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England and Wales High Court (Commercial Court) Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Commercial Court) Decisions >> Dredger "Kamal XXVI" & the Barge "Kamal XXIV" (The Owners And/or Demise Charterers of) v "Ariela" (Owners of the Ship) & Ors [2010] EWHC 2531 (Comm) (14 October 2010) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Comm/2010/2531.html Cite as: [2011] 1 Lloyd's Rep 291, [2011] 1 All ER (Comm) 477, [2011] Lloyd's Rep IR 220, [2010] EWHC 2531 (Comm) |
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QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
COMMERCIAL COURT
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
____________________
THE OWNERS AND/OR DEMISE CHARTERERS OF THE DREDGER | ||
"KAMAL XXVI" AND THE BARGE "KAMAL XXIV" | Claimants (2006)/Defendants (2009)/"Kamal" | |
- and - | ||
THE OWNERS OF THE SHIP "ARIELA" | Defendants (2006)/Claimants (2009)/"Ariela" | |
- and - | ||
CATLIN (FIVE) LIMITED | ||
(on its own behalf and on behalf of the underwriting members of | ||
Syndicate 2020 at Lloyds for the 2003 year or account) | ||
AND OTHERS | Third Parties/"Underwriters" |
____________________
MR PETER MACDONALD EGGERS (instructed by BARLOW LYDE & GILBERT LLP) for the Underwriters
Hearing date: 4 October 2010
____________________
Crown Copyright ©
Mr Justice Burton :
The Issues
"The features … to justify seeking a costs order against the insurers include the following: (1) the insurers determined that the claim would be fought; (2) the insurers funded the defence of the claims; (3) the insurers had the conduct of the litigation; (4) the insurers fought the claim exclusively alternatively predominantly to defend their own interests; (5) the defence failed in its entirety."
I shall call them the five 'Chapman features'.
"… took the decision to contest the litigation, and subsequently conducted the defence in an attempt to avoid or reduce their liability to the plaintiffs. In the circumstances I agree with [Counsel] that this is a paradigm case for the exercise of the court's discretion under section 51 to make a costs order against a non-party."
"… that the Underwriters agreed to pay a proportion of Ince & Co's costs and made payments towards the costs of Kamal's claim … the Underwriters have paid £160,307 in respect of Ince & Co's costs.
(2) that the Underwriters gave instructions to Ince & Co in respect of the conduct of the litigation, although instructions were also given by Kamal."
This appears to put in issue the degree of such conduct and control.
"33. The defendant submits that it can only demonstrate the element of control, interference and assumption of responsibility in the litigation if it knows what communications the interested parties have had with the solicitors, counsel or expert witnesses in the case. In my judgment, such material, if it exists, is likely to be relevant, and depending upon volume, timing and substance, may well be highly probative of the central disputed issue in the application."
i) He relies on the words of Phillips LJ in Chapman at p22E-F, as followed by Thomas J in Citibank at 131 ("no consideration of the merits").ii) He relies on the conclusions of Lightman J in Bristol & West at 144 – 5 ("no consideration of culpable delay").
No consideration of the merits
i) Phillips LJ in Chapman at 22(e) stated as follows:"[The] principle is that costs should normally follow the event … It does not mean that the principle only applies where a party has acted unreasonably in litigating. Were that the case, awarding costs would involve an enquiry that might be as substantial as the litigation itself. The averment by the Underwriters that their arguments in resisting the claim were "legitimate" is not only tendentious but also irrelevant. Whether, from the viewpoint of the costs order, a litigant was justified in contesting the litigation is normally to be judged simply from the result."ii) Thomas J, in Citibank at p131, with reference to Chapman feature (5), namely the failure, in that case, of the defence (in our case, of the claim), stated:
"It matters not why the defence failed. It is clear from the judgment of Phillips LJ that it is irrelevant whether the Underwriters thought that there were legitimate reasons for defending; from the costs viewpoint, the relevant consideration is the result. Bad faith in defending a claim, whilst it might be relevant to a claim as between insurer and insured … only goes to the issue of whether a costs order is to be made on a standard basis or an indemnity basis."
No consideration of culpable delay
"The crux of Bristol's complaint therefore is that SIFL could and should have reached the conclusion that the Solicitors were dishonest earlier and therefore ceased funding their defences earlier. Bristol as first choice seek an order that through a mini-trial an investigation be conducted as to the material available to SIFL in respect of the Actions over the periods that SIFL financed them so as to enable the Court to decide the date when SIFL could and should have concluded that there was dishonesty. If I refuse this, as second choice Bristol invites me to hold on the material before me that there was culpable delay in the Bhadresa cases where fraud should have been found by December 1996 and culpable delay in the Mascarenhas case where fraud should have been found by September 1996. In the Mascarenhas case SIFL concedes that (in retrospect) dishonesty could have been found established by September 1996, but denies that there was any delay in any of the Bhadresa actions or any culpable delay in any of the Actions. In answer SIFL contend that the manner in which it performs its responsibilities under the Scheme is not a matter to be investigated or explored on applications such as the present. It points out the mammoth task it had in the multi-suit litigation and that any delay must be viewed against that background. SIFL explains in its evidence any apparent delay (other than that conceded) as attributable to the need for the most careful and anxious consideration of a decision whether to find dishonesty; and that it is severely handicapped in answering the complaints by reason of its need to respect the legal professional privilege to which both it and the Solicitors are entitled and the confidentiality of relevant documentation and communications. Bristol replies that, once a complaint is made on an application such as the present of delay, it is incumbent on SIFL, if it wishes to defend, to waive any such privilege or confidentiality to which it is entitled and the Solicitors should likewise be required to decide whether they insist on any privilege to which they are entitled. Bristol argues that holding SIFL liable on applications such as the present can only do good, for it will encourage expedition by SIFL in resolving issues of dishonesty and accordingly of the existence of cover.
Leaving aside for the moment any question of causation, I do not think that it is just to make any order in favour of Bristol on this application. My reasons are as follows:
(1) I do not consider that (at any rate in any ordinary case such as the present) delay by a party's insurer in its decision-making whether it is entitled or bound to refuse cover is an exceptional circumstance that can justify an order under section 51. The timeliness of the decision-making processes by SIFL as to whether the Solicitors were dishonest is not a matter in respect of which Bristol has any legitimate interest or right of inquiry. SIFL at all times owed duties to act responsibly and fairly towards the Solicitors as solicitors insured under the Scheme: it owed no (potentially conflicting) duty of care or of expedition to Bristol as the plaintiff in actions against the insured. The enormous burdens on SIFL as insurer under the Scheme ought not to be increased by requiring SIFL constantly to look over its shoulder in case of exposure to such a claim and by allowing litigants such as Bristol to review, or requiring the Court to second guess, its decision-making processes …"
i) In that case, the respondent to the s51 application was the Solicitors' Indemnity Fund. As Lightman J recites, the Fund had significant duties to act responsibly and fairly towards solicitors insured under the Scheme, and had to resist any hasty conclusion that they had acted fraudulently. There is no such statutory scheme relevant here.ii) In Bristol & West there was no question of the SIFL having been in a position to discover and identify the fraud at the outset; hence the only question was whether they prolonged the action by any culpable delay. In this case, the issue relates to whether the Underwriters could and should have discovered the fraud right at the outset when it first inspected and investigated. Thus it is a question of both the bringing and the prolonging of the proceedings.
iii) As appears from his judgment (as referred to in paragraph 4 above), and as appears again at the bottom of the right hand column at p145, he concluded that the s51 application by Bristol was a "fishing expedition", which I am not asked to do in this case.
"37. The said order is just and reasonable in all the circumstances:
(a) the Underwriters failed to investigate the Claim adequately or at all prior to issue of proceedings or at any time. In particular, the Underwriters failed to analyse the evidence relied upon in support of the Claim and failed to have regard to Ariela's justified criticisms of the same. The Underwriters were in a better position to investigate the claim at an earlier stage than Ariela in that Underwriters had a contractual right under the insurance policy to any and all documents and to appoint its own surveyors and experts. Notwithstanding the limited documents available to Ariela and the restricted access available to its surveyors, those instructing Ariela quickly and clearly formed the view that the claim of Kamal was grossly inflated.
(b) had the Underwriters done so, it would have been apparent to them that the Claim was without proper foundation and/or fraudulent and should not be pursued."
"The Underwriters were likewise the victim of Kamal's fraudulent conduct in that Kamal represented to the Underwriters that the damage to Kamal XXVI for which it claimed an indemnity under the policy issued by the Underwriters was caused by the collision, whereas in fact it had in the main pre-dated the collision. As a result of Kamal's fraud, the Underwriters were induced to pay the claim for an indemnity. In 2009, after discovering the existence of the fraud, the Underwriters instituted proceedings against Kamal to seek redress."
Privilege
"The exception provides that there is no privilege in documents or communications which are themselves part of a crime or a fraud, or which seek or give legal advice about how to facilitate commission of a crime or a fraud (Thanki: The Law of Privilege (2006) at 4.33)."
This is so whether or not the solicitor knowingly assists in the furtherance of such criminal purpose (Kuwait Airways Corporation v Iraqi Airways Corporation [2005] 1 WLR 2734 CA at para 14), and, as Kuwait Airways itself makes clear, such loss of privilege applies both to legal advice and litigation privilege.
"33. It is irrelevant that the Underwriters (or Ince & Co) were unaware of the fraud. Kamal would (for obvious reasons) not be able to assert privilege in relation to the documents held by it. The Underwriters can be in no better a position. In one sense they were instruments in that fraud. However the events which have transpired are explained, the Underwriters were (albeit without knowing) pursuing a fraudulent claim against Ariela:
a. the Underwriters were paying Ince & Co to bring and further the fraudulent claim to secure recovery for the Underwriters from Ariela;
b. the Underwriters gave instructions as to how the fraudulent claim should be progressed;
c. the Underwriters relied upon fraudulent evidence to try and secure recovery from Ariela;
d. had the fraud succeeded, the Underwriters would have received sums from Ariela."
"The crucial question is whether the third party's criminal intention should have the effect of excluding the privilege of the client whom the third party is using as an innocent tool … In considering this question it is necessary to enquire what is the rationale of this exception to legal professional privilege at common law. This is to be discovered from R v Cox and Railton 14 QBD 153 itself."
which he then considers. He continues at 396D as follows:
"Now, when I have regard both to the purpose which has long been understood to underline the principle of legal professional privilege, and to the reason why communications passing between a client with a criminal purpose and a solicitor who is innocent of any such purpose are held not to be protected by such privilege, it appears to me to be immaterial to that exception whether it is the client himself, or a third party who is using the client as his innocent tool, who has the criminal intention. In either case, to adopt the words of Stephen J, the communications are intended to further a criminal purpose; in either case, the protection of such communications cannot be otherwise than injurious to the interests of justice; and in either case, the communications are in furtherance of a criminal purpose, and so cannot come within the ordinary scope of professional employment. Accordingly, unless there is some authority, or compelling reason, leading to an opposite conclusion, I would hold that the criminal intention of the third party will, in the circumstances under consideration, exclude the application of the principle of legal professional privilege at common law, even though the privilege, if it attached, would be the privilege of the client and not of the third party.
I have already stated that, so far as I am aware, there is no authority which points to the opposite conclusion. Is there any compelling reason which does so? The only reason suggested in the course of argument was that the client (as opposed to the third party) might be making the relevant communication to his solicitor in circumstances in which he was entitled to assume that the matter was protected by privilege, and in which he therefore felt able to communicate with his solicitor freely and without fear that his communications might thereafter be disclosed without his consent. To that objection there are, I consider, a number of answers. The first is that his privilege will only be excluded in so far as it relates to communications (or items enclosed with such communications, or to which reference is made in them) made with the third party's intention of furthering a criminal purpose. No other communication will be excluded from the application of the privilege; and the client's confidence will to that extent be protected. Second, the client is ex hypothesi innocent of the criminal purpose; disclosure of the circumstances will not in that respect be to his disadvantage. Third, the type of case under consideration must surely be most exceptional. Fourth, and most important of all, it seems to me that the disclosure of the third party's iniquity must, in the interests of justice, prevail over the privilege of the client, innocent though he may be.
Such being the principle at common law, I can see no reason why section 10(2) of the Act of 1984 should not be construed to the same effect."
"My Lords, I am convinced that Parliament was not seeking to enact a special code of legal privilege of different import to the common law position. I believe the draftsman was seeking to spell out the common law position for the benefit of those unacquainted with it and that section 10(2) must be construed with this in mind. The object of section 10(2) is in my view to explain that there is no privilege in material prepared for a criminal purpose.
I am in entire agreement with the analysis of the language of the section contained in the speech of my noble and learned friend, Lord Goff of Chievely, and for the reasons he gives I would construe the words as applying to all documents prepared with the intention of furthering a criminal purpose whether the purpose be that of the client, the solicitor or any other purpose. I can see no reason why the law should seek to protect such a document and thus shield the criminal from detection and prosecution."
"If the decision of the majority of your Lordships stopped short at construing section 10(2) of the Act of 1984 as embracing the intention of a client who has deceived his solicitor, and thus bringing the statute into line with the common law as expounded in Reg v Cox and Railton … I should be content to indicate my dissent for the reasons I have already sought to explain. But your Lordships take the very large further step of deciding that otherwise privileged communications between an innocent solicitor and his innocent client may lose their privilege, both under the statue and at common law, by reference to the intention of some third party to further a criminal purpose."
and he dissents in that regard.
"The learned Judge accepted, as do I, that legal professional privilege does not exist in respect of documents which are in themselves part of a criminal or unlawful fraudulent proceeding or, if it be different, communications made in order to get advice for the purpose of carrying out a fraud, and that this is so whether the solicitor was or was not ignorant of the fact that he was being used for that purpose. I assume, as did the Judge, that were the borrowers in this case the parties claiming privilege, either in litigation or in answer to a subpoena duces tecum, no claim to privilege in respect of documents of communications could be maintained.
...
It is submitted, however, by [Counsel] on behalf of the insurers, that because there was here a fraud, the bank lose their privilege, albeit that they were victims of the fraud and themselves wholly innocent …
Where, as in the present case, it is sought to contend against a wholly innocent party that a privilege does not exist, whether as assignee of a fraudsman or not, it is not in accordance with the law as previously laid down, and indeed [Counsel] so accepts. He accepts that for success this Court must be persuaded that the existing exception should be extended.
I for my part can see no ground upon which it could possibly be extended. To do so would involve the consequence that once there was a fraud, the party who was complaining could obtain discovery of documents otherwise covered by professional privilege not only against the fraud himself, but against anybody else who might be in a position to give evidence ..."
"8.011. The basis of [the insurers'] challenge [in Keyser Ullmann] was that, because of the borrowers' fraud, the lenders must lose their privilege even though they were the victims of the fraud and themselves wholly innocent. The insurers argued that, had the borrowers been the parties in the case who were claiming privilege (whether in litigation or in answer to a witness summons), they could not have maintained a claim to privilege in relation to such documents. It followed, they submitted, that an assignee of an insurance policy from an assignor who is party to a fraud cannot be in a better position than the assignor. These submissions were rejected because …" [reference is then made to the passage in Parker LJ's judgment set out in paragraph 9 above].
8.012. Although the Court of Appeal rightly rejected these propositions as unsustainable in [Keyser Ullmann], it would nevertheless appear from the House of Lords' subsequent decision in [Francis] that the position contended for by the insurers in the former decision is likely to be accepted where the person from whom the evidence is sought is used by the fraudster as his innocent tool. The distinction appears to be that, in [Keyser Ullmann], the banks, as assignees, were not being used in this way, for example to further or to cover up the borrower's fraud."
"It has been suggested that the decisions can be reconciled on the basis that in [Francis], the client was being used by the fraudster as part of the crime/fraud, whereas in [Keyser Ullmann] the banks were wholly independent of the fraudulent purpose and were not being used by the borrowers to cover up any fraud. Although this may be a satisfactory way of reconciling the decisions, it is difficult to see on policy grounds why the treatment of the two cases should be differ. If it is in the interests of justice to disclose the iniquity of the fraudster in the case where the client is an innocent tool, then it is surely also in the interests of justice to disclose the iniquity in the case of the assignee."