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England and Wales High Court (Chancery Division) Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Chancery Division) Decisions >> Les Laboratoires Servier & Anor v Apotex Inc & Ors [2008] EWHC 2347 (Ch) (9 October 2008) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2008/2347.html Cite as: [2008] EWHC 2347 (Ch), [2009] FSR 3 |
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CHANCERY DIVISION
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
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LES LABORATOIRES SERVIER (a company incorporated in France) (2) SERVIER LABORATORIES LIMITED |
Claimant |
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- and - |
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APOTEX INC APOTEX PHARMACHEM INC APOTEX EUROPE LIMITED APOTEX UK LIMITED |
Defendant |
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Antony Watson QC and Colin Birss QC (instructed by Taylor Wessing) for the Defendant
Hearing dates: 9 -12 and16 June, 28 July 2008.
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Crown Copyright ©
Mr Justice Norris.
Mr Justice Norris :
"In practice, once the NHS reimbursement price has been adjusted to account for the cheaper generic product, it is not possible for the originating manufacturer to raise the price to its pre-generic level, even if successful in obtaining a permanent injunction after trial. The market structure is irreversibly altered for the life of the patent, which in this case runs until 2021. This is in contrast to the potential damage to Apotex should the interim injunction turn out to be wrongly granted, which damage will be incurred over the relatively short period leading up to trial."
It was Servier's evidence (see paragraph 32 of the witness statement of Eric Falcand) that:-
"In contrast, if Apotex are prevented from continuing to supply the market but are ultimately successful at trial, I believe that the damage suffered by Apotex could be adequately compensated by damages."
Mann J accepted Servier's submission that Apotex damages were more easily capable of calculation than its own, and he granted an injunction permitting Apotex to fulfil its existing contractually binding orders for Perindopril taken before 3 August 2006 but otherwise restraining Apotex from selling Perindopril until trial. His Order provided that that trial should be a speedy trial starting on the first open day after 1 February 2007: in accordance with the usual practice the Order contained an undertaking by Servier in these terms:-
"If the court later finds that this Order has caused loss to [Apotex]…… and decides that [Apotex] should be compensated for that loss, [Servier] will comply with any Order the court may make."
"…were the patent valid, Servier's monopoly in practice would last until 2020. But, as the judge held and we confirm, it is invalid. And very plainly so. It is the sort of patent which can give the patent system a bad name. …the only solution to this type of undesirable patent is a rapid and efficient method for obtaining its revocation. Then it can be got rid of before it does too much harm to the public interest…it is right to observe that nothing Servier did was unlawful. It is the court's job to see that try ons such as the present patent get nowhere. The only sanction (apart, perhaps, from competition law which thus far has had nothing or virtually nothing to say about unmeritorious patents) may, under the English litigation system, lie in an award of costs on the higher (indemnity) scale if the patent is defended unreasonably."
(a) The undertaking is to be enforced according to its terms. In the instant case (as in many others) it is that Servier will comply with any order the court may make "if the court…finds that this Order has caused loss to the defendants." The question for me is therefore: what loss did the making of the Order and its continuation until discharge cause to Apotex?(b) The approach is therefore essentially compensatory and not punitive;
(c) The approach to assessment is generally regarded as that set out in the obiter observation of Lord Diplock in Hoffmann-La Roche v Secretary of State for Trade [1975] AC 295 at 361E namely:-
"The assessment is made upon the same basis as that upon which damages for breach of contract would be assessed if the undertaking had been a contract between the plaintiff and the defendant that the plaintiff would not prevent the defendant from doing that which he was restrained from doing by the terms of the injunction: see Smith v Day (1882) 21 Ch D 421 per Brett LJ at p427."(d) What Apotex was trying to do (and what the Order restrained it from doing) was to enter a new market for the sale of generic perindopril. It was denied exploitation of this opportunity. The outcome of such exploitation is attended by many contingencies but Chaplin v Hicks [1911] 2 KB 786 establishes (per Vaughan Williams LJ at p.791) that whilst "the presence of all the contingencies on which the gaining of the prize might depend makes the calculation not only difficult but incapable of being carried out with certainty or precision" damages for the lost opportunity are assessable.
(e) The fact that certainty or precision is not possible does not mean that a principled approach cannot be attempted. The profits that Apotex would have made from its exploitation of the opportunity to sell generic perindopril depend in part upon the hypothetical actions of third parties (other potential market participants) and in part upon Servier's response to them. A principled approach in such circumstances requires Apotex first to establish on the balance of probabilities that the chance of making a profit was real and not fanciful: if that threshold is crossed then the second stage of the inquiry is to evaluate that substantial chance (see Allied Maples v Simmons & Simmons [1995] 1WLR 1602). As Lord Diplock explained in Mallett v McMonagle [1970] AC 166 at 176E-G
"…. in assessing damages which depend on its view as to what…. would have happened in the future if something had not happened in the past, the Court must make an estimate as to what are the chances that a particular thing….. would have happened and reflect those chances, whether they are more all less than even, in the amount of damages it awards…"(f) The conventional method of undertaking this exercise is to assess damages on a particular hypothesis and then to adjust the award by reference to the percentage chance of the hypothesis occurring. In many cases it is sufficient to postulate one hypothesis and make one discount: but there is no reason in principle why one should not say that either Scenario 1 or Scenario 2 would have occurred and to discount them by different percentages. That is the course which Mr Watson QC urged in the present case: and I note that it has some support in Earl of Malmesbury v Strutt & Parker [2007] PNLR 570.
"There are two essential principles in valuing the claim: first, that the plaintiffs have the burden of proving their loss: second, that the defendants being wrongdoers, damages should be liberally assessed but that the object is to compensate the plaintiffs and not to punish the defendants."
The principle of "liberal assessment" seems to me equally applicable in the present context. Although a party who is granted interim relief but fails to establish it at trial is not strictly a "wrongdoer", but rather one who has obtained an advantage upon consideration of a necessarily incomplete picture, he is to be treated as if he had made a promise not to prevent that which the injunction in fact prevents. There should as a matter of principle be a degree of symmetry between the process by which he obtained his relief (an approximate answer involving a limited consideration of the detailed merits) and that by which he compensates the subject of the injunction for having done so without legal right (especially where, as here, the paying party has declined to provide the fullest details of the sales and profits which it made during the period for which the injunction was in force).
(a) Apotex says that it was kept out of the market for the entirety of the "at risk" period from the beginning of August 2006 until the beginning of July 2007 when the patent was declared invalid. It says that that period would have been a "plateau period" with the market divided between Servier as former patent holder and itself as the first generic to enter the market (and that I must decide whether perhaps one or two others might have joined in). It submits that the best guide to sales volume and unit price during this "plateau period" is afforded by the sales which Apotex managed to achieve during the few days at the end of July and the very beginning of August 2006 when it was in the market compared to the actual sales which it did achieve when it was allowed back into the market.(b) Servier says that everything that actually happened in July 2007 when the injunction was lifted would have happened in August 2006, that all actual market events would simply have occurred eleven months earlier, so the open market would simply have arrived eleven months earlier, and all that Apotex has lost is eleven months of the open market.
"… even and if the EPO decision may further prevent other generic companies to market their perindopril, I think that we have to keep in our warehouse a certain volume of perindopril enabling us to react quickly if needed….. therefore I would suggest to keep the bulk tablets available, and pack them later if unfortunately needed, knowing that in the future, we made directly put on the market some perindopril with both [AG1] and [AG2] livery (once again, the later the better)…"
It seems to me both that Servier was prepared to react (rather than to make pre-emptive moves), and that it regarded any postponement of its participation in the generic market as good.
"… we would have supplied the product once the generic came on the market. We would have supplied [AG1] and [AG2] and "short line" wholesalers. We would have supplied all customers willing to buy our generic…"
And again
" it was clear for us, and we were ready for that, if [Servier failed to obtain the injunction and Apotex remained on the market pending trial] we would supply [AG1] and [AG2] for them to on the market and we were also ready to have compensation deals with other wholesalers for Coversyl in order to ensure that we would be able to retain part of our market. Because although we would have won or we were expecting to win the case on the validity of the patent when the case was heard, we did not know how long it would take….. the decision of Apotex to come on the market would have pushed, would have encouraged, other generic companies to take the risk to follow them suit, to come on the market and the market would have been destroyed…"
But at another point he assented to the propositions that if the English court ruled the 947 patent to be valid then Servier would be able to maintain its monopoly and its premium price until 2020, that in the event of such a court victory Servier could remove any generic that had come on the market in the interim, and that if Servier had supplied AG1 and AG2 with authorised generic material its inevitable effect would be to reduce the price for perindopril. He then gave the following answer:-
"Q. .. do you agree with me.. that looked at from an economic point of view, standing in August 2006 looking forward, the value to you of the perindopril market if you do not supply [AG1] and [AG2] and the patent is valid is higher in the future than the value to you of the perindopril market if you do supply [AG1] and [AG2] and the patent is valid: correct?
Answer: Correct"
And again:-
"Q. In other words, on 8 August 2006, if you had not got an injunction, if your patent was still valid in United Kingdom, supplying product to [AG1] and [AG2] was one possible thing you could do, not the only thing you would do?
Answer: We could supply, but we wanted, first of all, to know the decision of the Judge on the validity of our patent.
Q. So let me be clear about that. What you are saying is that you would not have supplied [AG1] and [AG2] until you had a decision from the Judge in United Kingdom on the validity of your United Kingdom patent?
Answer: Yes
Q. You do understand that that decision did not come until 2007?
Answer. Yes"
In re-examination he tried to explain away this latter answer by saying he was confused between getting the injunction and establishing the validity of the patent: but he did not seem to me confused at the time, and appeared to deliberate over his answers.
"I would expect Apotex to gain a major part of the UK market without delay. Apotex is well-positioned to achieve this aim as it is a large, well established generic manufacturer with sufficient capacity to supply the UK market".
An attempt has been made to paint a very different picture on this enquiry. Further, at a time when it was subject to an obligation of full and frank disclosure so that the Court could make a proper assessment of the consequences of granting and of withholding an injunction, Servier's evidence made no mention of the then existing arrangements (whether for the supply to authorised generics or for rebates) which in the enquiry it says so significantly affected the market. It now says that such were the difficulties facing Apotex by reason of these matters that its loss for the entire period of the injunction is only £400,000 (compared to the £10 million which Servier agreed to pay to some of Apotex' competitors as compensation for depriving them of their right to sell perindopril). I think the only explanation for this of which I can properly take account is that in August 2006 Servier did not consider these to be significant elements in the picture which the Court would have to consider before deciding to grant or withhold injunctive relief: and that the present assessment that they are matters of great significance is one made with the benefit of hindsight.
(a) That the Court should decide not to enforce the cross-undertaking in damages;
(b) That Court should dismiss the claim for damages because Apotex cannot found a claim for damages on the proposition that they would have acted unlawfully;
(c) That if the Court was minded to award damages then in estimating lost profit one of the costs that should be taken into account is that Apotex would have had to pay damages or to render an account in Canada assessed by reference to Canadian law (as to which particulars would later be furnished).
Mr Justice Norris………………………………………………………9 October2008