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England and Wales High Court (Chancery Division) Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Chancery Division) Decisions >> Edwards & Ors v Hammersley [2020] EWHC 1925 (Ch) (20 July 2020) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2020/1925.html Cite as: [2020] EWHC 1925 (Ch) |
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BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALES
INSOLVENCY AND COMPANIES LIST (Ch D)
IN THE MATTER OF PARAGON OFFSHORE PLC (IN LIQUIDATION)
AND IN THE MATTER OF THE INSOLVENCY ACT 1986
7 The Rolls Building Fetter Lane London EC4A 1NL |
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B e f o r e :
____________________
NICHOLAS GUY EDWARDS | ||
DAVID PHILIP SODEN | ||
NEVILLE BARRY KAHN | ||
(the Former Administrators of Paragon Offshore plc (in liquidation)) | Applicants | |
And | ||
MICHAEL R. HAMMERSLEY | Respondent |
____________________
Mr Michael Hammersley, acting in person
Hearing dates: 23 April 2020, 11 May 2020 and 22 May 2020
____________________
Crown Copyright ©
Covid-19 Protocol: This judgment was handed down by the judge remotely by circulation to the parties' representatives by email and release to Bailii. The date and time for hand-down is deemed to be 10:30 am on 20 July 2020.
Introduction
Background facts
The US Chapter 11 proceedings
(a) the RCF Lenders (as defined below) and the Term Loan Lenders (as defined below) will receive their pro rata share of:
(i) a $410 million cash payment;
(ii) senior secured first lien debt (in the face amount of $85 million);
(iii) 50% of the equity interests in Reorganised Paragon (a Newco to be set up) that are to be distributed pursuant to the UK Sale Transaction ("Reorganised Paragon Equity") (subject to dilution by a management incentive plan); and
(iv) 50% of the Class A Litigation Trust Interests and 25% of the Class B Litigation Trust Interests,
in consideration for a full release of the RCF and the Term Loan;
(b) the Senior Noteholders (as defined below) will receive their pro rata share of:
(i) a $105 million cash payment;
(ii) 50% of the Reorganised Paragon Equity (subject to dilution of a management dilution plan); and
(iii) 50% of the Class A Litigation Trust Interests and 75% of the Class B Litigation Trust Interests,
in consideration for the full release of the Senior Notes; and
(c) the holders of General Unsecured Claims will receive cash in an amount equal to the lesser of 30% of their claim or their pro rata share of $5 million; and
(d) there will be no return to the shareholders of Paragon on the basis that the existing ordinary shares have no economic value, Paragon being insolvent.
Revolving credit facility ( referred to above as the RCF Lenders) US$755,764,000
Term loan facility ( referred to above as the Term Loan Lenders) US$641,875,000
6.75% senior notes (referred to above as the Senior Noteholders) -US$474,636,199
7.25% senior notes (referred to above as the Senior Noteholders) - $546,114,112
Law and Practice relating to discharge pursuant to paragraph 98 Schedule B1
'(1) Where a person ceases to be the administrator of a company (whether because he vacates office by reason of resignation, death or otherwise, because he is removed from office or because his appointment ceases to have effect) he is discharged from liability in respect of any action of his as administrator.
(2) The discharge provided by sub-paragraph (1) takes effect
(c) in any case, at a time specified by the court.
(3)
(3A)
(4) Discharge -
(a) applies to liability accrued before the discharge takes effect, and
(b) does not prevent the exercise of the court's powers under paragraph 75.'
'(1) The court may examine the conduct of a person who
(a) is or purports to be the administrator of a company; or
(b) has been or has purported to be the administrator of a company.
(2) An examination under this paragraph may be held only on the application of
(a)
(b)
(c) the liquidator of the company,
(d) a creditor of the company, or
(e) a contributory of the company.
(3) An application under sub-paragraph (2) must allege that the administrator
(a) has misapplied or retained money or other property of the company,
(b) has become accountable for money or other property of the company,
(c) has breached a fiduciary or other duty in relation to the company, or
(d) has been guilty of misfeasance.
(4) On an examination under this paragraph into a person's conduct the court may order him
(a) to repay, restore or account for money or property;
(b) to pay interest;
(c) to contribute a sum to the company's property by way of compensation for breach of duty or misfeasance.
(5)
(6) An application under sub-paragraph (2) may be made in respect of an administrator who has been discharged under paragraph 98 only with the permission of the court'
The objections raised by Mr Hammersley
(1) Paragon was not insolvent as at the date that the administration order was made ( 23 May 2017)
' The problem is twofold; one, equity is so under the money -- out of the money, excuse me, or underwater that it would take, literally, a billion dollars or significantly more, maybe a billion three, a billion four, to put equity in the money. That is a huge amount of money that will have to come into the estate to put equity in the money based on increasing the amount of value available to get from Noble. Based on my years of experience that's not a settlement number that you would ever get from Noble. That's a number that will require litigation and victory.'
Also at page 71, '..So I think the adequate representation point is important, but not sufficiently significant to overcome the fact that equity is simply out of the money in this case.'
At page 149 of the transcript the Judge dealt with valuation issues which had been raised.
' With regard to the equity committee objections on valuation, again, the evidence here overwhelmingly supports the debtors' valuation. The debtors' valuation was not challenged. The question is not a question of book value; it's a question of reorganization value, it's a question of liquidation value, it's a question of fair market value. And the evidence overwhelmingly indicates there's at least 1.3 to $1.5 billion of shortfall before you get to a place where there would be any return to equity. That clearly supports cramming down equity. It indicates that unsecured creditors or any creditor senior to equity is not receiving more than they're entitled to. And since they're not getting everything they're entitled to, equity is not entitled to any recovery.'
'I'm going to deny the motion for a variety of reasons; primarily, on a theory of collateral estoppel, there is nothing that has fundamentally changed as a result of the post-confirmation adjustment in the previous case, and this case as well, that changes the fundamental precept behind the Court's refusal to appoint an equity committee in the prior case, as well as its confirmation of that plan, which is that equity of PLC is fundamentally out of the money to the tune of over a billion dollars
That included -- that determination included a valuation of the Prospector entities; i.e., the value of the debtors' equity in those entities as part of the finding that the value was insufficient to put the creditors -- excuse me --to put the equity in the money.
Absent a finding it was a substantial possibility that equity will get a return, the Court cannot and should not appoint an equity committee and burden the negotiation with the participation of a fully-funded entity that is representing a constituent's fee that is simply out of the money.
Whether the assets of Prospector were restricted or unrestricted and outside or inside the ability of the creditors to attach, the reality is that once the value of those entities works its way up the equity chain, it gets to PLC and the value of the equity in those entities, even if those entities' assets aren't available, but the equity in those entities is available and part of the assets of PLC that were subject to the previous bankruptcy.
So, there's been no change.
The Court has already heard, in connection with the previous case, arguments with regard to this very issue of valuation, in connection with deciding a motion to appoint equity committee in the previous case, as well as confirming that plan and there is nothing that has changed as a result of the circumstances.
With regard to the administration, the inability to consummate some transactions, that changes the tenet that was underlying the previous decision of the Court. So, under the principles of collateral estoppel, the motion to appoint equity committee must be denied.
In addition, forgetting all that, just on the merits of what's in front of the Court today, again, the argument really comes down to a misunderstanding of the law and that is that the equity holders of PLC somehow own equity of the Prospector equities. It's just incorrect as a matter of corporate law.
They have a, as I said on the record during colloquy, they have a residual interest in the assets of PLC, subject to the absolute priority rule. The assets of PLC include the equity in the Prospector equities, either indirect or direct, and that equity in itself is an asset of PLC, not something that is owned by the PLC shareholders.'
40. Mr Hammersley has clearly raised the issue of solvency on all these occasions and in each one, the Court has rejected his argument. In my judgement, Mr Hammersley also fails before me. Put simply, there is no evidence which establishes that Paragon was solvent. Judge Sontchi explained graphically that 'equity was out of the money by a billon dollars'. The position, according to Judge Sontchi had not altered as between the earlier case, being Paragon 1 and Paragon 2. The financial position of Paragon and its insolvency was well established and accepted by both Judge Sontchi as well as by Mrs Justice Rose in making the administration order. Accordingly I reject this argument of Mr Hammersley for the reasons set out above. I note also that Judge Sontchi also dealt with Mr Hammersley's objection based upon his belief that the shares in Prospector were available to the shareholders of Paragon. This again is wrong in law as Judge Sontchi explained, there being no difference in this respect between English insolvency law and that applied by Judge Sontchi. The administration order was validly made, there is no pending appeal and accordingly the application to discharge is valid and this solvency argument does not prevent the discharge. In so far as there was any doubt, I have set out above excerpts from the judgments of Judge Sontchi.
That Paragon had US$810 million in cash and it was not liable for the debts of the Restricted Subsidiaries.
41. This argument of Mr Hammersley is somewhat a duplicate of his solvency argument above. I have already dealt with the issue relating to the Term Loan Guaranty. In my judgment, as I have set out above, there is clear evidence that Paragon was liable for the liabilities of the subsidiaries arising pursuant to the Term Loan Guaranty. This was also clear from the terms of the Fifth Plan which was approved by Judge Sontchi.
42. Equally, in those circumstances, the argument that there is US$ 810 million in cash available for the shareholders is simply unsustainable. Even if such a sum was available, it could only in my judgement be available for the benefit of the creditors of Paragon. Unless the creditors have been paid in full, then there is simply no possible distribution by way of a surplus to the shareholders. Judge Sontchi also reached this conclusion as is clear from the three passages I have set out above in his three judgments. It is clear that the issue of valuation was specifically raised by Mr Hammersley at the hearing on 7 June 2017 ( when the Fifth Plan was approved ). As Judge Sontchi was satisfied that the valuation evidence was such that Paragon was insolvent, he rejected the opposition of Mr Hammersley to the confirmation of the Fifth Plan. As Mr Arnold submits, it appears that Mr Hammersley may be confusing the balance sheet value of Paragon's assets based on their book value and the lower fair market value attributed to them by Lazard in its valuation prepared and filed in the US Bankruptcy Court proceedings. That valuation was specifically accepted and adopted by Judge Sontchi. This can be seen from the passage from the judgment that I have quoted above. However, Paragon is insolvent to a larger extent that some US$800 million. I reject this argument of Mr Hammersley as a ground for refusing to grant to the Former Administrators their discharge.
The argument that no honest director would abuse insolvency proceedings of another sovereign state to prevent shareholders from exercising their rights or conclude that distributing US$600-700 million in cash to assets for $0.00 in return was in the best interests of Paragon parent.
43. As I have set out above, I am satisfied that at the time that Paragon was placed into administration, it was insolvent. That was the conclusion of both Mrs Justice Rose and Judge Sontchi. Accordingly this argument of Mr Hammersley is equally unsustainable because the insolvency of Paragon prevents there being any return for shareholders as a matter of law. The shareholders have no such rights as assumed by Mr Hammersley in a case like the one before me where the company is insolvent. There is in any event no distribution to shareholders. The argument of Mr Hammersley that the Former Administrators have distributed a sum of between US$600 700 million for a nil return is, in my judgment, a misunderstanding by Mr Hammersley of the terms of the Fifth Plan. In my judgment, there was no distribution as alleged by Mr Hammersley made by the Former Administrators. Mr Hammersley seeks to rely upon the Loan Note Instrument as being in some way evidence of such a distribution.
44. As I have set out in some detail above, the Fifth Plan as well as the UK Implementation Agreement both dealt with the intercompany liabilities. Each of these contemplated and provided for the rationalisation of the intercompany arrangements. The intercompany liabilities of Paragon were reduced from US$500 million to US$309 million. Pursuant to the terms of the Loan Note Instrument, Paragon assumed liability for these reduced intercompany liabilities. Thereafter Paragon transferred its interest in Prospector to Reorganised Paragon. This was simply the debt for equity swap. The consideration was the reduction in the intercompany liabilities.
45. Again Mr Hamersley appears to be relying on the book value of the assets to create the sum of US$600-700 million when the correct valuation is that of fair market. In any event, the insolvency of Paragon is in my judgment beyond doubt based on the evidence before the US Bankruptcy Court and also before Mrs Justice Rose. As I have observed earlier, even an additional sum of US$800 million wold not cause Paragon to be solvent. Mr Hammersley has not presented any evidence which substantiates his argument in this respect and this argument of his is also rejected as a ground to prevent the discharge of the Former Administrators. The evidence demonstrates in my judgement that the Former Administrators acted in accordance with the terms of both the Fifth Plan and the UK Implementation Agreement.
The exclusive jurisdiction clause in favour of this Court shows that the post confirmation proceedings initiated by Mr Soden in the United States are invalid.
46. Mr Arnold took me in some detail to the provisions of the Fifth Plan in order to demonstrate that this argument of Mr Hammersley was misconceived. The definition of the 'corporate restructuring' in the Fifth Plan states, 'the reorganisation of the Paragon entities corporate structure in accordance with the Plan and the UK Implementation Agreement and through which (i) certain assets of the Liquidating Subsidiaries will be transferred to certain Transferred Subsidiaries and/or Reorganized Paragon; (ii) the Transferring Subsidiaries will be directly or indirectly transferred to Reorganised Paragon; and (iii) the Liquidating Subsidiaries will remain as direct or indirect subsidiaries of Paragon Parent, to be implemented prior or at the Effective Date.'
47. The UK Implementation Agreement is defined as setting out, ' the actions to be taken by the UK Administrators, certain Debtors, and certain Non-Debtor Affiliates of the Debtors to implement the Plan, including the UK Sale Transaction, and the steps required to implement the Corporate Restructuring.' The UK Sale Transaction is stated to mean 'a series of transactions, including, among other things, the Corporate Restructuring and a distribution of New Equity Interest to holders of Allowed Secured Lender and Allowed Senior Notes Claims, to be implemented pursuant to the UK Implementation Agreement and in accordance with the Plan as described in Section 5.13'.
48. Section 4.6 dealt with the intercompany claims and stated ' The holders of Intercompany claims shall be paid, adjusted, continued , settled, reinstated, discharged , eliminated, or otherwise managed , in each case to the extent determined to be appropriate by a Debtor or any Reorganised Debtor in their sole discretion and in accordance with the terms of the UK Implementation Agreement and the Subordination Agreements. '
49. Section 5.13 of the Fifth Plan sets out the roles of the UK Administration and its Administrators,
5.12 U.K. Administrators, U.K. Administration, and U.K. Sale Transaction.
(a) Prior to the Effective Date, the directors of Paragon Parent will seek an administration order from the English Court pursuant to paragraph 13 of Schedule B1 of the Insolvency Act 1986 to appoint the U.K. Administrators to, among other things, implement the U.K. Sale Transaction pursuant to the U.K. Implementation Agreement. Upon appointment, the U.K. Administrators will assume all powers necessary or expedient to effectuate the reorganization contemplated in the U.K. Implementation Agreement (including the power to effect the U.K. Sale Transaction in relation to Paragon Parent).
(b) U.K. Sale Transaction. Prior to or substantially contemporaneously with the Effective Date, following completion of the Corporate Restructuring and pursuant to the terms of the U.K. Implementation Agreement and this Plan, Paragon Parent shall distribute the New Equity Interests to holders of Allowed Secured Lender Claims and Allowed Senior Notes Claims, shall distribute Cash to the holders of certain Allowed Claims, and shall make any other distribution or transfer contemplated by this Plan on behalf of Paragon Parent as described in Article IV hereof in consideration for the release in full of such Allowed Claim. Reorganized Paragon shall enter into the Take Back Debt Agreement, among other documents, with the holders of Allowed Revolver Claims and Allowed Term Loan Claims, as applicable. In furtherance of the foregoing and the implementation of the Plan, the following transactions shall occur in the following order on or prior to the Effective Date (as indicated below).
(i) Prior to the Effective Date, Reorganized Paragon shall be formed and shall enter into the U.K. Implementation Agreement with, among others, Paragon Parent, certain of the Debtors, and certain non-Debtor affiliates of the Debtors. On or prior to the Effective Date and immediately upon completion of the transactions specified below, the Amended By-Laws and Amended Certificate of Incorporation governing Reorganized Paragon shall be in full force and effect.
(ii) Prior to the Effective Date, certain Debtors and non-Debtor affiliates of the Debtors (including Reorganized Paragon) will take such actions as are necessary to implement the Corporate Restructuring in accordance with the terms of this Plan and the U.K. Implementation Agreement. For the avoidance of doubt, all Cash held by Paragon Parent immediately prior to the Corporate Restructuring, other than Cash required to be retained in Paragon Parent as the U.K. Administration Reserve, shall be available for distribution in accordance with the Plan.
(iii) In accordance with, and subject to the terms of, the treatment sections of the Plan, the following transactions shall occur prior to or substantially contemporaneously with the Effective Date:
(A) Certain rights and obligations of the Liquidating Subsidiaries and the Transferred Subsidiaries arising under or in connection with the Intercompany Claims shall be assigned to and/or assumed by an alternative Liquidating Subsidiary or Transferred Subsidiary (as applicable) pursuant to the terms of the Plan and the U.K. Implementation Agreement.
(B) In consideration for the release in full of certain Allowed Claims and pursuant to the terms of the Plan and the U.K. Implementation Agreement, Paragon Parent shall:
(C) (i) distribute the New Equity Interests to holders of Allowed Secured Lender Claims and Allowed Senior Notes Claims, (ii) distribute Cash to holders of such Allowed Claims, and
(ii) make any other distribution or transfer contemplated by this Plan on behalf of Paragon Parent, and Reorganized Paragon shall enter into the Take Back Debt Agreement, among other documents, with the holders of Allowed Revolver Claims and Allowed Term Loan Claims, as applicable.
(D) On or after the Effective Date, the members of the New Board shall be appointed to serve pursuant to the terms of the applicable new organizational documents of Reorganized Paragon.
(E) In connection with the U.K. Sale Transaction, the Debtors shall assume and assign to the Reorganized Debtors all executory contracts and unexpired leases to which the relevant Debtor is a party that are not specifically designated on the Schedule of Rejected Contracts and Leases. The Reorganized Debtors' assumption and assignment of such executory contracts and unexpired leases shall be consistent with the procedures set forth in Sections 8.1 and 8.2 herein, and any requirements to obtain consent in connection with such assumption and assignment shall be deemed satisfied by the Reorganized Debtors' compliance with the procedures outlined in Section 8.2 herein.
(c) Dissolution of Liquidating Subsidiaries. Following the Effective Date, each Liquidating Subsidiary may be liquidated and dissolved in accordance with the applicable laws of the respective jurisdictions in which they are incorporated or organized (the "Liquidating Subsidiary Wind-Down"). The U.K. Administrators shall co-ordinate the Liquidating Subsidiary Wind-Down. If the liquidation or winding down of Paragon Parent results in the realization of any residual proceeds available for distribution to creditors of Paragon Parent then such residual proceeds shall be distributed to Reorganized Paragon and/or certain Transferred Subsidiaries pursuant to the terms of the U.K. Implementation Agreement.
Corporate Restructuring, U.K. Sale Transaction, and Liquidating Subsidiary Wind-Down. Pursuant to sections 363, 1123(a)(5), 1123(b)(4), 1123(b)(6), 1145, and 1146(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, the Confirmation Order shall authorize the Corporate Restructuring and the U.K. Sale Transaction and shall authorize, but not direct, the Liquidating Subsidiary Wind-Down, each under the terms and conditions of the U.K. Implementation Agreement and within the discretion, and consistent with the duties, of the U.K. Administrators.
Upon the Confirmation Date, the Debtors shall be authorized to take any and all actions necessary to consummate the Corporate Restructuring and the U.K. Sale Transaction, and shall be authorized, but not directed, to take any and all actions necessary to consummate the Liquidating Subsidiary Wind-Down, including, for the avoidance of doubt, commencing the
U.K. Administration (to the extent not commenced prior to the Confirmation Date).
Sale Free and Clear. On the closing date of the Corporate Restructuring, pursuant to the terms of the U.K. Implementation Agreement and the Confirmation Order, certain Assets shall be purchased by and vested in Reorganized Paragon free and clear of all Claims, Parent Interests, Liens, charges, encumbrances, and other interests, other than the liabilities expressly assumed pursuant to the U.K. Implementation Agreement and those Claims, Liens, charges, encumbrances, and other interests expressly provided or assumed pursuant to the Plan or the documents included in the Plan Supplement.'
50. The US Bankruptcy Court retained jurisdiction on all matters arising pursuant to the Chapter 11 case other than those matters which were administered in the UK Administration, as is set out in some detail in section 5.13 above. Article 11.3 states that the US Bankruptcy Court will no longer have jurisdiction over the UK Implementation Agreement and related matters after the effective date. However article 12.1 makes it clear that the US Bankruptcy Court retains jurisdiction in relation to modification of the Fifth Plan. In any event, Mr Hammersley's argument that the US Bankruptcy Court lacked jurisdiction is not a matter which this Court can or indeed should deal with. Issues relating to the jurisdiction of the US Bankruptcy Court are matters for that Court. In my judgment it is unnecessary to consider this issue further. Mr Arnold asked me to note that the US Bankruptcy Court itself rejected this lack of jurisdiction complaint when it refused Mr Hammersley's motion to revoke the order approving modification of the Fifth Plan. This demonstrates that these issues are for the US Bankruptcy Court. In my judgment from the evidence before me, this ground of Mr Hammersley does not lead to the discharge being refused.
The validity of the Loan Note Instrument
51. Mr Hammersley seeks to challenge the validity of this document. He asserts in his second skeleton that this document is invalid because as at the time that it was entered into, the 'debt' had been discharged. He invites me to expunge the Loan Note Instrument pursuant to Rule 14.11 of the Insolvency Rules 2016. In my judgment, there are no grounds in evidence before me which can support what Mr Hammersley seeks pursuant to rule 14.11. The Loan Note instrument formed part of the Fifth Plan as implemented through the UK Implementation Agreement. Clause 5.13 sets out above deals with the intercompany liabilities. Section 6.1(a) of the Fifth Plan specifically set out that the intercompany liabilities were to be dealt with under the terms of the UK Implementation Agreement. Pursuant to clause 6.1(a) of that agreement, the reorganisation steps under that agreement would,' pay, adjust, continue, settle, reinstate, discharge, eliminate, simplify, rationalise, otherwise manage the intercompany balances as between the parties such that after the effective date .(ii) Reorganised Paragon and/or certain Transferred Subsidiaries will retain certain intercompany claims against Paragon Parent.'
52. In my judgment, the Plan and the UK Implementation Agreement set out the treatment of the intercompany liabilities. These liabilities were not discharged by reason of the Fifth Plan. Mr Hammersley sought to argue that by the terms of US Bankruptcy law, the intercompany liabilities were discharged. There was no evidence before me of US Bankruptcy law. No permission was sought or given for an expert in US Bankruptcy law to be called. In any event had Mr Hamersley's submission been accurate, it would be somewhat surprising that Judge Sontchi had approved the Fifth Plan, its modifications and Paragon 2 without any issue relating to the alleged discharge of the intercompany liabilities. Again, I reject Mr Hammersley's argument as being a valid ground for refusing the discharge of the Former Administrators. Although Mr Hammersley sought to persuade me that I should set aside the Loan Note Instrument pursuant to rule 14.11 of the Insolvency Rules, there is no application before me enabling me to reach that type of determination. The application before me is one relating to the discharge of the Former Administrators. In my judgment based on the evidence before me, the loan note instrument is valid and merely a part of the Fifth Plan as carried out under the UK Implementation Agreement. I reject this argument as being one which prevents the discharge of the Former Administrators.
The Noble claims
53. Mr Hammersley also sought to rely upon there being a requirement for an independent investigation into these claims which are being run under the terms of the Fifth Plan. These claims have been transferred to a Litigation Trust for the benefit of the creditors. There is a reference to these claims in the passages which I have set out from the judgment of Judge Sontchi. The Judge makes the observation that it hard to see how the recovery from those claims could raise sufficient sums for there to be an interest in the same by the shareholders. In these circumstances, the Noble claims are not being managed and have not been managed by the Former Administrators. In my judgement this ground of Mr Hammersley is also rejected.
The alleged fraudulent conduct allegations.
54. As I have already set out above, Mr Hammersley makes a series of unsubstantiated and wide reaching allegations relating to what he perceives to be fraudulent conduct by both the Former Administrators, their lawyers and Counsel. I have already set out above that in my judgment there is no evidence before me relating to these unsubstantiated allegations. It appears to me that the real basis of the serious allegations being made by Mr Hammersley is his refusal to accept that the conduct of all these professionals was in accordance with the Fifth Plan and the UK Implementation Agreement. This is because ultimately Mr Hammersley has failed to defeat the Fifth Plan. He remains convinced in his own mind that in some way there should have been a distribution to shareholders. His fraud and misconduct allegations stem in my judgment from his failure to accept that he has failed in his objections to the Fifth Plan, its modification and his continuing failure to obtain the appointment of an equity committee. The passages which I have set out from the judgements of Judge Sontchi demonstrate a failure on the part of Mr Hammersley to accept the contents of the Fifth Plan and its operation. In my judgment, there is not a shred of evidence supporting these serious yet unsubstantiated allegations. In fact, the evidence before me demonstrates very clearly that the Former Administrators, their lawyers and Counsel, have acted with the professionalism and integrity expected of them. In conclusion none of the grounds raised by Mr Hammersley have any merit as being valid grounds for preventing the discharge of the Former Administrators. I therefore direct that their discharge takes place 14 days after this judgment has been handed down.
Dated