Case No: HC09C04529
Neutral Citation Number: [2011] EWHC 2112 (Ch)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
CHANCERY DIVISION

Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL

Date: 29/07/2011

Before :

MR JUSTICE MANN
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Between :

	Payless Cash & Carry Limited (In Liquidation)	Claimant	
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	(1)	Madhusudan Maganbhai Patel
(2)	Gardford Limited
(3)	Multirush Limited
(4)	MBT Cash & Carry Limited
(5)	MDD Trading Limited	

Defendants	

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Rupert Butler  (instructed by Moon Beever Solicitors) for the Claimant
Philip Hackett QC (instructed by Bark & Co Solicitors) for the First Defendant
Adam Gersch (instructed by Santers) for the Second Defendant

Hearing dates: 9th, 10th, 12th, 13th, 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th & 20th, 23rd & 26th May 2011
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Judgment 
Mr Justice Mann : 
Introduction

1.	This is an action in which the claimant company, which is in liquidation, claims the sum of almost £4m from the first defendant (“Mr Patel”) as a director who wrongfully and fraudulently caused it to incur a liability to HMRC for wrongfully claimed input tax on various liquor purchases.  The defendants other than Mr Patel were joined as entities which are said to hold assets which are Mr Patel’s or which hold assets which are controlled by him.  They are joined solely for freezing order purposes and no relief is sought against them.  The issues that arise, or might arise, between them and the claimant have not been dealt with during the trial before me; it was accepted that the determination of those issues could wait until the issues of liability were decided between the claimant (“Payless”) and Mr Patel.  Of those other defendants, only the second defendant was represented at the trial (though its representative withdrew once the postponement of relevant questions was in place).  Two of them are debarred from defending.  In the light of the agreed position I do not need to deal with any of the questions that arise as regards those other defendants and can concentrate on the main question of liability as against Mr Patel. 

2.	Payless operated as a cash and carry for liquor and tobacco.  On 30th November 2009 HMRC raised an assessment in the sum of over £3.9m in respect of the quarters between May 2007 and January 2009, and on the footing of that assessment petitioned to wind it up by a petition presented on 1st December 2009.  On the same date a without notice application was made for the appointment of a provisional liquidator and, immediately on her appointment she commenced (or undertook to commence) the present proceedings and sought a freezing order against Mr Patel.  In due course on 27th January 2010 a winding up order was made, and the provisional liquidator (Miss Louise Brittain) became the liquidator in the winding up.  

3.	At the trial the claimant was represented by Mr Rupert Butler; Mr Patel was represented by Mr Philip Hackett QC.  

The nature of the claim and the basic issues

4.	Although some of the terminology used in this case is similar to that used in what have become known as missing trader (MTIC) cases with which these courts have become familiar, this is not such a case.  This is not a case in which the fraud alleged is one involving a sequence of sales and purchases, with small “commissions” taken on each sale in the chain.  The present case is less complex in the structure of its alleged fraud, though the analysis of the facts relied on is itself of some complexity.  It is as follows.

5.	Payless had a substantial trade in the wholesale purchase and re-sale of liquor and tobacco.  A large part of this trade is accepted for present purposes by the liquidator as being genuine.   In the period of the returns under investigation in these proceedings the recorded value of the purchases which are not challenged is almost £95m.  The top four of them, namely purchases from Bestway Cash & Carry Ltd, Elbrook Cash and Carry Ltd, Imperial Cash and Carry Ltd and The Wine Cellar have been used as comparators in the sense that the records relating to trading with them have been compared with the trading with the 10 entities whose trades are disputed.   The liquidator accepts, and indeed avers, that the documentation which exists in relation to the trading with these entities is what one would expect in relation to proper trading and the company’s records in relation to this trade can be relied on.  In the course of its trade Payless paid VAT on its purchases from those entities and claimed it as a deduction in its accounting to the Commissioners of Revenue and Customs (HMRC).  In this action it is accepted that that activity was apparently properly conducted.  

6.	However, between May 2007 and January 2009 Payless also claimed to deduct input tax in respect of 10 other entities, namely (in alphabetical order):
AHA Wholesale Ltd
ALB (UK) Ltd
Applebeas Ltd
Condor Despatch Import & Export Ltd
Cube Cash and Carry Ltd
Delta Drinks Ltd
Shotts Ltd
Stealth Productions Ltd
Sunfyne Ltd
Yaterex Ltd
(I shall henceforth refer to each of them by the first word in their respective names.)  

The sum claimed in these proceedings is said to be the input VAT which was deducted in respect of (alleged) trades with those entities.  It represents the claimed input tax on the alleged trade with those entities in the period from May 2007 to January 2009.  HMRC and the liquidator have claimed that the trade which was said to generate that input tax was not genuine trade; as reflected in the input tax claimed it did not exist.  The documentation which is said to record it is said to be not genuine documentation in the sense that, insofar as it assumed or reflected a corresponding underlying trade, there was no such trade.   They do not rule out the possibility that there was some underlying trade with the entities in question, or some other unrecorded trade, but it was not the trade described in, or comprised in, the documentation relied on.  HMRC claimed that the claimed VAT was not deductible, so the claimed input tax was not properly claimed.  It issued an assessment on that basis on 30th November 2009 seeking payment of the £3.9m or so referred to above.   It is unnecessary to break down the amount of that assessment into the claims made in relation to each of the above companies.  There was no challenge to the proposition that the assessment represented the aggregate amount of the disputed input tax in the relevant returns.  The claim to input tax in respect of the impeached transactions is said to have been fraudulent and it is said that Mr Patel was a party to this fraudulent claim, and that he has brought about a claim of that amount against the company.  Thus he is said to be liable to the company in that amount.   

7.	The liquidator has not appealed the assessment.  It is of the essence of her present case that it is a proper one, and that Mr Patel has wrongfully caused the company to incur that liability.

8.	In the terminology of this case these 10 entities have from an early stage been called the “missing traders”, that description doubtless having been borrowed from other MTIC cases.   In terms of the usual MTIC phraseology, that is an inaccurate description of their status in this case, but  in the light of the entrenched use of that description in the case, and without indulging in any pre-judgment of the issues, I shall continue to use that term (as all parties did at the trial).  I shall call the suppliers as to whom no dispute exists the “accepted suppliers”.
9.	There is another group of suppliers which do not fall into either category.  They are a group which demonstrate some of what the liquidator says are the attributes of missing traders, but they are not relied on as such.  On the other hand, they are not treated as comparators in the same way as the accepted suppliers are.  The parties agreed that they were to be treated as "neutral", to use Mr Hackett's word.  Neither side relied on them, or relied on non-reliance by the other side.  It will not be necessary for me to refer to them as a category (though some of the names occasionally crop up in the narrative).

10.	Mr Patel maintains that the input tax in question was properly claimed and was the result of proper and genuine transactions.  The entries which purported to record them in the records of the company recorded genuine transactions, and the invoices (where available) were genuine invoices.

11.	The principal issue can thus be simply stated - were the underlying trades, or purported trades, with the missing traders genuine or not?  The Particulars of Claim seem to make a claim on the basis that there was no trade at all with the missing traders.  The case as advanced and put by Mr Butler developed in a different way - there might or might not have been some trade with the missing traders, and it could well be that there was some, but whether there was or not it was not the transactions or purported transactions in respect of which VAT input tax was claimed in the relevant quarters (which tax was the subject of the assessment).   At one stage in his final submissions Mr Hackett seemed to be saying that the liquidator was not entitled to run any case other than one based on an absence of any trade with the missing traders, so that if some trade was established that was an end of the case, at least so far as the claims in respect of that missing trader were concerned.  He said that that was the case his client had come to court to meet.  However, that was contrary to an express indication that he had given in opening, and on the basis of which the trial proceeded.   In that indication Mr Hackett accepted that the issue in the case was the principal issue described in the first sentence of this paragraph, and in due course he backed away from what seemed to be his altered stance.  In those circumstances the principal issue is the one thus stated.  It would not be inconsistent with that issue that some sort of trade was or might have been taking place between Payless and the missing traders (or some of them).  What matters is the particular trading as was implicitly referred to in the returns and the assessment.  To the extent that those trades were not genuine trades, the claim succeeds and Mr Patel is liable.  Mr Hackett never disputed that if those trades were not genuine, then his client would inevitably be liable in misfeasance.  

The burden and standard of proof 
12.	The burden of proof is plainly on the claimant, and since fraud is alleged I bear in mind the elevated requirements for proof that more serious allegations require - see Re H [1996] AC 563.  I also have to bear in mind part of the overall picture that the liquidator did not seek to prove.  The liquidator's case is that the VAT input tax in the relevant assessments, in respect of the missing traders, was dishonestly claimed in that the claimed underlying transactions (as reflected in printouts from Payless’s Sage accounting package) did not exist as such.  Strictly speaking, the liquidator would win if those bare facts were proved.  However, generally speaking people do not perpetrate fraudulent acts for no reason, and it will usually help in establishing the fraud to establish the reason or commercial context of the alleged fraud.  In most cases that will be obvious from the nature of the fraud itself, but in the present case it is not so clear.  The liquidator did not advance any positive case as to what was happening other than the generation and submission of inaccurate returns.  It was not, however, said that there was no trade in the relevant products going on at the time.  It was suggested to Mr Patel that there was some sort of trade, and the returns were somehow done to mask that trade, but beyond that general sort of description no wider facts, of which the impeached returns formed part, was put, and no attempt was made to prove one.  This means that there was no attempt to prove the fraud in a wider overall context.  That does not mean that it cannot be proved; the liquidator does not have to prove the wider context.  But it does mean, in my view, that I must approach the alleged fraud with even more care.  

Payless - general facts
13.	Payless was incorporated on 7th January 2004.  It was running the cash and carry business by June 2004, when Mr Patel purchased it in June 2004 for what he said was an aggregate sum of £500,000.  For that purpose he claims that be borrowed £450,000 from a company known as Crystal Gold Finance Limited, which his witness statement presented as an arm’s length company owned by a friend of his, Mohinder Singh Kang.  Mr Patel estimates its turnover to have been about £30m per year.  He was its sole director and shareholder from 2005 onwards.
14.	The company’s premises were a warehouse and ancillary buildings at Units 1, 2 and 10, Penhall Business Park, 19 Penhall Rd, Charlton, London SE7 8RX.  Units 1 and 2 were side by side, and comprised the cash and carry and a supporting warehouse.  Unit 10 was a short distance down the road, and was a further warehouse, supporting the other two units.  
15.	The company operated its own fleet of vehicles - 10 lorries of various sizes, and 8 vans.  One individual, Mr Barry Knight, was for much of the time in charge of transportation.

Witnesses
The following witnesses gave evidence to me.

Mr Gregory Hill
16.	He is a chartered accountant with Deloitte LLP, the liquidator’s firm.  His witness statement was an analysis of the accounting information which was available in relation to the apparent trade (or some of it) between Payless and the missing traders, and between Payless and the accepted suppliers, for the period starting 11th November 2006 until liquidation.   He worked from the available records (including interview records) and his evidence is the main evidence that the liquidator relies on in showing the allegedly anomalous nature of the recorded dealings and the inconsistencies in the records.  There were some omissions and shortcomings in his analysis, pointed out in cross-examination, and although in one or two limited respects they detracted from the force of what he had apparently found in the limited area on which he was cross-examined, they did not undermine the rest of his evidence, which I find to have been reasonably carefully put together and analysed.   There was no suggestion that the flaws that were exposed fundamentally undermined the rest of the analysis. It was suggested that later assessments of Payless (which are not the subject of this action) demonstrate that his work in relation to the missing traders is incomplete because there were other transactions, invoices and balances, but this point was not pursued in detail.  I find that I can rely on his analysis, not least because the bulk of it was not challenged. 

Miss Louise Brittain
17.	She is the liquidator of Payless and gave evidence which in essence consisted of drawing together information from other sources.  In her cross-examination she was criticised for putting in background material which was said to be unfair to Mr Patel, but I find that that criticism is itself unfair and inaccurate.  She was not actually challenged on the material parts of her evidence.  

Ms Lisa Taberer
18.	Ms Taberer is an officer of HMRC who provided an affidavit for the purposes of the initial application for a provisional liquidator.  She gave evidence of much of the documentary material relied on as establishing the allegedly fraudulent activities of Payless.  Her cross-examination was largely confined to an examination of the whereabouts of relevant documents in HMRC’s custody, and why it was that relevant documents emerged in stages and (in some cases) late in the day.  She was a reliable and fair witness.  She was not cross-examined much on the material which she deployed in her affidavit (and in a corrective witness statement).

Mr Roy Queralt
19.	He is an HMRC officer and carried out a visit to Delta in April 2008, where he met Mr Dhanda.  His credibility was not impeached and I can accept all his evidence. 

Ms Julie Kinch
20.	She is an HMRC officer who made a visit to ALB in April 2008.  Her cross-examination was as to various documentary records.  There was no challenge to the accuracy of her evidence, and I can accept it in full.

Mr David McMaster
21.	He is an HMRC officer who participated in various visits to Applebeas, Cube and Shotts.  Once again his evidence was not challenged and his cross-examination was confined to trying to get a little more detail on documentary matters.   

Other HMRC officers
22.	Witness statements were served for a number of other officers who had conducted visits to one or more of the missing traders on one or more occasions.  They were not required for cross-examination, and it is not necessary to list them here.  Their evidence stands unchallenged.  So far as it is relevant it is recorded (not necessarily linked with them) in various sections of the narrative below.

Mr Patel
23.	Mr Patel gave a principal witness statement which was surprisingly short, bearing in mind the detail of the case with which he was faced, and surprisingly lacking in detail, but I suspect that might have been attributable to lack of funding in this litigation.  While it is true that a lot of the detail of the case emerged at the stage of exchange of witness statements, he still did not seek to meet it by further evidence in chief.   He was cross-examined at length.
24.	To some extent Mr Patel was at a disadvantage in not having a mastery of detailed facts about the accounting of the company.  He is not to be criticised for that.  It affected a number of the points on which he was cross-examined.  However, even allowing for that, his evidence was often very unconvincing.  He would tend to take refuge in purported ignorance in a manner which suggested it was a convenient refuge from a question he did not want to answer.   Various of his answers were deeply unconvincing.  I deal with some of them below.  His evidence on the very important question of how it was that transactions were deleted from the Sage system, and how entries came to be altered in a record called the red books, was particularly unconvincing, both in its content and in its manner of delivery.  He was not, in my view, a reliable witness.  It does not, of course, follow from that alone that he was guilty of the fraud alleged against him.

25.	Of more importance was some evidence that he gave about his starting to write up the red books in February 2007.  By then he was the owner of the business, and had originally left its management to its previous manager.  He described that after a serious internal dispute between that manager and Mr Ramachandran he (Mr Patel) started to write up the company’s red cash books.  He wrote them up at the dictation (literally) of the previous manager, inserting amounts for some cash payments but leaving a blank where the payee should be and inserting the name later.  This was evidence with a high degree of inherent incredibility, and I do not accept it.  I think that Mr Patel was desperately contriving a story to explain why he wrote the name of the supplier in later.  Since it goes directly to the authenticity of key records which Mr Patel insists were genuine, accurate and crucial it is much more damaging to his overall credibility.  I think this was a calculated lie in relation to a central matter.

26.	Other aspects of his evidence were, in my view, fabrications made up for the purposes of this case. They included:
(i)  His description of his invoicing and ordering procedure, which was unlikely in a serious business.
(ii)  His account of why he sought verification of VAT numbers of trading counterparties,  but started trading before what he regarded as a significant step, which was actually applying to HM Customs  for verification of a counterparty’s VAT number and status.
(iii)  A statement that he would not necessarily take as true a counterparty’s statement that that counterparty had been de-registered for VAT, from which he then resiled when he saw the logical consequences of his statement.  
(iv)  A protestation that he did not know what work Jaimin Patel (who used to work for him) currently does at MDD Trading Ltd (the 5th defendant) which now trades from Payless’s cash and carry premises, and which he claimed to visit to look at trial bundles (despite the fact that he has his own set at his daughter’s flat which is in a property just round the corner from where he lives).
(v)  He gave evasive evidence about the links between two missing trade representatives (Harish Bhanderi and Nihat).  
(vi)  He was obviously evasive about a conversation that he had had a few months before with a Mr Dhanda of Delta in a manner which suggests that he will be evasive when he thinks it suits his interest to do so.
(vii)  He gave implausible evidence about recent contacts with one of the representatives with whom he dealt, namely Nihat (see below).   According to him, Nihat was a representative for three traders with whom he had substantial dealings, but he knew virtually nothing about him.  Nihat has now been deported, and Mr Patel claimed to have spoken to him 3 or 4 weeks before the trial on a social call when Nihat rang him.  The forthcoming trial was allegedly not mentioned.  This is simply implausible.  The dealings with Nihat, as described by Mr Patel, were such that a continuing social relationship is unlikely, so a social call itself is unlikely.  If it took place, and bearing in mind that Mr Patel was facing an imminent trial about, inter alia, the companies for whom Nihat dealt, it is inconceivable that there would be no discussion of it.  Either no call took place, or it did take place and the case was discussed.  The latter is probably more likely, because I consider that Mr Patel has not told the full truth of his relationship with Nihat, but either way I consider that Mr Patel has lied about this.
Viewing his evidence as a whole, and the manner in which it was given (with periodic retreats into expressions of ignorance which were sometimes hard to accept) I did not consider him to be a reliable or credible witness.  That does not, of course, mean that I reject all his evidence, or that his defence automatically fails.  

Ms Syeeda Talqueen
27.	She worked on telephone sales within Payless and gave evidence of that.  It was not easy to see the relevance of this evidence, and her cross-examination did not produce any really relevant material either.  She was obviously trying to be accurate in her evidence.

Mr Kantilal Hirani
28.	He has worked in cash and carries for some time, and from February 2007 until December 2009 he worked at Payless.  He sat in the back office of one of the units occupied by Payless, working on purchases from the major suppliers (not any of the missing traders).  He described the process of ordering goods and checking invoices when they arrived.  I consider him to be an honest and reliable witness.

Mr Kuldeep Singh
29.	Mr Singh was a lorry driver and the director of a haulage firm which owned heavy goods vehicles.  He gave evidence that he delivered beer to Payless from “various cash and carry’s on many occasions”, through his witness statement.  In cross-examination he said there were 14 occasions (he was very specific on the number) and identified one supplier only, represented by “James”, from whom he picked up beer from a farmhouse called Rogers Yard.  This is a material difference.  I did not find him to be a credible witness.  His witness statement promised supporting documents which, it then turned out, were lost in a burglary in 2010, as was a laptop computer on which he created invoices.  His demeanour, lack of consistency and quality of evidence as a whole was such that I could not treat him as giving generally credible evidence.  He was the only person called to corroborate Mr Patel’s claim that large amounts of goods were actually delivered by the missing traders in accordance with the invoices.   

Jaimin Patel
30.	Jaimin Patel (“Jaimin”, to distinguish him from Mr Patel) was the person who created many of the cash book entries.  He is a form of cousin, through marriage, of Mr Patel, and lives in the same house.  He is a young man of 25.
31.	I did not consider him to be a reliable witness.  His evidence was on occasions inherently implausible and on others he was evasive.  From time to time I got the distinct impression he was giving answers he had been asked to give, or that he thought he should give, instead of what would have been the correct answer.  There was one striking pause before he answered a question about who filled in the red books when he was not there, as though he could not remember what he was supposed to say.  In the end he identified Hiren – but he gave me the impression he did not know whether he was supposed to say that.  He went to India at one stage and did not resume writing up the red books straight away, though he went to the office.  His explanation for this was not plausible.  All in all, I did not consider his evidence to be reliable or always truthful.
Missing witnesses
32.	At least one key witness was missing, namely Mr Ramachandran.  He was the bookkeeper responsible for entering transactions on to the computer.  His evidence would have been very illuminating, because the liquidator’s case is so dependent on the method and integrity of the record keeping, and Mr Patel avows its integrity.  However, he did not give evidence.  Mr Patel said he was not calling him because he was terminally ill and his wife had expressed the view that whatever life he had left he should enjoy.  Mr Patel did not know if he was bedridden.  No medical certificate or doctor’s letter was produced.  

33.	This court is entitled to draw adverse inferences from the failure to call an important witness without any justifiable explanation. The evidence of Mr Patel does not contain a very good justification for these purposes, particularly bearing in mind the misgivings I have about Mr Patel’s credibility generally.  There was no evidence that Mr Ramachandran is not fit to come and give evidence.  It does not follow that a terminal illness renders him unfit, without more.  Nor is there evidence that Mr Ramachandran has even refused to come.  The evidence was merely about what his wife said.  Mr Patel said that he had seen Mr Ramachandran working at Payless’s old premises (now operated by the 5th defendant) as recently as 18th March 2011.   I therefore treat his absence as the absence of a witness whose evidence is relevant and important, and whose absence has not been satisfactorily explained.

34.	There was also no good reason advanced for his not calling another potentially very significant witness.  Mr Patel’s case has always asserted the integrity and centrality of a set of red cash books as records of cash actually paid.  They were made up by various people from time to time, including Jaimin Patel and  a young man called Hiren.  Hiren was, in my view, an obviously appropriate, if not necessary, witness to explain what he did in relation to the red books (particularly since some of his entries have obviously been altered) but he (unlike Jaimin) was not called.  Mr Patel knows where he lives (they are relations) but did not proffer a reason for not calling him.

35.	It is also to be noted that Mr Patel did not call any witnesses to the actual supply from missing traders (either suppliers or transporters) other than Mr Kuldeep Singh.  Mr Singh’s evidence was not credible, and in any event it did not extend to more than a limited number of deliveries over a limited period.  I consider that to be significant.  Genuine suppliers and their transporters ought to have been capable of generating more witnesses than that.  (I bear in mind that while Payless had its own transport operation, its drivers were not involved in the obtaining of supplies from the missing traders, so the absence of Payless’s drivers is not significant in this context.)   No good reason was advanced for not calling any of these people.  One of his contacts (Nihat - see below) has apparently been deported, which would obviously be an obstacle to his personal attendance, but no attempt was made to get his evidence by other means.  So far as one of the apparent representatives of a supplier was concerned (a Mr Bissenden) Mr Patel had even spoken to him the day before he gave evidence, yet he was not called to give evidence.  
36.	All these are, in my view, significant matters when it comes to considering the credibility of his case.
The accounting mechanisms and records of Payless
37.	Much of the liquidator’s case depends on the treatment (or absence of treatment) of the claimed trades with the missing traders in the book-keeping and accounting records of Payless, and inconsistencies in the recording of transactions in the various records.  It is therefore necessary to start by setting out what those records were.
38.	The company operated two accounting packages on its computers - Sage for purchases, and Quickbooks for sales.  There is a suggestion in the evidence of Mr Hill that this demarcation was not rigidly adhered to, but the extent of any departure is not apparent to me and this case does not involve sales, so I can ignore the involvement of Quickbooks.  
39.	Sage and Quickbooks were operated principally by a Mr Ramachandran on two or more computers at the company’s premises.    The purchases were all said by Mr Ramachandran (in an interview with the liquidator) to have been properly entered by him into Sage.  It was the source from which the VAT returns were composed, and it is by working back from this that HMRC and the liquidator show that the disputed returns contain claims in respect of trades with the missing traders.  The returns are consistent with printouts which were apparently produced for VAT return purposes, and it is from these printouts that the amounts can be identified.  
40.	Purchases are apparently recorded in invoices, or at least are supposed to be.  Mr Patel said that if a purchased load was picked up by one of Payless’s drivers, the driver would check that the load matched the invoice.  If the load was delivered by the seller, the delivery was checked at Payless’s warehouse.  That is a plausible system.  A point arose at the trial as to the manner in which that would be likely to be done, and whether the invoices would be marked (because no relevant missing traders’ invoice bore any markings consistent with that process).  I deal with that below.   Mr Patel said that there was a book which recorded inward deliveries; the liquidator disputed that, saying none was found and putting that there never was one (because Mr Patel would not have wanted there to be one).  

41.	A considerable amount of Payless’s trade was conducted in cash.  This cash was recorded in various ways:
(i)  Cash purchases were recorded in a cash book - the “red book”.  Mr Patel’s case is that this was the record of what was paid out for purchases.  The evidence of Jaimin Patel is that he gave the red book to Mr Ramachandran.  His witness statement says he did this  “at the end of the day”, but since he said in cross-examination that he sometimes left it 3 or 4 days before making it up, that must be qualified.  At any rate, it seems that it must be Mr Patel’s case that this cash book was the record from which the Sage record was made up so far as cash payments to suppliers were concerned - there would seem to be no other obvious candidate capable of covering all payments.
(ii)  Cash sales were written into daily takings sheets, and further recorded in a daily invoice sale report (called the Z slip).  This information was then put into an Excel spreadsheet and then put on the computer in the Sage package.  
(iii)  Cheque sales were also written into the daily takings sheets and recorded in Quickbooks.  Till receipts were kept.
42.	The principal records of Payless which are available in this case, and which have been relied on by the liquidator as demonstrating that the impeached trades were not genuine, were as follows:
(i)	The Sage database.  This is where one identifies the input tax that has actually been claimed.
(ii)  Invoices.
(iii)  Receipts endorsed on invoices.
(iv)	  Some separate manuscript receipts given by traders.  
(v)   The red cash books.  In an interview with the liquidator Mr Patel indicated the centrality of these records as far as he was concerned.  He said that these records encapsulated sales purchases, and on many occasions in his evidence he stressed the centrality and importance, and indeed accuracy, of this record.
(vi)  The spreadsheets and Z slips.
(vii)  A cheque ledger.
43.	A large part of the case of the liquidator involves comparing how these can (or cannot) be reconciled in the case of the missing traders, and to an extent comparing the success (or lack of it) of this exercise when so carried out with the records relating to the accepted suppliers.  Mr Hill’s findings, which I find to be true, are that the transactions recorded in the various elements present inconsistencies - thus some paper invoices are not recorded in Sage, and some entries in Sage are not supported by paper invoices (or at least not existing invoices).  Similarly, in relation to cash payments, there are non-correspondences between the transactions shown in the Sage records and the red cash books.   There is a period at the beginning of March 2009 for which there are two overlapping sets of red book entries.  Pages (perhaps as many as 20) have been torn out of the beginning of one red book (though the first available page ties up chronologically with where the previous one left off, with the help of some loose pages from another book).  There are a number of instances where cash payments to some missing traders are tippexed out and cash payments to another are written in.  Different instances of Sage were apparently run on two different computers.  
Mr Patel’s evidence as to the manner of dealing with the missing traders
44.	Mr Patel’s evidence as to how they were dealt with was as follows.
45.	He had formerly been responsible for all the company’s purchases, but as time went on found he could not do them all and delegated purchasing from larger suppliers to Mr Hirani.  He retained the smaller suppliers - about 50 in all.  The missing traders fall into this category - he was the only person who arranged purchases from these traders.  
46.	Larger suppliers required payment by cheque.  Customers often paid in cash; cash was paid into the bank to make sure that funds were available on which cheques could be drawn.  Other suppliers often preferred cash, which Mr Patel says he found to be a more economical and efficient way to run the business.  A daily takings summary was drawn up, from which the amount of cash left over at the end of the day would be apparent.  The cash was kept in a safe overnight.  
47.	His witness statement says that suppliers who were paid in cash would be paid as and when cash was available.  Many suppliers gave credit, the amount of credit sometimes growing as they came to know the company better.
48.	Mr Ramachandran was responsible for maintaining computer records of transactions (and in particular for running the SAGE accounting package) and for preparing VAT returns; Mr Patel signed the latter.  Mr Patel maintained that they were accurate, though he never operated the computer himself.
49.	Mr Patel said he placed orders with the missing traders by phone.  He negotiated prices which included delivery to him.  He would be told on a daily basis what his stock situation was, and would make an assessment of what he required.  He claimed to be looking one or two weeks ahead, and deliveries would take between 3 and 5 days to arrive.  Sometimes he was let down.    
50.	Some stock was delivered by suppliers; some was picked up by Payless's own fleet of vehicles.  If the latter happened the driver would check the quantity against the invoice on pick up, and they would be checked on arrival at the warehouse or cash and carry premises.  If the goods were delivered by the supplier, the goods would be checked against the invoice at the warehouse. If there was a discrepancy he or Mr Hirani would take it up with the supplier, though Mr Patel's evidence was that in all the time of dealing with the missing traders there were no discrepancies, shortfalls or breakages which needed to be taken up.

51.	If cash was the agreed method of payment then the cash, or an agreed proportion of it, would be paid to an appropriate nominated person and that person would sign a receipt for it.  These cash payments were entered in the red cash book, which was “sometimes filled in on a daily basis and sometimes updated every few days”.   There was no satisfactory evidence of where the cash payment was written down pending its being communicated to the writer of the cash book (most often Jaimin), so either Mr Patel had a good memory (to the penny or odd number of pounds in some cases) or there were relevant pieces of paper which have not survived at all, and about which Mr Patel has forgotten.  In his cross-examination Mr Patel said that payments were recorded on daily cash sheets, but in interviews with the liquidator or her staff Mr Ramachandran (who would have a much better knowledge of systems than Mr Patel) referred to such sheets as recording only takings, not payments.  I reject Mr Patel’s evidence about this, which leaves the unsatisfactory lack of evidence as to what happened between payment out of cash and the physical entry into the red books.  

52.	The cash that was paid was generally not paid to satisfy identified invoices, either in whole or in part.  It was paid on account from time to time.   Mr Patel would pay as and when cash was available and not required elsewhere.  Mr Patel would pay the representatives of the missing traders himself, when they called, and on occasions would pay their delegates.  The sums involved were often several tens of thousands of pounds at a time.
53.	His business had credit periods agreed with suppliers.  His oral evidence was clear enough in relation to the major accepted suppliers.  He had periods of a few days to 15 days, depending on the goods and apparently, in some cases the transactions.  He paid by post-dated cheques (at least sometimes).  Coca Cola gave him rather longer periods, between 45 and 60 days.  However, the arrangements, such as they were, with the missing traders were different and much more confused.  He started by saying that he had no express agreements, and then proceeded to give a confused picture, saying that he negotiated with the representative every time he bought.  His evidence was confused on this.  I do not accept he reached such agreements as a matter of general practice, on every purchase.  He also claimed that credit periods of as long as 90 days were common in the trade.  I regarded that as a matter of unsubstantiated and convenient assertion.
54.	While his witness statement clearly said that invoices would be provided with delivery of the goods, in his cross-examination Mr Patel said that sometimes he would get an invoice in advance of getting goods from a missing trader.  On some occasions Ravi (a representative of various missing traders) would do that.  He explained this unlikely occurrence on the footing that Ravi would sometimes go to Dubai, where he dealt in flats, and would provide an invoice in advance if he was going to be away.  The fact of invoices being delivered in advance emerged in the context of cross-examination as to invoices which had apparently been entered on Sage but subsequently deleted.  He explained the deletion on the footing that they must have been deleted because the goods in question were not delivered ("I can assure you that must have been the reason.").  This, logically, required the delivery of an invoice in advance of the goods.  The manner in which this invoicing point emerged made the evidence very unconvincing and I do not accept it.  I think that Mr Patel was making it up to provide a convenient possible explanation for the deletions, because the real reason would have been unpalatable.  I deal further with these deletions below.  

55.	Mr Patel described how he conducted what he called due diligence.  He was aware of the need, or desirability, of verifying the VAT status of those with whom he traded.  Accordingly he tended to take three steps to verify that status in the case of new traders.  He looked at a copy of their VAT registration certificate; he checked the status on available on-line records; and he asked Customs and Excise to verify the status.  The latter step, he claimed (with some plausibility), took some time.  He also suggested that Customs and Excise prevaricated.  He does not seem to have carried out any credit or other checks on new traders when he started trading with them.  He seems to have treated a check on their VAT registration status as being the most important thing to check.  I find he was certainly and strongly aware of the need to be seen to be dealing with someone who was registered for VAT purposes if he was to  be able to reclaim VAT.  He regarded registered status as a green light for the purposes of starting to trade.  In a significant number of cases the representative of the new trader (usually Ravi) would arrive with "due diligence paper" (i.e. VAT records).  He also had some further limited and ultimately unhelpful information on some of the missing traders - thus on Stealth he also had an unsigned letter of introduction and a copy of the passport entry of one of the directors (whom he never met).  The essence of this picture is that if his evidence is to be believed he started trading with a number of traders knowing nothing about them other than their VAT status, the identity (name only) of a director or two (in some cases) and that they purported to be willing and able to supply him with beer (and occasionally wine).  The picture he presented was not one consistent with a regularly and conscientiously conducted business, particularly bearing in mind the scale of the business involved.

56.	Aspects of this account were also dealt with by other witnesses.  Mr Hirani (whose evidence I accept) gave evidence of the checking of the price of incoming goods against an invoice in relation to goods from the major suppliers.  He said that goods were checked at the warehouse before he got the invoice.  He would raise any price discrepancies (comparing invoice prices with the last price charged, or against a price list) with Mr Patel. 

57.	Mr Jaimin Patel described in some detail how he dealt with orders from customers (sales) but he did not deal with suppliers.  Nevertheless, since he had the key to the safe and was dealing with cash from customers, he was part of the payment process.  He said that payment was not made to suppliers on an “invoice to invoice basis” - it was on an account basis according to how much was due to the supplier.  Suppliers came to Payless to receive payment and would sit in the back office with Mr Patel for 15-30 minutes.  Mr Ramachandran had a record of how much was due and Mr Patel decided how much he would pay.  Jaimin Patel then got the cash ready.  At the end of the day, or occasionally the next day, Mr Patel would tell him the details of the payments made by cash and he would record them in the red cash book.   On a daily basis he entered the previous balance, how much was received that day and the payments out (nature of payment, or recipient, and amount). 

The liquidator’s case based on the quality of the accounting, trading and financial documentation of Payless
58.	The liquidator’s case relies principally on the comparative analysis referred to above.  The analysis covers the period of the assessment and extends either side as well, in order to present the context in which the disputed transactions lie.  It draws attention to the quality of the documentation which is said to underpin the trades underlying the input tax and in the documentation of the company generally.  The following is a general description of points that are common to some or all of the missing traders.  It will be useful to describe them here in general terms, so that the detail in the context of each of the missing traders can be more readily understood (and can be more shortly expressed).   
(i)  In many cases the numbering of missing’ traders invoices is consecutive in a way which would logically only make sense if Payless was that trader’s only customer in the period in question.   While it is theoretically possible that Payless was the only customer, that would be odd, and it is rendered odder by the number of times it apparently occurs.
(ii)  In some cases the goods supplied are described so generically as to amount to no real description at all, and certainly not one that is sufficient to enable a pick-up driver or warehouse staff to check that the right quantity of the right goods had been delivered.  Mr Patel’s evidence is that in the case of the goods in question (nearly always beer, but sometimes wine), one does not need any description beyond that given.   Mr Patel’s case was that the description enabled experienced operators such as himself and his employees to see at a glance whether the goods were on the lorry, because the packaging and palleting involved was sufficiently standard to enable that to be done.  I can say at this stage that there is probably something in Mr Patel’s point, and this aspect of the evidence is not something to which any real weight should be given.
(iii)  There are inconsistencies in the spelling of words which ought to have been spelt correctly in a proper invoicing system.  I did not regard this as very significant and do not dwell on it.
(iv)  In all cases the invoices are white, non-multi-part and in very clean unfolded condition, with hardly a mark on them.  In contrast, the majority of the accepted supplier invoices are multi-part and have a much more “handled” appearance, with more markings.  I can say at this stage that as a matter of fact this comparison is correct.
(v)  The missing trader invoices are largely unmarked, except in some cases for a nominal code number.  This contrasts with the accepted supplier invoices which look as though they have been ticked off to signify some checking process.  The liquidator’s case was that tick markings were put on the accepted supplier invoices at Payless’s warehouse, and demonstrated an understandable, if not inevitable, marking off process as the goods were checked in.  This was contrasted with the absence of markings on the missing traders invoices.   Mr Patel’s evidence was that there was no such marking on the accepted supplier invoices; the marks that were there were put there by the seller, or to a limited extent by someone at Payless other than the warehouse staff.  I accept that evidence. It coincides with Mr Hirani’s evidence, which plausibly explains some markings as put on by him, and with the probabilities when one considers the marking.
(vi)  The cash books from time to time have entries in which one name, amongst several for the same day, is in a different pen.  Others have one missing trader’s name tippexed out and another’s written in on top.  There are also parallel cash book entries for a period at the beginning of March 2009 with seriously inconsistent entries notably for payments to Sunfyne.  The liquidator says that this supports a case that the red cash book entries are not genuine records of genuine payments to suppliers.  This is dealt with in more detail below.
(vii)  There are significant instances of the Sage records failing to reflect the cash book, and the cash book not being reflected in the Sage records.
(viii)  The missing trader invoices were stored differently from the other supplier invoices.  The latter were stored mixed together, in rough date order, with no spreadsheet summary.  The missing trader invoices were stored separately by supplier, often listed monthly on spreadsheets.
I find all these criticisms established to a greater or lesser extent, other than (ii) and  (v).  No satisfactory explanation was advanced by Mr Patel.

59.	Payless does not seem to have sought to impose any terms of trading.  No evidence of any such terms were found at its premises, though one copy of a set of terms was found at the premises of one of the missing traders (Yaterex).  

60.	No method of stock recording was found at Payless’s premises.  Mr Patel claimed that there was a book recording stock, and complained that it had not been produced.  I find either that there was none, or that there was a record which has been suppressed by Mr Patel.  

A comparison of the missing traders and the accepted suppliers - generally applicable points
61.	Mr Hill’s work (which did not cover the whole of the period of the company’s trading, but started as at 11th November 2006) revealed the following differences between the way trade was conducted with missing traders as a whole and the accepted suppliers as a whole.  A great deal of what he found was not challenged in detail.  I find the following as a result of his exercise.

62.	The vast bulk of the trade with the missing traders was in cash.  According to the records, just under 95% of the trades were in cash.  This contrasts with the cash element of trade with the accepted suppliers which he puts at 12%.  He arrives at his figure by omitting the “neutral” traders from the picture.     I find his figures are correct, but the significance of this by itself is limited.  

63.	It is not possible to match the majority of purported payments to the amounts apparently invoiced to the missing traders.  Other than some payments apparently noted on the face of the invoices, sums are not allocated in any way.  This is contrasted with the most significant accepted supplier (Bestway) where it has been possible to match 206 out of 245 payments to specific invoices.

64.	Generally speaking, the period of trading with each of the missing traders (with the exception of Cube and Applebeas) is short, whereas trading went on with the accepted suppliers throughout the entire period.  I note the periods in question when I deal with each of the missing traders separately.  I accept this difference.    By way of illustration, the period of trading with each of the major accepted suppliers was over 1000 days.  For most of the missing traders it was very much less.

65.	In relation to several missing traders there are apparently invoices for which no reclaim of VAT input tax was made.  The most significant was Applebeas - 59 invoices totally £2.2m gross (£340,000 odd input tax).  This is said to cast doubt on the validity of invoices.  The others are Cube (3), Sunfyne (8) and Stealth (4). 

66.	On the face of the records, each of the missing traders extended a significant amount of credit to Payless over the period of trading.  This is a conclusion which Mr Hill arrives at by comparing the invoices from each of them on the one hand and the alleged cash payments, and striking a running balance.  Its effect was not disputed by Mr Patel.  He did not find this remarkable.  I disagree with that - some of the figures (if accurate) are very remarkable and are not what one would expect in a regularly run business.  The actual amount of “credit” in relation to each missing trader appears from the details below.  

67.	Mr Hill drew attention to the fact that the invoices for some of the missing traders demonstrate a higher proportion of identical amount invoices than is demonstrated by the invoicing pattern for the accepted suppliers.  I find this true as a matter of fact (again, it was not challenged); it is a factor capable of demonstrating a series of fabricated invoices, but its weight is limited.   In the case of one set of repetitions (3 identical Applebeas invoices on the same day) Mr Patel said it was because there were identical deliveries in separate loads to each of the three buildings of Payless on the same day; each load required an accompanying invoice.  I did not find this wholly convincing, but Mr Patel would be entitled to make the valid counter-point that if he was fraudulently creating false invoices he would have to be very inept simply to repeat figures and amounts on previous invoices.

The reliability of the documentation, alterations, and inconsistencies in and involving the red cash books
68.	The red cash books are firmly propounded by Mr Patel as being an accurate record of cash transactions that he conducted.  They contain a large number of records of what he says are genuine cash payments paid to the missing traders.  The liquidator’s case is that they are a fabrication, at least so far as recorded payments to missing traders  are concerned.  At its highest the liquidator’s case is that entries were made in batches of weeks at a time to create entries which would support fictitious trading, and then some of them were altered further.

69.	Mr Patel’s case is that the cash books record accurately the cash expenditure of the company.  They were created by Jaimin and others.  He said he could not really answer questions about detailed entries because he did not create them, though he suggested possible reasons for some alterations made to missing trader entries.  

70.	Jaimin, however, described in some detail how he created them during the period for which he was responsible for them.  He said they were written up by him either on the day of each entry, or within 3 or 4 days if he was too busy to do them at the time.  He did not take primary records and enter them directly into the cash book.  Rather, he first wrote down the relevant entries on to a piece of paper and then wrote up the cash books from that.  The intermediate pieces of paper were destroyed.  He got the information from Mr Ramachandran, from other records or, in the case of cash payments to suppliers, from Mr Patel.

71.	The cash books are each standard red A4 lined exercise books, without any special lined columns for figures.  The format of each day’s entries is, by and large identical.  That format matters, so I have to describe it, but it is best done by reference to a sample page, a copy of which, as written by Jaimin, is annexed to this judgment as Appendix 1.  Each entry consists of the date in the centre of the page, followed sometimes by one blank line (occasionally two) and sometimes none, with cash receipts on the left hand side of the page and payments on the right.   The first figure on the receipts side is a carried forward figure, and the second is receipts for the day.  On the right the last figure is a carried forward figure, which is a balance which can only be struck by taking into account the preceding payments.  There is then usually at least one blank line before the next date.  That is how Jaimin generally did it.  One can see that for weeks at a time the entries are all in the same pen (save for some odd individual transaction entries, which are challenged) and then the pen colour might change and remain in that changed colour for some more weeks, and then change back again.  The last book is, for reasons which were not satisfactorily explained, entirely in pencil.   For a period when Jaimin was in India a gentleman called Hiren did the entries, and for a brief period Mr Ramachandran did as well, but by and large they adopted that format (save that Hiren sometimes did not leave as many blank lines).  Mr Patel wrote some entries in the earlier stages of his ownership of Payless.

72.	There were 5 books of this kind (an earlier book, in a completely different format, was also kept, but I do not deal with that here).  The first of those books starts at 15th November 2006 and runs to 4th August 2007; the latter entries in this book were made by Mr Patel himself.  The second starts with 5th August 2007 (Jaimin’s first entry) and runs to 12th August 2008.  The third (still in Jaimin’s hand at this stage) starts at 13th August 2008 and runs to 19th March 2009.  From 28th December 2008 the handwriting changes to that of Hiren, and he continues to the end of the book.  This change of handwriting would coincide roughly with the beginning of an absence of Jaimin in India; he returned in March.  The fourth book itself starts at 16th March 2009, and runs to 7th May 2009.  It starts with Mr Ramachandran’s handwriting and changes to Hiren’s on 22nd March.   However, it also contains some loose sheets, in Mr Ramachandran's handwriting, starting at the beginning of the month.  There is thus an overlap between books 3 and 4; the entries in that overlap are by no means identical.   The fifth book starts at 19th May, in Jaimin’s handwriting again, and runs to 26th November 2009.  Hiren’s handwriting takes over from 11th September, though he also seems to have completed the entry for 10th September which was started by Jaimin.  

73.	There are various unexplained oddities in these books thus far, which cast significant doubt on their accuracy and worth.
(i)  No explanation is given for the overlap between, or parallel nature of,  books 3 and 4 in relation to their first half of March 2009 (treating the loose sheets as being part of book 3 for these purposes).  There is no good reason why these parallel  entries should exist.
(ii)  The parallel entries are not the same in content.  They start from a different opening balance.  The cash receipts amounts are  usually the same, and the disbursements on expenditure other than payments to suppliers are generally the same, but payments recorded as made to missing traders are generally different.  Thus, by way of example, on 1st March a payment of £35,590 to Sunfyne is recorded by Mr Ramachandran. Hiren records a payment of £42,000.  On the next day Mr Ramachandran records a payment to Sunfyne of £55,000; Hiren records £15,000.   This pattern is repeated throughout the parallel period.  There are some discrepancies in other items too. Inevitably, the opening and closing balances are different.   It is apparent that different sets of records have been created.  They cannot both be right.  Nor has any good reason been suggested as to why they exist for this period.  
(iii)  An inspection of the originals demonstrates that a number of pages (probably about 20) have been torn out of the beginning of  book 4.  No explanation of that has been volunteered.
74.	It is also apparent that significant entries have been altered some time after the dates on which they purport to have been recorded.  This inference is drawn from the following material.  

75.	In the back of book 2 there are some loose sheets, one of which is a list headed with Applebeas’ name and containing lists of amounts against dates.  On its front the dates start in Jaimin’s handwriting in black for some 33 entries, changing to blue for 16, then back to black for some 21.  Then they change to Hiren’s handwriting to the end of the document.  The alignment of the entries on the page shifts half way down Hiren’s list, suggesting that it was compiled on at least two different occasions.  

76.	Jaimin said that this list was (so far as he was concerned) compiled for the benefit of Mr Patel so that the latter could see the sums that had been paid.  He said that it should contain the same figures as the red book; the inference would be that it would be extracted from the red book, not least because (if Jaimin is right about its purpose) that is where it would have to have been taken from.  It is noteworthy that Mr Patel did not ask for this to be done, and in substance he said that these pieces of paper would be of no use to him.  Their evidence therefore conflicts.  I think that Jaimin must be the more accurate here.  There is no-one other than Mr Patel who would be interested in these summaries. 

77.	The red book has an entry on 5th December 2008 recording cash paid to Applebeas on that date.  The sum currently showing is £30,780.94, but that is written on Tippex which overlays an original sum which is no longer readable.  The loose sheet records £40,105 as being the sum for Applebeas on that date.  That is likely to be the sum under the Tippex.  However, the date of the change is significant.   The new sum in the book is written in Hiren’s handwriting.  No satisfactory explanation was given for this.  If the cashbook was accurate and written up as Jaimin described it, it is not apparent how or why this can have happened.  It does not appear it was the correction of a simple mistake.  The alteration was written in Hiren’s hand, so it must have been written after he took over the book, which was apparently on or about 31st December - a minimum of 3 weeks later.  

78.	The same point is apparent in relation to an Applebeas entry in Jaimin’s hand for 15th December, where an original entry has been tippexed out and substituted by £65,580.93 in Hiren’s hand.  The listed entry (in the summary sheet) was £74,000.  In this day’s case other adjustments are apparent as well.  It is obvious that Hiren has entered an additional item into the day’s cash payments, above Jaimin’s.  The item is a cash payment to Wine Cellar of £8,419.07.  When added to the altered sum one has a total of £74,000, the sum extracted by Jaimin and which, probably, underlies the Tippex.  So at some stage after Jaimin stopped doing the red books a decision has been taken to alter an apparent cash payment to Applebeas and change the amount to one to Applebeas and one to Wine Cellar.  I do not consider that this is some form of mistaken allocation of a cash payment, as some of Mr Patel’s evidence would have me believe.  I think that it is a deliberate alteration of the records for some unexplained purpose.  

79.	There are further unexplained inconsistencies between the apparent summary and the existing red book entries.  They include obliterated entries in the cash book (with listings in the list), and attributions of payments to Applebeas in the list but to another payee in the red book (this time apparently without Tippex). 
80.	The red books, and the evidence adduced by Mr Patel in relation to them, also present numerous other obstacles to their being treated as being accurate contemporaneous records.
(i)  Many entries purporting to relate to suppliers (mostly missing traders) have been altered by Tippex to a greater or lesser extent.  It was suggested by Mr Patel that so far as amounts were concerned, this represented a reallocation of a cash payment, or an occasion on which cash had been earmarked for a supplier, put on one side, but then used for other purposes by the time the seller turned up to collect it.  His manner of doing business, and the professed manner of creating these books, make this an unlikely explanation and I do not accept it.
(ii)  It is obvious that other entries have been added at some point after the original entries were made.  This is sometimes apparent from the different hand used, and on other occasions it is apparent from the fact that the entry has been added to what would generally be a blank area (or blank line) above or below the original entries.  There are some which are below the carried forward figure, which strongly suggests that they were added after the balance was struck.  There are others on the blank line next to the day heading - they are an obvious addition there.
(iii)  The earliest version of the red books were cash records in the handwriting of Mr Hirji Sayani.  Mr Sayani had been the manager of the business under the previous owner, and he stayed on for a while after Mr Patel had bought it.  He maintained a similar cash record, but Mr Patel’s handwriting starts to appear in odd entries from 1st February 2007.  For a number of entries after that date, until 14th February 2007 when Mr Patel took over writing in the books completely, Mr Patel’s handwriting can be seen adding the payee of various cash payments (usually a trader called Just Drinks) in a manner which clearly suggests it was written in after the rest of the day’s entry was placed there.  I find that it was.  Mr Patel could not offer an explanation for this other than that Mr Sayani was running the business and told him to do it.  This is not a convincing explanation.  Apart from anything else, it does not explain why Mr Sayani did not do it himself.  I think that the writing was done because Mr Patel was ultimately in control and he wanted it done.
(iv)  From 14th February 2007, or perhaps 13th February, Mr Patel took over writing the cash matters in the cash record.  At first he gave no explanation of why he took it over at that point, but in his evidence the next day claimed to have recalled that Mr Sayani and Mr Ramachandran had had a serious row.  At about that time Mr Patel said he would like to see the cash, or write the cash book, and he took that over.  However, what he wrote was at the dictation of Mr Sayani.  Mr Sayani would have his records, and would dictate to Mr Patel (literally) what he should write.  In those circumstances, and in that manner, Mr Patel says he started writing up the cash book.  It is impossible to believe this incredible story.  Mr Patel was the owner of the business.  It is natural that he would want to see the cash position, but he could have done that by looking at the cash books when they had been written up by someone else, and making all necessary inquiries.   Alternatively he could have checked the primary records (such as they were) and made his own entries without involving Mr Sayani.  What makes no sense is that he, as owner, would sit there while someone else dictated the figures and items to him.  Mr Patel is shrewd enough to have found another control mechanism.  I am afraid that I consider he was lying to me about this matter.
(v)	Shortly after Mr Patel started writing the cash books entries for Yaterex
started to appear.  However, they are irregular entries, in which “Yat” is written over something else (tippexed out) or inserted between already existing entries.  He claimed that this was done because Mr Sayani told him what to write, or because Mr Ramachandran told him after the event that Mr Sayani had made a mess of the entries and they needed to be corrected.  Again, I simply do not accept that explanation.  It does not account sensibly for what he, as owner of the business, was doing.  I think that he was, for his own reasons, re-designating an entry in a manner for which he has not given a plausible reason, and for which there can be no inferred plausible reason consistent with the accuracy of the final entry.
(vi)	In those early versions of red book entries (not in fact in a book – they exist
only as loose sheets of paper) there are various entries which are round sum payments, presumably intended to reflect payments to suppliers, and where the payee is left blank.  If there really was a real and regular payment to a real supplier, of which Mr Patel (whose handwriting it is) wished to make a real record, it would not be left blank.  He would know to whom such large sums of money (many thousands of pounds) were paid.
(vii)  Other later additions are apparent from a difference in the colour of the pen in the entry of the identity of the recipient of amounts of cash.  For example, on 12th June 2008 there are 11 entries in the “paid” column.  They are in blue, except for a payment to Applebeas, where the paid figure is in black, and the name “Applebeas” is written in a different blue pen.  Similarly on 13th June the word “Applebeas” (against a payment of £98,258) is written in a different pen from the rest of the entry.  I find that those differentiated items were made at a different time from the rest of the entry.  The entry has, to that extent, been reconstructed.   No good reason was advanced as to why this should have been done, particularly if it is right that the entries were made up on the day or within 3 or 4 days of the day.  There has been retrospective reconstruction which is inconsistent with that.
(viii)  According to the systems as described by Mr Patel, all payments in the cashbooks ought to be reflected in the Sage records, though the cash records were the most immediate records. A large number of the missing trader payments in the period investigated by Mr Hill are indeed reflected in the Sage records.  There are, however, some inconsistencies between those two sets of records, most notably:
(a)  The red books record over 130 cash payments to Shotts.  Not one of them appears in the Sage record.
(b)  A significant number of Sage entries for Yaterex correspond in date with entries in the red book but not in amount.  These entries cannot be a mistaken transcription; the Sage record must have been made up from some different primary record.  (Inconsistencies on other accounts are often explicable as mistakes in transcription, and do not raise the same concerns).
(c)  On Yaterex, there are half a dozen consecutive red book entries with no matching payment in the Sage record; and 7 Sage entries with no matching cash book records.  There is no apparent good explanation for this inconsistency.  

81.	The matters referred to above are the most significant matters arising out of a consideration of the red books.  Taken in aggregate they reveal that the red books cannot be treated as the reliable indicator of cash payments that Mr Patel would say they are.  I think that they demonstrate that, so far as missing traders are concerned, they are not reliable, and are to a very material extent, if not completely, a contrivance.  I am not satisfied that the alterations which are clearly demonstrated are the correction of mistakes, or some legitimate and genuine reallocation of a payment. 

The discovery of different Sage records
82.	I have referred above to the existence of more than one Sage record.  When Mr Hill first conducted his analysis of Payless’s records he worked from what he thought was an appropriate version.  In the parlance of this case it became known as backup 2.  It was apparently a backup of the database as at 10th September 2009.  Then he discovered evidence of prints from an earlier version (backup 1 – 25th November 2007), covering some of the same period.  The two versions did not contain identical transactions in the overlap period, though some were the same.  The existence of these two versions suggested parallel, not consecutive, records.   Although no reason was given for this, it was not pressed on me as being, of itself, sinister.  Mr Hill did not treat it as having any sinister import.  In the absence of a clear case being put that it was, I do not so treat it.

83.	Then shortly before the trial Mr Hill discovered a third version (backup 3 dated 23rd November 2009).  It appears that this is a later version of what was in backup 2 - it is not a parallel version.  But a comparison of the two does have a relevance in considering the alleged transactions in relation to some of the missing traders.  

The trading with the missing traders
84.	What follows is an account of the relevant facts in relation to each of the missing traders.  Again, there are some generally applicable points which can be made at this stage because they are applicable to more than one trader.
The current corporate status of the missing traders
85.	With the exception of Stealth, which is the subject of a suspended striking off from the register, all the missing traders are either in winding up (Cube, Condor and Yaterex) or dissolved (the remainder).  

The individual representatives
86.	Although there are 10 missing traders, they shared a more limited number of representatives.  Mr Patel dealt with specified individuals in relation to each of them, none of which seemed to be directors of their respective companies.  They were as follows.
(i) A group of the companies were represented by a man known only as Ravi.  
(ii) A second group (Yaterex and Condor) was represented by someone known as Nihat Helvacioglou.  According to Mr Patel, Nihat could not write.  He has since apparently been deported.   Mr Patel was strangely incurious and unaffected by the fact that this man with whom he had done so much business should have been deported.

Chronology - handing over the baton
87.	In respect of some of the missing traders it can be seen that as one ceased to supply another took over, according to the trading records of Payless.  Thus it will be seen from the dates of trading that as Yaterex stopped, Condor started, and as Condor stopped, Delta started.  Later, ALB gave way to Applebeas, which gave way to Sunfyne, and as Sunfyne was finishing Shotts started.   Mr Butler suggested that this smacks of baton-passing in the sense of finding a new purported supplier when an existing one had its VAT-registered status terminated, the essence of his point being that what was required by Payless, and supplied by the representative in question, was a new VAT-registered company.    A chronological picture of the general method of trading as represented in Payless’s records, and the pattern of payments relating to each missing trader, can be seen from this bar graph produced by Mr Hill:

(In monochrome, the upper of the two bars for any company is the period of payments and the lower is the period of the invoices.)

I take them in the order in which they ostensibly commenced trading.  I generally give figures in round terms.

Cube
88.	The following facts are material in considering whether there was genuine trade with Cube to back the VAT input tax claims.
(i)  The records show that in the period investigated by Mr Hill, trading took place between November 2006 and April 2008.  Total payments of £11.04m are recorded, of which £273,000 are non-cash and the rest (97.6%) were apparently cash.       The non-cash payments were in only 5 of the months in question.  
(ii)  The records available to the liquidator show that as at April 2008 there was an apparent balance owing by Cube to Payless of almost £110,000 (i.e. Payless had overpaid).  The liquidator has found no correspondence in Payless’s records indicating a demand for payment of that sum.  However, it is apparent that there was some prior trading with Cube before the period investigated by Mr Hill, and it is just possible that this prior trading may affect the overall balance due in respect of Cube trading, so I do not treat this is a suspicious factor.
(iii)  Mr Hill was able to match some invoices to the non-cash payments.  Otherwise he was unable to match cash payments to invoices.  Typically, in the Sage records payments are recorded as “Payment on account”.
(iv)  Comparing the payments against the invoices demonstrates that significant amounts of credit were given by Cube to Payless.  From May to September 2007 Payless consistently owed around £400,000, and the amounts then rise steeply to a maximum of almost £1.2m in October before falling back to £200,000 by the end of the year, rising back up to £800,000 in January, and then falling and rising sharply until the final apparent balance.  
(v)  The representative who dealt for Cube was Harish Bhanderi.  Mr Patel said he had no means of contacting him directly, but could contact him through his (Mr Bhanderi’s) brother if necessary.
(vi)  Mr Patel’s nephew Jayesh was apparently an owner of Cube (according to Companies House records) but Mr Patel professed to have been ignorant of that fact.  In an interview with the Official Receiver Jayesh himself claimed to have been ignorant of his own directorship of this company.  This does not sound like a regularly run supplier.
(vii)  The invoices from Cube, so far as available, are white, non-multipart stationery.   They are in a good state, unfolded and mostly unmarked (apart from a pencilled nominal code number).  
(viii)  Three invoices in a gross amount of £50,349.70 do not seem to have been the subject of a VAT input tax claim.
(ix)  While the Sage records record invoices for the whole of the above period, there are no physical invoices from between mid-September 2007 until there are about 20 at the very end of the trading period.  Dozens of physical invoices are therefore missing.
(x)  The records of the company contain 2 Sage printouts with differing invoiced amounts.  A printout dated 19th May shows invoiced amounts of £3.4m,  whereas one dated 16th February 2010 shows an amount invoiced of £7.79m.  There are some common invoices but in the main different invoices are recorded on the two versions.  There is no apparent explanation (or at least no apparent good reason) for this discrepancy - both prints should have been the same if the company’s record keeping was regular and proper.  The “missing” invoices referred to above are all recorded on the later print (along with relatively few invoices corresponding to available invoices). 
(xi) Unlike invoices from some of the other missing traders, the invoices do not show a suspicious pattern of consecutive numbering. 
(xii)  There is no physical evidence that Mr Patel conducted any due diligence activity in relation to Cube.
(xiii)  The liquidator sought information about trading with Cube from those who seemed to be the officers of Cube.  They have not provided her with any particulars of such trading.   Cube is now in liquidation and its liquidator has told Miss Brittain that there are no records within Cube concerning trade with Payless, apart from some letters received by him from Mr Patel.
(xiv)  There are no documents relating to Cube other than the invoices - no purchase orders, correspondence, delivery notes or the like.
(xv)  Between 25th September 2007 and 12th April 2008 officers of HMRC made various visits to Cube’s premises.  Records were requested and, in essence, were never forthcoming.  Such Cube representatives as were seen were not able to, or did not, give proper accounts of the business.  On one occasion a break-in was given as the reason for the absence of records.  The officers were told that invoices were printed on the premises but copies were not retained.  On two other occasions invoices to Payless (among others) were seen, but an explanation for their presence was not given.  On 20th February 2008 officers were told that “nothing was happening”, and by 8th March the premises were closed up.  At a visit on 12th April 2008 a group of men were observed apparently burning company records, including invoices.  For the entire period of purported trading with Payless which is the subject of the assessments on which this case is based, Cube did not submit any VAT returns.  It is difficult in the extreme to treat Cube as a respectable trading entity, trading in accordance with acceptable trading norms.
89.	Practically all the factors above give rise to the greatest suspicion as to the reality of the purported trading between Payless and Cube.  There are few indicia of what would be regarded as normal trading practices; most of the above are indicia pointing against a normal trading relationship.

Yaterex
90.	Payless’s records suggest that there was trading with Yaterex between February 2007 and May 2007, with cash payments recorded from February 2007 to June 2007.  There are 87 invoices, dated on the majority of the working days from February to May.  The following facts are material.
(i)	The representative of Yaterex with whom Mr Patel dealt was Nihat. 
(ii)  Although trading purportedly started on 1st February 2007, no payment was shown until 23rd February, so that £400,000 of credit was afforded to Payless.  Over the period of trading the credit  twice peaked at £800,000.
(iii)  The invoices are numbered sequentially from 1 to 62, and then 163 to 189, with just 2 numbers missing.  This suggests no trading with anyone else in the periods covered by the invoices.
(iv)  The total invoiced trade was £2.8m.  £2.45m was paid in cash; no non-cash payments were made.   According to the cash records in the red books that would leave a balance owed by Payless of £394,000.  However, endorsed on a Sage printout of the Yaterex account bearing the date 14th July 2007 there is a written statement, written out in Mr Patel’s hand and signed by Mr Ahmet Asslam, a director of Yaterex, confirming the accuracy of the ledger and stating that there was a nil balance.  The Sage printout does not record a balance owing.  No explanation was given as to how there was discrepancy between the red book records and the Sage records.  
(v)  The invoices are again in prime, apparently unhandled, condition.
(vi)  Yaterex was deregistered for VAT in June 2007, whereupon trade stopped. 
(vii)  When Mr Hill was doing his initial work, he worked from a computerised Sage backup 2.  That record had no details of any trading with Yaterex.  Yet there were physical printouts from an apparent Sage record which did show such trading.  Since there was no evidence of deletions from the version from which Mr Hill originally worked, it must follow that printouts came from a different version of Sage records.  This turned out to be backup 1.  There was no evidence of deletion of Yaterex transactions from backup 2.  This does not encourage any belief that Payless’s records were accurate and conscientiously kept.
(viii)  Mr Patel instructed a company called Due Diligence Exchange Ltd to carry out some due diligence checks on Yaterex.  Their work is dated 21st March 2007.  By that time, according to Payless’s records, goods to the value of almost £1m had been supplied and £439,000 of cash paid.  This would support the idea that the due diligence checks were done for reasons of form, not substance.
(ix)  The liquidator has written to those who were directors of Yaterex from time to time, including Nihat, asking them to verify the trading position.  No reply was received. The Official Receiver, as liquidator of Yaterex (it was wound up on 12th March 2008), says he has no trading records.  Nihat failed to respond to a request from HMRC made on 2nd October 2007 for proof of payment from Payless to Yaterex.
(x)  Payless’s records do not contain any documents from Yaterex apart from invoices.  
(xi)  In interviews with HRMC officers on 27th May 2007, Nihat seems to have admitted that the 2 then directors were really his nominees.  Because of a criminal conviction he was under certain trading restrictions, so he took the view he was forced to do it.
91.	The overall picture given by the evidence is not one of a normal supplier engaging in normal trade with its customer.  

Condor
92.	Invoices from Condor span the period from 1st June 2007 to 29th June 2007. 33 invoices appear in Payless’s records, with an aggregate amount of just over £1m.  The following further facts are relevant.
(i)	There is no evidence of due diligence in relation to Condor.
(ii)  Its representative was Nihat.  It seems to have taken over from where Yaterex left off.
(iii)  The most recently recorded directors of Condor have not responded to a request by Ms Brittain for an interview.  Nor have they responded to orders for examination under section 236 of the Insolvency Act 1986.
(iv) According to HMRC, Condor did not file any VAT returns covering the period during which trading was said by Payless to have been taking place with it.  HMRC has, however, issued assessments covering the period of alleged trading with Payless.  
(v)  No documents relating to trading with Condor exist in Payless’s records other than invoices.  
(vi)  The person identified as being the director of Condor (Mr Orlauskas) denied being a director at an interview with HMRC on 27th July 2007.  He did, however, claim to have some knowledge of the company’s trading and said that the company had only 2 customers, neither of which was Payless. He claimed not to know Nihat, though his residence recorded him as living at a property of which Nihat was a joint owner.  In June 2007 Nihat told HMRC officers that he was a director of Condor; that is not recorded in any written record.
(vii)  The director of the company described by Mr Orlauskas as being Condor’s sole supplier denied receiving any money from Payless, and denied supply of various goods shown in Condor documents as having been supplied to it.
(viii)  Mr Hill’s analysis of Payless’s records shows that Condor was paid solely in cash, and that if one treats the red books as being the accurate record of cash receipts it is still owed some £380,000.   No demand for that sum appears in Payless’s records.  
(ix)  The Condor invoices in Payless’s record are in the same apparently unhandled condition as is referred to above.
 (x)  The invoices contain sequential numbering from 1 to 33 preceded by coding for the day and month.  This suggests no other invoices were issued by Condor for the relevant period. 
(xi)  The invoices bear what seem to be records of cash receipts, usually more than one payment per invoice.  If that is what they are then by and large they correspond with red book entries up to 6th July 2007.  Thereafter the markings on the invoices continue but the red book entries stop.  The continuing entries seem to correspond with Sage records.  Mr Hackett drew attention to the fact that the later Sage entries which do not have a corresponding red book entry have a high degree of correlation with Delta entries in the red books which do not correspond to Delta Sage entries, the suggestion perhaps being (though it was never put) that this was an apparent mis-attribution.  
(xii)  Payless’s records contain a printout of a Sage supplier activity summary relating to Condor, showing a nil  balance owing and bearing a signed acknowledgment by Mr Soylu, a director of Condor, to the effect that he has reconciled the account with his company’s books and that it is accurate.  The wording of the acknowledgment is in Mr Patel’s hand.  Mr Soylu’s signature is added to that wording.  The printout was made at 4.03pm on 20th July 2007.  There is the same date below the signature, written in manuscript, probably in a third hand.   The accuracy of this document presupposes the inaccuracy of the red books in relation to cash receipts, because it reflects payments not recorded there (but in the same amounts as are attributed to Delta).  The formality of this step contrasts strongly with the informality with which the cash side of Payless’s business was undertaken.  I strongly doubt its genuineness.
93.	Once again the method and pattern of trading does not suggest regular trading with the characteristics one would expect in arm’s length trading of this magnitude.

Delta
94.	Payless’s records suggest that trading with Delta started in July 2007.  The first recorded invoice is dated 5th July 2007. Chronologically at least it seems to have taken up where Condor left off, but the pattern of trading is different when compared with other missing traders.   There are 24 invoices between then and 27th July; then a gap until 4th October when there are 5 in 2 days; then a gap until 6th November when there are 7; then a gap until 4th December when there are 6 over 3 days.   Excel spreadsheets then indicate a resumption of trading in February 2009 for about a month.  This last period of trading is not reflected in the assessments in which this action is rooted.
95.	The following additional facts are material.
(i)  Although the apparent trading was somewhat stop-start in 2007, the pattern of recorded payments is rather more spread out across the second half of that year.  There are cash payments in the red book from 7th July to 7th August, and then from 14th August there are cheque payments spread out in the period between then and Christmas.  59% of the payments were by cheque (or direct transfer).  No payments are recorded as being made after December 2007.
(ii)  There is no link between the amount of any cash payments and any particular invoices.  There are some invoices which can be linked to some non-cash payments.
(iii)  The records show an overpayment of £383,000 by the end of the first 6 months of trading, for which there is no evidence of correction.   No explanation for this was offered, but I note that this sum is not far off the apparent underpayment to Condor.  The possibility of misattribution as between these companies was vaguely floated by Mr Hackett (see above under Condor), but not pursued.  It is not easy to see how there could have been a persistent honest mistake of this nature.
(iv)  If the £383,000 is carried forward, the result of the 2009 trading then leaves Payless owing Delta £1.5m, for which there has been no apparent demand.  If the £383,000 falls to be attributed to Condor then there is a £1.83m debt owing on Payless’s own books.
(v)  The invoices demonstrate the same unhandled look as is referred to above.
(vi)  In contrast to many other missing traders, the invoices describe the number and volume of product, and not just the names of the product comprised within it.
(vii)  In 2008 HMRC uplifted various documents from Delta, including 44 invoices from Delta to Payless.   This is almost the number (44) of the invoices reflected in the total records as set out by Mr Hill.  Although I have not seen a comparison, it looks as though, unlike most of the other missing traders, Delta had got invoices corresponding to those in, or recorded in, Payless’s records.
(viii)  In the first period of trading Mr Patel dealt with Mr Dhanda at Delta.  Mr Dhanda has told the liquidator that he ceased to deal with Payless when too many cheques bounced.  But the important thing is that Mr Dhanda has accepted that he dealt with Payless.   He denied any dealing after December 2007 (in essence).  
96.	I do not think that the first phase of trading with Delta demonstrates the same shortcomings as the other missing traders, or at least not to the same extent, and there are pointers to genuine trade.  There are significant non-cash payments; the trading is three or 4 short bursts; and the representative of Delta has corroborated the fact of some real dealing.  I do not find the claim established in relation to that point.  The second phase (2009) falls outside the scope of the present claim.

ALB
97.	Trading with ALB ostensibly started in April 2008 according to the apparent invoicing, as Cube left the scene.  It went on until May.  Payments ostensibly went on until June.  In that time the trade was apparently just over £1.5m.  The following facts and matters are relevant.
(i)  All payments to ALB were in cash.  
(ii)  As with the other missing traders, cash payments cannot be directly linked as being in satisfaction of any invoice.  They are described as payments on account.
(iii)  The first invoice was dated 7th April 2008.  By the time the first payment of ALB is recorded on 19th April (a payment of just short of £94,000) the debt of Payless to ALB was almost £1m.  That is a very large amount of credit to be allowed to a new trading counterparty in such a short period of time, with no apparent checks, negotiations or formalities in the relationship. 
(iv)  The representative of ALB was Ravi.  Mr Patel did not deal with anyone else, and there is no suggestion that he knew anything about anyone at ALB.  This was the first time he had had dealings with Ravi.  Apparently Ravi came looking for him.  Mr Patel carried out no due diligence checks on Ravi.  
(v)  The ALB invoices have the “hardly handled” appearance.
(vi)  The invoices are sequentially numbered from 1788 to 1833, with no breaks.  This suggests no trading with any other entity in the period.
(vii)  ALB was deregistered for VAT on 8th May 2008.  That coincided with the cessation of trading with Payless.
(viii)  HMRC have examined ALB’s records.  They contain no reference to Payless.
(ix)  The director of ALB up to 4th February 2008 was Mr Colin Hunt.  The records show that on that date Keith and Valerie Russell became directors.  On 7th April 2008 ALB’s accountant told HMRC officers that Mr Hunt had told him the preceding week that he had ceased to be a director and was selling the business to the Russells.  The accountant presented a picture of Mr Hunt’s being overwhelmed by detail, unable to read computer screens, and operating from a tiny office with a broken computer. On paper ALB had made a large profit, but Mr Hunt was incapable of understanding this.  
(x)  Mr Hunt failed to attend planned interviews.
(xi)  The directors are apparently now untraceable.
(xii)  Payless’s and HMRC’s records show some limited due diligence records in relation to ALB.
(xiii)  In Payless’s records there are handwritten receipts for cash payments from Payless to ALB from 2nd April to 16 May 2008.  They total £1.163m.  Like the invoices, they have a “hardly handled” appearance.  They are apparently written in the same hand and with the same pen.
(xiv)  There are a couple of instances in the red books where an entry for ALB has apparently been written in on a different occasion from the other entries for that day - they are in different ink.
(xv)  Although ALB did not file a VAT return for the period in which Payless claims they were trading, it was assessed in respect of substantial amounts of VAT (approximately £2m) in the preceding year.  Mr Hackett relies on this as evidence that ALB was actually trading in amounts sufficient to have supplied Payless with the amounts claimed.
98.	Once again a large number of these factors cast serious doubts as to the genuineness of the alleged trading.   They do not present a picture of what can be described as a normal substantial trading relationship.
Applebeas
99.	The first transaction with Applebeas is recorded as being 15th May 2008 - just a week after ALB was de-registered.  Mr Patel’s evidence was that Ravi presented this company as a new trading partner when ALB ceased.  The last recorded invoice was 14th November.  396 invoices are apparently recorded, an average of over 2 invoices per day.  The gross invoice sum from the available records is £13.7m.
100.	The following material facts emerge.
(i)  As appears above, this is Ravi’s second introduction, and he was the representative throughout.  He was, however, unknown to Mr Hunt, who claimed to have managed this company for at time, or to Mr Brown, another manager.
(ii)  The Applebeas invoices are numbered in a continuous sequential run from 100 to 469a, missing only no. 257; from 452 onwards there are invoices to which letters  “a”, “b” and so on are added, but the run is still sequential.   This strongly suggests that Payless was Applebeas’ only trading partner in that period.  
(iii)  There are two copies of invoice no 330.  On one the date has been amended in manuscript from 15th September 2008 to 15th August; the second is printed as dated 15th August.  Its numerical sequence would put it in September.  Invoices 328, 329 and 331 are also dated in a way which puts them at various dates in August when their natural run (if numbered in the order in which they were drawn) would put them in September.  Although this point was not investigated in the evidence, it is hard to see how this can have happened in a properly run business, delivering and invoicing in an orderly way.  
(iv)  As with other missing traders, the presentation of the records shows a large amount of credit being persistently extended.  In the first month of business the invoiced amount was £1.1m, and at one point in November 2008 Payless owed Applebeas a net amount of £5.8m.  
(v)  The invoices present as unhandled white computer prints.
(vi)  Virtually all payments to Applebeas were in cash (95.7%).  As with the other missing traders, it is not possible to link any given cash payment to any specific invoice.  The “payment on account” system seems to have taken place again.
(vii)  On one reading the records reflect that Payless still owes Applebeas a very significant sum - £1.2m or perhaps even £2.4m, depending on how one treats certain invoices (see below).
(viii)  As part of his due diligence exercise, Mr Patel made an inquiry as to Applebeas’ VAT registration number.  He did so in a letter received by HMRC on 5th June 2008.  The letter is not itself dated, but I infer it was sent a day or so before that.  By then he had been trading with Applebeas for 3 weeks. Mr Patel had enclosed an unimpressive letter of introduction, a copy passport of Mrs Lee, the apparent director, a couple of account documents, certificate of VAT registration and a certificate of incorporation.   HMRC’s response was that  it was unable to confirm that Applebeas’ was a valid registration, apparently because the information provided was not the same as that held by Customs (in some unspecified way).   Payless carried on trading anyway.  I think that this sort of exercise was carried out as a matter of form, not because Payless was in any way concerned about the status of its supplier as a reputable supplier.  
(ix)  The director of Applebeas was a Mrs Rachel Lee.  When visited on 11th September 2008 by HMRC officials she seemed to have no knowledge of the business of the company.  A Mr Brown, who was also there on that day, said he had recently replaced Mr Colin Hunt as manager of the company and that he, Mr Brown, had approached her to become that manager, which is an odd way round of doing things.  Mr Brown said that little business had been done since a previous visit on 10th July.  Payless’s own records show hundreds of thousands of pounds of trading in that period.   His remark, and Payless’s records, cannot be reconciled.  Mr Brown did not mention Payless as a trading partner.  He mentioned trading with other names (but the continuous invoice numbering of Applebeas’ invoices would suggest otherwise).  When subsequently questioned by the liquidator’s staff, Mr Brown was unable to identify Applebeas’ main suppliers.  Mrs Lee, at an interview, said she knew little of Applebeas’ trade, having allowed Mr Hunt to look after it for her while she was having a baby.  
(x)  Mr Hunt was interviewed by the liquidator’s representatives shortly before the trial and a note of the interview was produced by the liquidator.  He did refer to trade with Payless, but could not recall the names of any customer other than Payless.  He never saw any stock, and never saw or received any cash.  A Mr Russell always collected the cash.    
(xi)  Applebeas submitted only one VAT return, in July 2008, when it declared very much less by way of sales and output tax than the trading to that date  recorded by Payless.
(xii)  I have referred above to the question of whether there was an outstanding balance due to Applebeas.  When Mr Hill first did his work he concluded that there was such a balance, because the documents he was working from showed outstanding invoices of about £1.2m.   A later study of the Sage records available to him revealed a run of invoices, at the end of the period of trading, had been deleted from the Sage records.  The aggregate of the deleted invoices amounted to over £1m, though deleting them would not quite remove the outstanding balance.  Those deleted invoices on the Sage system span the period from 28th October 2008  to 14th November 2008 .  The way in which Sage maintains its records, and the various backed up versions of the records, enables one to see that the invoices were still shown on the system as at 17th December, and were deleted at some time after that.   So some of them were on the system for over a month and a half, and all of them for a month.  Mr Patel’s explanation for this deletion was that the goods in question were never delivered, though the invoices had been rendered and then put on the system, so they had to be deleted.  I find this explanation to be untrue.  On Mr Patel’s own account of the way his business worked, even if an invoice was delivered in advance of the goods (which was unlikely in itself) it would have become apparent within a few days that goods had not been delivered, and Payless’s book-keeping systems would have been unlikely to have entered the invoices that quickly anyway.  It is unlikely in the extreme that the sequence of invoices would have continued to be rendered, and entered, with no corresponding deliveries for so long.  I find that it is no coincidence that Applebeas was deregistered for VAT on 21st October, which is shortly before this run of invoices.    I think that the only explanation for the deletion of these invoices is that they were entered on to Sage at some point, then it was appreciated that Applebeas registration was cancelled on 21st October, so they could not be presented as trading because Mr Patel did not wish to be seen to be trading with an unregistered trader.  So they were deleted.  They were deleted because they never represented genuine transactions in the first place.  I am satisfied that, taken in the context of the rest of the evidence, this is an instance of false records being further falsified when it was appreciated that the original false impression was one which Payless no longer wanted to give.
(xiv)  There are manuscript receipts for cash payments, but they are £2m short of the total trading apparently shown in the books of the company and some are not matched by entries in the red books.  They are all in the same handwriting.  It is not clear who signed them but it seems that an attempt may have been made to sign some with the name “Lee” though the signature is not hers.  The receipts are  numbered sequentially but the consecutive numbering is inconsistent with their purported dates.
(xv)  Some of the Applebeas entries in the red books have been amended in a different hand, obviously at some point after they were initially recorded.
101.	The overall picture in relation to Applebeas is not one of regular trading with a regularly conducted supplier.  The above facts are so far out of the normal that it is not possible to treat the Applebeas recorded transactions as being genuine trades.  
Sunfyne
102.	The material facts in relation to Sunfyne are as follows.
(i)  The first Sunfyne invoice is dated 2nd November 2008; the last is 4th January 2009.  In terms of timing it took up where Applebeas left off.
(ii)  The total invoiced amount is £2,465,050.
(iii)  All payments other than £150,000 were paid in cash.  No payment at all was made until 9th January, i.e. after the last invoice.  Only £105,000 was paid during January.  The remaining payments (roughly 60 of them) were paid over the period between 5th February and 24th March, with one more in April and one more in May.  So by the end of trading Payless had not paid any invoiced sum.  
(iv)  According to the available records, at the end of the payment period Sunfyne had been overpaid in the sum of £99,686.  Mr Hill suggests that an explanation for this is that there may be some undiscovered invoices, but if that is right then there must be some such invoices which are both undiscovered and not entered on Sage, and there is no indication in the records as to how Mr Patel can have known for how long, and in what sum, he should keep on paying Sunfyne.
(v)  Sunfyne’s representative was Ravi.  So in this sense too  Sunfyne took up from where Applebeas left off.  
(vi)  The invoices (64) are all numbered sequentially, starting at 90A, with some A and B sub-numbering.
(vii)  The invoices from 126 to 132 have not had their VAT element (£39,226.19) reclaimed.
(ix)  Once again the invoices are white, on A4 paper and are in apparently unhandled condition.  Frequently they do not set out the number and volume of the product.  They are in identical format to the ALB invoices.  However, unlike the other invoices, they have a “Code” column.  
(x)  HMRC have provided invoices from Sunfyne to Rochdale Drinks Distribution Limited covering the period between 1st December 2008 and 26th December 2008, and sequentially numbered from 121 to 120 (i.e. a number range within the numbering of the invoices purportedly given to Payless).
(xi)  Sunfyne was dissolved without an intervening winding up on 3rd August 2010.
(xii)  Mr Patel sought validation of the VAT number on 27th November 2008 (i.e. after he started trading), and got it on 29th November.   By this time the records of Payless reflect sales of over £1.1m.
(xiii)  On 27th January Mr Bullock, a director of Sunfyne, was interviewed by the liquidator’s solicitors.  He said he had never heard of Payless and Sunfyne had ceased to trade on 18th December 2008 (contrary to what Payless’s records show - they show invoices dated up to 5th January 2009).  
(xiv)  Sunfyne’s VAT return for the period 1st to 17th December 2008 record sales of £327,857, whereas Payless’s records show purchases by it alone from Sunfyne of over £707,000.
(xv)  The first cash payment to Sunfyne recorded in the red book is on 5th February 2009.  It is in my view an entry written in after the rest of the entries for the day were completed, because it is on the same line as the date heading, which does not normally happen.  The line where one would expect to see the carried forward figure has an Applebeas entry added over Tippex, and the carried forward line has been pushed down one line, so it is against the date of the next day.  It is apparent to me that after the day’s entries were completed, and indeed after the next day’s entries were entered, the Sunfyne entry (actually mis-spelt as “Sanfyne”) was added, the carried forward entry was tippexed out so that the Applebeas entry could be added, and a recast carried forward figure was added one line below where it originally was.  Thereafter there is a Sunfyne entry on almost every day until the entries in that book stop on 19th March (there is a date heading for 20th March, but with no entries under it.  On every occasion where Sunfyne’s name appears up to and including 5th March Sunfyne’s name has been written on Tippex which obscures the name of an originally entered payee.  It is not possible to see what name has been tippexed out for many of the entries, but one can detect that name for some entries.  On 2nd March, 25th February, 16th February and 5th February, for example, one can see that Applebeas’ name has been originally written.  There was no forensic evidence as to what was under the Tippex, but I can see for myself, by holding up the paper to a strong enough light, what is written underneath for at least those dates.   It seems, and I find, that up until some date after 5th March (whenever it was that the 5th March entry was made) the cash book was made up showing Applebeas as the recipient of cash, and that on a date thereafter a decision was made to re-write the recipient’s name as Sunfyne.  It is difficult to imagine how this can have been done for a legitimate reason to make the records accord with reality.  Mr Patel surmised that this was the new boy making a mistake, but I think that it is highly unlikely.  It is much more likely to have been done so as to fabricate an apparent reality, and I find that it was.
(xvi)  There are other red book inconsistencies.  On 1st March Sunfyne is shown as receiving £42,000, in an entry on which both the amount and payee are written over Tippex.  On a separate sheet containing red book type entries for the same period in pencil, written in a different hand from the contemporaneous red book entries (it is probably Mr Ramachandran’s), Sunfyne is shown as receiving £35,590.  Similar differences can be seen for other dates.  Mr Patel suggested that this was Mr Ramachandran correcting Hiren’s mistake, but that is unlikely.  The Ramachandran entries are in pencil and look like drafts.  Hiren’s are in ink; and one would have expected Mr Ramachandran to have corrected mistakes in the red books themselves, not on loose sheets where his pencil entries occur.
103.	These are all serious irregularities, which are overall inconsistent with regular trade.  They are badges of a contrived trade, not an actual trade.

Stealth
104.	The relevant and significant facts in relation to Stealth are as follows.
(i)  Stealth’s invoices started on 17th November 2008 and the last was dated 30th January 2009.  The total invoiced sum was £1.717m.  
(ii)  No payments are recorded to Stealth until 25th March 2009.  So the whole £1.717m was left outstanding, with no payments of any invoices, for almost 2 months.  The ostensible balance was then apparently paid over a period ending in mid-May.  That is not normal trading.  Mr Patel suggested that 90 days credit was normal in the business.  But that is not, in my view, a good explanation of this very unusual pattern of payment.
(iii)  All recorded payments are cash.  
(iv)  The records suggest an overpayment to Stealth in the sum of £24,305.   There is no apparent demand for the repayment of this apparent overpayment.  Mr Hill suggests that unrecorded invoices might explain this matter, but that it not a likely explanation (in respect of genuine trade) - the invoices would have to be missing in fact, unrecorded on the Excel spreadsheet and unrecorded in Sage, in which case it is hard to see how they came to be paid in the first place.
(v)  The invoices again present as unhandled, and are consecutively numbered, though this time preceded by the initials “PL” (presumably connoting Payless), so the consecutive numbering does not of itself suggest that Payless was its only customer in the period.  
(vi)  Four invoices do not seem to have been the subject of a claim to reclaim input tax; the unclaimed VAT is £19,228.
(vii)  One of the invoices is dated 31st November 2008.  That could, of course, be an honest mistake on a genuine invoice, but in the context of the totality of the evidence about this supplier and the rest of the evidence, it is more likely to be a mistake by someone paying insufficient attention to creating a run of invoices designed to present a picture, rather than a mistake by someone preparing a genuine invoice.
(viii)  A  director of Stealth, Mr Martins, has not responded to the liquidator’s request for information.  Previously, post sent to his address had been returned.
(ix)  It appears that Mr Patel asked HMRC for confirmation of Stealth’s VAT number at some stage in or prior to September 2008, but his letter is not available.  He was not given that confirmation but got a printout of the number on the Europa website on 20th November.  He renewed his request on 28th November (after he apparently started trading) and got a confirmation on 1st December.  Re-confirmation was sought in April, but it was not forthcoming.  In fact Stealth had been de-registered with effect from 19th January 2009.  
(x)  Stealth’s own VAT returns for the period covered by the apparent trading with Payless records sales of £4.6m but no purchases.  
(xi)  As with the other missing traders, there are no documents for Stealth in the records of Payless other than invoices and some due diligence documents.  
(xii)  Again, Ravi was the representative with whom Mr Patel dealt.  He dealt with no-one else.
(xiii)  There is a Sage printout generated on 18th May 2009 which does not reflect the receipt of any payments at all.  Mr Hill only discovered that payments had been entered into Sage when he discovered the second of his backups to be discovered.  It therefore seems that the cash payments were un-entered for many months after the red books recorded them as being made.
(xiv)  Attempts by HMRC to contact individuals concerned with Stealth, either at its apparent premises or by post, have all been unsuccessful.  
(xv)  At present there is a pending dissolution of Stealth, which the liquidator has asked to be postponed.
105.	Once again, the features of these trades, and especially the gap between invoices and payment, indicate strongly that this is not genuine, regular trading.  

AHA
106.	Trade with this company was only brief and sporadic.  There is a recorded payment by cheque of £4,772 in February 2008, with no apparent matching invoice.  In July 2008 a cheque payment of £3,524 was made.  This can be matched, at least in amount, with an invoice of the same month.  There is nothing irregular or suspicious about any of this activity.
107.	Between 30th May 2009 and 5th June 2009 there were 5 invoices totalling £237,172.32.  From 21st June 2009 to 18th August 2009 unallocated cash payments (apparently on account) of £244,322 are recorded, leaving an overall overpaid balance of £11,932.  Thus again there was an apparent extended credit period, and trading with AHA had ceased over 2 weeks before any payment was made.
108.	The following further relevant facts exist in relation to trade with this company:
(i)  The contact with whom Mr Patel dealt in this last period was Nihat.
(ii)  Some of the invoices have recorded written receipts on them.  
(iii)  The company’s name is misspelt on some, but not all, of its invoices, as is its given email address (the middle “e” is missing).  This is an unlikely mistake for a genuine trading company to make.
(iv)  The invoices have the same unhandled appearance as is referred to above.
(v)  Mr Patel sought confirmation from HMRC of the validity of AHA’s VAT number on 13th June 2009 (after trading had commenced).  The response on 16th June did not confirm it.  Further requests were made over the months until November.  This suggests some sort of anxiety to trade with AHA again.  It is not easy to see why Mr Patel would want to do that if he had other regular suppliers.   The documentation submitted to HMRC included a letter of introduction in which AHA’s name was again consistently misspelt.  This casts doubt on the genuineness of the company and its operation, and the fact that Mr Patel seems not to have noticed this, or not to have cared, suggests that he did not much care about the identity and worth of his ostensible counterparty.
(vi)  Mr Singh claimed to have typed invoices for transport costs to AHA, but was unable to produce any copies.  He claimed to have had a burglary in which these were amongst the documents that were stolen.  I did not find this to be credible evidence.
(v)  The individual who was the director of AHA from 1st June 2009 has not responded to the liquidator’s request for information and has not complied with an order to provide information under section 236 of the Insolvency Act 1986. 
(vi)  AHA never submitted any VAT returns in respect of any trading.
The latter period of trading presents many of the same features as the trading that I referred to above as being non-regular and unusual.  I find that it fits into the same pattern.  However, the July 2008 invoice stands out as being different (as well as being displaced in time).  The evidence suggests, and I find, that this invoice was actually paid by a recorded transaction.  That transaction was, I find, valid.  That has a technical significance for the claim.  It is only that invoice, and the VAT said to have been paid pursuant to it, that falls within the scope of this claim.  The later trading period falls outside the period covered by the challenged VAT returns.   Thus the only AHA transaction which is the subject of the claim in this action is, on the facts, not capable of sustaining the claim.  Whatever the fate of the rest of the claim may be, that part of the claim, to that extent, fails.
 Shotts
109.	Payless’s records suggest that it traded with Shotts between January 2009 and July 2009.  The total amount invoiced appears to be £7.663m.  There were 201 invoices in a 193 day period.  Between May 2009 and October 2009 payments of £5.114m were made, all but £12,000 being in cash.  This gives rise to an apparent debt of £2.5m still owing from Payless.  There is no recorded demand for its payment.  
110.	The following relevant facts emerge from the evidence:
(i)  Chronologically the company took over from Sunfyne (the date of Shotts’ first invoice is the day after Sunfyne’s last).  
(ii)  As with all the missing traders, all the cash seems to be payment on account.
(iii)  By the time the first recorded payment is made in May 2009, over £6m was ostensibly due to Shotts.  Mr Patel’s averment of a 90 day credit period, even if true, does not explain this.
(iv)  The invoices again present as unhandled.
(v)  The invoices were entered on Sage in a very strange way.    Backup 2 (10th September 2009) showed invoices from January and March 2009 (plus 2 in February) only, totalling only some £1.4m.  However, backup 3 (23rd November 2009) showed another £6.2m (making the total referred to above).  This gave a run of invoices from January through to July (adding a lot in February), adding some 178 invoices.  It therefore appears that the extra invoices (for February, and then April to July) must have been added to Sage at some point after 10th September.  It is hard to conceive of a legitimate reason for this.  It is to be noted that none of these additional invoices are noted on the Excel spreadsheet.   It then transpired that there were physical invoices corresponding to these entries.  They had been uplifted by HMRC, and had not been made available to the liquidator despite requests for all relevant documents and assurances they had been provided.  HMRC’s record in providing all relevant documents to the liquidator in this case  leaves much to be desired (as was reflected by the fact that HMRC felt constrained to instruct counsel to explain the position to me).  However, the position remains that the additional invoices were apparently added to the Sage database long after their respective dates.  
(vi)  The numbering of the invoices presents suspicious activity.  Those invoices reflected in backup 2 run from 1 to 38.  The invoices added in to backup 3 start at 2nd February with no. 1701, and then run to no. 1764 (the numbering is not always absolutely consecutive when ordered by date). They split no. 15 from no. 16, and no 16 from no. 17.  Somewhere in the middle no. 49 appears.  Then on 1st April no. 39 appears, and the numbering goes on to 135, with no 96 as a last outlier.  There is no obviously good reason for this.  The way the numbers run, and the late addition to the Sage database, give the appearance of a late insertion of invoices into gaps, which raises serious questions about their validity. 
(vii)  Shotts were deregistered for VAT on or about 8th July and it was so informed by a letter of that date.  This is about 2 weeks after the last of the main run of invoices, though there is one outlier invoice of 16th July.  
(viii)  Shotts has never submitted any VAT returns in respect of any trading and has not provided documentary evidence in support of the contention that it made supplies to Payless.
111.	Once again this pattern of events presents non-regular (in the sense of out of the ordinary) trade and is reflected in business records which are not conventionally constructed.  
Conclusion on trading
112.	Having made those findings I turn back to the question of whether it has been established that the claims for input tax which are the subject of recoupment under the assessments referred to above were proper claims, based on real transactions which are all reflected in the original returns, or whether they are not based on proper transactions and are contrivances which do not reflect reality.   If they are the latter then they were deliberate acts and were wrongful, and (as observed above) Mr Patel through his counsel accepts that Mr Patel will inevitably be liable for having brought them about.
113.	I bear in mind that the liquidator bears the burden of proof in relation to this matter.  She must show that the transactions cannot and should not be treated as genuine, so the real question for me is not so much which of two alternatives I should choose from, but whether the liquidator has proved her case.  I also bear in mind the enhanced standard of proof (within the test of balance of probabilities) that such a serious charge attracts.
114.	The above findings demonstrate at the very least a very unconventionally carried on business whose record-keeping was poor and inaccurate.   However, a badly run business, with badly kept books, and with unorthodox business practices, is not necessarily a fraudulently run business.  The liquidator has to satisfy me that the shortcomings of the business in relation to the missing traders was not just an odd approach, or incompetence, but that they demonstrate a business in which its primary accounting records and evidence cannot be right and were deliberately fabricated to reflect something other than reality.  
115.	I have come to the clear conclusion that that is indeed the effect of the evidence.  The cumulative effect of the shortcomings cannot, in my view, be attributed to accident, incompetence or an honest mistaken view of the business world.  It is unnecessary and inappropriate for me to rehearse again the factors which I have described above, but I can summarise the main points as follows:
i)	The red books, which Mr Patel insisted were the best record of what happened in relation to cash, shows clear evidence of alteration of records with no good reason for that alteration.  This is both by altering the payee, altering the amount and late insertion.  The existence of two sets of inconsistent entries for the same period, without any explanation and any attempt to say which was the right one, means that their reliability is immediately called into question.  That reliability is also impeached by the other criticisms of the books which I have made above.  They are not true records of what they purport to record, at least so far as payments to the missing traders are concerned.
ii)	The Sage records, on which the VAT returns were based, cannot be relied on because they contain unaccounted for deletions and other faults which cannot be attributed to bad practice or accident.
iii)	The trading patterns of several of the missing traders is not what one would call regular.  The long periods for which large sums were left outstanding make the transactions look highly unusual.  The amounts and proportions of cash paid are huge. 
iv)	Mr Patel’s ignorance of most of the suppliers and their representatives is most suspicious. 
v)	Most of the missing traders do not have the attributes of normal businesses.  They have more of the attributes of fronts.
vi)	The pattern of invoices is suspicious in many cases.  The consistently unhandled nature is also a cause for suspicion, though I acknowledge that this feature is shared with early Delta trading which I have already held not to be impeachable. 
vii)	Mr Patel has no, or no plausible, explanation for many of the suspicious factors referred to above, and in particular for the alterations, additions to and deletions from the red books.
116.	These principal matters, and the findings that I have made above, demonstrate to the required standard that the trade with the missing traders was not as it was represented in the company’s records so far.  I reject Mr Patel’s account of his dealings with the missing traders so far as he sought to project a sequence of events which consisted of orders, deliveries, proper invoices reflecting those orders and payment of invoices.  He may well have ordered goods but he did not do so from the missing traders in that orderly and conventional fashion.  Something else was going on.  The company’s records were intended to project what Mr Patel wished them to project, which was not the reality.  I find that invoices and Sage records were generated in order to be able to make a claim for input tax and without there being underlying trades corresponding to what those invoices and records purported to reflect.  In short, the trade with the missing traders, if any (and subject to the limited exceptions appearing above) was not what it purported to be.  The due diligence exercises were conducted for the sake of form (so that Mr Patel could say he carried out some checks).  What was important to him was to have a company which could be identified as having an active VAT number, so that he could purportedly invoice it for VAT purposes.  As soon as it no longer had a valid VAT registration he dumped the use of that company in favour of another.  If he made a mistake, as he did with Applebeas, and failed to notice (or be informed) that the VAT registration of his “seller” had been terminated then he had the invoices relating to the non-registered period deleted from the records.  
117.	Mr Patel was frequently at pains to point out that there must have been some trades because he was selling large amounts of the sort of things he says he was buying from the missing traders and he must have been getting them from somewhere.  So, he said, there was no reason to doubt the apparent trades with the missing traders because that is where he said he got the beer (and wine)  from. 
118.	It was no part of the liquidator’s case that there was no trade at all in beer and wine.  It was not necessarily part of her case that there was no trade at all with the missing traders.  Her case was, whatever trade there may or may not have been, it was not the trade reflected in the disputed input tax claims.  There are various possibilities, including different trade with the missing traders at a different level and not involving VAT; trading with other completely different entities, free of VAT, for which the documentary trade with the missing traders is a cover; or no trade at all. There are doubtless other possibilities.  The liquidator does not seek to prove any of them.  She is entitled to adopt that stance of saying that the purported trade with the missing traders did not take place as documented, and does not have to go further and work out what was actually going on in Payless.  As I have observed, in many cases the proof of a fraud will, in practice, require it to be demonstrated what the context of the fraud was – otherwise the fraud is less plausible – but it is not an absolute necessity and in the present case the evidence that the purported trades were not genuine is sufficiently strong that the inability to complete the actual trading picture does not detract from the inferences that are to be drawn from the primary facts as I have found them to be.
119.	I have considered the other points raised by Mr Hackett in his final speech as pointing away from the fraud relied on.  One of the most compelling is the existence of some verifiable and verified bank payments made to some missing traders.  I have referred to their amounts above.  In the case of those payments there can be no doubt that money was paid to the missing trader.  However, it does not follow that they should be treated as a badge of legitimacy which demonstrates that all other transactions with that trader happened no matter how questionable they may otherwise seem.  Save for those transactions which I have already indicated were genuine, I do not find that those payments were necessarily linked to genuine invoices giving rise to genuine input tax.  The remaining suspicious factors in each case lead me to the conclusion that while money has been paid, the underlying trading is not as claimed.   Otherwise Mr Hackett’s submissions seek to demonstrate that the liquidator’s case does not create a smooth, internally and externally consistent whole.  That may be the case.  There are some wrinkles, but overall it is a compelling case and I find it established.
Overall conclusion and determination
120.	I therefore find that the claim in this case is made out.  Payless submitted VAT returns which contained claims for input tax which were not justified because, so far as they reflected missing trader trades, those trades did not take place as claimed and VAT input tax was not paid as claimed.  Mr Patel was responsible for that and as director he is liable to the company for the amounts wrongly claimed; as I have observed, Mr Hackett accepted that if wrongful claims were made then Mr Patel must, on the facts, be liable, and that sensible concession avoids discussion of precisely what the chain of causation was between Mr Patel and the returns.  The amount of the liability will have to be finalised – I have found a couple of small corners of the missing trader trading to be valid, or not demonstrated as invalid, and the award of damages or compensation will have to reflect that.  That finalisation can be done by agreement (I would hope), failing which I will rule on it.  I will also have to rule in due course on the appropriateness of continuing injunctive relief against the 2nd to 5th defendants.