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	England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions >> Mireskandari v Solicitors Regulation Authority [2014] EWHC 1351 (Admin) (21 March 2014) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2014/1351.html Cite as: [2014] EWHC 1351 (Admin)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

		CO/9503/2012 Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2A 2LL
		21 March 2014

1. LORD JUSTICE MOSES: This is an application for costs on appeal which came to a sudden end following my ruling refusing an adjournment for the reasons set out in a judgment of 5 February 2014. The background to the matter is sufficiently identified within that judgment. There is therefore no basis now that the appeal has been withdrawn by the appellant for doing other than dismissing the appeal, and I so order.
2. The next question is as to the costs of the application for an adjournment and of the appeal. So far as the costs of the application, resisting the application for an adjournment, the total costs claimed, £9,290.50, with VAT £11,148.60, I have already ordered that they be summarily assessed. The sums seem to me to be reasonable. The application was made very much at the last minute on what I found to be a wholly unjustified basis and on a basis which Mr Mireskandari and those advising, and I exclude counsel and the solicitors who had by that stage withdrawn, must have realised was a wholly unjustifiable basis having regard to the history of his reliance upon medical reasons for seeking an adjournment. But it was obviously important that the SRA be in a position to explain to any judge dealing with it the background to the matter. In those circumstances the costs seem to me to be justified. I have already ruled for obvious reasons that they should be on an indemnity basis so under "2" of the draft order, the sum I order is £11,148.60.
3. The next question is the costs of the appeal. They amount, as one might expect having regard to the nature of the litigation, to very large sums indeed. I have not done the total but they must add to £192,000 odd. The first question therefore is whether it would be appropriate to have any summary assessment at all or whether I should order that they be assessed by taxation.
4. In my view, it would be wholly unjustified to order taxation of these sums even though they are substantial. Anyone with even a passing knowledge of the history of the matter could be under no doubt as to the approach Mr Mireskandari would take to any opportunity offered to challenge the figures by way of taxation. There is a substantial risk that he would use that opportunity to ramp up even further costs in wholly unjustifiable and unreasonable challenges. The best example of his behaviour in relation to costs has already been seen in relation to what is described as the Angel Airlines litigation in which it is recorded in various judgments that he had occupied 50 days of court time, and the participation of 24 different judges, in relation to disputes as to the detailed assessment of costs in what MacKay J had described as "an appalling piece of litigation". There is no reason to think that his attitude would be any different were I not to make a summary order.
5. So far as the amounts are concerned they have been set out in various schedules. Having regard to the nature of the appeal they seem to me to be reasonable. It must be recalled that so far as the appeal was concerned, there were some 43 grounds of the appeal, some 76 pages of written argument in single spacing. Much of the grounds related to what was said to be the unjustified refusal of the adjournment on medical grounds but they sought to ignore substantial allegations of dishonesty which persisted unchallenged.
6. It seems to me that the costs identified in the first schedule and in the second schedule are reasonable. In relation to the second schedule they concern substantial time taken in taking additional depositions by which it was sought to form a basis for introducing fresh evidence to show that the Doctor engaged by the disciplinary tribunal, Dr Schoma's evidence, was colourable and should not have been relied upon by the Tribunal. Those substantial costs incurred in retaining United States lawyers seem to me to be justifiable. I would therefore order in relation to the appeal that the sums claimed in the first two schedules are reasonable. Looking at the third schedule, which brings these costs up to date and include the costs of making this application, they, too, are reasonable.
7. The next question is whether they should be ordered on an indemnity basis. For the reasons I have already given, and are manifest from every judgment every judge has given about this matter, they amply make good the proposition that this has been wholly abusive and unreasonable litigation pursued in an appeal for which it is apparent that Mr Mireskandari can have had no enthusiasm as manifested by his last-minute and hopeless application for an adjournment. If this conduct of litigation does not justify an indemnity order I do not know what litigation does. In those circumstances I shall make an order for costs on an indemnity basis in the total sums which amount to the addition of those three schedules, which is £192,379.84.
8. The sums are to be paid by 4.00 pm on 4 April 2014. I order that the sums that have been paid in to court by way of security for costs, whatever they now amount to with interest, should be paid out. The question arose as to whether the payment out should be stayed, pending final determination of a renewed application to the Court of Appeal to appeal against the order of Simon J and Cranston J. Having regard to what I perceive to be the merits of that application, and the fact that if the sums are paid out they will be paid to the Solicitors Regulation Authority which would have to pay them back should that application receive any favourable reception, in my view there is no need for there to be any stay. I do not need to make an order identified in the draft order 79. I would ask counsel if they can revise the draft and hand it in so that I can sign it.
9. MR TABACHNIK: My Lord, I am obliged.
10. LORD JUSTICE MOSES: Thank you all very much.