conclude that the statutory defence had been made out, since there was another obvious, or on the face of it practicable means unexplored by the interested parties which might have had a far greater chance of reducing or ameliorating the noise nuisance which was emanating from their premises.
25. Accordingly, I take the view that the Magistrates, when considering the statutory defence, reached a conclusion which was not open to them on the whole of the evidence put before them. In summary, they should not have concluded that the interested parties, on the balance of probability, had proved that they had used the best practicable means to prevent or counteract the effects of the proved breach of the enforcement notice, namely the proved noise nuisance.
26. That being so, it is appropriate that I grant this application for judicial review, and I do so. Mr Wignal will address me, no doubt, in a few moments, as to what relief is appropriate in these circumstances.

MR WIGNALL: Well, if your Lordship will be making quashing orders, I think your Lordship in fact has done, then your Lordship is perhaps in the territory of Rule 54.19 of the CPR, which allows --

MR JUSTICE WYN WILLIAMS: Well, I do not think I have, unless I have chosen my words very awkwardly, I do not think I have yet quashed the order.

MR WIGNALL: Ah.

MR JUSTICE WYN WILLIAMS: Because it does strike me that in the events that have occurred, you may wish to consider, and only consider, whether a declaratory order is sufficient, or do you really want this sent back for the interested parties to have some kind of fine imposed upon them so many months, years now, after the relevant event?

MR WIGNALL: Yes.

MR JUSTICE WYN WILLIAMS: It is your discretion. I am not saying I will not do it, but what are the realities of this case?

MR WIGNALL: My Lord, I wonder whether you would be willing to give me a minute or two to discuss that with the gentlemen behind me?

MR JUSTICE WYN WILLIAMS: Yes, of course. Obviously, if there is still a continuing battle between the interested parties and the council, I can well understand that you may want this case brought to a fruition, in the sense of a conviction recorded and the rest of it. If, on the other hand, the real point was just to try and ensure that Magistrates follow the sections properly, well then you have achieved that anyway.

MR WIGNALL: Let me take some brief instructions from them.

MR JUSTICE WYN WILLIAMS: Yes.

(Pause)

MR WIGNALL: My Lord, I am grateful for the time.

MR JUSTICE WYN WILLIAMS: Yes.

MR WIGNALL: We have no evidence of recent problems in the area. On the other hand, this is a matter where the police have been involved in the past, and I understand there are concerns, in particular from the solicitor who has normal conduct of this case, in conjunction with the Environmental Health Officer, no doubt, that there will be problems this summer; and for those reasons, we do ask you to quash the order. We ask you to remit it with a declaration to the Magistrates that there was no evidence on which they were able to find the defence of best practical means proved. That is our preferred route.

MR JUSTICE WYN WILLIAMS: Yes, all right. I accede to your submission that I should quash the acquittal.

MR WIGNALL: The wording of 54.19 might help the court.

MR JUSTICE WYN WILLIAMS: Yes.

MR WIGNALL: We are looking for a declaration that there was no evidence of best practical means, because that would make sure the Magistrates did not open up the matter again, that particular matter again.

MR JUSTICE WYN WILLIAMS: Yes, I am glad you are so frank about it. I am just ever so slightly anxious about completely tying the hands of the Magistrates, when you have litigants-in-persons and all the rest of it.

MR WIGNALL: Yes.

MR JUSTICE WYN WILLIAMS: I mean, if it were to be the case, for example, that the Magistrates were told in a short new hearing of various factors which, in effect, made it impossible or very impractical to have the music indoors without effectively ruining it, and so it would not happen, is that not something they should receive to test and assess or not?

MR WIGNALL: Well, there has been an unsatisfactory state of affairs going back to matters back in September.

MR JUSTICE WYN WILLIAMS: I know, I know.

MR WIGNALL: 18 months ago. There has to be some finality in proceedings. You would not, by exercising your supervisory jurisdiction, tie the Magistrates hands; because they might say, for instance, this is a matter which should be dealt with by the most lenient of possible penalties. One could see that there would be a full range of penalties available to them.

MR JUSTICE WYN WILLIAMS: Yes.

MR WIGNALL: A discharge of some sort might be available to them. But it would be a shame to send everyone back after 18 months to re-litigate the whole matter.

MR JUSTICE WYN WILLIAMS: Well, I suppose what 54.9 actually means --

MR WIGNALL: 54.19?

MR JUSTICE WYN WILLIAMS: 54.19 -- is that I quash the decision, I remit it to the decision maker, and direct it to reconsider the matter, and reach a decision in accordance with the judgment of the court. It does not actually empower me to grant the declaration that you suggest. I mean, they must read my judgment, and if there was no other evidence, then that is end of it.

MR WIGNALL: Yes, I suppose in some circumstances, that might be a battle for another day even, but --

MR JUSTICE WYN WILLIAMS: Yes.

MR WIGNALL: Yes.

MR JUSTICE WYN WILLIAMS: So I will accede to your submission that the appropriate order is to quash the acquittal, to remit the case to the Magistrates, and to make a direction that they reconsider it, and reach a decision in accordance with my judgment.

MR WIGNALL: Yes. I am grateful, my Lord. The other matter might be costs, but your Lordship will be aware that, save for exceptional circumstances, the defendants have not come to defence the --

MR JUSTICE WYN WILLIAMS: I think I would be straying outside the conventional wisdom if I were to make an order for costs.

MR WIGNALL: You would, yes. I am grateful. Thank you very much.

MR JUSTICE WYN WILLIAMS: Right. And obviously, that was an extempore judgment. If, as I assume, there will have to be a transcript go to the Magistrates, then you will not be surprised that at least my poor use of language on occasions will be corrected.

MR WIGNALL: It sounded perfect, my Lord.

MR JUSTICE WYN WILLIAMS: I was not soliciting compliments. But sometimes parties, I know you will not be, but sometimes parties think, "Well, he did not quite say that", when they get the written judgment. But I think obviously in a case where the court below will need to consider my words, then if necessary I will permitted to improve upon them.

MR WIGNALL: Excuse me, my Lord. Does that mean that there will not be a written judgment coming up?

MR JUSTICE WYN WILLIAMS: No, no, but I presume that someone will have to obtain a transcript, which means I will have to approve it, that is all, and there may be a few alterations, that is all. Thank you very much.